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Supreme Court of India
Paradip Port Authority vs Paradeep Phosphates Ltd on 12 August, 2025
Author: Rajesh Bindal
Bench: Rajesh Bindal
2025 INSC 971 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10542 OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9751 of 2023)
PARADIP PORT AUTHORITY …Appellant (s)
VERSUS
PARADEEP PHOSPHATES LTD. …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10543 OF 2025
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9870 of 2023)
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PARADIP PORT … Appellant (s)
VERSUS
PARADEEP PHOSPHATES LTD. AND ANR. … Respondent(s)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2025.08.12
18:25:46 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 48
JUDGMENT
Rajesh Bindal, J.
Table of Contents
S. No. Heading Paras Page
I. Preliminary 1-3 2-3
II. C.A. No.____ of 2025
arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9751 of 2023
1. Factual Aspects 4-16 3-9
2. Arguments for the Appellant 17 9-13
3. Arguments for the Respondent 18 13-17
4. Discussion 19-33 17-28
5. Conclusion 34 28-29
III. C.A. No.____ of 2025
arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9870 of 2023
1. Factual Aspects 35 29-30
2. Arguments for the Appellant 36-38 30-32
3. Arguments for the Respondent 39 32
4. Discussion 40-46 33-35
5. Conclusion 47 35-36
IV. Constitution of Appellate 48-58 36-47
Authority
V. Relief 61-62 47-48
1. Leave granted.
2. This order will dispose of two appeals.
Page 2 of 48
3. The issue pertains to fixation of tariff by the Paradip Port
Authority1. There were two Writ Petitions2 decided by the High Court
by a common order3. Both were filed by the appellant herein. Though
the period involved is different, the High Court had decided both the
writ petitions by a common order. For this reason, both the appeals are
being taken up and decided together.
C.A. NO. ____ OF 2025
ARISING OUT OF S.L.P.(C) NO.9751 OF 2023
FACTUAL ASPECTS
4. The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant
(formerly Paradip Port Trust) challenging the common order of the
High Court dated 11.01.2023 disposing of WP (C) No.11 of 2010.
5. The aforesaid petition was filed against order dated
19.10.2009 passed by the Appellate Authority in appeal 4, which
upheld the arbitral award5 dated 27.12.2002. The Appellant was
ordered to refund the additional amount charged till 31.03.1999 along
with interest, holding the same to be unilaterally enhanced. As far as
refund from 01.04.1999 and interest is concerned, both the parties
were directed to file petition before Tariff Authority for Major Ports
1 Earlier Paradip Port Trust
2 WP (C) No.732 of 2012 and WP (C) No.11 of 2010
3 Dated 11.01.2023
4 Appeal No.5/L.S/2003
5 Case No.MA/NCJ/12/2001dated 27.12.2002
Page 3 of 48
(hereinafter referred to as the TAMP). The award and appellate order
were subject matter of challenge in the Writ Petition.
6. The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the
impugned award and the appellate order.
7. The appellant is a major port authority, governed by the
provisions of the 1963 Act6, which is now renamed as Paradip Port
Authority (PPA) under the 2021 Act7. The 1963 Act was replaced by
the 2021 Act.
8. The respondent herein was a public sector unit when it
entered into a bilateral agreement with the appellant/Authority on
03.08.1985. The idea thereof, as is evident from the agreement, was
that the appellant/Authority agreed for construction of berth at
Paradip Port, to be known as Fertilizer Berth, to provide berthing
facilities exclusively to the respondent. The tariff to be paid by the
respondent was prescribed in the Agreement. The rates could be
suitably enhanced at such intervals as would be mutually agreed upon
by the parties from time to time. It was the responsibility of the
respondent to make such construction and install such equipments
exclusively at their cost to ensure smooth handling of its cargo. It was
6 Major Port Trusts Act, 1963
7 Major Port Authorities Act, 2021
Page 4 of 48
responsible for its maintenance as well. Clause 19 of the Agreement
provided that the respondent shall be subjected to application of all
relevant laws, rules and regulations of the Paradip Port Trust, as may
be applicable from time to time.
9. In exercise of power conferred under Sections 48 to 52 of
the 1963 Act, Traffic Department of Paradip Port Trust issued
Notification8 dated 05.10.1993 for revision of scale of rates for use of
various facilities at the Ports. It was conveyed to the respondent. The
payments were made by respondent to the Authority at revised rates.
10. Vide letter dated 11.05.2000, the Appellant/authority while
rejecting request made by the Respondent for waiver of interest on
account of delayed payment of revised port charges, offered the
facility of payment thereof in 3-4 installments. This was replied to by
the respondent vide its letter dated 18.05.2000 seeking waiver of
interest on account of financial condition of the respondent. The
appellant/Authority responded to the same vide letter dated
31.05.2000 again requesting for deposit of interest by 30.06.2000,
failing which services to respondent’s incoming vessels would be
stopped. The respondent filed Civil Suit 9 before the Civil Judge (Junior
Division) praying for declaration that appellant/Authority had no right
8 Notification No.1344
9 Original Suit No.115 of 2000
Page 5 of 48
to amend terms and conditions of bilateral agreement dated
03.08.1985. Further, the respondent prayed for injunction against
appellant from giving effect to the terms and conditions contained in
the scale of rates published on 05.10.1993, claiming that the same do
not form part of the bilateral agreement.
11. As the respondent on 15.09.2000 was still a public sector
unit, the Trial Court on that day directed the respondent to obtain
clearance certificate for litigation from the high power committee.
12. The Respondent being a public sector unit as on that date,
a supplementary agreement was signed between the parties on
10.08.2001 providing for resolution of dispute by arbitration. From a
reading of aforesaid supplementary agreement, it is evident that the
same was an informal mechanism for resolution of dispute as the
provisions of the Arbitration Act were strictly made inapplicable. It
may be relevant to add here that there was already a clause for
arbitration in the agreement signed between parties. The same was
not invoked.
13. The arbitrator was appointed. During the process of
aforesaid proceedings, by way of a share purchase agreement dated
28.02.2002, executed between the President of India and Zuari Maroc
Page 6 of 48
Phosphates Private Limited, 76% shareholding of the Respondent
Company was transferred. As a result thereof, from 28.02.2002
onwards, the Respondent Company was a private sector entity.
14. The Arbitrator framed the following issues and answered
them:
S. No. ISSUE ANSWER
I What was the scope and ambit Clause 19 of the
of the agreement entered into agreement shall be
between the parties? applicable only for the
other port charges and
cannot provide any help
to unilaterally change the
terms of the agreement.
II Whether the tariff as provided No
in the contract can be revised
unilaterally without the consent
of the other party?
III Whether the rates revised were No
reasonable and the respondent
in the given circumstances was
justified to enhance the rates?
IV Whether the interest claimed Yes
by the Port authorities for
delayed payment was
permissible under the contract
or under the statutory rules
and regulations, etc.?
V Whether the claims and Port Authorities should
counter claims filed by both refund the amount
the parties are tenable in law charged by them on the
Page 7 of 48
and on merit? basis of unilateral
enhancement from the
initial dated till
31.03.1999.
As far as the refund and
interest from 1.04.1999 to
till date is concerned,
both the parties should
make a petition to the
TAMP.
Finally, vide award dated 27.12.2002, the Arbitrator held the appellant
liable to refund the enhanced amount of port services from October
1993 till 31.03.1999. As the period of dispute for determination for the
Arbitrator was from October 1993 till 31.10.2001, for the period from
01.04.1999 till 31.10.2001, the parties were given option to approach
the TAMP for resolution of their dispute.
15. As per the procedure agreed upon by the parties, the
appellant/Authority preferred an appeal against the aforesaid Award.
After filing of the appeal, there was lot of litigation between the
parties, which is not relevant for the purpose of the issues raised in the
present appeal, except that on 30.05.2009, resolution was passed by
the Appellant-Authority to withdraw easementary rights given to the
Respondent. A proposal to recover a sum of ₹40.36 Crores from the
Page 8 of 48
Respondent was also approved as arrears towards revision of tariff in
line with IFFCO tariff for the period from March 2002 till January 2009.
15.1 On 02.06.2009, the aforesaid resolution was communicated
to Respondent invoking clause 21 of the agreement dated 03.08.1985.
15.2 Challenging the aforesaid communication dated
02.06.2009, the Respondent filed Writ Petition10 in the High Court.
Noticing the fact that on the same issue, a Civil Suit No.55/2009 was
pending in court of Civil Judge Junior Division Kujang, which the
Respondent offered to withdraw, and noticing the fact that
proceedings were also pending before TAMP for fixation of tariff for
the earlier periods, matter was left open to be decided by TAMP.
15.3 Vide order dated 19.10.2009, the Appellate Authority
rejected the appeal filed by the Appellant against the award of
Arbitrator dated 27.12.2002.
15.4 Aggrieved against the order passed by the Appellate
Authority, the Appellant/Authority preferred Writ Petition 11 before the
High Court which was dismissed
10 WP (C) No. 86509 of 2009
11 Writ Petition (C) No.11 of 2010
Page 9 of 48
16. In the Writ Petition filed by Appellant/Authority, the award
of the arbitrator and Appellate Authority was upheld. The order of
High Court is under challenged in this Appeal.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPELLANT
17. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant/Authority, submitted that Clause 1 of the Agreement
provides that the captive berth shall be exclusively used by the
respondent, subject to payment of tariff as mentioned in the Schedule
annexed to the Agreement. The rate was subject to enhancement at
such intervals as would be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Clause 19 of the Agreement clearly provides that the respondent shall
be subjected to the application of all relevant laws, rules and
regulations of the Authority as may be enforced from time to time. In
the case in hand, certain tariff was fixed when the Agreement was
entered into between the parties on 03.08.1985. That cannot be said to
be an Agreement providing for the tariff fixed for all times to come.
That is the reason why an enabling provision was provided for revision
of tariff. The Agreement clearly envisages application of laws, rules
and regulations to the respondent. In case the parties failed to agree
to mutually settled terms for revision of tariff, the law will take its own
course
Page 10 of 48
17.1 Learned senior counsel also referred to the pleadings by
the respondent in the civil suit filed. It is the admitted case of the
respondent therein that in the year 1993-94 a proposal was made by
the appellant/Authority for revision of tariff, to which the respondent
objected vide letter dated 16.03.1993. Still, the appellant/Authority
forcibly enhanced the tariff unilaterally from October 1993. The
aforesaid admitted fact in the suit filed by the respondent clearly
establishes that initially an effort was made for revision of tariff by
mutual consent, however, respondent having not agreed to the same,
the Appellant/Authority did not have any other option but to proceed
in terms of provisions of Sections 48 to 52 of the 1963 Act. A
notification was issued on 05.10.1993. After issuance of the aforesaid
notification, the respondent continued to pay the revised tariff without
any objection till the time the aforesaid civil suit dated 30.06.2000 was
filed. The same being cleverly drafted, had only sought the relief of
declaration and permanent injunction. The relief being that the
appellant/Authority could not amend the terms of the Agreement
dated 03.08.1985; the appellant/Authority could not give effect to the
revised rates as published in the year 1993 and permanently
injuncting the appellant/Authority from giving effect to 1993
Notification. No relief was claimed for any refund of the amount
Page 11 of 48
already deposited by the respondent in terms of rates revised vide
Notification dated 05.10.1993.
17.2 It was further submitted that the aforesaid arguments were
specifically raised before the Arbitrator, in appeal against the Award
and in the Writ Petition before the High Court, however, the same were
not considered. The same goes to the root of the case and needs
examination by this Court. The arbitration could be in terms of the
claim made by the respondent in the civil suit and not beyond that. In
fact, from the conduct of the respondent, it did not have right to
challenge the revised tariff as notified on 05.10.1993 as without any
objection the same was paid till the filing of the suit dated 30.06.2000.
Referring to Section 55 of the 1963 Act, it was submitted that though
no claim for refund of any amount was made in the civil suit on the
basis of which the arbitration proceedings were conducted, any claim
of refund could be filed within six months only. In the case in hand,
the refund was never claimed by the respondent. It was further argued
that there is basic error in the Award of the Arbitrator because refund
was claimed for the period from October 1993 till 31.03.1999. The
issue for revision of tariff was not considered any further either in
appeal or in writ petition. It was held that the provisions of the Act will
not apply even if there was failure on the part of the parties to agree
Page 12 of 48
upon for revised tariff. Whereas, for the period from 01.04.1999, the
finding given is that TAMP constituted under Section 47A of the 1963
Act will have jurisdiction to determine the tariff. In the Award of the
Arbitrator the period so mentioned was from 01.04.1999 to 31.10.2001.
In addition to the aforesaid period vide an order passed by the High
Court on 08.07.2009 in Writ Petition No.8509 of 2009, a direction was
given for consideration of such an issue by TAMP even for the period
subsequent thereto.
17.3 Further argument was raised that even otherwise, the claim
made by the respondent, even though it may be considered
admissible for the argument’s sake, shall be time-barred as the suit for
raising an issue regarding tariff from October 1993 onwards was filed
in June/July 2000.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENT
18. On the other hand, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the case in
hand does not call for any interference by this Court. The issue has
already been examined at three different levels, namely, Arbitrator,
the Appellate Authority and thereafter in a Writ Petition by the High
Court. There are concurrent findings of fact. Hence, the scope of
Page 13 of 48
interference by this Court is minimal unless there is grave error, and
the views expressed by the authorities or the court are not plausible.
18.1 The disputed period from the year 1993 to 1999, has been
dealt with in the Award of the Arbitrator. There is no issue after
01.04.1999 as TAMP has been constituted. Even otherwise, in the
factual matrix, specially which are to be dealt with by the Expert
Bodies, the courts adopt a hands-off approach. Referring to the
provisions of the Agreement entered between the parties on
03.08.1985, the submission is that Clause I thereof in fact is a primary
clause. The tariff rates have been agreed upon. It further provides
that the increase, if any, in future can only be with mutual agreement.
In case the parties failed to mutually agree upon revision of tariff, the
issue may have to be resolved by an independent third party. It can
be by way of arbitration or may be by any other remedy. Schedule
attached to the agreement was referred to. It was highlighted from
there that some of the rates as agreed upon were fixed minimum
charges whereas some were variable. Clause II of the Schedule is also
relevant in that context which deals with additional charges payable
by respondent, namely, tug hire, pilotage and port dues only as per
the scale of rates and no other charges like berth hire, warping,
mooring or immuring charges are payable.
Page 14 of 48
18.2 Further, reference was made to Clause 20 of the agreement
which specifies that if there is any dispute arising out of and in relation
to clauses of Agreement or for interpretation of any terms of the
Agreement, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Clause 2 of the
Agreement clearly specifies that the entire construction had to be
raised by the Respondent. Once rates have clearly been defined in the
agreement as agreed upon between the parties, there is no need for
invocation of Clause 19 of the Agreement. The rates which have been
agreed upon between the parties are not the normal rates which may
be applicable for any other importer. In the business world, such
types of agreement are entered into which are for mutual benefit with
an idea to promote business.
18.3 In response to the arguments raised by Mr. Jaideep Gupta,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the
respondents had paid the revised charges from 1993 to 1999 without
raising any objection, reference was made to various correspondence
between the parties starting from 16.03.1993. It was at the stage when
there was proposal for revision of rates as was notified on 05.10.1993.
The suit had to be filed in June 2000 when Respondent was requested
to deposit the net outstanding interest amounting to ₹38,58,718/-
latest by 30.06.2000, failing which Appellant would have stopped
Page 15 of 48
services to the incoming vessels. It was during the pendency of the
suit that on agreed terms the matter was referred to arbitration on
10.08.2001. It was during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings
that Respondent, which was a public sector unit, was sold off to a
private player on 28.02.2002.
18.4 To buttress the argument that the Award of the Arbitrator,
which was upheld by the Appellate Authority and thereafter by the
High Court, has dealt with all the issue threadbare, it was submitted
that firstly, the Arbitrator framed issues with the consent of both the
parties. Insofar as the main issue is concerned regarding justification
of revision of rates, despite opportunity granted to the respondents no
material was placed before the Arbitrator which could justify revision
of rates as sought by the Appellant/Authority. As far as the enabling
provision in the Agreement regarding revision of the rates by mutual
agreement is concerned, the finding recorded by the Arbitrator was
not disputed.
18.5 Reference was made to the order passed by the Appellate
Authority which again examined the Award of the Arbitrator and has
recorded categoric finding that there was no error therein. The issue
was thereafter considered by the High Court which also upheld the
Page 16 of 48
same. There are limited grounds on which an award of the Arbitrator
can be interfered with.
18.6. He further argued that reliance on the revision of rates by
the Wage Board in 1994, could not be the basis for revision of tariff in
1993.
DISCUSSION
19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the relevant referred record.
20. The facts of the case are not in dispute that an agreement
was executed between the parties, namely Paradip Port Trust and
Paradeep Phosphates Ltd on 03.08.1985 for use of ‘captive berth’ in
terms of the conditions laid down in the Agreement. At the time when
the aforesaid agreement was executed, the respondent/Paradeep
Phosphates Ltd. was a public sector unit. Clause 1 and 19 of the
Agreement which are relevant for consideration of the issues in
question are extracted below:
“1. That the said Captive berth shall be exclusively
provided for use of the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., subject
to payment of the Rate mentioned in the schedule of rates;
annexed to the agreement and will become payable one
calendar month after the berthing of the Ist vessel at thisPage 17 of 48
berth. The rates now charged can be suitably enhanced at
such intervals as would be mutually agreed upon by the
parties from time to time.
x x x x
19. That the Paradip Phosphates, shall be subjected
to the application of all relevant laws, rules and regulations
of the Paradip Port Trust that are for the time being in force
and that would be framed and enforced from time to time.”20.1. Along with the Agreement a Schedule was annexed which
provided for tariff for different facilities to be used by the respondent.
Part of the same were fixed whereas other charges namely tug hire,
pilotage and port dues were to be paid as per the scale of rates.
20.2. A perusal of Clause 1 of the Agreement shows that the
facilities could be used subject to payment of the rate mentioned in
the schedule of rates, and the rates charged can be suitably enhanced
at such intervals as would be mutually agreed upon between the
parties from time to time.
20.3. Clause 19 provides that the respondent shall be subjected
to the application of all relevant laws, rules and regulations of the
Paradip Port Trust.
21. Merely because an Agreement was entered into between
the parties, the same cannot override the provisions of law. The terms
Page 18 of 48
of the Agreement only provides for creation of facilities and certain
tariff to be charged from the respondent, which could be revised from
time to time as agreed. In case the parties do not agree with the
revision of tariff the same will not remain in abeyance as some
authority has to resolve this issue. Even the counsel for the respondent
did not dispute this fact. After the aforesaid Agreement was executed,
as cost and overheads on many aspects had increased, vide
communication dated 08.04.1993, the appellant had written to the
respondent mentioning that ever since the agreement was entered
into, the port charges had increased by 50% during 1989, whereas no
revision of tariff was made for the respondent. Though, as per the
proposed rates, the increase in tariff for others may be in the range of
40 to 50%, whereas for the respondent the additional tariff will be only
25%. Option was given to the respondent in case any discussion was
required. From the record before this Court there was nothing to show
that any reply was given by the respondent to the aforesaid
communication.
21.1. Vide Notification dated 05.10.1993, in exercise of power
conferred with the competent authority under Sections 48 to 52 of the
1963 Act, new scale of rates were notified for use of port facilities. The
aforesaid notification in Clause 3.1.1 provided for separate rates for
Page 19 of 48
the respondent, as compared to the normal rates for other users of the
port facilities. The respondent continued paying the revised rates
without any objection.
21.2. A communication dated 11.05.2000 from the appellant to
the respondent has been referred to, which talks about rejection of the
proposal of the respondent for waiver of interest for delayed payment
of certain dues from October 1993 to January 1996 and request for
payment of the outstanding amount of interest. Opportunity was given
to pay the arrears in 3-4 installments. In response to the aforesaid
communication, the respondent vide letter dated 18.05.2000, on the
subject of waiver of interest for belated payment, submitted that the
respondent had been requesting for revision of existing agreement in
the present day context. To dispute payment of interest, it was
submitted that there was no provision in the Agreement for the
purpose. Request for waiver of interest was rejected by the appellant
vide communication dated 31.05.2000. Time was granted up to
30.06.2000 for payment of the outstanding interest, failing which the
appellant may be constrained to stop the facilities provided for.
Page 20 of 48
22. The respondent filed a civil suit praying for the following
reliefs:
“a) To declare that the Defendants and their agents
have no right to amend the terms and conditions of the
bilateral agreement dated 3.8.1985, unilaterally.
b) To declare that the defendant and their agents
have no right to give effect to the terms and conditions
contained in the Scale of Rates published by them in the year
1993 which do not form part of the bilateral agreement
dated 3.8.1985.
c) To permanently injunct the defendants their
agents and officers from giving effect to the terms and
conditions contained in the scale of Rates published by the
Defendants in the year 1993. To allow any other relief(s) as it
may deem proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
And for which act of kindness the Plaintiff shall ever pray as
in duty bound.”
23. Interim stay was granted on 30.06.2000. Vide order dated
15.09.2000, the Trial Court in the aforesaid suit directed the
respondent/plaintiff in the civil suit to obtain clearance from the High
Power Committee as two public sector units were party to the
litigation.
24. It may be out of place if not mentioned here that in the
Agreement signed between the parties, Clause 20 provided for
Page 21 of 48
reference of any dispute, arising out of or in relation to any of the
clause of the agreement, to arbitration. The parties agreed for
resolution of disputes by adopting an informal mechanism and an
agreement was signed on 10.08.2000 in that regard. It provided for
the reference of dispute to the Arbitrator as mentioned in the clause,
and in case any of the parties was aggrieved of the award, the remedy
of appeal was also provided. The clause specifically mentioned that
the Arbitration Act shall not be applicable to the arbitration under this
clause. The terms agreed on 10.08.2000 are extracted below:
“In the event of any dispute or differences relating to the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the
contracts, such dispute or difference shall be referred
by either party to the Arbitration of one of the
Arbitrators in the Department of Public Enterprises to
be nominated by the Secretary to the Government of
India in charge of the Bureau of Public Enterprises. The
Arbitration Act, 1940 shall not be applicable to the
arbitration under this clause. The award of the Arbitrator
shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute,
provided however, any party aggrieved by such award
may make a further reference for setting aside or
revision of the award to the Law Secretary, Department
of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of
India. Upon such reference the dispute shall be decided
by the Law Secretary or the SpecialPage 22 of 48
Secretary/Additional Secretary when so authorised by
the Law Secretary, whose decision shall bind the Parties
finally and conclusively. The parties to the dispute will
share equally the cost of arbitration as intimated by the
Arbitrator.”
25. We deem it appropriate to deal with the argument raised
by the learned senior counsel for the respondent at this stage
regarding challenge to the award of the Arbitrator on limited ground
as enumerated under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 199612. As it was agreed upon between the parties that the
Arbitration Act will not be applicable, it was an informal in-house
procedure adopted by the parties for resolution of the dispute where
public sector units were involved, hence, the principles laid down for
the examination of award given under the 1996 Act will not be
applicable.
26. On 30.11.2001, a statement of claim was filed before the
Arbitrator. While the matter was at the stage of completion of
pleadings, vide Agreement dated 28.02.2022, the President of India
transferred 74% shares in the respondent company to Zuari Maroc
Phosphates Private Limited. As a result of which the respondent
became a private entity and was no longer a public sector unit. The
12 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’
Page 23 of 48
Arbitrator passed an award on 27.12.2002 recording certain findings,
which were contrary to law and anomalous.
26.1. The Award held that only Clause ‘1’ of the Agreement will
apply and not Clause ‘19’. The aforesaid finding goes against the very
basic principle that the entire agreement has to be read as a whole
and not different clauses in isolation.
26.2. On the second issue as to whether the tariff provided in the
agreement could be revised unilaterally by the appellant without the
consent of the respondent, it was opined that the appellant should
have sought consent of the respondent. If the consent is not received,
the appellant could have terminated the Agreement or referred the
matter to an arbitrator to decide the question of such enhancement.
The enhancement of rates from October 1993 was quashed. For the
period from 01.04.1999 onwards, the parties were given liberty to
approach the TAMP. This was done while referring to the instance of
M/s Oswal Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd.
26.3. On the issue of whether the rates revised were reasonable,
the claim was rejected. But the issue regarding levy of interest for
delayed payments was decided in favour of the appellant by referring
Page 24 of 48
to the regulations framed by the appellant. In that regard, reference
was made to Clause 19 of the Agreement.
27. Further, it was argued that since the exercise had already
been undertaken, no interference was warranted. It is a little
surprising to note that the Arbitrator, Appellate Authority and also the
High Court did not find any justification for revision of rates which
were fixed way back in the year 1985 till 1999. The fact remains that
during the interregnum, periodically the port charges were revised
from time to time vide notifications issued in years 2000, 2005, 2007
and 2011. It cannot be disputed that during the interregnum the cost
of many inputs and services being provided by the appellant must
have increased manifold; even the salaries of the employees and the
wages of the workmen. Calculations in such cases cannot be with
mathematical precision.
28. A perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority
shows that the same is totally cryptic. Being the first Appellate
Authority, it was incumbent upon it to re-examine the facts in terms of
the law applicable. The Appellate Authority had merely re-written
some of the findings of the Arbitrator, barely stating that the sole
arbitrator had correctly decided the issue. The Appellate Authority
Page 25 of 48
has not considered the factual aspect of the matter regarding revision
of rates.
29. The High Court while considering the issue has totally
misdirected itself by holding that the Agreement will override the
provisions of the 1963 Act. Reliance by Respondent on a judgment in
Patiala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs Patiala Central Cooperative
Bank Employees’ Union13 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 was
totally misplaced. The issues, though required to be dealt with in
detail, were not discussed.
30. It is not in dispute that from time to time tariff has been
revised by the appellant in terms of the provisions of the 1963 Act.
Three different notifications have been issued on 27.04.2000,
12.01.2005, 31.10.2007 and 23.05.2011 as pointed out at the time of
hearing.
31. A fact that cannot be lost sight of is that by ignoring the
arbitration clause in the Agreement signed between the parties, an
informal mechanism was agreed upon, as both parties were public
sector units. The idea was to resolve the issue. However, the fact
remains that after the informal arbitration process started, with the
transfer of 74% shares of the respondent to a private sector company,
13 (1996) 11 SCC 202; 1996 INSC 1056
Page 26 of 48
the dispute had taken the shape of contested litigation, which was
required to be adjudged by an expert body and not in the manner it
had been dealt with.
32. It is important to note that the 1963 Act was replaced by the
2021 Act. In the 1963 Act, Chapter V-A, consisting of Sections 47-A to
47-H, was added w.e.f. 09.01.1997. It provides for the constitution of a
‘Tariff Authority’ for fixation of scales of units for using various
facilities provided at the port. The authority consisted of a Chairman,
from amongst persons who is or who has been a Secretary to the
Government of India or has held any equivalent post in the Central
Government and two other Members who have expertise in the
subject; one Member from amongst economists having experience of
not less than fifteen years in the field of transport or foreign trade and
another Member from amongst persons having experience of not less
than fifteen years in the field of finance with special reference to
investment or cost analysis in the Government or in any financial
institution or industrial or service sector. Even in the informal
arbitration, the Arbitrator, while deciding the dispute for part of the
period, namely, October 1993 to 31.03.1999 had referred the parties to
invoke the jurisdiction of TAMP for the period subsequent thereto,
namely, 01.04.1999 to 31.10.2001. The reason for this was that TAMP
Page 27 of 48
came into existence on 01.04.1999, even though the amendment to the
1963 Act had been made earlier in 1997. The 1963 Act has been
replaced by the 2021 Act with effect from 03.11.2021. Section 54
thereof provides for the constitution of an ‘Adjudicatory Board’ for the
purpose of fixation of tariff. Hence, as on today, it should be the board
which should have adjudicated this dispute. However, as was pointed
out and is evident from the first proviso to Section 54 of the 2021 Act,
no adjudicatory board has been constituted under the 2021 Act,
hence, it is the TAMP which has jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue.
33. In our view, the issues required to be considered for
revision of rates applicable to the respondent for use of various
facilities, have not been considered in the manner these were
required to be considered. The TAMP being an independent authority
consisting of experts, will be the right authority for resolution of
dispute between the parties, which is pending for more than two
decades.
CONCLUSION
34. For the reasons mentioned above, we set aside the Award
of the Arbitrator, the order of the Appellate Authority and also the
order passed by the High Court. We remit the matter to TAMP for
Page 28 of 48
adjudication of the dispute regarding revision of tariff applicable to
the respondent for the period from October 1993 till 31.03.1999. As we
are remitting the matter, we have not dealt with other issues raised in
the appeal. Needless to add that all the issues, including limitation,
shall be considered by the TAMP.
C.A. NO.___ OF 2025 ARISING OUT OF S.L.P.(C) NO.9870 OF 2023 FACTUAL ASPECTS
35. In the present appeal, the order dated 11.01.2023 passed
by the High Court is under challenge. Before the High Court, an order
passed by TAMP on 22.11.2011 was the subject matter of challenge.
Vide aforesaid order, tariff proposal for the financial year 1999-2000 to
2009-10 was determined. The claim of appellant for revision of the
rates was rejected. It may be out of place, if not mentioned here, that
before the TAMP, part of the period of 01.04.1999 till 31.10.2001 was
the subject matter before the Arbitrator who had granted liberty to
the parties to get the same decided by the TAMP. For the period prior
thereto, he had adjudicated the dispute, and from 01.11.2001 onwards,
matter was considered by the TAMP in view of the order dated
08.07.2009 passed by the High Court in WP (C) No.8509 of 2009. In the
said Writ Petition, the High Court was called upon to adjudicate the
Page 29 of 48
validity of the communication dated 02.06.2009 by which the
Appellant raised a demand of ₹40.36 crores from the Respondent, for
the period March 2002-January 2009, by computing rates applicable
for Oswal Chemicals & Fertilizers and IFFCO. The High Court vide
order dated 08.07.2009 left the matter to be decided by TAMP as the
parties had already approached TAMP.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPELLANT
36. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellant, submitted that TAMP was called upon to decide the tariff
firstly for the period 01.04.1999 to 31.10.2001 which was referred to
by the Arbitrator. It was for the reason that TAMP had come into
existence w.e.f. 01.04.1999. For the period subsequent thereto i.e.,
from 01.11.2001 till 31.03.2010, determination was in view of a
reference made by the High Court vide order dated 08.07.2009
passed in WP (C) No. 8509 of 2009. It is not a matter of dispute that
fixation of tariffs is a highly complicated arena which is the job of
experts. In fact, TAMP has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in
it entirely on a wrong premise. Firstly, there was a clear violation of the
principle of natural justice in the case in hand. Number of documents,
account statements and other details were filed by both the parties.
The Appellant had given a Powerpoint Presentation, however, still the
Page 30 of 48
TAMP had the audacity to mention in the order dated 22.11.2011 that
no opportunity of hearing was required to be given. Such complicated
issues could not be adjudicated merely by reading the documents
wherein lot of figures and a past period was involved.
37. Secondly, on a wrong premise, the TAMP wished to enter in
the wrong arena of making an effort to find out as to how tariff was
agreed upon between the parties vide agreement dated 03.08.1985.
That was not the issue to be considered. The only issue before the
TAMP was to consider revision of tariff on account of various factors
which had evolved during the interregnum. The cost is not to be
calculated only pertaining to the area which was to be captively used
by Respondent. Rather, there are number of other common facilities
created, it is not simply the cost of the appellant which had to be
reimbursed, as was evident from the approach of the TAMP.
38. It was further argued that in the matter of revision of tariff
for the period October 1993 to 31.03.1999 where also the claim for
revision was rejected. One of the arguments is for examination of the
issue by the expert body as the arbitrator or appellate authority
having not considered the issues in this light, these should have been,
and the prayer is for referring the matter back. In case the aforesaid
prayer is accepted for the period mentioned above, the matter for the
Page 31 of 48
period in question will have to be remitted back for the reason that in
case there is revision of tariff for the previous period, the same will
certainly have bearing on period subsequent thereto. It was further
argued that the approach of the TAMP could not be appreciated
simply for the reason that no case for increase of tariff was made out
though the period in question before TAMP was more than a decade.
The cost of various inputs and overheads had increased manifold
during this period, on account of various services provided by the
Appellant to the Respondent. In fact, the TAMP had totally misdirected
in its approach.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENT
39. In response, Mr. Shyam Diwan Learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent submitted that the expert body namely the TAMP,
considered the claim made by Appellant. Thereafter, the High Court
has also examined the issue. Once two authorities have already
considered the issues threadbare and despite adequate opportunity
given to the appellant to place relevant material on record to justify
revision of tariff, nothing could be produced, this Court should not
enter into an arena of tariff revision which is the job of the expert
Page 32 of 48
bodies. The facts in detail cannot possibly be examined and
appreciated.
DISCUSSION
40. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
41. The issue required to be considered by the TAMP in the
case in hand was regarding proposed revision of tariff by the
Appellant for facilities provided to Respondent. At the cost of
repetition, we need to add that an agreement was executed between
Appellant and Respondent on 03.08.1985, fixing a certain tariff for
captive use of berth known as ‘fertilizer berth’. The tariff initially fixed
was revised by the Appellant to which issue was raised by
Respondent. As at relevant point of time the Respondent was Public
Sector Unit, the matter was referred for informal arbitration to Joint
Secretary and Legal Advisor to the Government of India, Ministry of
Law, Justice and Company Affairs and even remedy of appeal was
provided to the Law Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Law & Justice, Government of India. Period involved was October 1993
to 31.10.2001. The arbitrator considered the matter while and rejected
the claim for any revision of tariff from October 1993 to 31.03.1999.
Page 33 of 48
TAMP having come into existence w.e.f. 01.04.1999, for the period
subsequent thereto, parties were given liberty to approach the TAMP.
This is how the matter for revision of tariff for the aforesaid period was
before the TAMP. As even for the period subsequent thereto namely
01.11.2001 onwards, there was dispute regarding tariff between the
parties, in a Writ Petition14 filed by Respondent, the High Court vide
order dt. 08.07.2009 directed TAMP to expeditiously dispose of the
matter already pending before it. This is how the TAMP had
considered the matter pertaining to the revision of the tariff from
01.04.1999 to 31.10.2010.
42. It looks a little surprising that TAMP did not find any
justification for revision of tariff even for a time gap of more than 10
years. The costs, overheads on many aspects must have increased
manifold during the interregnum.
43. Insofar as the opportunity of hearing is concerned, the
High Court has also failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter while
referring that both the parties underwent a process of mutual
agreement, hence it cannot be said to be a case of non-affording of
opportunity of hearing. The High Court lost sight of the fact that TAMP
was called upon to decide the dispute as the parties had failed to
agree to any terms. In that eventuality, on the basis of the material
14 W.P. (C) No.8509 of 2009
Page 34 of 48
placed on record of both parties, an opportunity of hearing was
required to be given, where complicated issues of facts were involved,
which could be explained by the parties at the time of hearing. It is a
clear case of violation of principles of natural justice.
44. One of the reasons assigned was that the basis for fixation
of tariff at the time of entering into the initial agreement could not be
deciphered. The same, in our opinion, prima facie was not the
material fact for consideration for revision of tariff. The tariff was to be
revised keeping in view the base point and not the basis for fixation
thereof.
45. One of the principles on which we are unable to agree is
the reimbursement of the cost principle. Even under the normal tariff
fixation regime, the cost-plus return approach is the principle to be
followed.
46. Further, once we have set aside the award of the Arbitrator,
order of the Appellate Court and also of the High Court pertaining to
the revision of the tariff for the period from October 1993 to
31.03.1999, and remitted the matter to be decided by TAMP, in our
opinion, even the order pertaining to the period in question also
deserves to be set aside as the base for revision of tariff for
subsequent periods is yet to be determined.
Page 35 of 48
CONCLUSION
47. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order
passed by the TAMP and also the High Court are set aside. The matter
is remitted to the TAMP for decision afresh along with the matter for
the period prior thereto. Needless to add that in the process of
adjudication both the parties should be given due opportunity of
hearing.
CONSTITUTION OF APPELLATE AUTHORITY
48. During the course of arguments and at the time of
examination of issues in detail, it transpired that the process for
fixation of tariff presently by the TAMP or the adjudicatory board, as
constituted and provided for under the 2021 Act, is the job of experts
in the field. Direct appeals have been provided against the order
passed by the TAMP or the adjudicatory board to this Court. To take
the views of the counsel for the parties, we had again listed the matter
on July 30, 2025, for direction. Thereafter, brief notes have been
received from the learned counsel for the appellants and respondent.
49. The 1963 Act provided for the constitution of Tariff
Authority i.e. TAMP for fixation of tariff applicable for any port. The
authority consists of a Chairman, from amongst persons who is or who
Page 36 of 48
has been a Secretary to the Government of India or have held any
equivalent post in the Central Government and two other Members
who have expertise in the subject, one Member from amongst
economists having experience of not less than fifteen years in the field
of transport or foreign trade and another Member from amongst
persons having experience of not less than fifteen years in the field of
finance with special reference to investment or cost analysis in the
Government or in any financial institution or industrial or service
sector.
50. Under the provisions of the 1963 Act, no statutory remedy
was provided against any order passed by the TAMP.
51. As the position stands today, the 1963 Act has been
replaced by the 2021 Act with effect from 03.11.2021. In the 2021 Act,
an adjudicatory board has been constituted under Section 54 thereof.
The function of the board is fixation of tariff. First proviso to Section 54
of the 2021 Act provides that till such time the board is constituted,
TAMP as constituted under the 1963 Act will continue to function.
52. Section 60 of the 2021 Act provides for remedy of appeal
against the order passed by the adjudicatory board to this Court.
Meaning thereby, first appeal against the order passed by the
adjudicatory board and at present in its absence the TAMP, would lie
Page 37 of 48
to this Court. The relevant provisions as referred to above are
extracted below:
“54. Constitution of Adjudicatory Board.—
(1) The Central Government shall, by notification, constitute,
with effect from such date as may be specified therein, a
Board to be known as the Adjudicatory Board to exercise
the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such
Adjudicatory Board by or under this Act:
Provided that until the constitution of the Adjudicatory
Board, the Tariff Authority for Major Ports constituted
under Section 47-A of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38
of 1963) shall discharge the functions of the Adjudicatory
Board under this Act and shall cease to exist immediately
after the constitution of the Adjudicatory Board under this
Act:
x x x x
60. Review and appeal.—
(1) Any party aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Adjudicatory Board under this Act, from which an appeal is
allowed under sub-section (2), but from which no appeal has
been preferred, may apply for a review of such decision
before the Adjudicatory Board, in such form and manner and
within such time, as may be prescribed, and the said Board
may make such order thereon, as it thinks fit.
(2) Any party aggrieved by any decision or order of the
Adjudicatory Board, may file an appeal to the SupremePage 38 of 48
Court of India, within sixty days from the date of
communication of such decision or order to him:
Provided that no appeal shall lie from a decision or order
passed by the Adjudicatory Board with the consent of
parties:
Provided further that the Supreme Court may, entertain any
appeal after the expiry of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring
the appeal.”
53. If we examine the authority vested in the adjudicatory
board under the 2021 Act, apart from tariff setting it has various other
functions like-
a. functions to be carried out by the erstwhile TAMP
arising from the Tariff Guidelines of 2005, 2008, 2013,
2018 and 2019 and tariffs orders issued by the TAMP;
b. receive and adjudicate reference on any dispute or
differences or claims;
c. appraise, review the stressed Public Private
Partnership projects and suggest measures to revive
such projects;
d. look into the complaints received from port users
against the services and terms of service rendered by
the Major Ports or the private operators and to pass
Page 39 of 48
necessary orders after hearing the parties concerned;
and
e. look into any other matter relating to the operations of
the Major Port.
54. It cannot be denied that fixation of tariff would involve
consideration of various factual aspects, especially figures involved.
This Court may not have the expertise to examine the accounts in
detail for the purpose of fixation of tariff. While deciding appeal
against an order of an expert body, all issues of law and fact are
required to be considered. Whether the process providing for the first
appeal against the order of the adjudicatory board is reasonable, is an
issue.
55. Similar issue with reference to fixation of tariff under the
Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 15 came up for
consideration before this Court in W.B. Electricity Regulatory
Commission v. CESC Ltd16. Under the aforesaid Act, a Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission17 was constituted for discharge of
various functions assigned thereof under Section 13 thereto. It was
with reference to fixation of tariff. Section 16 of the 1998 Act provided
for an appeal to the High Court against an order passed by the
15 Hereinafter referred to as the 1998 Act
16 (2002) 8 SCC 715
17 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘CERC’
Page 40 of 48
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. Section 17 of the
aforesaid Act provided for the establishment of the State Electricity
Regulatory Commission to discharge functions for the fixation of tariff
for intra-State transmission of power. Section 27 of the 1998 Act
provided for appeal to the High Court against an order passed by the
State Commission.
56. In the aforesaid judgment, the matter came up for
consideration before this Court against the judgement of the High
Court in an appeal against an order passed by the State Electricity
Regulatory Commission. Noticing the fact that the CERC consists of
technically qualified persons and is an expert body for determination
of tariff which is required to consider lot of factual position, this Court
observed that it would be more appropriate and effective if a statutory
appeal is provided to a similar expert body so that various questions,
which are factual and technical in nature could be considered at the
first appellate stage. It was further observed that, neither the High
Court nor this Court would in reality be an appropriate forum to deal
with this type of factual and technical matters. It was recommended
that the appellate jurisdiction, against the order of the State
Commission under the 1998 Act, should be conferred either on the
CERC or a similar body. Reference was also made to the appellate
Page 41 of 48
tribunal constituted to hear appeals against the order passed by the
Telecom Regulatory Authority under the Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India Act, 1997. Relevant para 102 thereof is extracted
below:
“Re: An effective appellate forum
102. We notice that the Commission constituted under
Section 17 of the 1998 Act is an expert body and the
determination of tariff which has to be made by the
Commission involves a very highly technical procedure,
requiring working knowledge of law, engineering, finance,
commerce, economics and management. A perusal of the
report of ASCI as well as that of the Commission abundantly
proves this fact. Therefore, we think it would be more
appropriate and effective if a statutory appeal is
provided to a similar expert body, so that the various
questions which are factual and technical that arise in
such an appeal, get appropriate consideration in the first
appellate stage also. From Section 4 of the 1998 Act, we
notice that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
which has a judicial member as also a number of other
members having varied qualifications, is better equipped to
appreciate the technical and factual questions involved in
the appeals arising from the orders of the Commission.
Without meaning any disrespect to the Judges of the High
Court, we think neither the High Court nor the Supreme
Court would in reality be appropriate appellate forums in
dealing with this type of factual and technical matters.
Page 42 of 48
Therefore, we recommend that the appellate power against
an order of the State Commission under the 1998 Act should
be conferred either on the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission or on a similar body. We notice that under the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 in Chapter
IV, a similar provision is made for an appeal to a Special
Appellate Tribunal and thereafter a further appeal to the
Supreme Court on questions of law only. We think a similar
appellate provision may be considered to make the relief of
appeal more effective.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. It is important to emphasise that the workload of Major
Ports in India has doubled, registering a 7.5% Compound Annual
Growth Rate over 10 years and handled 819.227 million tonnes of
cargo in Financial Year 2023-24. When the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963
was first enacted in the year 1964, there were 7 major ports 18 in the
country. With the growth in business, 5 more major ports 19 have been
created. Recently, in 2024, Union Cabinet approved setting up of
another major port at Vadhavan, Maharashtra. Considering the rise in
business at the major ports, the importance of the TAMP in resolving
the equally rising number of disputes cannot be undermined.
Disputes related to such a technical area of importance can be better
18 Namely Vizag, Chennai, Cochin, Mumbai,Vishakapatnam, Mormugao and Kandla
19 Namely Kolkata, Paradip, Tuticorin, New Mangalore, and JNPT
Page 43 of 48
dealt with by a specialised expert body. Appeals therefrom should
also be maintainable before specialised appellate body.
58. Besides this, we take note of the fact that there are other
similar expert bodies which are headed by technically qualified
persons along with persons with knowledge of accounting and
economics. Specialised expert appellate body has also been
constituted to entertain appeal against orders of such expert bodies.
Reference can be made to-
a. Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992–
Securities Appellate Tribunal has been created to
entertain appeals against orders of the Securities
Exchange Board of India.
b. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997–
Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
was constituted to hear appeals against the orders of
the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. TDSAT has
also been conferred powers of the Appellate Tribunal
under Section 17 of the Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, 2008 with reference to the
jurisdiction vested therein.
Page 44 of 48
c. Competition Commission Act, 2002– Competition
Appellate Tribunal [now merged with National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal] was constituted to
hear appeals against the orders of Competition
Commission of India.
d. Electricity Act, 2003– Appellate Tribunal for
Electricity (APTEL) constituted to hear appeals against
the orders of the adjudicating officer or the Central
and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions. APTEL
has also been given powers to hear appeals under the
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006
against the orders passed by Petroleum and Natural
Gas Regulatory Board, in the absence of a regular
mechanism created under aforesaid Act.
e. Companies Act, 2013– National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal has been constituted to hear
appeals against the orders of National Company Law
Tribunal.
59. Reference can also be made to the judgment of this Court
in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Limited20 where one of the
issues considered by this Court was ‘as to whether direct statutory
20 (2020) 6 SCC 1 : 2019 INSC 1236
Page 45 of 48
appeals from Tribunals to the Supreme Court ought to be detoured’.
After examination of the matter, by referring to the various statutes
wherein direct appeals have been provided to this Court, the direction
as given in para ‘218’ of the judgment, is extract below:
“218. It is apparent that the legislature has not
been provided with desired assistance so that it may rectify
the anomalies which arise from provisions of direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. Considering that such direct appeals
have become serious impediments in the discharge of
constitutional functions by this Court and also affects access
to justice for citizens, it is high time that the Union of India, in
consultation with either the Law Commission or any other
expert body, revisit such provisions under various
enactments providing for direct appeals to the Supreme
Court against orders of tribunals, and instead provide
appeals to Division Benches of High Courts, if at all
necessary. Doing so would have myriad benefits. In addition
to increasing affordability of justice and more effective
constitutional adjudication by this Court, it would also
provide an avenue for High Court Judges to keep pace with
contemporaneous evolutions in law, and hence enrich them
with adequate experience before they come to this Court. We
direct that the Union undertake such an exercise
expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months at the
maximum, and place the findings before Parliament forappropriate action as may be deemed fit.”
Page 46 of 48
59.1. It may be out of place if not added here that the 2021 Act isnot mentioned in the list of Acts referred to in the aforesaid judgment
in para 200 as the same was delivered on 13.11.2019 whereas the 2021
Act came into force thereafter on 03.11.2021.
60. In view of our above observations, we recommend to make
the remedy of appeal more effective and meaningful without
disrespect to any authority. It would be appropriate if an expert
appellate body is constituted to hear appeals against the orders
passed by the adjudicatory board/TAMP.
RELIEF
61. On merits
C.A. No.____ of 2025
arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9751 of 2023
61.1. We set aside the order of the Arbitrator, the
order of the Appellate Authority and also the order passed
by the High Court. The matter is remitted back to the TAMP
for adjudication of the dispute regarding revision of tariff
applicable to the respondent for the period from October
1993 till 31.03.1999.
C.A. No.____ of 2025
arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9870 of 2023
Page 47 of 48
61.2. Impugned order passed by the TAMP and also
the High Court are set aside. The matter is remitted to the
TAMP for decision afresh along with the matter for the
period prior thereto.
Regarding constitution of Appellate Authority
61.3. In view of our above observations, we
recommend to make the remedy of appeal more effective
and meaningful without disrespect to any authority. It
would be appropriate if an expert appellate body is
constituted to hear appeals against the orders passed by
the adjudicatory board/TAMP.
62. The Registry of this Court shall forthwith send a copy of
this order to the Secretary, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law
and Justice, Government of India to examine the issue and take
appropriate steps.
……………….……………..J.
(M.M. SUNDRESH)
……………….……………..J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
New Delhi
August 12, 2025.
Page 48 of 48
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