Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 30.07.2025 vs State Of H.P on 13 August, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.60 of 2013
Reserved on: 30.07.2025
.
Decided on: 13.08.2025
Mahinder Singh ........Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. .....Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner: Mr. N.K. Tomar, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision petition is directed against the
judgment dated 23.02.2013, passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court) vide which
the judgment of conviction dated 18.3.2011 and order of
sentence dated 22.3.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court)
were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?No
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same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
.
revision are that the police presented a challan against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of the Indian
Penal Code (in short “IPC“). It was asserted that informant Ravi
Dutt (PW1) was working as a carpenter and was residing at
Pabiyana. He and his son Neeraj (PW2) left for their work on
29.11.2009, after locking the room and the kitchen. The
informant returned home at 9:00 A.M and found that the locks
were broken. The articles in the kitchen and the room were
scattered. He found that a pair of silver anklets, a gold nose pin,
three coins of silver, and one gas cylinder were missing. The
informant suspected Mahinder Singh (the present accused)
because he was involved in the commission of a similar offence
earlier. He made a complaint to the police. His statement
(Ex.PW7/A) was recorded, and F.I.R. (Ex.PA) was registered in
the police station. HC Ranjit Singh (PW7) conducted the
investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW7/B). The
photographs of the spot (Ex.PW4/A to Ex.PW4/D) were taken.
One stone (Ex. P3) and two broken locks (Ex. P1 & Ex. P2) were
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found on the spot. These were put in a cloth parcel and the
parcel was sealed with seal “R”. Seal impression (Ex.PW7/C)
was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The accused made a
.
disclosure statement (Ex.PW1/A) that he could get the gas
cylinder recovered. He led the police to a place where the gas
cylinder was concealed. The police recovered the cylinder and
seized it vide memo (Ex. PW1/B). The accused produced a pair of
silver anklets (Ex. P4), a nose pin (Ex. P5), and two silver
‘kangan’ (Ex. P6), which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW3/A).
Site plan of the place of recovery (Ex.PW7/D) was prepared.
Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and
after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared
and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reason to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was
charged for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 457 & 380 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove
its case. Ravi Dutt (PW1) is the informant. Neeraj (PW2) is his
son. Jeet Singh (PW3) witnessed the recovery. Naresh (PW4)
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took the photographs. HC Roshan Lal (PW5) was working as
MHC with whom the case property was deposited. R.S. Chauhan
(PW6) prepared the challan. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW7) conducted
.
the investigation.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its
entirety. He did not lead any defence evidence.
6.
Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the
informant proved that a theft had taken place. The accused
made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of a gas
cylinder. He also produced the stolen articles. There was no
reason for the informant to falsely implicate the accused.
Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of the IPC and
was sentenced as under:-
Section(s) Sentence(s)
Section 457 of The convict was ordered to undergo
the IPC simple imprisonment for three years
and pay a fine of ₹5,000/-.
Section 380 of The convict was ordered to undergo
the IPC simple imprisonment for three years
and pay a fine of ₹ 5,000/-.
In default of making the payment of fine, the convict
was ordered to undergo further simple imprisonment
for nine months for the aforesaid offences. The
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substantive sentences of imprisonment awarded to the
convict were ordered to run concurrently.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed
by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which
.
was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour District At
Nahan (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held
that theft in the house of the informant was duly proved. It was
proved that the accused had produced the stolen articles. He
made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of the
cylinder. These circumstances cumulatively led to the only
inference that the accused had committed the theft. Learned
Appellate Court also held that the sentence imposed by the
learned Trial Court was excessive and reduced the simple
imprisonment from three years to six months.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present
revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material placed before them. The witnesses
were interested and inimical. The F.I.R. was the result of
deliberation. The allegations against the accused were not
proved. Neeraj (PW2) stated that all the articles were found at
home, which made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The
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disclosure statement was not witnessed by the independent
witnesses and was not proved as per the law. There were major
contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, and
.
the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the statements.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed
and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts
below be set aside.
9.
r to
I have heard Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
10. Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred
in appreciating the matter placed before them. There was no
evidence that the cylinder recovered by the prosecution was
stolen from the informant’s possession. The informant
admitted that he did not have the subscriber copy issued by the
gas agency, which made his version highly doubtful that the
cylinder was issued in his name. There is a discrepancy between
the articles recovered and the articles stated to have been
stolen. There was no proper identification of the stolen articles.
Learned Courts below did not advert to this aspect of the case,
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and the judgments and order passed by them are not
sustainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned
.
Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, supported the judgments
and order passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted
that the accused was found in possession of stolen property
immediately after the theft, and a presumption that he had
committed theft would apply to the present case. Learned
Courts below rightly held that the recovery of the stolen articles
proved the commission of theft by the accused. This was a
reasonable view taken by the learned Courts below, and this
Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the learned Courts below. He prayed that the
present revision be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
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(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a
revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify
the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was
.
observed at page 207: –
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revisionagainst conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vestsjurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding,
sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The
object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or anerror of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-
founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
individual cases. It is also well settled that whileconsidering the same, the Revisional Court does not
dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case toreverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power
to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is
for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
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or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4
.
SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly
explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise
the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
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substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in
the proceedings under CrPC.”
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor
case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC
.
460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has
also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context
of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section
228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83,
para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate
for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.
However, it is not only difficult but inherently
impossible to state such principles with precision. At
best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some
of the principles to be considered for proper exercise
of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing
of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together,
as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution
is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection, and
that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:27400 )made from the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations
are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever.
reach such a conclusion, and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether the
case would end in conviction or not at the stage
of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material
on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily
with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an
abuse of the process of court leading to
injustice.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to
the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records, but it is an opinion formed prima
facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out
inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is
not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be
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cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with
an application for discharge.
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
.
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [Stateof Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri,
(1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while consideringthe scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court,
this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55,
para 5)“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one ofsupervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said
revisional power cannot be equated with the powerof an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a
second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,
it would not be appropriate for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion
on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions
Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought
to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of
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2025:HHC:27400 )have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the
oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
.
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court
in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] .
This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order
of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely
on the ground that another view is possible. The
following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another
view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant
to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power
of the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional
power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is
not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the
finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be
revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law
or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or where
the material facts are wholly ignored or where the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the
decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”
14. In the above case, the conviction of the accused
was recorded, and the High Court set aside
[Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao
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Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of
conviction by substituting its view. This Court set
aside the High Court’s order holding that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its
views, and that too without any legal basis.
.
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at
page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence ofperversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret theevidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and HandelsGmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design
and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-
established principle of law that the Revisional Court willnot interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictionalerror. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in
the negative.”
17. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18. The informant Ravi Dutt (PW1) stated that he and his
son had left for work. When he returned on the 30 th, he saw that
the locks were broken. The articles were lying scattered. The
cylinder was stolen. Anklet, silver ‘kangan’, nose pin and three
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coins of silver were missing. He informed Jeet Singh about the
theft. He stated in his cross-examination that Jeet Singh(PW3)
had called the accused. He denied that he had mentioned the
.
gold nose pin and gold coins in the F.I.R. He volunteered to say
that these were of silver.
19. His statement is corroborated by Jeet Singh (PW3),
who stated that Ravi Dutt told him about the damage to the
locks and theft of the cylinder. He (Jeet Singh) went to the spot
and saw that the locks were broken. Ravi Dutt said that the
silver anklet and, silver nose pin were also missing. He also
informed the police. He stated in his cross-examination that he
had not seen any passbook/receipt of the cylinder. He denied
that the cylinder was inside the room.
20. The testimony of Ravi Dutt regarding the
commission of theft is also corroborated by the statement
(Ex.PW7/A), which was made on 30.11.2009 at 8:30 P.M.
21. Neeraj (PW2) stated that no recovery was effected in
his presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He
denied that the police seized the stone and broken locks from
the spot in his presence. He admitted that he and his father had
left for work after locking the house. He admitted that his father
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told him about the damage to the lock and theft of articles and
the cylinder. He denied that the police made inquiries from the
accused, and the accused got recovered the stolen articles. He
.
stated in his cross-examination by learned counsel for the
accused that all the articles were lying inside the house when he
returned to the spot.
22. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness
makes the prosecution’s case highly suspect. This submission
is not acceptable. He is not a witness to the disclosure statement
(Ex.PW1/A), recovery memo (Ex. PW1/B), stone and broken
pieces of locks (Ex. PW2/A), and recovery memo (Ex. PW3/A) of
silver anklet, nose pin and ‘kangan’. Therefore, the fact that he
has not supported the prosecution case regarding the recoveries
and disclosure statement will not make the prosecution case
suspect. Further, his statement that all the articles were lying in
the house at the time of his return does not mean that no theft
was committed. He was not accompanying the informant, and
he returned after the police were called. The police had effected
the recovery before his arrival, and his testimony that articles
were lying in the house does not mean that no theft had taken
place. Therefore, the testimony of this witness will not assist
the accused.
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23. Jeet Singh (PW3) stated that the accused got
recovered the cylinder. He also produced a silver ‘kangan’ and
an anklet, which were seized by the police. He identified the
.
articles in the Court. The accused made a disclosure statement
(Ex.PW1/A), which was witnessed by him. The police seized the
stone and broken pieces of locks, which were seized in his
presence. He stated in his cross-examination that his house and
the house of Ravi Dutt are separated by 10 houses. 5-6 houses
are located adjacent to the house of Ravi Dutt, which are
scattered. He admitted that stone is commonly available. He
denied that no recoveries were effected, and he put the
signatures in his home. He denied that he had enmity with the
accused.
24. The cross-examination of this witness does not
show that he has any enmity with the accused. He categorically
denied his enmity with the accused and denied suggestion does
not amount to any proof. Thus, the learned Trial Court had
rightly relied upon his testimony.
25. The informant also supported the recoveries. He
stated that the police picked up stones, broken locks and seized
them. He identified the stone and the locks. The accused made a
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disclosure statement that he could get the cylinder recovered.
He led the police and got the cylinder recovered. The accused
also produced a silver anklet and a ‘kangan’, which were seized
.
by the police. He denied in his cross-examination that no
recovery was effected in his presence.
26. HC Ranjit Singh (PW7) stated that he interrogated
the accused. The accused made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW1/
A). He also produced one pair of silver anklets (Ex.P4), a nose
pin and two ‘kangan’, which were seized by the police. The
accused led the police to a place from where the gas cylinder
was recovered. He stated in his cross-examination that 10-12
houses were located on the spot. The house of Ravi Dutt was at a
distance of 15 meters from the road. He did not seize the
passbook. He denied that no recovery was effected. His
testimony also corroborates the informant’s testimony.
27. It was submitted that the police did not associate the
independent witness, which makes the prosecution case highly
suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The police
associated Jeet Singh (PW3), who is an independent person.
Further, there is no requirement to associate an independent
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witness while recording the disclosure statement and effecting
the consequential recovery.
28. In State Versus Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652, the recovery
.
was discarded by the High Court on the ground that no
independent witness had signed the memo, and it was signed
only by a highly interested person. It was held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that there is no requirement under Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act or Section 161 of Cr.P.C. to obtain the
signatures of independent witnesses.
r The requirement of
independent witnesses is when the recovery is effected under
Section 100(4) of the Cr.PC and not when the recovery is
effected pursuant to the disclosure statement. It was further
observed that statements of police officials cannot be doubted
because they are official witnesses. It was observed:-
“17. Recovery of the nicker is evidenced by the seizure
memo, Ext. PW-10/G. It was signed by PWlO-Sharda be-
side its author, PW17-Investigating Officer. The Division
Bench of the High Court declined to place any weight on
the said circumstance purely on the ground that no
other independent witness had signed the memo, but it
was signed only by “highly interested persons”. The ob-
servation of the Division Bench in that regard is ex-
tracted below:
“It need hardly be said that in order to lend assur-
ance that the investigation has been proceeding in
a fair and honest manner, it would be necessary
for the Investigating Officer to take independent::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:27400 )witnesses to the discovery under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act; and without taking indepen-
dent witnesses and taking highly interested per-
sons and the police officers as the witnesses to the
discovery would render the discovery, at least, not.
free from doubt.”
18. In this context, we may point out that there is no re-
quirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
obtain the signature of independent witnesses on the
record in which the statement of an accused is written.
The legal obligation to call Independent and respectable
inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the ex-
ercise made by the police is cast on the police officer
when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code.
Section 100(5) of the Code requires that such a search
shall be made in their presence and a list of all things
seized in the course of such search and of the places in
which they are respectively found shall be prepared by
such officer or another person, and signed by such wit-
nesses. It must be remembered that a search is made to
find out a thing or document which the searching officer
has no prior idea where the thing or document is kept. He
prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion or some
guesswork that it could possibly be ferreted out in such
prowling. It is a stark reality that during searches, the
team which conducts the search would have to meddle
with lots of other articles and documents also, and in
such a process, many such articles or documents are
likely to be displaced or even strewn helter-skelter. The
legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be made
in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the lo-
cality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled
with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled
thereto. But the recovery of an object pursuant to the in-
formation supplied by an accused in custody is different
from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII
of the Code. This Court has indicated the difference be-
tween the two processes in the Transport Commissioner,
Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors.
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21
2025:HHC:27400 )
1. Following observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. can be
used to support the said legal proposition:
“Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to
which reference was made by the counsel, deals
with searches and not seizures. In the very nature.
of things, when the property is seized and not re-
covered during a search, it is not possible to com-
ply with the provisions of subsections (4) and (5)of Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In
the case of a seizure (under the Motor Vehicles
Act), there is no provision for preparing a list of
the things seized in the course of the seizure forthe obvious reason that all those things are seized
not separately but as part of the vehicle itself.”
19. Hence, it is a fallacious impression that when recov-
ery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the
accused, the document prepared by the Investigating
Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must nec-
essarily be attested by independent witnesses. Of course,
if any such statement leads to the recovery of any article,
it is open to the Investigating Officer to take the signa-
ture of any person present at that time, on the document
prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was present
or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the
document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of
law, that the document so prepared by the police officer
must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence un-
reliable. The court has to consider the evidence of the In-
vestigating Officer who deposed to the fact of recovery
based on the statement elicited from the accused on its
own worth.
20. We feel that it is an archaic notion that the actions of
the police officer should be approached with initial dis-
trust. We are aware that such a notion was lavishly en-
tertained during the British period, and policemen also
knew about it. Its hangover persisted during post-inde-
pendent years, but it is time now to start placing at least
initial trust in the actions and the documents made by
the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are untrustworthy.
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22
2025:HHC:27400 )
As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the
other way around. That official acts of the police have
been regularly performed is a wise principle of presump-
tion and recognised even by the legislature. Hence, when
a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain arti-
.
cle was recovered by him on the strength of the state-
ment made by the accused, it is open to the court to be-
lieve the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown
to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-ex-
amination of witnesses or through any other materials,
to show that the evidence of the police officer is either
unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a partic-
ular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect the
truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could
certainly take into account the fact that no other inde-
pendent person was present at the time of recovery. But
it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the
police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison
such action merely for the reason that police did not col-
lect signatures of independent persons in the documents
made contemporaneous with such actions.”
29. It was held in Praveen Kumar Versus State of
Karnataka (2003) 12 SCC 199, that there is no requirement to
associate independent witnesses at the time of the disclosure
statement. It was observed: –
“20. The learned counsel for the appellant, however,
contended that the alleged statement, Ext. P-35 was
made to PW 33, not in the presence of any independent
witness; hence, the same should be rejected. He also
contended that the said statement was made on 2-3-
1994, but the recovery was made only on 3-3-1994;
therefore, the said recovery cannot be correlated to the
statement, if any, made by the accused on 2-3-1994. He
also challenged the fact of recovery, stating that the
panch witnesses to the said recovery cannot be believed.
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23
2025:HHC:27400 )
21. Section 27 does not lay down that the statement
made to a police officer should always be in the presence
of independent witnesses. Normally, in cases where the
evidence led by the prosecution as to a fact depends
solely on the police witnesses, the courts seek corrobora-
.
tion as a matter of caution and not as a matter of rule.
Thus, it is only a rule of prudence which makes the court
seek corroboration from an independent source, in such
cases, while assessing the evidence of the police. But incases where the court is satisfied that the evidence of the
police can be independently relied upon, then in such
cases, there is no prohibition in law that the same cannot
be accepted without independent corroboration. In theinstant case, nothing is brought on record to show why
the evidence of PW 33 10 should be disbelieved in regard
to the statement made by the accused as per Ext. P-35.
Therefore, the argument that the statement of the appel-
lant as per Ext. P-35 should be rejected because the same
is not made in the presence of an independent witness
has to be rejected.”
30. The Full Bench of the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court
has also considered this question in State of Rajasthan vs.
Mangal Singh, AIR 2017 Raj. 68 and gave the following reasons
for not insisting upon the presence of independent witnesses
during the disclosure statements:
22. We are of the firm opinion that the insistence to keep
attesting witnesses present when the Investigating Offi-
cer records the information supplied by the accused un-
der Section 27 of the Evidence Act is absolutely unwar-
ranted and rather amounts to a direct infringement of
the confidentiality of the investigation. There are strong
reasons behind this conclusion. We summarise a few il-
lustrations to fortify the same:
(a) Investigation commences the moment an F.I.R. is
registered for a cognizable offence. An Investigating::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
24
2025:HHC:27400 )Officer, having custody of the accused, cannot pre-
dict in advance the precise moment when the accused
would decide to reveal the information, which could
lead to the discovery of an incriminating fact. Thus, if
attestation of the information by an independent
.
witness is insisted upon, as a direct corollary thereto,
the Investigating Officer would be required to keep
the witnesses in attendance right from the moment
the accused is arrested till the information is elicited.
This would lead to an absolutely absurd situation and
is likely to frustrate the investigation. The very sanc-
tity of investigation and the privilege available to the
Investigating Officer to keep the investigation se-
cluded from prying eyes would be compromised.
(b) Another possible situation may be that the ac-
cused might divulge the information under Section
27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer at a
particular point in time when independent witnesses
are not available. For adhering to the procedure of
seeking attestation by independent witnesses, the
Investigating Officer would then be required to sum-
mon independent witnesses and request the accused
to repeat the information in their presence. At this
point in time, the accused may either refuse to di-
vulge the information given earlier or may oblige the
Investigating Officer with the information, which
would then be taken down in writing in the presence
of the independent attesting witnesses. However,
there is a fundamental glitch in adopting this proce-
dure, which would certainly make the information, if
any, received the second time around in the presence
of the witnesses, inadmissible in evidence. Law is
well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, including the judgment in the case of
Aher Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashtra, reported
in AIR 1956 SC 217, that information of a fact already
known to the Investigating Officer is inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, in case the Investigating Officer,
while making an investigation of the accused in his
custody, is provided information under Section 27 of
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25
2025:HHC:27400 )
the Evidence Act and soon thereafter, calls the Pan-
chas and records the same in their presence, then he
would be recording the memorandum of information
already known to him. Such information would be
inadmissible at the outset, and thus, the entire en-
.
deavour would become nothing short of an exercise
in futility.
(c) There is yet another risk involved, which could
severely prejudice the accused if the information
provided by the accused under Section 27 is recorded
in the presence of independent witnesses. The infor-
mation under Section 27 of the Evidence Act often
comprises two parts: one being confessional, which
has to be excluded, and the other, which leads to the
discovery of an incriminating fact and is admissible
in evidence to the extent of the discovery made in
pursuance thereof. In case independent witnesses are
kept present when the information is given by the
accused, the prosecution may make an endeavour to
prove even the confessional part of the information
as being an extrajudicial confession made in the
presence of independent witnesses. There may even
arise a situation where the independent witness
present to attest to the memorandum prepared under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is a Magistrate. In such
a case, the confessional part of the information un-
der Section 27 of the Evidence Act would almost as-
sume the character of a confession under Section 26
of the Evidence Act, thereby condemning the accused
to face severe consequences. There is a high proba-
bility of this situation arising in cases involving the
recovery of narcotics where the Investigating Officer
gives an option to the accused that be searched in the
presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Con-
templating that option to be searched in the presence
of a Magistrate is given, and a search of the accused
is conducted, and during the process, he is also ques-
tioned in the presence of the Magistrate. At this time,
the accused may provide information under Section
27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer,
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26
2025:HHC:27400 )
which is partly confessional in nature and is taken
down in writing and witnessed by the Magistrate by
adhering to the requirement of attestation. In such a
situation, the accused would be faced with severe
consequences because the prosecution would then,
.
by lifting the prohibition contained in Section 26 of
the Evidence Act, insist to prove the whole of the in-
formation as amounting to a confession made in the
presence of a Magistrate. Thus, the requirement
seeking attestation of the memorandum prepared
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not have
any logic or rationale behind it.”
31. Therefore, the disclosure statement cannot be
discarded on the ground that independent witnesses were not
associated.
32. It was submitted that the recovery was effected from
an open place which was accessible to all, and the recovery
cannot be relied upon. This submission is not acceptable. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Jeet
Singh, (1999) 4 SCC 370: 1999 SCC (Cri) 539: 1999 SCC OnLine
SC 282 that an article may be concealed in a place which is open
and accessible to all. The question is not whether the article was
recovered from an open and accessible place, but whether it was
visible to others or not. It was observed at page 378:
“26. There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act
which renders the statement of the accused
inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from
any place which is “open or accessible to others”. It is a
fallacious notion that when recovery of any::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
27
2025:HHC:27400 )incriminating article was made from a place which is
open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the
evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any
object can be concealed in places which are open or
accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried.
on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry
leaves lying in public places or kept hidden in a public
office, the article would remain out of the visibility of
others in normal circumstances. Until such an article isdisinterred, its hidden state will remain unhampered.
The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he
discloses that fact to any other person. Hence, the
crucial question is not whether the place was accessibleto others or not, but whether it was ordinarily visible to
others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the
concealed place is accessible to others.
27. It is now well settled that the discovery of fact
referred to in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the
object recovered, but the fact embraces the place from
which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the
accused as to it (Pulukuri Kottaya [PulukuriKottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 IA 65]). The said
ratio has received unreserved approval of this Court in
successive decisions. (Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State ofMaharashtra [(1969) 2 SCC 872], K. Chinnaswamy
Reddy v. State of A.P. [AIR 1962 SC1788], Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka [(1983) 2
SCC 330: 1983 SCC (Cri) 447], Shamshul Kanwar v. State
of U.P. [(1995) 4 SCC 430: 1995 SCC (Cri) 753], State ofRajasthan v. Bhup Singh [(1997) 10 SCC 675: 1997 SCC
(Cri) 1032].)
33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Limbaji v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 340: 2001 SCC
OnLine SC 1460 that merely because the recovery was effected
from an open place is not sufficient to discard the recovery and
the statement that accused had hidden the articles could be
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28
2025:HHC:27400 )
relied upon to show the possession of the accused. It was
observed:
“IV(b). [14] We are left with the evidence of recovery of
.
the ornaments of the deceased on the basis of the
confessional statement of the accused under Section 27
of the Evidence Act, if the discoveries are to be believed,
which ought to be. The next two questions are whetherthe accused shall be deemed to be in possession of the
articles concealed at various spots and whether such
possession could be said to be recent possession. But for
the decision of this Court in Trimbak v. State ofM.P. [AIR 1954 SC 39: 1954 Cri LJ 335], the first question
need not have engaged our attention at all. That was a
case in which, at the instance of the accused, the stolenproperty was recovered at a field belonging to a third
party, and the accused gave no explanation about hisknowledge of the place from which the ornaments were
taken out. The High Court, while absolving the appellant
of the charge of dacoity, convicted him under Section411 IPC for receiving the stolen property by applying the
presumption that he must have kept the ornaments at
that place. On appeal by the accused, this Court took theview that there was no valid reason for convicting the
appellant under Section 411 IPC. The Court pointed outthat one of the ingredients of Section 411, namely, that
the stolen property was in the possession of the accused,
was not satisfied. The Court observed thus: (AIR p. 40,para 6)
“6. When the field from which the ornaments
were recovered was an open one and accessible
to all and sundry, it is difficult to hold positively
that the accused was in possession of these
articles. The fact of recovery by the accused is
compatible with the circumstance of somebody
else having placed the articles there and of the
accused somehow acquiring knowledge about
their whereabouts, and that being so, the fact of
discovery cannot be regarded as conclusive proof::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
29
2025:HHC:27400 )that the accused was in possession of these
articles.”
If this view is accepted, there is the danger of seasoned
criminals, who choose to keep the stolen property away
from their places of residence or premises, escaping
.
from the clutches of presumption, whereas the less
resourceful accused who choose to keep the stolen
property within their house or premises would be
subjected to the rigour of presumption. The purpose
and efficacy of the presumption under Section 114(a)
will be practically lost in such an event. We are,
however, relieved of the need to invite the decision of a
larger Bench on this issue in view of the confessional
statement of the accused that they had hidden the
articles at particular places and the accused acting
further and leading the investigating officer and the
panchas to the spots where they were concealed. The
memoranda of Panchnama evidencing such statements
are Exhibits 26, 28 and 30. If such a statement of the
accused, insofar as the part played by him in concealing
the articles at the specified spots is admissible under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, there can be no doubt
that the factum of possession of the articles by the
accused stands established. We have the authority of
the three-judge Bench decision of this Court in K.
Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1788:
(1963) 1 Cri LJ 8] to hold that the statement relating to
concealment is also admissible in evidence by virtue of
Section 27. In that case, the question was formulated byWanchoo, J., speaking for the Court, as follows: (AIR p.
1792, para 9)
“9. Let us then turn to the question whether the
statement of the appellant to the effect that ‘he
had hidden them (the ornaments)’ and ‘would
point out the place’ where they were is wholly
admissible in evidence under Section 27 or only
that part of it is admissible where he stated that he
would point out the place but not that part where
he stated that he had hidden the ornaments.”
After referring to the well-known case of Pulukuri
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30
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Kottaya v. Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 IA 65], the
question was answered as follows: (AIR p. 1793, para
10)
“10. If we may respectfully say so, this case clearly
brings out what part of the statement is admissible
.
under Section 27. It is only that part which
distinctly relates to the discovery which is
admissible, but if any part of the statement
distinctly relates to the discovery, it will be
admissible wholly, and the court cannot say that it
will excise one part of the statement because it is
of a confessional nature. Section 27 makes that
part of the statement which is distinctly related to
the discovery admissible as a whole, whether it be
in the nature of a confession or not. Now, the
statement in this case is said to be that the
appellant stated that he would show the place
where he had hidden the ornaments. The Sessions
Judge had held that part of this statement, which is
to the effect ‘where he had hidden them’, is not
admissible. It is clear that if that part of the
statement is excised, the remaining statement
(namely, that he would show the place) would be
completely meaningless. The whole of this
statement, in our opinion, relates distinctly to the
discovery of ornaments and is admissible under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The words
‘where he had hidden them’ are not on par with
the words ‘with which I stabbed the deceased’ in
the example given in the judgment of the Judicial
Committee. These words (namely, where he had
hidden them) have nothing to do with the past
history of the crime and are distinctly related to
the actual discovery that took place by virtue of
that statement. It is, however, urged that in a case
where the offence consists of possession, even the
words ‘where he had hidden them’ would be
inadmissible as they would amount to an
admission by the accused that he was in
possession. There are, in our opinion, two answers
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31
2025:HHC:27400 )
to this argument. In the first place, Section 27 itself
says that where the statement distinctly relates to
the discovery, it will be admissible whether it
amounts to a confession or not. In the second
place, these words by themselves *though they
.
may show possession of the appellant would not
prove the offence, for after the articles have been
recovered, the prosecution has still to show that
the articles recovered are connected with the
crime, i.e., in this case, the prosecution will have to
show that they are stolen property. We are
therefore of the opinion that the entire statement
of the appellant (as well as of the other accused
who stated that he had given the ornament to Bada
Sab and would have it recovered from him) would
be admissible in evidence, and the Sessions Judge
was wrong in ruling out part of it.” *(emphasis
supplied)
In the light of this decision, we must hold that the
accused must be deemed to be in exclusive
possession of the articles concealed under the
earth, though the spots at which they were
concealed may be accessible to the public. It may
be mentioned that in the Trimbak case [AIR 1954
SC 39: 1954 Cri LJ 335], this Court did not refer to
the confessional statement, if any, made by the
accused falling within the purview of Section 27
and the effect thereof on the aspect of possession.
34. This position was reiterated in Ibrahim Musa
Chauhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 SCC OnLine SC 254,
wherein it was observed:
“15. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh (1999) 4
SCC 370, this court dealt with the issue of recovery from
a public place and held:
“21. The conduct of the accused has some rele-
vance in the analysis of the whole circumstances
against him. PW 3 Santosh Singh, a member of the::: Downloaded on – 13/08/2025 21:32:37 :::CIS
32
2025:HHC:27400 )Panchayat hailing from the same ward, said in his
evidence that he reached Jeet Singh’s house at 6.15
a.m. on hearing the news of that tragedy and then
accused Jeet Singh told him that Sudarshana com-
plained of pain in the liver during the early morn-
.
ing hours. But when the accused was questioned by
the trial court under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, he denied having said so to
PW 3 and further said, for the first time, that heand Sudarshana did not sleep in the same room,
but they slept in two different rooms. Such conduct
on the part of the accused was taken into account
by the Sessions Court in evaluating the incriminat-
ing circumstance spoken to by PW 10 that they
were in the same room on the fateful night. We,
too, give accord to the aforesaid approach made by
the trial court.”
16. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat
Fakira Dhiwar (2002) 1 SCC 622, this Court held:
“22. In the present case, the grinding
stone was found in tall grass. The pants andunderwear were buried. They were out of the
visibility of others in normal circumstances.
Until they were disinterred, at the instance ofthe respondent, their hidden state had re-
mained unhampered. The respondent aloneknew where they were until he disclosed it.
Thus, we see no substance in this submission,also.”
17. In view of the above, it cannot be accepted that a re-
covery made from an open space or a public place which
was accessible to everyone should not be taken into
consideration for any reason. The reasoning behind it is
that it will be the accused alone who will know the place
where a thing is hidden. The other persons who had ac-
cess to the place would not be aware of the fact that an
accused, after the commission of an offence, had con-
cealed contraband material beneath the earth or in the
garbage.”
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33
2025:HHC:27400 )
35. Similarly, it was held in Perumal Raja v. State, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 12, that if the accused does not tell the Criminal
Court that his knowledge of the concealment was based on the
.
possibilities that absolve him, an inference can be drawn that
the accused had concealed those articles. It was observed:
“32. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471,
this Court, in the facts therein, held that recovery of a
dead body, which was from the place pointed out by theaccused, was a formidable incriminating circumstance.
This would, the Court held, reveal that the dead body
was concealed by the accused unless there is material
and evidence to show that somebody else had concealedit, and this fact came to the knowledge of the accused
either because he had seen that person concealing the
dead body or was told by someone else that the dead
body was concealed at the said location. Here, if the
accused declines and does not tell the criminal courtthat his knowledge of the concealment was on the basis
of the possibilities that absolve him, the court can
presume that the dead body (or physical object, as thecase may be) was concealed by the accused himself. This
is because the person who can offer the explanation asto how he came to know of such concealment is the
accused. If the accused chooses to refrain from tellingthe court as to how else he came to know of it, the
presumption is that the concealment was by the accused
himself.
33. The aforesaid view has been followed subsequently
and reiterated in Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of
Gujarat (2013) 7 SCC 45, Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State
of Maharashtra (2015) 1 SCC 253, State of
Maharashtra v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde (2000) 6 SCC
269, and Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam (2013) 7 SCC
417.”
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34
2025:HHC:27400 )
36. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the
silver anklet was missing. The accused produced a pair of silver
anklets, which were identified by the informant as his own.
.
There is nothing in his cross-examination that suggests his
identification is incorrect. Therefore, the silver anklet is proven
to be stolen property.
37. The informant categorically stated that his cylinder
was also stolen. The accused got recovered a gas cylinder. The
informant identified the gas cylinder, and there is nothing to
doubt the informant’s identification. It was submitted that the
gas distribution book was not produced to show that the
cylinder was issued in the name of the informant. This
submission will not help the accused. The gas distribution book
would have been required if the statement of the informant was
found to be untrustworthy, but there is nothing in the
informant’s statement to discredit it. The place was seen by Jeet
Singh, and the cylinder was found missing. Therefore, there is
sufficient material on record to show that the cylinder was
stolen. The identity of the cylinder was not challenged in the
cross-examination. Therefore, the identification made by the
informant cannot be doubted. The theft is committed against
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35
2025:HHC:27400 )
the possession and not against the ownership. Therefore, it was
not necessary to prove the ownership of the gas cylinder.
38. It was submitted that the informant stated that the
.
gold nose pin was stolen, whereas the recovery of the silver
nose pin was effected. Therefore, the nose pin is not proven to
be the stolen property. This has to be accepted as correct. The
FIR specifically mentioned that the gold nose pin was stolen,
and the recovery of the silver nose pin does not make it stolen
property. However, this fact will not make the prosecution’s
case suspect because other articles are proven to have been
stolen and recovered at the instance of the accused.
39. The recovery of the stolen articles immediately after
the theft will lead to a presumption that the accused had
committed the theft. Section 114 Illustrations (a) provides that
a person found in possession of the stolen goods soon after the
theft is presumed to be a thief or the receiver of the stolen
property. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dakkata Balaram Reddy v. State of A.P., (2023) 19 SCC 461: 2023
SCC OnLine SC 474 that where the accused was found in
possession of the stolen goods, a presumption would arise
under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and the burden to
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36
2025:HHC:27400 )
rebut the presumption is upon the accused. It was observed at
page 471:
“27. In this regard, it may also be noted that A-2 was
.
found in possession of a bag carrying some of the stolen
ornaments and, therefore, such possession itself speaks
against him, in terms of Section 114( a) of the Evidence
Act, 1872. Being a fact especially within his knowledge, itwas for A-2 to explain how he came to be in possession
of those stolen ornaments, under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, 1872. However, no explanation was offered
by him. As regards A-1, it is the prosecution’s case thathe confessed to the commission of the crime and upon
being questioned as to the stolen gold ornaments, he
went into the other room in his house and brought out abag containing the gold ornaments. This part of his
confession would, therefore, be admissible under Section27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the recovery of
the stolen gold ornaments.”
40. Therefore, learned Courts below were justified in
holding that the accused had committed the theft. This was a
reasonable inference which would be drawn, and no
interference is required for it.
41. The learned Appellate Court has already reduced the
sentence of imprisonment to six months and has taken a lenient
view. No further interference is required with the sentence.
42. No other point was urged.
43. In view of the above, the present revision petition
fails, and the same is dismissed.
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37
2025:HHC:27400 )
44. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back
forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment.
.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
13 August 2025.
(yogesh)
r to
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