Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
West Bengal State Agricultural … vs The State Of West Bengal And Anr on 13 August, 2025
2025:CHC-AS:1548
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta
C.R.R. 718 of 2018
With
CRAN 1 of 2018 (Old CRAN 1222 of 2018)
West Bengal State Agricultural Marketing Board
Versus
The State of West Bengal and Anr.
For the Petitioner : Ms. Sutapa Sanyal, Adv.
Mr. Debrup Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. Pradeep Kr. Tulsyan, Adv.
Mr. Tirthankar Dey, Adv.
For the Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, Ld. Sr. Adv.
Mr. Anirban Dutta, Adv.
Ms. Sharmistha Ghosh, Adv.
Mr. Victor Chatterjee, Adv.
Mr. Amit Ghosh, Adv.
Mr. Ranit Ray, Adv.
Heard on : 01.08.2025
Judgment on : 13.08.2025
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Ajay Kumar Gupta, J:
CRAN 1 of 2018 (Old CRAN 1222 of 2018)
1.
This instant application is for condonation of delay of 1463
days in preferring the Revisional application filed by the petitioner
under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short, ‘CrPC‘) challenging the legality, propriety
and correctness of the impugned Order dated 09.04.2014 passed by
the Learned Judge, 4th Special Court, Calcutta in Case No. 01 of 2013
arising out of Hare Street P.S. Case No. 172 dated 13.03.2013 under
Sections 120B/420/467/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
read with Section 13(1)(c)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, pending before the Learned 4th Special Court, Bankshall Court,
Calcutta for adjudication.
2. By the said impugned order, the Learned Trial Court allowed
the opposite party no. 2, another Government establishment, namely,
West Bengal Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation
Limited, to withdraw the amount from the freezed account of the
petitioner.
3. The brief facts of the case as per the petitioner are that the
petitioner is a body corporate. The State Government, in exercise of
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its power conferred under the provisions of Section 36 of the West
Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972, as
amended thereto, constituted and established the petitioner board by
way of notification published in the Official Gazette. In view of The
West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation)
(Amendment) Act, 2014, the name of the West Bengal State
Marketing Board has been renamed as West Bengal State
Agricultural Marketing Board, the petitioner herein.
4. The petitioner herein receives market fees from various
Market Committees and such amounts collected are deposited in the
West Bengal State Marketing Board Fund. The Board also invests the
money in short term deposit scheme to earn interest on the idle
amount.
5. Sometime in the month of November 2013, the debit
transaction in respect of the account of the petitioner with the
Allahabad Bank, Ultadanga Branch was frozen. Upon enquiry, it was
informed to the petitioner that pursuant to the notice under Section
102 of the CrPC, issued by the Officer-in-Charge, Bank Fraud Section
Detective Department, Lal Bazar in connection with Hare Street P.S.
Case No. 172 dated 13.03.2013 under Sections 120B/420/467
4
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/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section
13(1)(c)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, bank account
was frozen.
6. The matter was placed before the higher authorities of the
petitioner for its decision. However, in the month of June 12, 2014 it
appears that a sum of Rs. 15,66,06,608/- has been withdrawn from
the bank account of the petitioner and upon enquiry, it came to the
knowledge of the petitioner that by the impugned order dated
09.04.2014 passed by the Learned 4th Special Court, Calcutta, the
opposite party no. 2, another Government establishment, namely,
West Bengal Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation Limited
was permitted to withdraw the said amount from the account of the
petitioner though, entire money belongs to the petitioner.
7. Ms. Sanyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner submitted that pursuant to the impugned order passed by
the Learned Special Court, the amount of the petitioner was
withdrawn by the opposite party no. 2. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the impugned order, the petitioner filed this
Revisional application praying for setting aside the impugned order
with a further direction upon the opposite party no. 2 to return or to
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deposit the said amount of Rs. 15,66,06,608/- to an interest-bearing
account and/or restrained them from utilisation said amount until
disposal of the Revisional application.
8. Learned counsel further submitted that the delay of 1463
days in filing of application was unintentional. Delay occurred due to
internal movement of files in different departments to take decision
on the issue of filing appropriate application after consultation and
deliberation with the higher officials, finally, obtaining opinion and
advice from the legal department. The file was sent to the Secretary
through proper channel through Joint Secretary to the Secretary at
Nabanna prior to filing of the application, the authority was to be
given sanction to file the application against the impugned order of
the Learned Special Court. It took time for consultation, preparation
of the draft application, vetting for legal compliance and filing of the
Revisional application caused a delay of 1463 days, was absolutely
unintentional, not deliberate and/or latches on the part of the
petitioner.
9. In addition, it was further submitted that the record was
misplaced during the aforesaid process of filing. Therefore, such delay
was beyond the control of the officials as such it may be condoned to
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do substantial justice as both the petitioner and the opposite party
no. 2 are Government organisations and huge amount of money is
involved.
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has
placed reliance of the following judgments in order to support her
contention that this Court can condone such delay, when there are
two government establishments are involved and to do substantial
justice. Those judgments are as under: –
i. Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Rep. &
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.1 Particularly in
Paragraph Nos. 35, 41 and 42 thereof;
ii. State of Manipur & Ors. Vs. Koting Lamkang2
particularly in Paragraph Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
thereof;
iii. State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani & Ors.3
particularly in Paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 thereof;
iv. Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Vs.
K.V. Ayisumma4 particularly in Paragraph No. 2
thereof;
1
(2023) 10 SCC 531;
2
(2019) 10 SCC 408;
3
(1996) 3 SCC 132;
4
(1996) 10 SCC 634;
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2025:CHC-AS:1548
v. G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Bangalore5 particularly in
Paragraph Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 thereof;
vi. State of Nagaland Vs. Liptok AO and Ors. 6 particularly
in Paragraph Nos. 8, 9 and 15 thereof.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above cited judgments on
behalf of the petitioner categorically laid down the principles while
considering the application for condonation of delay under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 from time to time as under:-
“i. The law of limitation was founded on public
policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by
itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of
delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice.
ii. The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic
enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further,
when substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against one another, the former would prevail.
iii. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of
cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is
not always decisive while exercising discretion in such
matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the5
(1988) 2 SCC 142;
6
(2005) 3 SCC 752.
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merits of a claim were also to be considered when
deciding such applications for condonation of delay.
iv. A distinction should be drawn between
inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay.
v. The officer responsible for the negligence would
be liable to suffer and not public interest through the
State.
vi. It is equally common knowledge that litigants
including the State are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even-handed manner.
When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation
of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing,
and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the
State is less difficult to understand though more difficult
to approve, but the State represents collective cause of
the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken
by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on table for considerable time
causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible.
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vii. The expression “sufficient cause” be considered
with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather
than the technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day’s delay.
viii. In litigations to which Government is a party
there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be
ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for
such defaults, no person is individually affected; but
what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the
characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
ix. The State should not be penalized for the lapses
of some of its officers and that in the particular
circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying
the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a
matter for the discretion of the High Court.
x. Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do
substantial justice to the parties. The provision
contemplates that the court has to go in the position of
the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be
said to have resulted from the cause which he had
adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the
peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient.
Although no special indulgence can be shown to the
Government which, in similar circumstances, is not
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shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a
practical view of the working of the Government without
being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.
xi. Discretion given by Section 5 should not be
defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary
matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient
cause” should receive a liberal construction.
xii. No separate standards to determine the cause
laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of sufficient cause.
xiii. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or
whether cases require adjustment and should authorise
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate
permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file
appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the
officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be
made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally,
the State cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual. The individual would always be quick in
taking the decision whether he would pursue the
remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a
person legally injured while the State is an impersonal
machinery working through its officers or servants.”
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12. Per contra, Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed
the prayer of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
and submitted that 1463 days is equal to more than 4 years. Delay in
filing the Revisional application for more than 4 years should not be
condoned even the petitioner is Government establishment.
13. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Ganguly further submitted that
the amount withdrawn by the petitioner was originally belongs to the
opposite party no. 2. It was transferred by the accused person in the
account of the petitioner. The Learned Special Court has rightly
passed the order for withdrawing the same after hearing and full
satisfaction, however, subject to furnishing of bond. Whether the
money belongs to the petitioner or opposite party no. 2 would be
decided after full trial and final disposal of the criminal case by the
Learned Special Court.
14. It was further submitted that delay has not been explained
sufficiently and properly by the petitioner. Simply, stating that it took
such delay in obtaining sanction without explaining sufficient causes
need to be dismissed at threshold. Question of substantial justice
and deciding on merits does not arise at the stage of considering
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Section 5 application. Therefore, this application for condonation of
delay is liable to be rejected even though the petitioner is a State
Government organisation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court time and
again reiterated that it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that
the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
15. To support of his contention, learned senior counsel has
placed reliance on the following judgments as under: –
i. Postmaster General and Ors. v. Living Media
India Ltd. and Anr.7, particularly in paragraph nos.
25 to 31 thereof;
7
(2012) 3 SCC 563;
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ii. Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation
of Brihan Mumbai8, particularly in paragraph nos. 24,
25, 27 to 30 thereof;
iii. The Inspector, Railway Protection Force v. Sk.
Sirajul Islam and Anr.9 particularly in paragraph nos.
14 and 15 thereof;
iv. State of W.B. v. Soroj Kumar Mondal and Ors. 10,
particularly in paragraph nos. 1 to 3 thereof;
v. State of M.P. and Ors. v. Bherulal11, particularly
in paragraph nos. 4, 6 to 8 thereof;
vi. Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) Represented by Executive Engineer v.
Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. 12,
particularly in paragraph nos. 58 to 63, 65 to 69 thereof;
vii. Union of India v. Jitendra13, particularly in
paragraph nos. 2 to 5 thereof;
viii. Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao v. Reddy
Sridevi and Ors.14, particularly in paragraph nos. 6.2
to 8 thereof;
8
(2012) 5 SCC 157;
9
(2013) 1 CCrLR (Cal) 693;
10
(2020) 7 SCC 263;
11
(2020) 10 SCC 654
12
(2021) 6 SCC 460;
13
(2021) 10 SCC 789;
14
(2021) 18 SCC 384;
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ix. Union of India and Ors. v. Vishnu Aroma
Pouching (P) Ltd. and Anr.15, particularly in
paragraph nos. 2 to 7 thereof;
x. State of U.P. and Ors. v. Sabha Narain and
Ors.16, particularly in paragraph nos. 1 to 6 thereof;
xi. State of M.P. Vs. Ram Kumar Choudhary 17
particularly in paragraph nos. 4 to 8 thereof;
xii. H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since
Deceased by LRS18 particularly in paragraph nos. 13
to 19 thereof;
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above cited judgments on
behalf of the opposite party no. 2 categorically laid down the
principles while considering the application for condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 from time to time as
under:-
“i. A liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in15
(2022) 9 SCC 263;
16
(2022) 9 SCC 266;
17
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612;
18
2025 SCC OnLine SC 54.
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the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
ii. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
iii. What colour the expression “sufficient cause”
would get in the factual matrix of a given case would
largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation.
iv. No premium can be given for total lethargy or
utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State
and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the
applications filed by them for condonation of delay
cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting
the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of
bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.
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v. The only explanation given for the enormous
delay of 1697 days in filing is stated to be that there is
a public interest involved and there are certain other
matters pending. All we can say that if there is public
interest involved then the Government has been grossly
negligent to look after the public interest. ….. If the
Government has suffered any consequences thereof
monetarily or otherwise, it is always open to the
Government to recover financial recompensation from
the persons responsible for causing loss to the
Government.
vi. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was
prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether
the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover
an ulterior purpose.
vii. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from
a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
172025:CHC-AS:1548
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no
choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is
hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
viii. Why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party. Though we are conscious of the
fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government. It is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
182025:CHC-AS:1548
process. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
ix. Repeatedly deprecating the practice of
authorities coming before this Court after inordinate
delays assuming as if the Law of Limitation does not
apply to them. Repeatedly, reliance is placed on the
judgments of vintage when technology was not easily
available. No reference is made to the subsequent
judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] which has dealt
with the issue that consideration of the ability of the
Government to file appeal in time would have to be dealt
with in the context of the technology now available and
merely shuffling files from one table to the other would
no more be a sufficient reason.
x. The laws of limitation are founded on public
policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as
“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind
of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
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based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that
there should be end to litigation but at the same time
laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for
legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They
are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond
in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”
xi. Discouraged State Governments and public
authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk
in to the Supreme Court as and when they please
ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the
statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to
them.
xii. The leeway which was given to the
Government/public authorities on account of innate
inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this
Court which came at a time when technology had not
advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown.
This position is no more prevalent and the current legal
position has been elucidated by the judgment of this
Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.
[Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3
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SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] Despite this, there seems
to be little change in the approach of the Government
and public authorities.
xiii. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner
has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation.
xiv. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his
part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
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whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
xv. Time and again, the Supreme Court has
reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts
that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice
oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be
employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
xvi. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant
matter which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not.”
17. Upon hearing the arguments advanced by the rival parties
and on perusal of the Judgments cited by the Parties, this Court is of
the opinion that even a Government organization would not be
entitled to any extra benefit of condonation of delay. Suit, appeal
and/or revision must be filed within the limitation period. It is settled
law that if delay caused without any intentional or latches either from
government department or private individual if explained sufficiently,
delay can be condoned. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
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18. Revisional application is to be filed within the period of
limitation of 90 days from the date of judgment and order under
challenge. It further provides the High Court may entertain the
Revisional application even after the expiry of the period of 90 days
provided that the Court is satisfied that the Petitioner was prevented
by sufficient cause for preferring the application beyond the statutory
period of limitation.
19. There must be sufficient and cogent grounds for delay and
that must be explained by the Petitioner in an application as to why
such enormous delay was caused in filing the instant application. It
is apparent from the Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself that there is
a power to condone the delay but condonation of delay can never be a
mechanical and routine manner, when the law provides limitation for
preferring revisional application.
20. The provision contemplates the discretionary power of the
Court for condonation of delay. Even then, the discretionary power
exercised judicially by recording the reasons. When there is an
enormous delay of 1463 days a Court is bound to ascertain the
sufficient cause and/or genuine reasons or acceptable of such
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sufficient cause while considering the application for condonation of
delay.
21. Learned Advocate representing the petitioner pointed out
that the delay was neither due to latches nor negligence on the part
of the Petitioner. She also referred several paragraphs of the
application showing sufficient causes indicated therein for not filing
the application within the statutory period of limitation.
22. Petitioner averred in the said application, the following
reasons in filing delay, which are as follows:
Firstly, sometimes in the month of November, 2013,
the debit transition in respect of the account of the
petitioner with the Allahabad Bank, Ultadanga Branch
was frozen.
Secondly, November, 26, 2013 Bank of the petitioner
informed that pursuant to the notice under Section
102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, debit
transaction of the account of the petitioner had been
frozen;
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Thirdly, In the mean time on June 12, 2014 a sum of
Rs. 15,66,06,608/- had been withdrawn/debited from
account of the Petitioner;
Fourthly, upon enquiry, it came to knowledge that
sometimes in September, 2014 by an order dated
09.04.2014 permitted to withdraw the aforesaid
amount from the account of the Petitioner;
Fifthly, The said matter was referred to the Secretary,
Sometime on or about November, 2014 for seeking his
advice and opinion for taking legal steps as the
Opposite Party No. 2 is also wholly owned by the
Government of West Bengal;
Sixthly, files are sent to the Secretary through proper
channel via the Joint Secretary. The Report was
received by the petitioner, but somehow during transit,
the file was misplaced and could not be traced despite
vigorous search;
Seventhly, the file was located sometime in the month
of April, 2017;
Eighthly, the authority accords sanction to proceed
against the impugned order. Accordingly, instructions
were given to prepare the necessary application in
month of September, 2017;
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Ninthly, draft application prepared by Learned
Advocate and sent to the office for necessary inputs
some time on November, 2017. The Legal department,
after making some changes, returned to the learned
advocate sometime on 3rd December, 2017;
Tenthly, on or about 3rd week of January, 2018, a
conference was held with senior counsel and copy
handed over to her for settling;
Eleventhly, the learned senior counsel returned the
draft sometime on 2nd February, 2018 but could not
file it due to the cease work by the Learned Advocates
and their clerk.
Finally, the application was, ultimately, filed on April,
2018 and, thus, the delay of 1463 days in filing
application was unintentional and not deliberate.
23. The reasons averred by the Petitioner in the application for
delay are insufficient and not acceptable owing to non-explanation of
particular dates of movement of the files from one department to
other. To substantiate such delay, the petitioner should have
explained the particular dates of movement of the file. Most of
paragraphs merely indicated months and year without specific dates.
There are so many gaps between two dates. Like the period of
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referring the matter to the Secretary on or about November, 2014,
misplacing file and when file was traced, has not been sufficiently
explained to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and reasons
assigned are not acceptable.
24. Apart from the date of instruction to the Learned counsel for
preparation of application i.e. from November, 2017 till filing of
application on April, 12, 2018 was also not explained satisfactorily.
Long and inordinate delay cannot be condoned in a mechanical
manner. Undoubtedly, a short amount of delay can be condoned by
taking a lenient view in criminal cases, especially to do substantial
justice but delay in the present case is extremely inordinate of more
than 4 years.
25. The Revisional Court should apply a liberal approach while
considering the question of limitation in a time barred criminal
revision. The court is not required to adopt a hyper-technical or
pedantic approach; rather it should adopt a liberal approach and
every day’s delay should not be expected to be explained. Substantial
Justice should be preferred over technical justice. However, long
delay cannot be condoned in absence of valid or sufficient cause. The
appellant fails to explain the delay in its application. The reasons
27
2025:CHC-AS:1548
cited by the Petitioner are made in a routine manner in vague and not
definite, which definitely cannot be a ground for condonation for a
long delay. Undisputable long delay cannot be condoned without a
sufficient cause being clearly explained.
26. In addition, the judgments relied upon on behalf of the
Petitioner, definitely, would not sufficiently add the benefits to the
petitioner since in those cases, a maximum 479 days delay was
allowed to be condoned. Whereas, in the present case 1463 i.e. more
than 4 years’ delay in filing application found to be without sufficient
explanation of delay. Therefore, judgments cited by the petitioner are
no manner applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the
case.
27. Furthermore, in a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs.
& Ors. – Vs. – The Special Deputy Collector (LA) 19, was held at
paragraph 26 as follows:
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
19
2024 SCC OnLine SC 513
282025:CHC-AS:1548
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting
the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised
or availed of for a long time must come to an end
or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has
to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or
cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind
but the same cannot be used to defeat the
substantial law of limitation contained in Section
3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is established for various
factors such as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
29
2025:CHC-AS:1548
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also
entitled to the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided
on the parameters laid down for condoning the
delay and condoning the delay for the reason that
the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.”
28. In the case of Union of India & Anr. – Vs. – Jahangir
Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR20, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India analyzing all the decisions on the subject reiterated the
position of law expounded in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee – Vs. –
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. 21.
Paragraph 33 of the said case is set out hereinbelow:
“33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy &20
2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
21
(2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 649
302025:CHC-AS:1548
Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the
following observations:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining factsituation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
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21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and
it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days,
for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other
side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities
of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which
is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
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2025:CHC-AS:1548
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on
merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant
manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters.””
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29. In the backdrop of the above discussions, this is not a fit
case to allow the condonation of delay of 1463 days. Consequently,
CRAN No. 1 of 2018 (Old CRAN 1222 of 2018) is hereby rejected.
30. The Revisional application being CRR No. 718 of 2018 also
stands dismissed as barred by limitation.
31. In view of disposal of revisional application, all connected
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
32. Let a copy of this judgment and order be communicated to
the Learned Court below for information.
33. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this Judgment be given to
the parties, as expeditiously, upon compliance of all legal formalities.
(Ajay Kumar Gupta, J)
(P.A.)
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