Allahabad High Court
Dharmveer vs State Of U.P. on 12 August, 2025
Author: Krishan Pahal
Bench: Krishan Pahal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:136841 Court No. - 65 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 20117 of 2023 Applicant :- Dharmveer Opposite Party :- State of U.P. Counsel for Applicant :- Lal Mani Singh,Praveen Kumar Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Krishan Pahal,J.
1. List has been revised.
2. Heard Sri Lal Mani Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Sunil Kumar, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material placed on record.
3. Applicant seeks bail in Case Crime No. 69 of 2022, under Sections 498A, 302 I.P.C., Police Station- Chaubepur, District- Kanpur Nagar, during the pendency of trial.
4. As per prosecution story, the marriage of the applicant was solemnized with the deceased person as per Hindu Rites about 11 years before the incident, the applicant and other family members are stated to have subjected the victim to cruelty for demand of dowry, thereby leading her to death on 16.03.2022 at about 11:00 PM.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the applicant is absolutely innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. Applicant is the husband of the deceased person and he has nothing to do with the said offence. The FIR is delayed by about three and half days and there is no explanation of the said delay caused. There are general and omnibus allegations against all the accused persons. The cause of death is coma and septicemia as a result of burn injuries. It is further argued that the deceased had received accidental injuries in the kitchen and was rushed to the hospital by the applicant only. The said fact of having admitted the deceased in hospital on 17.03.2022 at about 12:25 AM stands fortified by Annexure No.2 to the affidavit.
6. It is further argued by learned counsel for the applicant that there is no criminal antecedent of the applicant. It is further argued that the deceased had expired on 17.03.2022 itself and the FIR has been instituted three days after her death, as such it is a clear cut case of false implication. The applicant is languishing in jail since 21.03.2022, as such, period of incarceration is more than three and half years and he is ready to cooperate with trial. In case, the applicant is released on bail, he will not misuse the liberty of bail.
7. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the bail application on the ground that there is statement of informant whereby the deceased is stated to have informed him about her being set ablaze by diesel, as such, applicant is not entitled for bail.
8. The well-known principle of “Presumption of Innocence Unless Proven Guilty,” gives rise to the concept of bail as a rule and imprisonment as an exception. A person’s right to life and liberty, guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, cannot be taken away simply because the person is accused of committing an offence until the guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states that no one’s life or personal liberty may be taken away unless the procedure established by law is followed, and the procedure must be just and reasonable. The said principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court inSatender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors., 2022 (10) SCC 51.
9. It is a settled principle of law that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial. No material particulars or circumstances suggestive of the applicant fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like have been shown by learned AGA.
10. The said viewpoint was shared in AIR 1924 Cal 476 Nagendra Nath Chakrabarthi v. King-Emperor whereby the High Court held that bail’s purpose is to secure the accused’s attendance, not to punish. Courts must consider accusation nature, evidence, likely sentence, and accused’s character.
11. In Meerut Conspiracy Case, reported in AIR 1931 All 356 ? Emperor v. Hutchinson and AIR 1931 All 504 ? K. N. Joglekar v. Emperor this Court held that High Court’s bail power under S.498 CrPC is unfettered but must be exercised judicially. Bail is generally the rule; refusal is exception.
12. In Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2012 SC 830 it was reiterated that object of grant of bail to an accused of an offence is neither punitive nor preventive in nature. The true object behind grant of bail is to secure appearance of accused during trial. Refusal of bail and detention of under trial prisoner in jail to an indefinite period violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The court should keep in view the principle that grant of bail is the rule and committal to jail an exception. Seriousness of the offence is not to be treated as the only consideration in refusing bail.
13. Overcrowding in jails and inordinate delay in disposing of cases often result in undertrial prisoners, who are presumed innocent and incarcerated through no fault of their own, being deprived of their fundamental rights. The failure to ensure a speedy trial despite overcrowding and systemic inefficiencies violates the right to personal liberty under Article 21. Overcrowding further compounds the problem, as jails house far more inmates than their capacity, with the majority being undertrials which leads to the loss of identity and dignity of prisoners. The state and judiciary are constitutionally mandated to ensure that undertrial prisoners are not wrongfully confined for extended periods and that trials are conducted expeditiously to uphold justice and human dignity. These factors make it entirely justifiable to invoke Article 21 protections in such cases. (See: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, In re, (2017) 10 SCC 658; State of Rajasthan Vs. Balchand, AIR 1977 SC 2447;and Ashim vs. National Investigation Agency (2022) 1 SCC 695)
14. Reiterating the aforesaid view the Supreme Court in the case of Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 595 has again emphasised that the very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment is not to be forgotten. It is high time that the Courts should recognize the principle that ?bail is a rule and jail is an exception?.
15. The Supreme Court in Jalaluddin Khan vs. Union of India, (2024) 10 SCC 574, held that ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ even in special statutes like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. If the conditions in the special statute for the grant of bail are met, then bail should be granted.
16. Allowing the bail of the accused in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2024 INSC 645 the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
?7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant herein keeping in mind the following aspects:
(i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years;
(ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and
(iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses.
8. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time, the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India.
9. Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.
10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court, (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the, magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.”
11. The same principle has been reiterated by this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.
12. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, this court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
13. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225. In the latter the court re-emphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:
“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”
14. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:
“21. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials.
22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner:
“loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”
23. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration has further deleterious effects where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.”
15. The requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred to as “the 2008 Act”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated under Section 11 of the 2008.
16. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 had an occasion to consider the long incarceration and at the same time the effect of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act and observed as under: (SCC p. 722, para 17)
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.”
17. In the recent decision, Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) 10 SCC 51, prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay engaged the attention of the court, which considered the correct approach towards bail, with respect to several enactments, including Section 37 NDPS Act. The court expressed the opinion that Section 436A (which requires inter alia the accused to be enlarged on bail if the trial is not concluded within specified periods) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 would apply:
“We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each special Act has got an objective behind it, followed by the rigour imposed. The general principle governing delay would apply to these categories also. To make it clear, the provision contained in Section 436-A of the Code would apply to the Special Acts also in the absence of any specific provision. For example, the rigour as provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in the way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a person. We do feel that more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought to be. After all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would be very less and there may not be any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there is a need to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the process and also a stricter compliance of Section 309 of the Code.”
18. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.
19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.
20. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.?
17. The Supreme Court has also allowed the bail of the accused on ground of her long period of incarceration i.e. 6 years and there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial in near future in the case of Indrani Pratim Mukerjea v. CBI 2022 SCC OnLine SC 695.
18. In the money laundering case of V. Senthil Balaji V. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 INSC 739, the accused was incarcerated for more than 15 months as such the Supreme Court declared “inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial and the higher threshold for the grant of bail cannot go together”.
19. In a significant judgment of Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 granting bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), the Supreme Court held that a constitutional court can grant bail despite statutory restrictions if it finds that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution has been infringed.
20. While granting bail to ex-West Bengal minister in Partha Chatterjee v. Enforcement Directorate 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3729, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that “a suspect cannot be held in custody indefinitely and that undertrial incarceration should not amount to punitive detention.”
“The Court would, nevertheless, ensure that affluent or influential accused do not obstruct the ongoing investigation, tamper with evidence, or influence witnesses, namely, actions that undermine the fundamental doctrine of a fair trial,” observed the bench.
21. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the evidence on record, taking into consideration the delay in institution of FIR coupled with the fact that applicant having admitted the deceased person at hospital and applicant is incarcerated in jail for a considerable period of time and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the Court is of the view that the applicant has made out a case for bail. The bail application is allowed.
22. Let the applicant- Dharmveer, who is involved in aforementioned case crime be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned subject to following conditions. Further, before issuing the release order, the sureties be verified.
(i) The applicant shall not tamper with evidence during trial.
(ii) The applicant shall not pressurize/intimidate the prosecution witnesses.
(iii) The applicant shall appear before the trial court on the date fixed.
23. In case of breach of any of the above conditions, it shall be a ground for cancellation of bail.
24. It is made clear that observations made in granting bail to the applicant shall not in any way affect the learned trial Judge in forming his independent opinion based on the testimony of the witnesses.
Order Date :- 12.8.2025
Karan
(Justice Krishan Pahal)