Delhi High Court
Shantanu Prakash vs Doris Chug Gim Lian & Ors on 14 August, 2025
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 29.07.2025
Judgment delivered on: 14.08.2025
+ FAO(OS) 39/2025, CM APPL. 18092/2025 (Stay) & CM.
APPL. 18093/2025 (Ex.)
SHANTANU PRAKASH .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Senior
Advocates with Ms. Bani
Dikshit, Mr. Uddhav Khanna &
Ms. Disha Joshi, Advocates.
versus
DORIS CHUG GIM LIAN & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Vasudha Sharma and Ms.
Saumya Sinha, Advocates for
R-1 & R-2.
+ FAO(OS) 40/2025 & CM APPL. 18993/2025 (Stay)
PRAMOD THATOI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Dhruva Vig & Mr. Ishaan
Karki, Advocates.
versus
DORIS CHUNG GIM LIAN & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Vasudha Sharma and Ms.
Saumya Sinha, Advocates for
R-1 & R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT
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HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J.
1. The present Appeals are filed against the common Judgment of
the learned Single Judge dated 23.01.2025 in O.A. No. 226/2024 &
O.A. No. 227/2024 in CS (OS) No. 655/2017.
2. By the said judgment, the learned Single Judge adjudicated
upon the aspect of whether the delay in filing the Written Statement
beyond the maximum prescribed period of 120 days, as stipulated
under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side)
Rules, 20181, can be condoned. The said judgment was rendered in
challenges raised by the Appellants herein before the learned Single
Judge from the reasoned order dated 05.11.2024 passed by the learned
Joint Registrar.
3. Since the learned counsel for the Appellant has contended that
the issue raised herein is primarily a question of law, this Court does
not deem it necessary to set out the factual matrix of the entire dispute,
except to the extent relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the
present lis.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:
4. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant would rely upon
the following points in support of the challenge mounted herein.
A. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the entire suit,
instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, is malafide and a mere camouflage. He contends that
there exists a chequered history between the parties herein and
1
High Court Rules.
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considering the nature of the dispute, the institution of the suit
itself lacks bonafides.
B. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the aspects
relating to the historical background, are extremely essential for
the purpose of adjudicating the issues raised in the suit and,
therefore, equity would demand that the Appellants herein be
permitted to set out its defence, and that the closure of the same
through the impugned judgment would result in undue
prejudice and is not in the interest of fair and just adjudication.
In support of this contention, the learned Senior Counsel relies
upon the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Esha Gupta v. Rohit Vig2, and particularly paragraphs 7, 8 and
10 which are set forth as follows:
“7. It must be noticed at this stage that the Appellant has
also referred to certain instructions given by her to her
lawyers regarding the preparation of the written
statement. She has inter alia averred that “due to one
inadvertent reason or the other, the written statement
could not be filed.” However, the Court does not wish to
examine this aspect of the matter but would confine itself
to examining whether the reasons given by the
Appellant/Defendant herein are sufficient for the Court to
condone the delay.
8. What weighs with the Court in addition to the
documents produced adduced and submissions made, is
that her proposed written statement is ready. A copy
thereof has been enclosed as Annexure A-16 to the present
appeal. In other words, if the present appeal was to be
allowed, the Appellant/Defendant is in a position to file
her written statement, as she proposes, straightaway,
without seeking any further time. The second factor that
weighs with the Court is that given the nature of the suit, it
would be in fact be in the interest of the Plaintiff to know
as to what the stand of the Defendant is, rather than a
situation where there is no written statement at all.
2
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2702.
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Thirdly, in the circumstances, the impugned order was
passed just five days after the expiry of the deadline to file
the written statement, and before the filing of the present
appeal, i.e. by 19th December, 2019, the
Appellant/Defendant was ready with the proposed written
statement. Therefore, the bonafides of the
Appellant/Defendant, as far as her willingness to file the
written statement is concerned, are evident. The Court,
therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion on the
truthfulness or otherwise of the other assertions of the
Appellant.
***
10. In the peculiar facts referred to above, and without
expressing any view on the correctness or otherwise of the
assertions of the Appellant/Defendant, vis-à-vis, the
conduct of her counsel, this Court considers it appropriate
to put the Appellant/Defendant to terms while permitting
her to file the proposed written statement, as enclosed with
the present appeal as Annexure A-16.”
(emphasis supplied)
C. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants specifically refers to
Paragraph 8 of the judgment and submits that, given the nature
of the underlying suit, it would be in the interest of justice to
condone the delay in the filing of the Written Statements.
D. The further point that is canvassed by the learned Senior
Counsel is with respect to the prevailing ambiguity of the legal
provisions and the manner in which the provisions were to be
applied.
E. The learned Senior Counsel further draws our attention to
various judgments rendered by this Court over time, particularly
the judgment in Amarendra Dhari Singh v. R.C. Nursery
Private Limited 3 , and in particular paragraphs 23 to 26, to
contend that the earlier view of this Court has been to allow
such delay to be condoned. In support of this, the learned Senior
3
2023 SCC OnLine Del 84.
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Counsel particularly refers to and relies upon paragraphs 23 to
26 of the judgment, which are set forth as follows:
“23. A reading of the above provision would show that the
written statement shall not be taken on record, unless filed
within 30 days of the date of service of summons or within
the time provided by the Rules, the CPC or the
Commercial Courts Act, as applicable. Therefore, the time
prescribed by the CPC, wherever applicable, is made
expressly applicable to the filing of the written statement.
24. Rule 4 of the Rules, though in the opening part thereof
states that the Court may extend the time for filing the
written statement by a further period not exceeding 90
days, „but not thereafter‟, further goes on to state that in
case, no written statement is filed within the extended time
also, the Registrar „may‟ pass orders for closing the right
to file the written statement. It is settled principle of law
that the word „may‟ is not a word of compulsion; it is an
enabling word and implies discretion unless it is coupled
with a duty or the circumstances of its use otherwise
warrants. The use of word „may‟ in Rule 4 is to confer a
discretion in the Registrar in a given case not to close the
right of the defendant to file the written statement even
though the same has not been filed within the extended
time. The discretion that was left in the Court under Order
VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC as
applicable to non-commercial suits, has been continued by
the Rules.
25. It is to be kept in mind that the High Court of Delhi, at
the time of notifying the Rules in 2018, had the benefit of
the CPC as applicable to non-commercial suits as also the
special provisions applicable to Commercial Suits under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court would
have been well aware of the interpretation placed by the
Courts on these provisions, laying special emphasis on the
words used therein. The High Court did not choose the
language of the Commercial Courts Act. This shows the
intent of the High Court, in its Rule making power, not to
foreclose the discretion vested in the Court/Registrar to
condone the delay even beyond 120 days of the service of
summons if sufficient cause is shown for such non-filing. It
is settled law that use of same language in a later statute
as was used in an earlier one in pari materia is suggestive
of the intention of the legislature that the language so used
in the later statute is used in the same sense as in the
earlier one, and change of language in a later statute in
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pari materia is suggestive that change of interpretation is
intended.
26. Applying the above principle, it must be held that the
High Court, not having adopted the language of the
Commercial Courts Act, but of the CPC as applicable to
non-commercial suits, did not intend the Court to be
completely denuded of its power to condone the delay in
filing of the written statement beyond 120 days of the
service of the summons.”
F. He would also refer to the judgment of the coordinate bench of
this court in Jamaluddin v. Nawabuddin 4 and in particular
paragraph 6 thereof, which reads as follows:
“6. Further, it is also pertinent to observe that the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the recent decision of Bharat Kalra v. Raj
Kishan Chabra reported as 2022 SCC OnLine SC 613 has
also inter alia observed, that the delay in filing the written
statement can be condoned, subject to compensating the
plaintiff with costs. The relevant portion of the ratio is
extracted hereinbelow:–
“1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order
passed by the High Court on 12.08.2021 whereby delay of
193 days in filing of the written statement was not
condoned.
3. Admittedly, the suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff is
not the one which is governed by the Commercial Court
Act, 2015. Therefore, the time limit for filing of the
written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC is not
mandatory in view of the judgment of this Court reported
as „Kailash v. Nankhu‟ reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480.
4. In view of the aforesaid judgment, we find that the
delay in filing of the written statement could very well be
compensated with costs but denying the benefit of filing
of the written statement is unreasonable.
5. Consequently, we allow the present appeal. The order
passed by the High Court is set aside. The written
statement already filed is taken on record.
6. We do hope that the trial Court shall expedite the
decision of thesuit keeping in view the old age of the
plaintiff.
4
2023 SCC OnLine Del 974.
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7. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.””
He would submit that paragraph 6 of the said judgment permits
the delayed filing of the written statement upon payment of
costs, and the Appellant herein is willing to do the same in the
present case. However, he would candidly submit that the said
judgment does not consider the specific provisions, namely,
Rules 4 and 5 of the High Court Rules.
G. He would thereafter refer to and rely upon the judgment of the
coordinate bench of this court in Vikrant Khanna vs. Amita
Lamba5, specifically paragraph 23, wherein this Court observed
that there existed an uncertainty regarding the interpretation of
Rule 4, Chapter VII of the High Court Rules, and the same could
only be resolved through the judgment of this Court in Manhar
Sabarwal vs. High Court of Delhi6. The relevant excerpt from
Vikrant Khanna (supra) is as follows:
“23. There was some uncertainty in relation to the
interpretation of Rule 4, Chapter VII of the DHC Original
Side Rules, as also the fact that it was finally in October
2022, that the issue relating to filing of documents by the
Plaintiff, finally came to a close…………..”
(Emphasis supplied)
By the aforesaid judgments, the learned Senior Counsel would
seek to trace the history of the “uncertainty in the position of
law” with respect to the issue of condonation of delay in the
filing of the Written Statement beyond the period of 120 days.
5
2024 SCC OnLine Del 6661.
6
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945.
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H. He would, thus, contend that given this uncertainty of law that
existed during the relevant period, the Appellant should be
shown leniency by this Court, and the delay in filing the Written
Statement should, therefore, be condoned.
I. However, he would also seek to distinguish the present position
of law, by highlighting instances where such condonation has
been permitted, and, in particular, refers to the judgment of the
learned Single Judge in Bharat Singh vs. Karan Singh7.
J. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the
Respondent herein had allowed the suit to remain dormant
during the period when such uncertainty prevailed and, suddenly
woke up to file an application sometime in 2022, thereby
reviving the same. He would thus submit that the period of time
when the issue remained dormant was now resulting in a
situation where the interpretation of the rules has left him at the
proverbial “short end of the stick”.
K. He would thereafter seek to reiterate the proposition, which was
expressly rejected in the judgment of Charu Agarwal v. Alok
Kalia & Ors.8, with respect to the alleged distinction between
Rules 4 and 5 of the High Court Rules, wherein this Court has
held that no such distinction exists between Rules 4 and 5. The
impugned judgment, in fact, at paragraph 10 thereof, has
extracted the relevant portion, which is reproduced herein for the
sake of convenience:
“10. However, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Charu Agarwal (supra) after noticing the conclusion in7
2025 SCC OnLine Del 691.
8
2023 SCC OnLine Del 1238.
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Amarendra Dhari Singh (supra) has held that the
principle propounded by this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani
(supra) was a binding principle and has held as under:
“28. As would be apparent from the aforesaid conclusions
which stand recorded in Amarendra Dhari Singh, the
learned Judge appears to have taken the view that
notwithstanding the usage of the expression “but not
thereafter” in Rule 4, the penultimate part of that Rule,
and which in the opinion of the learned Judge conferred a
discretion upon the Registrar to either close the right to
file a written statement or to grant further time, clearly
appeared to suggest that the said power of condonation
would still be available notwithstanding the maximum
period as prescribed in that Rule having lapsed. While
seeking to explain the decision in Ram Sarup Lugani, the
learned Judge held that the difference between the
language of Rule 4 and 5 would be crucial and decisive
and thus the Registrar being empowered to extend time
beyond the maximum prescribed notwithstanding the use
of the expression “but not thereafter”. It becomes
significant to recall here that a submission was in fact
addressed before the Division Bench that the stipulation of
the matter being placed before the Court after the
maximum period had expired in terms of Rule 5 would
appear to suggest that the prescription of time in that
provision was not inviolable. The said contention was
soundly rejected by the Division Bench in light of the
peremptory language employed in the Rule.
29. Similarly, the decision in Harjyot Singh was sought to
be explained with the learned Judge observing that the
Court had failed to notice the distinction in the language
employed in Rules 4 and 5 and that it had not noticed the
judgment of the Court in Esha Gupta. Suffice it to note at
this juncture that the decision in Esha Gupta rested
principally on Order VIII and the decisions rendered in
the context of that provision. However, that analogy as
would be evident from the preceding parts of this decision,
had been stoutly negated in Ram Sarup Lugani which had
come to be delivered after the judgment in Esha Gupta.
Additionally, it may be noted that the decision in Esha
Gupta had in any case failed to consider the earlier
decisions of the Court and which had categorically held
that the principles underlying Order VIII could not have
been imputed to construe the Rules of the Court.
30. The learned Judge further observed that this Court
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while framing the Rules consciously chose not to adopt the
language as employed in the Commercial Courts Act,
201515. This, according to the learned Judge, would be
indicative of the intent to preserve the discretion which
stands vested in the Registrar notwithstanding the
maximum period of 120 days having expired. Suffice it to
state that those provisions do not employ the phrase “but
not thereafter” at all.
***
35. It must with due respect be observed that neither
Order VIII as originally standing in the Code nor its
provisions as adopted by the 2015 Act employ the phase
“but not thereafter”. The said expression stands enshrined
in both Rules 4 and 5 of 2018 Rules. It was the adoption of
the aforesaid phrase which was understood by the
Division Bench in Ram Sarup Lugani to be of critical and
vital significance. The Court is further constrained to
observe that once the Division Bench had on an extensive
review of Rule 5 come to conclude that the usage of the
expression was indicative of a terminal point having been
constructed, it would have been impermissible to take a
contrary view. Ram Sarup Lugani had tested the
provisions of Rule 5 based on a textual interpretation, the
adoption of a special period of limitation, the recognition
of the Order VIII principles not being applicable and even
the inherent power not being liable to be invoked in light
of the emphatic language of the provision itself. Ram
Sarup Lugani had also noticed the earlier Division Bench
judgments in DDA v. K.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd.18, HTIL
Corporation B.V v. Ajay Kohli19 as well as in Print Pak
Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Papers Converters20. all of
which had consistently upheld and recognised the primacy
of the Rules over the provisions of the Code. The Court in
Ram Sarup Lugani had also duly noticed the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Desh Raj. The former decision thus
constituted a binding precedent on the scope of the Rules,
the mandatory nature of the timelines prescribed
thereunder and that neither Order VIII nor the inherent
powers of the Court being liable to be invoked to extend
the period of limitation as stipulated in Rule 5.
36. While the aforesaid discussion would have been
sufficient to lay the controversy at rest, since Amarendra
Dhari Singh also proceeds on a perceived distinction
between Rules 4 and 5, the Court deems it apposite to
observe as follows. As was noticed in the preceding parts
of this decision, both Rules employ the phrase “but not
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thereafter”. Both the phrases “not exceeding” and “but
not thereafter” must clearly be accorded due weight and
consideration. This was an aspect which was duly noticed
in Ram SarupLugani.
37. Regard must also be had to the fact that while the
penultimate part of Rule 4 is not replicated in Rule 5, that
too would be of little significance when one holistically
reads Rule 4. It becomes pertinent to note that the
obligation to file a written statement in 30 days is
originally placed by Rule 2 falling in Chapter VII. Rule 4
deals with the extension of time for filing a written
statement. As is manifest from a plain reading of that
provision, it confers a power on the Court to condone the
delay that may have been caused and a written statement
having not being filed within 30 days if it be satisfied that
the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause and for
exceptional and unavoidable reasons to file the same
within the prescribed period. Rule 4 then and upon such
satisfaction being arrived at empowers the Court to extend
the time for filing a written statement by a further period
not exceeding 90 days but not thereafter.
38. The penultimate part of Rule 4 talks of the power of
the Registrar to close the right of a Defendant to file a
written statement if it be found that the same has not been
tendered within the extended time. The use of the phrase
“extended time” cannot possibly run beyond the maximum
period of 120 days. In any case, the said provision as
made in Rule 4 cannot possibly be countenanced or
interpreted to recognise the Registrar being empowered to
additionally extend time beyond the period of 120 days.
The reliance which has been placed on various decisions
noticed above and delivered in the context of Order VIII
as found in the Code would have to be duly understood
bearing in mind what had been held by the earlier
Division Benches of our Court in K.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd.,
HTIL Corporation as well as in Print Pak. The said
judgments had consistently held that the Rules as adopted
by the Court would clearly prevail over and above those
which may find place in the Code. All the four decisions
noticed above, had been rendered prior in point of time to
Esha Gupta and had neither been noticed nor considered
in the said judgment. Ram Sarup Lugani while relying on
the aforenoted decisions, had drawn sustenance from
those decisions in support of its ultimate conclusion that
Order VIII and the principles underlying the same would
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not apply to Rule 5.
39. The Court also deems it necessary to observe that the
Rules directly fell for consideration of the Division Bench
in Ram Sarup Lugani as well as the learned Judges who
authored Gautum Gambhir and Harjyot Singh. The facial
distinction between Rules 4 and 5 which appears to have
weighed with the Court in Amarendra Dhari Singh would,
in any case, not justify taking a contrary view. The Court
notes that both Gautum Gambhir and Harjyot Singh were
decisions rendered directly in the context of Rules 4 and 5
as enshrined in Chapter VII. This Court thus finds itself
unable to accord an interpretation upon Rule 4 or 5 which
would run contrary to what had been held in the earlier
decisions and which necessarily bind this Court.
40. In conclusion, this Court is of the considered opinion
that Gautam Gambhir, Ram Sarup Lugani and Harjyot
Singh are binding precedents on the scope of Rules 4 and
5 as falling in Chapter VII of the Rules. The mere fact that
the argument of a perceived discretion vesting in the
Registrar in Rule 4 was not specifically raised or
addressed would not justify the judgment of the Division
Bench being either ignored or doubted. The Court has
already noticed the issues that arise out of the judgment of
the Division Bench in Esha Gupta. The earlier decisions of
the Division Benches of the Court in K.R. Builders, HTIL
Corporation, and Print Pak do not appear to have been
cited for the consideration of the Bench. Ram Sarup
Lugani was a judgment which came to be rendered upon
an exhaustive analysis of the earlier precedents rendered
in the context of the Rules and the Code, the peremptory
language in which Rule 5 stood couched, of how the
creation of a special rule relating to limitation would
exclude the permissibility of condonation or extensions
being granted. While the order of the Division Bench in
Tushar Bansal was based on a concession that was made,
the judgment in Jamaluddin came to be pronounced with
neither side having drawn the attention of the Court to the
decision in Ram Sarup Lugani. The said decision
proceeded on the principles which underlie Order VIII of
the Code and the judgments of the Supreme Court in
Kailash and Bharat Kalra rendered in the context of that
provision. The Court notes that the adoption of Order VIII
principles already stood negated by the earlier Division
Benches in K.R. Builders, HTIL Corporation, Ajay Kohli
and Print Pak. Those decisions too do not appear to have
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been cited for the consideration of the Court in
Jamaluddin.
41. The Court thus comes to conclude that the principles
enunciated in Ram Sarup Lugani would continue to bind
and govern the interpretation liable to be accorded to the
Rules. The Court has firstly found that there exists no
distinction between Rules 4 and 5 which may be
countenanced in law as justifying Rule 4 being
interpreted or understood differently. In any case the
binding decisions rendered on the subject constrain the
Court to desist from treading down this path. The Court,
bound by the rule of precedent, is of the considered
opinion that such a review or reconsideration would be
impermissible in law. Since the Court has found that
both coordinate Bench as well as Benches of a larger
coram have conclusively settled all issues that stand
raised, no reference is also warranted.
(emphasis supplied)”
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents submits as
follows:
A. Learned counsel for the Respondents would commence the
arguments by submitting that the Appellants herein have been
actively participating in other ongoing litigations. In support of
this contention, learned counsel for the Respondents would
submit a list of dates to demonstrate that, even in the present
suit, the Appellant has been continuously appearing, and there
has been no impediment preventing them from filing the
Written Statements within the prescribed time.
B. Learned counsel for the Respondents, with respect to the
proposition concerning the alleged uncertainty in law, would
submit that, in fact, no such uncertainty exists as claimed by the
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would refer to an earlier judgment of this Court, delivered by
the learned Single Judge in Harjot Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur9,
wherein it washeld that such delay cannot be condoned.
C. Additionally, the learned counsel for the Respondents would
seek to distinguish the judgment in Vikrant Khanna (supra),
wherein the delay was condoned, by asserting that the
circumstances of that case were peculiar, and would rely upon
paragraph 23 of the said judgment to support this
distinction.The relevant extract of paragraph 23 of Vikrant
Khanna (supra) is as follows:
“23. ………Under such circumstances and peculiar facts,
the Court has perused the impugned order of the ld. Single
Judge, and does not wish to interfere in the same as the ld.
Single Judge has considered all the orders passed by the
ld. Joint Registrar granting repeated extensions for filing
written statement and has imposed heavy costs on the
Defendant/Respondent for having filed the written
statement beyond prescribed time.”
(emphasis supplied)
D. Learned counsel for the Respondents would thereafter state that
given the existing position of law, the delay cannot be condoned
and relies upon the judgments of this Court in Amit Tara
(supra), Delhi Gymkhana Club (supra) and in particular
Manhar Sabharwal (supra).
E. Learned counsel for the Respondents further places reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Modula India
vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo10, to assert that the mere rejection of
a written statement does not render a party entirely defenceless.
Learned counsel for the Respondents would submit that such
9
2021 SCC OnLine Del 2629.
10
(1988) 4 SCC 619.
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non filing would not be prejudicial especially since it is neither
going to be an ex-parte proceedings nor does the same preclude
the Appellants from cross-examining witnesses.
REJOINDER:
6. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, in rejoinder,
would submit that-
A. There is now clarity in respect to the law as of 2024 and
reiterates his submission that the Appellants have been
prejudiced by the fact that the matter remained in limbo since
2019, and submits that the consequences should not be as strict
due to an event that was not in its control.
B. He would further emphasize that the suit is tainted with
falsehood and would, therefore, necessarily require a defence
through the filing of a Written Statement.
C. He submits that, given the nature of the dispute and the issues
raised therein, the mere fact that the Appellant may have the
benefit of cross-examination, the same would not suffice.
D. He would also seek to rely upon the application for condonation
of delay, wherein at paragraph 2, it has been stated that the
plaint and documents filed were voluminous, and that the
documents were of fair vintage. Additionally, he submits that
more than a thousand e-mails were exchanged between the
parties, contributing to a delay on the part of the Appellant in
reviewing the various documents and filing the Written
Statement. Further, the learned Senior Counsel would submit
that due to Covid-19 pandemic, the offices of the Appellants
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were shut, and the functioning of the Appellants company was
significantly limited.
ANALYSIS:
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused
the record, including the documents and judicial precedents relied
upon in support of their respective contentions.
8. Upon careful consideration, we find no infirmity in the
judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. The current position
of law is that there is no provision for the condonation of delay in
filing the Written Statement beyond the prescribed period. The same
is the result of the judgment of the coordinate bench in Manhar
Sabharwal (supra), Amit Tara (supra) as well as Delhi Gymkhana
Club (supra).
9. The judgment in Manhar Sabharwal (supra) has conclusively
settled the ambiguity regarding the interpretation of Rules 4 and 5 of
the High Court Rules. Consequently, the law as it presently stands,
clearly militates against the case presented by the Appellant.
10. Accepting the Appellant’s contention would mean applying a
judgment interpreting a statutory provision prospectively, which, it is
settled, is not permissible, unless specifically ordered, as otherwise,
judgments apply retrospectively.
11. We now advert to the aspect of the suit being in the nature of a
camouflage and also that of the chequered history as between the
parties therein.
12. We are of the opinion that the said aspect is not pertinent for the
purpose of determining what is clearly a pure question of law, and in
respect of which no equitable consideration can be given.
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13. We are also in agreement with the contention of the
Respondents that the Appellants were clearly not precluded from
participating in the proceedings and had, in fact, been actively
pursuing their remedies in the suit as well as in other proceedings
before this Court. The Appellant has been ably represented by
numerous counsel throughout the proceedings.
14. The contentions raised in the application for condonation of
delay, in support of the Written Statement, stating that the Appellant
was constrained by prevailing Covid-19 conditions and the necessity
for the Appellant to personally go through the documents, which were
voluminous is also, in our opinion, not very convincing. We are also
of the opinion that it is not the case that the Appellant herein lacked
resources or support, given the presence of highly qualified lawyers,
which is self-evident from various proceedings before this Court, and
not a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
15. In view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and the settled
position of law, we are of the considered opinion that the present
appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.
16. Accordingly, the present appeals, along with pending
application(s), if any, are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
ANIL KSHETARPAL
(JUDGE)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
(JUDGE)
AUGUST 14, 2025/v/kr/ds
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA FAO(OS) 39/2025 & FAO(OS) 40/2025 Page 17 of 17
Signing Date:14.08.2025
17:15:24