Jharkhand High Court
Renu Singh vs Sh. Vivek Prasad on 20 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:24553
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
A.C. (S.B.) No. 5 of 2014
----
Renu Singh, Wife of Manoj Kumar, Flat No.-101, Shiv Sai Towers,
Phase-II, New Area Morabadi, P.O. Ranchi University, P.S.
Bariyatu, District-Ranchi.
... ... Appellant
Versus
Sh. Vivek Prasad, Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement,
(Prevention of Money Laundering Act) Govt. of India, P.O. A.P.
Sabha, P.S. Tutorials, Lucknow-226 001.
... ... Respondent
with
A.C. (S.B.) No. 6 of 2014
----
Sujit Kumar @ Sujit Kumar Singh, S/o Shri Awadhesh Singh,
Quarter No. -L4/5, Cross Road No. 13, Sidgora, P.O. -Agrico, P.S.
Sidgora, Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum.
... ... Appellant
Versus
Sh. Vivek Prasad, Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement,
(Prevention of Money Laundering Act) Govt. of India, P.O. A.P.
Sabha, P.S. Tutorials, Lucknow-226 001.
... ... Respondent
with
A.C. (S.B.) No. 7 of 2014
----
Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Kumar Singh, Son of Late Awadhesh
Singh, R/o Flat No.-101, Shiv Sai Towers, Phase-II, New Area
Morabadi, P.O. Ranchi University, P.S. Bariyatu, District-Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
.
... ... Appellant
Versus
Sh. Vivek Prasad, Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement,
(Prevention of Money Laundering Act) Govt. of India, P.O. A.P.
Sabha, P.S. Tutorials, Lucknow-226 001.
... ... Respondent
with
A.C. (S.B.) No. 8 of 2014
----
1.Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Kumar Singh, Son of Sh. Awadhesh
Singh, R/o Flat No.-101, Shiv Sai Towers, Phase-II, New Area
Morabadi, P.O. Ranchi University, P.S. Bariyatu, District-Ranchi-
834008.
2.Subodh Kumar @ Subodh Kumar Singh, S/o Sh. Awadhesh
Singh, Quarter No.L4/5, Cross Road No.-13, Sidgora, P.O. & P.S.
Sidgora, Jamshedpur
... ... Appellants
Versus
Sh. Vivek Prasad, Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement,
(Prevention of Money Laundering Act) Govt. of India, P.O. A.P.
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2025:JHHC:24553
Sabha, P.S. Tutorials, Lucknow-226 001.
... ... Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
------
For the Appellants : Mr. Sameer Saurabh, Advocate
Ms. Divya, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Varun Girdhar, Advocate
--------
C.A.V. on 06/08/2025 Pronounced on 20/08/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
Prayer:
1. The instant appeals, under Section 42 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002, have been filed for setting
aside order dated 09.01.2014 passed by learned Appellate
Tribunal, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, at New Delhi
in connection with MP-PMLA-690-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-
PMLA-522/LKW/2013 [in A.C. (S.B.) No. 5 of 2014]; MP-
PMLA-688-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-PMLA-520/LKW/2013
[In A.C. (S.B.) No. 6 of 2014]; MP-PMLA-689-/LKW/2013
(COD) & FPA-PMLA-521/LKW/2013 [In A.C. (S.B.) No. 7 of
2014] and; MP-PMLA-592-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-PMLA-
489/LKW/2013 [In A.C. (S.B.) No. 8 of 2014], whereby and
whereunder the learned Tribunal has dismissed the
application for condonation of delay and consequently
dismissed the appeal. Further prayer has been made for
setting aside the order dated 11.10.2012 passed by the
adjudicating authority in original complain case no. 146 of
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2012 by which the learned adjudicating authority has
confirmed the provisional attachment no. 01/2012 dated
18.05.2012.
2. Since all the appeals arise out of the common order
dated 09.01.2014, as such with the consent of learned
counsel for the parties, they are taken up together and are
being disposed of by this common order.
Factual Matrix
3. Since common facts is involved in these matters, as
such for the sake of convenience, the factual aspect of AC
(SB) No. 5 of 2014 is referred as under:
4. On 15.10.2009 and 21.10.2009 searches were
conducted by the Income Tax Department at Ranchi and
village home residences of the Manoj Kumar, in course of
which four different Panchnama (Seizure Lists) were prepared
relating to recovery and seizure of (a) 169 Fixed Deposit
Receipts investing Rs. 12,54,45,499.00 with Uttar Bihar
Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Magarpal Murtaza Branch, Chapra,
out of fixed deposit of Rs. 12,54,45,499.00, fixed deposit of
Rs. 25,00,000/- was in the name appellant; (b) 24 Fixed
Deposit Receipts worth Rs. 12,75,000.00 invested with
United Bank of India, R.K. Mission Extension Counter,
Morabadi, Ranchi; (c) Rs. 4,49,000.00 in the saving account
of Manoj Kumar and Miss Summy Priya, daughter of Manoj
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Kumar from United Bank of India, R.K. Mission Extension
Counter, Morabadi, Ranchi and (d) Rs. 23,77,977.00
recovered from Saving Bank Account of Manoj Kumar,
Subodh Kumar Singh, Sujit Kumar, Smt. Renu Singh and
Miss Summy Priya from Uttar Bihar Kshetriya Gramin Bank,
Magarpal Murtaza Branch, Chapra.
5. The Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation)
referred the matter to the Vigilance Department due to his
proximity with I.G. (Vigilance) against the guidelines issued
by C.B.D.T., pursuant to which an F.I.R. vide Vigilance P.S.
Case No. 23/2009 dated 02.12.2009 was registered by
Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi. In course of investigation, the
Vigilance Bureau conducted fresh search of all the premises
of Manoj Kumar/appellant(s). Pursuant to filing of an F.I.R.
Manoj Kumar was taken into custody and therefore, he could
not make proper representation. He, however, was granted
bail by the High Court.
6. Pursuant to the investigation the Vigilance Bureau,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi filed a Final Report
bearing No. 15/2010 dated 15.04.2010 before the Learned
Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi for the offence under section
13(1) (e) and section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and sections 467, 468, 469, 471 and 420 of the
Indian Penal Code only against Manoj Kumar. Though
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cognizance has been taken by the concerned court, till date
no order has been passed on the point of framing of charges
against the sole accused Manoj Kumar, against whom Final
Form was submitted. Despite the fact that as is evident from
the above referred submission that all the bank accounts and
fixed deposit receipts were already seized by the Income Tax
Authorities and the same were still in their possession, which
was well within the knowledge of the Enforcement Directorate
authorities, the said authority issued a provisional
Attachment Order No. 1/2012 under Section 5(1) of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as the P.M.L. Act) on 18.05.2012.
7. The complainant / respondent filed a complaint before
the Learned Adjudicating Authority vide Original Complaint
No. 146/2012 for confirmation of the provisional attachment
order no.-1/2012 dated 18.05.2012 in terms of Section 5 (5)
of the P.M.L. Act in E.C.I.R. No./02/Pat.2011/AD dated
22.6.2011.
8. Being aggrieved with the same, the appellants
approached before the Appellate Tribunal against impugned
judgment dated 11th October, 2012 passed by the
Adjudicating Authority in Original Complaint No. 146 of 2012
dated 12th June, 2012 confirming the provisional attachment
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order no. 01/2012 dated 18th May, 2012 passed under the
PMLA, but with delay of 168 days.
9. The learned Tribunal considering the submissions
advanced by the parties, has dismissed the applications for
condonation of delay and as such the appeal preferred by the
appellants also stand dismissed.
10. Aggrieved with the order passed by the learned appellate
tribunal, the appellants have approached this, Court.
11. It appears from the factual aspect that against the
attachment proceeding, which culminated into attachment of
the property in question, the appellant approached the
appellate authority but since the same was barred by
limitation, hence, the appeal was filing along with the delay
condonation application filed under Section 26(3) of the
PMLA, 2002, taking inter alia, the ground that since the
appellant, Manoj Kumar, was feeling restlessness in the last
week of November, 2012 and his condition started
deteriorated as such he has taken to City Trust Hospital and
Research Centre, Ranchi on 1st December, 2012 where he
was diagnosed by the doctor to be suffering from Myocardial
Ischemia and his treatment was started. The applicant
remained in rest till 23rd January, 2013.
12. In support thereof, a certificate dated 23rd January,
2013 was issued by the concerned hospital which has been
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filed by the appellant with the delay condonation application.
Further ground has been taken that on 24th January, 2013
the appellant felt severe chest pain, therefore, he was again
admitted to the said hospital, where after examination it was
found that he had suffered a heart attack [Myocardial
Infraction].
13. The appellant remains in ICU and was discharged on
20th May, 2013 from the hospital. Submission has been made
that he was suffering from Myocardial Infraction, Jaundice
etc. which can be ascertained from his discharge slip dated
20th May, 2013 of City Trust Hospital and Research Centre,
Ranchi, copy of which has been filed along with the
application.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has taken the
ground that copy of discharge slip and the certificate from
City Trust Hospital & Research Centre, Ranchi are not
certified to be true copies and no reliance can be placed upon
them. He contended that the above two documents filed by
the applicant are not sufficient to infer sufficient cause
condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The veracity of the
alleged documents has also been challenged by the learned
counsel for the respondent on the following pleas: –
i. The copies of prescriptions of medical treatment to Manoj
Kumar by the Hospital from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 has
not been filed with the application.
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ii. Certificate from Hospital advising rest to the Appellant,
Manoj Kumar from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 was issued on
23.1.2013 that is after the alleged period of rest had
expired. No prescriptions or advise issued to the appellant
from time to time advising rest has been filed reflecting
that the certificate has been procured by the Appellant.
iii. Discharge slip does not indicate the nature of medical
treatment given to Manoj Kumar nor any other relevant
record has been produced to show as to what treatment
was prescribed and given to the said Appellant.
iv. No documents showing details of treatment given by
the Hospital to Manoj Kumar when he was allegedly
admitted in ICU for the period from 24.1.2013 to
20.5.2013 has been filed with the applications.
v. Copies of medical treatment bills from City Trust
Hospital & Research Centre for treatment in ICU of Manoj
Kumar have not been filed by the applicants.
vi. The appellant, Manoj Kumar Singh has not even
disclosed the name of the Doctor who had treated him and
had advised rest and treated him during the period he
was allegedly admitted in ICU.”
15. The appellate authority after considering the averments
made in the delay condonation application and arguments
advanced by the parties and law laid down in this regard
dismissed the delay condonation application stating that the
cause which has been shown cannot be said to be sufficient
to condone the delay and consequently, the appeals preferred
by the appellants also stand dismissed.
16. This Court, on perusal of the impugned order passed in
the appeal, has found that the appellate authority while
deciding the application filed for condoning the delay has also
entered into the merit of the issue.
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Submission of the learned counsel for appellants:
17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has
submitted that the order by which the delay condonation
application has been rejected cannot be said to be just and
proper since the appellant was suffering from cardiac disease
and to that effect medical prescriptions were appended with
the application, which itself suggest that the appellant due to
the unavoidable circumstances could not be able to prefer
appeal within the period of 45 days as required.
18. It has been contended that the authority has not
appreciated the medical prescriptions issued by the Hospital
in which the appellant was indoor patient and as such the
delay has been caused.
19. It has also been contended that while not condoning the
delay rather dismissing the delay condonation application the
tribunal has entered into merit also, which was not
warranted reason being that once the delay has been refused
to be condoned it was not available for the authority to enter
into the merit of the case, therefore, the present appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-ED:
20. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the
respondents-ED has submitted that the ground which has
been agitated for the purpose of showing sufficient cause in
condoning the delay has properly been appreciated by the
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authority, which would be evident from the finding so
recorded in the impugned order.
21. It has further been submitted that all the
certificates/prescriptions issued by the concerned hospital
has been disbelieved since the photocopy of the said petition
has been filed without any valid prescriptions and even the
report showing the reason said to be unavoidable.
22. The submission has been made that there is no dispute
that once the appeal was dismissed on the ground of
limitation then it was not available for the appellate tribunal
to enter into the issue of merit.
23. It has also been submitted that the order impugned may
be confined only to the issue of limitation and so far as the
discussion so made on the issue of merit concerned, the
same can be ignored by making observation that the said
finding will not come in the way of the further adjudication of
the pending issues.
Analysis
24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the memo of appeal as also
the impugned order.
25. The issue which requires consideration is as to:
I. Whether the consideration so made while dealing with
the issue of limitation is unjustified?
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II. Whether it was available for the authority also to enter
into the merit once the application filed for delay
condonation has been rejected?
III. Whether the discussion so made on the issue of merit
even has been passed can the impugned order be
restricted only to the issue of limitation?
26. All the issues since are inter-linked, as such they are
taken up together.
27. The issue of limitation is first to be considered since
herein the delay condonation application has been filed to
condone the delay in filing the appeals. The ground has been
referred showing the medical ailments suffering from cardiac
issues. Medical certificates/prescriptions have been annexed
said to be issued by the concerned hospital.
28. This Court before considering the reason assigned in the
delay condonation application needs to refer herein what
constitutes „sufficient cause‟.
29. Furthermore, there is no dispute about the fact that
generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground
of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from
inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the
application to condone the delay before entering into the
merit of the lis.
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30. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
31. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim,
(1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in
Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate
harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law
provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk
of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on
equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized
by law.”
32. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
under:
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“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds.”
33. While considering the similar issue, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as
under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle
is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
34. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for
filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide motive and
gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which
should be taken into consideration while considering the
question of condonation of delay.
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35. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762,
has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The
proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court
by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further
has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it
should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter
naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts
and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona
fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts
as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it. In this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always
material and relevant when the court is dealing with
applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5
and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have
been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions
of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to
be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section
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14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that
the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant
because apart from the general criticism made against the
appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of limitation no
other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have
already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner
rejected the appellant’s application for condonation of delay
only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to file the
appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and
that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.
36. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or
not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right
is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is
necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and
at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
37. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning
of „sufficient cause‟. The consideration of meaning of
„sufficient cause‟ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81],
wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at
paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder: –
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that
which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices
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to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances
of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to
be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn.
Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 :
AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629]
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993]
this Court explained the difference between a “good cause”
and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient
cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that
of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or
not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on
the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
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AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil.
A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what
it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to
a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its
aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.
28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a
stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired
in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7
SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705
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: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation
amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93
: AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
38. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
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afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless
a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
39. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression „sufficient cause‟ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ram Nath
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Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient
cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or
not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot
be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps.
But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule
and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not
taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected
when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and
law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon
the parties either way.”
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40. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression „sufficient cause‟ has been dealt with
which means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part
in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”.
41. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements
has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of
period of delay but the said consideration must be passed
upon the explanation if found to be sufficiently explained.
42. This Court on the basis of aforesaid settled position of
law is now proceeding to examine the finding so recorded by
the authority as to whether proper appreciation of the
ground(s) so agitated in the delay condonation application is
there or not.
43. It is evident from the delay condonation application that
the ground has been taken for cardiac problem supported by
medical prescriptions. But it has been disputed by learned
counsel for the respondents-ED taking the ground that the
copies of prescriptions of medical treatment to Manoj Kumar by
the Hospital from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 has not been filed
with the application. Further ground has been that the
Certificate from Hospital advising rest to the Appellant, Manoj
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Kumar from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 was issued on 23.1.2013
that is after the alleged period of rest had expired. No
prescriptions or advise issued to the appellant from time to
time advising rest has been filed reflecting that the certificate
has been procured by the Appellant. So far Discharge slip is
concerned, it does not indicate the nature of medical treatment
given to Manoj Kumar nor any other relevant record has been
produced to show as to what treatment was prescribed and
given to the said Appellant, therefore, it cannot be relied upon.
Even No documents have been placed before the court showing
details of treatment given by the Hospital to Manoj Kumar
when he was allegedly admitted in ICU for the period from
24.1.2013 to 20.5.2013. Even the Copies of medical treatment
bills from City Trust Hospital & Research Centre for treatment
in ICU of Manoj Kumar have not been filed by the appellant-
Manoj Kumar and name of the doctor under whom he was
under treatment has also not been disclosed.
44. Furthermore, the other appellants were also there, who
could have filed the appeal in time without waiting for filing of
appeal by the appellant-Manoj Kumar but they also chosen
not to file appeal within time rather they chose to wait for
filing of appeal by appellant-Manoj Kumar and this aspect of
the matter has not been explained by the appellants.
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45. This Court is in agreement with the reasoning so given
in arriving at the conclusion for showing no sufficient cause
in condoning the delay.
46. The basic reason which this Court has found after going
through the delay condonation application that although the
petitioner is said to suffer from cardiac disease and but no
medical prescription has been appended rather only the
certificate issued by the concerned hospital is there. Though
Pathological reports have been furnished. We have perused
the pathological report and in one of the reports, the
parameter appears to be normal.
47. This Court has also considered while pointing out on
behalf of learned counsel for the respondent-ED that in a
case of cardiac disease, the angiography report is the best
way to ascertain the cardiac disease but there is no such
report. The aforesaid contention advanced on behalf of the
respondent-ED cannot be disputed.
48. This Court considering the aforesaid fact is of the view
that the delay if said to be not sufficiently explained can be
said to suffer from an error and in that view of the matter, the
stand which has been taken on behalf of the appellant in
approaching the competent forum cannot be said to be with
due diligence.
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49. This Court taking into consideration the aforesaid facts
and discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the
impugned order so far dismissal of appeal on the ground of
delay in filing the appeals is concerned does not require any
interference.
50. Hence, all the appeals are hereby dismissed.
51. So far as the entering into the issue of merit by the
appellate tribunal is concerned, there is no dispute that once
the lis is being decided on the issue of limitation, it is not
available either for the court of law or the quasi-judicial
authority/functionary to enter into the issue of merit but
here the issue on merit has also been discussed and the case
has been dismissed even on merit.
52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
the case of Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v.
Labour Court, Bhilwara, (2009) 3 SCC 525, has opined that
while deciding an application for condonation of delay the
Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case.
53. It has also been observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
the case State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar
Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1927 that the merits of the
case cannot be considered while dealing with the application
for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
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54. It needs to refer herein the recent judgment of the
Hon‟ble Apex Cour rendered in the case of H. Guruswamy
& Ors v. a. Krishnaiah since deceased by Lrs., civil appeal
no. 317 OF 2025 wherein it has been observed that “Once it
is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits
of the main matter.
55. In the aforesaid judgment it has also been held that the
concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented
approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to
frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.
56. Thus, the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona
fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
57. This Court in view of the aforesaid settled position of law
is of the view that the part of the order whereby and
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whereunder the discussion has been made on the issue of
merit and case has been dismissed on merit, is unwarranted
reason being that if the application has been dismissed on
the ground of limitation itself then the issue on merit ought
not to have been discussed and while doing so tribunal has
committed error.
58. But the question is that if the said error is present then
what benefit the appellants will get. If the lis has been
dismissed on the ground of limitation the consequence would
be dismissal of appeal also, although not on merit but on the
issue of limitation.
59. Accordingly, all the issues are answered.
60. In view thereof, all the appeals stand dismissed.
61. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Alankar/
A.F.R.
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