Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Smt. Minati Goswamiand Another vs The State Of West Bengal And Others on 19 August, 2025
2025:CHC-AS:1584-DB
Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present: The Hon'be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar
W.B.L.R.T. 14 of 2025
Smt. Minati Goswamiand another
Vs.
The State of West Bengal and others
For the petitioners : Mr. Shyama Prasad Purkait
Ms. Moumita Mandal
For the State : Mr. Sk. Md. Galib
Ms. Priyamvada Singh
For the respondent nos.5 & 14 : Mr. Manoranjan Jana
Mr. Radhasyam Maiti
Heard on : 19.08.2025
Judgment on : 19.08.2025
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. After the hearing is concluded and the court is about to pass
judgment, learned counsel for the private respondents, to whom
it was made abundantly clear that the writ petition is going to be
allowed, seeks to raise an objection to this court taking up the
matter on the purported ground that a relative of one of us
(Bhattacharyya, J.) had appeared at one stage in a different
matter between the same parties.
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2. However, we strongly deprecate such unsportsmanlike and
unfair attitude of the learned Advocate for the private
respondents, which should be beneath the dignity of any counsel
to adopt.
3. We say so because after having come to know clearly that the
court was going to pass an order against his client, the learned
Advocate cites the appearance of the relative of one of us
(Bhattacharyya, J.), that too in a completely different matter
having no connection with the present writ petition.
4. Despite such previous matter being between the same parties,
there is no nexus between the said matter and the present one.
5. Moreover, it is absurd that no objection was taken at the outset
but while passing the final order, seeing that his client is going
to lose the matter, learned counsel takes such an objection.
6. To us, it is shameful for a member of the Bar to take such plea
at such a stage, since we are a part of the same system, that is,
the Bar and the Bench work in tandem and an action like this,
which is beneath the dignity of an Advocate, affects the court
more than the concerned counsel.
7. In any event, we choose to turn down such belated attempt to
take the matter off the board during the course of passing
judgment, after counsel for the parties were heard at length.
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8. Affidavit-in-opposition and affidavit-in-reply filed respectively by
the private respondents and the writ petitioner be kept on
record.
9. The matter arises out of an order of the Land Reforms and
Tenancy Tribunal whereby the Tribunal affirmed an order of the
Collector condoning the delay of about sixteen years in
preferring an application under Section 9 of the West Bengal
Acquisition of Home Stead for Agricultural Labourers, Artisans
and Fishermen Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1975
Act”).
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that under Section 9
of the 1975 Act, if there is any dispute on the question as to
whether a land has vested in an occupier under the provisions of
Section 4 of the 1975 Act, the matter shall be referred to the
Collector, whose decision thereon shall be final.
11. Section 4 of the 1975 Act provides that where an occupier has
been in possession of any land on the 26 th day of June, 1975,
then, if the land in his possession does not exceed .0334
hectare, such land, and if the land in his possession exceeds
.0334 hectare, so much of such land as does not exceed .0334
hectare, shall stand acquired by the State Government and shall
thereupon stand transferred to and vest absolutely in favour of
such occupier.
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12. The writ petitioner was declared to be such occupier by an order
dated July 25, 2007 passed by the concerned BL & LRO (Block
Land and Land Reforms Officer).
13. The private respondents, on the allegation that the dispute had
not been disposed of by the BL & LRO, thereby committing
contempt of a previous direction of the Land Reforms and
Tenancy Tribunal, had approached the Tribunal for taking
action for such contempt.
14. The learned Tribunal turned down the same, taking note of the
fact that the proceeding had not only been initiated, giving rise
to Miscellaneous Case no.62 of 2003, but had already been
disposed of and as such no contempt lay.
15. The private respondents preferred a writ petition against such
order of the Tribunal, which was also turned down by a
coordinate Bench of this court by an order dated July 14, 2023
passed in WBLRT 38 of 2009.
16. While dismissing the said writ petition, the Division Bench
observed, inter alia, that the BL & LRO acted in terms of the
order dated August 7, 2010 and passing a final order; hence, it
could not be said that the BL & LRO acted in contemptuous
violation of such order, simply on the ground that there were
grievances with regard to the order dated May 4, 2007 of the
concerned BL & LRO.
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17. In such circumstances, the court observed that the writ petition
should be dismissed.
18. The writ court further observed that the order dated May 4,
2007, passed by the concerned BL & LRO disposing of
Miscellaneous Case No. 62 of 2007, may or may not be
justifiable and the writ petitioner might have grievances against
the same which are to be ventilated “in accordance with law
before an appropriate forum”.
19. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner before us submits that
merely by virtue of such observation, no right was created to
prefer an appeal in favour of the private respondents.
20. Citing the pendency of the said writ petition and another
unconnected civil suit, the private respondents sought to explain
the delay in preferring a challenge under Section 9 of the 1975
Act before the Collector.
21. Although the said challenge was initially captioned as one under
Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955,
subsequently the same was amended and labelled as a challenge
under Section 9 of the 1975 Act.
22. Learned counsel submits that although Section 9 does not
contemplate any limitation period, the residuary provision in the
Limitation Act should be applicable and as such, the challenge
having been preferred after an inordinately long period of 16
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years from the date of the impugned order, ought to have been
turned down at the outset.
23. However, the Collector condoned the delay by observing that the
case should be admitted for adjudication of the “justifiableness”
of the grievances of the appellants on merit as it is settled law
that technicalities of limitation alone cannot bring the process of
adjudication to an end.
24. The Tribunal affirmed the said order by going one step further,
observing that since no provision of limitation was engrafted in
Section 9 of the 1975 Act, there was no scope for condonation of
delay, and no application for condonation of delay was required
to be filed at all.
25. Learned counsel appearing for the private respondents opposes
the writ petition and submits that in view of a strong case on
merits having been made out, the learned Tribunal was justified
in affirming the order of the Collector entertaining the challenge
under Section 9 of the 1975 Act.
26. It is further submitted that since Section 9 does not contain any
limitation period, the challenge under Section 9 could not be
said to have been time-barred.
27. Upon a careful consideration of the submissions of the parties,
we are unable to accept the contention of the private
respondents.
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28. It is well-settled that even if no specific period of limitation is
stipulated, a party cannot be permitted to take out a challenge
under any statutory provision to any order passed under the
said statute after an inordinate period of time, since valuable
rights accrue in favour of the party enjoying the fruits of such
impugned order in-between.
29. There has to be a finality to litigation and, as such, an
inordinate delay of 16 years in preferring the challenge ought to
have been construed to be a sufficient ground for dismissing the
challenge under Section 9 of the 1975 Act, if not otherwise, on
the ground of equity, since the private respondents did not come
with clean hands in preferring the challenge after long 16 years.
30. Even otherwise, we are to consider as to what is the nature of a
challenge under Section 9 of the 1975 Act.
31. The language in which the said provision is couched is that if
there is any dispute on the question as to whether a land has
vested in an occupier under the provisions of Section 4 of the
1975 Act, the matter shall be “referred” to the Collector.
32. A reference cannot be verbal, since the grounds of challenge as
well as the nature of the order are to be disclosed while referring
the matter to the Collector.
33. As such, since neither a suit nor an appeal lies before the
Collector, as both are creatures of statute, it has to be construed
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that the reference to the Collector under Section 9 has to be by
way of an application.
34. The residuary provision in the Schedule of the Limitation Act,
1963, that is, the Article 137 thereof, provides the limitation
period for any other application for which no period of limitation
is provided elsewhere in the said Act.
35. Such limitation period is stipulated therein as three years from
when the right to apply accrues.
36. It is to be noted that Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act
specifically provides that where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule of
the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation
Act shall apply as if the said period was the period prescribed by
the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which
they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
37. Thus, on a plain reading of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act,
even if no specific limitation period is prescribed in a statute, by
necessary implication, the provision of Section 3 shall apply as if
such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule of the
Limitation Act.
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38. Since no specific period of limitation for taking out a reference
under Section 9 of the 1975 Act has been prescribed in the
statute, it shall be deemed, on a composite reading of Section
29(2) and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, that the limitation
for such application/reference will be three years from the date
when the right to apply accrues.
39. Since the order which has been challenged before the Collector
under Section 9 was passed by the BL & LRO on July 25, 2007,
the date of accrual of the right to apply arose on the self-same
date, since the private respondents, who have subsequently
preferred the challenge under Section 9, were themselves the
applicants therein and the order was passed in their presence.
40. Thus, the limitation period for preferring a challenge under
Section 9, under the residuary clause of Article 137 of the
Limitation Act, expired three years after July 25, 2007, that is,
on or about July 24, 2010.
41. The challenge under Section 9 was filed after an inordinate delay
of 16 years from the order, thus being hopelessly barred by
limitation.
42. Even the private respondents, by filing an application under
Section 5, read with Section 14, of the Limitation Act, submitted
to the rigours of the Limitation Act and admitted that the
Limitation Act is applicable.
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43. The ground for condonation of delay cited by the private
respondents in the said condonation application was primarily
that the private respondents were engaged in “litigation”
otherwise.
44. One such “litigation” was the challenge before the Land Reforms
and Tenancy Tribunal and the subsequent writ petition
therefrom.
45. However, the said challenge was on a completely different footing
and not in the nature of an application under Section 9 of the
1975 Act or a challenge to the order dated July 25, 2007,
whereby the BL & LRO categorically held that on scrutiny of the
records of rights and available papers and on perusal of the
matter, the recording in favour of the present writ petitioner was
upheld.
46. In fact, the application filed before the Land Reforms and
Tenancy Tribunal was on an allegation of alleged contempt on
the perception that the BL & LRO had not disposed of the
matter, contrary to the directions of the Tribunal.
47. The Tribunal turned down such plea on the ground that the
matter had already been disposed of and the writ court affirmed
the said order.
48. Hence, the said application for contempt cannot be equated with
a bona fide challenge to the substantive order dated July 25,
2007 before a wrong forum.
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49. The other litigation cited by the private respondents in the
condonation application was a title suit between the parties
which, however, was on an entirely different footing, not being a
challenge to the order dated July 25, 2007 in any manner
whatsoever.
50. Thus, the pendency of the other litigations are not germane and
do not attract the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
as sought to be argued by the private respondents herein.
51. That apart, in the order of the BL & LRO dated July 25, 2007
itself, the said authority categorically recorded that the
applicant therein, that is, the present private respondents, may
prefer an appeal before the appropriate authority under Section
9 of the 1975 Act, thus, making it abundantly clear as to what
provision was to be resorted to by the private respondents.
52. Hence, the private respondents cannot feign ignorance of the
available remedy in that regard, since they had knowledge of the
same from the date of the impugned order of the BL & LRO
itself.
53. Hence, on a composite consideration of the above
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal
acted completely without jurisdiction in coming to the
conclusion that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not
attracted, since Section 9 of the 1975 Act does not specifically
stipulate any limitation.
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54. Insofar as the order of the Collector under Section 9 is
concerned, the same merely deals with the condonation
application in an absolutely cursory manner, by observing that
the objection as to limitation was a mere technicality, without
considering the huge and inordinate delay of 16 years in
preferring the challenge and that there was no sufficient
explanation furnished by the private respondents for such delay.
55. Although courts and quasi-judicial forums are lenient in
condoning delay, such lenience cannot be extended to such an
extent that the provisions in the Limitation Act would be
rendered nugatory. Moreover, no lenience can be shown in
respect of litigants who are utterly negligent in pursuing their
legal remedy. In the present instance, the private respondents
waited for 16 long years to prefer the challenge, without
providing any plausible justification for such prolonged delay at
all. They had been litigating before other forums in the
meantime and, thus, had sufficient access to legal advice from
counsel.
56. Instead of relegating the parties back to the first forum, since we
have discussed at length the grounds cited by the private
respondents for the condonation application and as we have
turned down such grounds, we choose to decide the matter
finally in the present proceeding.
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57. In view of the above discussions, it was a palpable act of
travelling de hors its jurisdiction on the part of the Land
Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal and the Collector, in passing the
orders impugned herein, as the provisions of the Limitation Act
were very much applicable to the application under Section 9 of
the 1975 Act and the condonation of the long delay of 16 years
in a mechanical manner, without any reason being shown for
such delay, was inexcusable.
58. In such view of the matter, WPLRT 14 of 2025 is allowed on
contest, thereby setting aside the impugned order of the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, Second Bench in
Case No. O.A. 2536 of 2024 (LRTT) as well setting aside Order
No. 3 dated July 25, 2024 passed by the Collector under the
1975 Act and ADM and DL & LRO, South 24 Parganas in L.R.
Appeal No. 981 of 2023.
59. There will be no order as to costs.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
AD-16
AK