Babu vs Elsamma Mathew @ Ely Kurchardt on 20 August, 2025

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Kerala High Court

Babu vs Elsamma Mathew @ Ely Kurchardt on 20 August, 2025

                                                              2025:KER:62276

RFA NO. 162 OF 2020


                                       1

                                                                         CR

                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                    PRESENT

                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM

         WEDNESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 29TH SRAVANA, 1947

                             RFA NO. 162 OF 2020

         AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 16.03.2020 IN OS NO.117 OF

                           2013 OF SUB COURT, PALA


APPELLANTS/DEFENDANT NO.2 AND 3:
     1      BABU
            AGED 46 YEARS
            S/O.LATE GEORGE, RESIDING AT PONNAMKUZHIYIL HOUSE,
            KURUVAMUZHI, KOOVAPPALLY VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK,
            KORATTY KARA, PRESENTLY AT 83 MILE STREAM SHANIKIL, BLARNEY
            ROAD, CORK IRELAND REPRESENTED BY POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER
            ALEYAMMA(MOTHER).

     2       ALEYAMMA,
             AGED 62 YEARS
             W/O.LATE GEORGE, RESIDING AT PONNAMKUZHIYIL HOUSE,
             KURUVAMUZHI, KORATTY KARA, KOOVAPPALLY VILLAGE,
             KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK.

             BY ADVS.
             SRI.BIJU .C. ABRAHAM
             SHRI.B.KRISHNAN
             SHRI.R.PARTHASARATHY


RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT NO.1:

     1       ELSAMMA MATHEW @ ELY KURCHARDT
             W/O.KUCHARDT, RESIDING AT KARWENDEL STRASSE 21, 12203,
             BERLIN, WEST GERMANY REPRESENTED BY HER POWER OF ATTORNEY
             HOLDER SMT.ALICE, W/O.CHACKO, AGED 69 YEARS, MOOZHAYIL
             HOUSE, KOT ROAD, MUTTAPPALLY, MUKKOOTTU THARA, KOTTAYAM
             DISTRICT.
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RFA NO. 162 OF 2020


                                    2


     2     SMITHA,
           AGED 42 YEARS
           W/O.BABU, RESIDING AT PONNAMKUZHIYIL HOUSE, KURUVAMUZHI,
           KORATTY KARA, KOOVAPPALLY VILLAGE, KANJIRAPPALLY TALUK,
           PRESENTLY AT 83 MILE, STREAM SHANIKIL, BLARNEY ROAD, CORK,
           IRELAND.


           R1 BY ADVS.
           SMT.NISHA GEORGE
           SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
           SHRI.SIDHARTH.R.WARIYAR
           SRI.T.KRISHNANUNNI (SR.)

           R2 BY SRI.MATHEWS K.UTHUPPACHAN




     THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 20.08.2025,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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RFA NO. 162 OF 2020


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                                                                   CR
                               JUDGMENT

1. Appellants are the Defendants Nos.2 & 3 in the suit. The

Respondent No.1 is the Plaintiff and the Respondent No.2 is the

Defendant No.1 in the suit. The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff filed

the suit for cancellation of Ext.A2 Sale Deed dated 18.09.2013

and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to

vacate the building in the plaint schedule property. The plaint

schedule property is an extent of 87.40 Ares of land and the

building therein, which belonged to the Plaintiff as per Ext.A1

Sale Deed dated 02.06.1975. Ext.A2 is a Sale Deed executed

by the Defendant No.2, as the Power of Attorney Holder of the

Plaintiff, as per Ext.A4 Power of Attorney dated 26.02.2001

executed by the plaintiff in favour of the Defendant No.2,

transferring the plaint schedule property for a sale consideration

of Rs.2,50,000/-. The plaintiff is a lady residing in West Germany
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since the year 1968. The Defendant No.1 is the wife of

Defendant No.2. The Defendant No.2 is the son, and the

Defendant No.3 is the wife of the brother of the plaintiff, George,

who died in an accident on 26.10.2000.

2. The case of the plaintiff is that since the plaintiff had been

residing abroad, the plaint schedule property was being looked

after by the plaintiff’s brother, George, till his death and

thereafter by his son, the Defendant No.2. The plaintiff had

certain properties in Vandiperiyar also. After the purchase of the

plaint schedule property as per Ext.A1 Sale Deed, the plaintiff

permitted the family of her brother to reside in the building on

the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff and the family of her

brother were having a smooth and cordial relationship. After the

death of her brother, the plaintiff planned to dispose of the plaint

schedule property and the other properties at Vandiperiyar since

it was found that Defendant No.2 would not be able to manage
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the properties. Ext.A4 Power of Attorney was executed on

26.02.2001 in favour of the Defendant No.2 on account of the

close family relationship and mutual confidence since the

Defendant No.2 agreed to look after and sell the properties. On

the strength of Ext.A4 Power of Attorney, the Defendant No.2

sold the properties at Vandiperiyar as per Exts.A7 & A8 Sale

Deeds dated 29.07.2003 and 02.05.2003 respectively. Though

the Plaintiff used to enquire with the Defendant No.2 as to the

progress of the sale of the plaint schedule property, the

Defendant No.2 had been representing that it requires some

time, as the land value is very low. Only in February 2013, the

Plaintiff came to know, in her enquiry, that the Defendant No.2

executed Ext.A2 Sale Deed in favour of the Defendant No.1

when the Defendant No.3 asked the Plaintiff to leave the plaint

schedule property, shouting that the Plaintiff had no right over

the said property. Defendant No.2, being an agent of the
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Plaintiff, obtained an undue advantage by alienating the

property to his wife – Defendant No.1, thus directly benefiting

himself. The confidence reposed by the Plaintiff in the

Defendant No.2 has been misused to obtain gain for himself,

which is against the principles of the law of agency. Defendant

No.2, bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interest of the

Plaintiff by pretending as such, gained for himself huge

pecuniary advantages in derogation of the rights of the Plaintiff

in the plaint schedule property. The Defendant No.2 has

misrepresented and acted fraudulently so as to secure an

undue advantage at the cost of the Plaintiff’s interest. Hence,

Ext.A2 Sale Deed is liable to be cancelled and the defendants

are liable to be vacated from the plaint schedule property.

3. The Defendant No.2 and the Defendant No.3 filed separate

Written Statements dated 02.01.2014 and 13.11.2013,

respectively.

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4. The Defendant No.2 filed Written Statement contending, inter

alia, that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to the

plaintiff. The Defendant No.2 transferred the properties of the

plaintiff as per Document Nos.2794/2003 (Ext.A7) and

2361/2003 (Ext.A2) after receiving sufficient consideration by

the Defendant No.2 using Ext.A4 Power of Attorney given by the

Plaintiff. The sale consideration was fully paid to the Plaintiff

directly and through the bank, and the Plaintiff has issued a

Receipt to Defendant No.2 in the year 2005. The Defendant

No.2 has not misused or committed breach of trust of the power

of attorney given by the Plaintiff. The plaintiff had knowledge

about the Ext.A2 document on the date of registration of the said

document itself. The said document is valid and sustainable and

registered after receiving consideration, and the plaintiff has

received the consideration from the Defendant No.2. The

allegation that the plaintiff has not received the money and that
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the Defendant No.1 did not have sufficient financial resources

at the time of execution of Ext.A2 is incorrect. The Defendant

No.3 is having the right to reside in the plaint schedule property.

The Defendant No.3 has been residing in the plaint schedule

property in her own right since the year 1975 with her husband.

The suit is barred by limitation.

5. The contentions of the Defendant No.3 in her Written Statement

are substantially the same as those raised by the Defendant

No.2 in his Written Statement.

6. Subsequent to the filing of Written statements by the Defendant

Nos. 2 and 3, the Counsel for the Defendants filed a Memo

dated 05.11.2014 for treating the contentions in the Written

Statements of the Defendants Nos.2 and 3 as the contentions

of the Defendant No.1 also.

7. After the filing of Written Statements by the Defendants Nos.2

and 3 and the aforesaid Memo by the Counsel for the
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Defendants, the Plaintiff amended the Plaint as per the Order in

I.A.No.801/2015 dated 04.09.2015, incorporating additional

contentions that the Plaintiff has not accepted any amount as

consideration towards Ext.A2 Sale Deed. The claim that the

plaintiff issued a Receipt in 2005 is against the facts and truth.

The plaintiff has not issued any such Receipt as alleged. The

Receipt, if any, is obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and

undue influence. The Receipt, if any, does not relate to the

alleged sale of the plaint schedule property. Even if the

Defendant No.2 had somehow managed to obtain any sort of

Receipt, it was never intended to be one for the sale of the plaint

schedule property as the Defendant No.2 was always

maintaining and even made the Plaintiff believe that the plaint

schedule property was yet to be sold and that the Plaintiff was

having other property too, which was also dealt with by the

Defendant No.2.

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8. After amendment of the plaint, the Defendant No.3 filed an

additional Written Statement dated 10.09.2015 for herself and

as Power of Attorney holder of the Defendant No.2 denying the

allegations incorporated through amendment in the Plaint and

further contending that the plaintiff received the entire sale

consideration of her properties directly and through the bank

and that a Receipt with respect to the same was issued to the

Defendant No.2.

9. The Trial Court framed the following issues in the suit:

. Whether the second defendant in collusion with the first
defendant fraudulently created Ext.A2?

. Whether Ext.A2 is void?

. Whether Ext.A2 has to be cancelled?

. Whether the defendants are to be directed to vacate the
building in the plaint schedule property by way of mandatory
injunction?

. Reliefs and costs?

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. Is the suit barred by limitation?

10. From the side of the plaintiff, she was examined as PW1, one

of the friends of the deceased brother of the plaintiff was

examined as PW2, the Advocate Commissioner who prepared

Ext.C1 and C1(a) was examined as PW3 and marked Exts.A1

to A12 in evidence. From the side of the defendants, the

Defendant No.2 was examined as DW1, the Bank Manager who

brought Ext.X1 Statement of Accounts was examined as DW2

and marked Exts.B1 to B4 in evidence. The Statement of

Accounts brought by DW2 is marked as Ext.X1. The

Commission Report and Sketch prepared by PW3 were marked

as Exts.C1 & C1(a).

11. The Trial Court decreed the suit, cancelling Ext.A2 Sale Deed

and granting a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to

vacate the building in the plaint schedule property within a

period of one month from the date of the decree and allowing
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the plaintiff to realize the costs of the suit from the defendants.

The Trial Court found that Ext.A2 is void and the Plaintiff is

having title over the plaint schedule property; that the

Defendants have been residing in the property as permitted by

the Plaintiff; that the plaintiff is entitled to get mandatory

injunction as she is not ready to permit the Defendants to

continue their residence in the property; that the Plaintiff has

filed the suit within three years as required under Article 59 of

the Limitation Act from the date on which the facts entitled the

Plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled first become known to

her; that the evidence and circumstances probabilise the case

of the Plaintiff; that the Defendant No.2 who was bound in a

fiduciary character to protect the interest of the Plaintiff had put

himself in a position where his interest and duty is in conflict;

that the Defendant No.2 who is a trustee for sale had obtained

benefit out of the trust and gained pecuniary advantage for
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himself; that the Defendant No.1 was not employed and she has

no source of income; that the Defendant No.1 has no case that

she received money from any source to purchase the property;

and that Defendant No.1 has not entered into the box to prove

that she purchased the property for valid consideration.

12. The present Appeal is filed by the Defendants 2 and 3 alone.

The Defendant No.1 did not file any appeal challenging the

judgment and decree in the suit. It is stated in the appeal that

Defendant No.1, who is impleaded as Respondent No.2 in the

appeal, is working in Ireland and therefore she is unable to join

as Appellant in the appeal.

13. Respondent No.2 appeared through counsel in this appeal.

14. I heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants, Sri. B. Krishnan,

assisted by Adv. Sri. Biju C. Abraham, the learned Senior

Counsel for the Respondent No.1, Sri. T. Krishnanunni, assisted
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by Adv. Sri. Sidharth R. Wariyar and the learned counsel for the

Respondent No.2, Sri. Mathews K. Uthuppachan.

15. The learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that the suit

must fail on two grounds. First is that the suit is barred by

limitation. Second is that even if it is accepted that all the

findings of the Trial Court are correct, the relief of cancellation

of Ext.A2 Sale Deed and consequential mandatory injunction

could not be granted in favour of the Plaintiff. The learned

Counsel contended that the suit was filed in the year 2013 to

cancel the Ext.A2 document, which was executed in the year

2003. Ext.A2 is a registered document. In such a case, in view

of the definition of the phrase ‘a person is said to have notice’ in

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Plaintiff is deemed

to have knowledge of the fact of execution of Ext.A2 from the

time at which it was executed. The learned counsel relied on the

Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Ravikumar v. S. Kumar in
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SLP (Civil) No.9472/2023 and the decision of this Court in St. Mary’s

Church, Pattanam v. O.P. Paul and Another [2017 (2) KLT 687] in support

of his contention. The learned counsel relied on the decision of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant

Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle [2024 KHC 6743],

in which it is held that long possession operates as notice of title

and that when long possession has been with a party for several

decades, it strengthens his claim for title. In the present case,

Defendant No.1 has been in possession of the property since

the year 2003 on the strength of her title, and the suit was filed

only in the year 2013, nearly a decade later. The learned

Counsel cited the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court

in Travancore Bank Ltd. v. P.C. Abraham and another [1954 SCC OnLine

Ker 49] and contended that there is no fiduciary relationship

between the promisor or promisee and the beneficiary of a

contract. The learned Counsel contended that Ext.A4 Power of
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Attorney is a contract of Agency and hence no fiduciary

relationship is created between the Plaintiff and the Defendant

No.2. The learned counsel cited the decision of this Court in

Mathu v. Cherchi [1990 (1) KLT 416] to substantiate the point that in

a case where the person executing the deed is not blind, infirm

or otherwise incapacitated and no fraudulent misrepresentation

is made to him and he had the opportunity of reading the deed,

the plea of non est factum is not available. The learned Counsel

contended that Ext.B1 Receipt is admitted by the Plaintiff and

hence the plea of non est factum is not available to her in view

of the aforesaid decision. The learned Counsel invited my

attention to the various provisions under Chapter X of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872, dealing with Agency, and contended that in

case of violation of any contract of agency, the remedy available

to the principal is only for recovery of compensation and not

repudiation of the contract entered into by the agent. The
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learned counsel further contended that as against the third party

who entered into a contract with the principal through the agent,

the principal is not having any remedy. Hence, even if it is found

that the Defendant No.2 has violated Ext.A4 Power of Attorney,

the remedy of the plaintiff is only to seek compensation from the

Defendant No.2 and the Plaintiff has no right to seek any

remedy against the Defendant No.1 who is a total stranger and

to seek cancellation of Ext.A2 document in favour of the

Defendant No.1. The learned Counsel concluded his arguments

praying to allow the Appeal by setting aside the impugned

judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and by

dismissing the suit.

16. The Counsel for the Respondent No.2 supported the arguments

of the Counsel for the Appellants.

17. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the

1st respondent/plaintiff contended that the case on hand is
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squarely covered by Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act,

1872. If the conditions in Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act

are satisfied, the principal may repudiate the transaction

entered into by the agent on behalf of the principal. The learned

Senior Counsel contended that the evidence on record would

reveal that the Defendant No.2 executed Ext.A2 Sale Deed for

his own benefit without obtaining prior consent from the Plaintiff

by dishonestly concealing the material fact of sale by the

Defendant No.2 in favour of the Defendant No.1 who is his wife

and the dealing of the Defendant No.2 has resulted in the

disadvantage of the Plaintiff. Hence, the Trial Court rightly

cancelled Ext.A2 Sale Deed executed by the Defendant No.2 in

favour of the Defendant No.1. The learned Senior Counsel

further contended that the Defendant No.1 did not prove her

source of income to purchase the plaint schedule property as

per Ext.A2 Sale Deed. The Defendant No.1 did not even care to
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step into the witness box to give evidence. She did not file any

Written Statement of her own. She merely adopted the Written

Statements of the Defendant Nos.2 and 3 by filing an Adoption

Memo. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of the

Madras High Court in Achutha Naidu v. Oakley Bowden and Co. and

Another [AIR 1922 Madras 497], the Division Bench decision of the

Karnataka High Court in U. Vijaya Kumar and Another v. Malini V. Rao

[2016 0 Supreme(Kar) 441] and the Division Bench decision of the

Gujarat High Court in Prakash Babulal Sheth v. Shashikalal Mayur

Sheth [2022 0 Supreme(Guj) 1523] for elaborating the principles

under Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act.

18. In the light of the arguments advanced before me and on

perusal of the records, the following points arise for

determination in this Appeal.

1. Whether the appeal at the instance of the Defendant Nos.2

and 3 against the judgment and decree setting aside Ext.A2 in
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favour of the Defendant No.1 is maintainable in the absence

of any challenge against the same by the Defendant No.1?

2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek cancellation of Ext.A2

under Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act?

Point No.1

19. The present Appeal is filed by the Defendant Nos.2 and 3

alone. It is stated in the Memorandum of Appeal that the

Defendant No.1 is unable to join as Appellant since she is

working in Ireland. Order XLI Rule 4 CPC provides that where

there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit,

and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground

common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of

the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole

decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary
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the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the

case may be. Of course, if all the defendants are aggrieved by

the judgment and decree, an appeal by one of the aggrieved

defendants is sufficient to maintain the challenge to the

judgment and decree, and any order in the Appeal would be

beneficial to the defendants who have not appealed against it.

The Defendant Nos.2 and 3 could not be said to be aggrieved

by the cancellation of Ext.A2 by the Trial Court as they do not

claim any right over the property covered by Ext.A2

independently of Defendant No.1. The grounds available to the

Defendant No.1 with respect to the challenge against Ext.A2 is

not available to the Defendant Nos.2 and 3. The contention of

the Defendant No.2 is that he executed Ext.A2 Sale Deed in

favour of the Defendant No.1 as the Power of Attorney holder of

the Plaintiff on the strength of Ext.A4 Power of Attorney and that

the property belongs to the Defendant No.1 on the basis of
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Ext.A2 Sale Deed which was validly executed on the strength of

Ext.A4 Power of Attorney. The Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 can have

a grievance against the order of mandatory injunction, but they

claim the right of residence only on the strength of the right

claimed by the Defendant No.1. The relief of mandatory

injunction is consequential to the main relief of cancellation of

Ext.A2 Document. Hence, an Appeal filed by the Defendant

Nos.2 and 3 could not be treated as an Appeal at the instance

of the Defendant No.1. The Defendant Nos.2 and 3 could not

maintain an appeal against the judgment and decree cancelling

Ext.A2 Sale Deed as they are not having any interest in the

property covered by Ext.A2. The Defendant Nos.2 and 3 will not

be in any way benefited by the reversal of the impugned

judgment cancelling Ext.A2. In the Memorandum of Appeal,

Defendant No.2 has no case that it is he who purchased the

property as per Ext.A2. The statements and grounds in the
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Memorandum of Appeal would clearly indicate that he is

maintaining his position as Power of Attorney of the Plaintiff and

Defendant No.1 as the purchaser of the property as per Ext.A2.

Hence, I am of the view that this Appeal at the instance of the

Defendant Nos.2 and 3 alone against the impugned judgment

and decree cancelling Ext.A2 is incompetent.

Point No.2

20. The suit is filed for cancellation of Ext.A2 document dated

18.09.2003 executed by the Defendant No.2 in favour of the

Defendant No.1. The suit was filed on 10.04.2013. The specific

contention of the plaintiff is that she came to know about Ext.A2

document only in February 2013, consequent to the enquiry

conducted by her when she was asked to get out of the plaint

schedule property by Defendant No.3, shouting that she has no

right over the property. The Trial Court relied on Article 59 of the

Limitation Act and found that the suit was filed within the period
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of three years from the date when the facts entitling the Plaintiff

to have the instrument cancelled first became known to the

Plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the Appellants relied on the

decision of this Court in St. Mary’s Church (supra) and contended

that the Plaintiff after executing a Power of Attorney authorising

the Power Holder to deal with the immovable property and

transfer the same cannot be permitted to claim ignorance of the

documents or acts and deeds done by his agent or power holder

on a later stage. The learned Counsel contended that the

knowledge of a registered document would start from the date

of its execution and registration and that the ignorance or

concealment of the contents of the document or nature of the

document from the knowledge of the person who had executed

the document would not take away the notice of execution of a

registered deed in view of the definition of the phrase ‘a person is

said to have notice’ in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It
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is useful to extract the definition of the phrase ‘a person is said to

have notice’ in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.

“3. Interpretation clause — In this Act, unless there is

something repugnant in the subject or context,–

xx xx xx

“a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows

that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or

search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he

would have known it.

Explanation I.– Where any transaction relating to immoveable

property is required by law to be and has been effected by a reg-

istered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any

part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to

have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration

or,
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where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where

the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section

(2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908),

from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such regis-

tered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within

whose sub-district any part of the property which is being ac-

quired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being ac-

quired, is situated:

Provided that–

(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration com-

pleted in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act,

1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder,

(2) the instrument [or memorandum] has been duly entered or

filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that

Act, and
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(3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instru-

ment relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept un-

der section 55 of that Act.

Explanation II.–Any person acquiring any immoveable property

or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to

have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time

being in actual possession thereof.

Explanation III.–A person shall be deemed to have had notice

of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his

behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:

Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the prin-

cipal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any per-

son who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”

21. The deemed knowledge of a registered document under

Explanation I is available only against the person acquiring the

property covered by the document or any part of, or share or
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interest in, such property and not against any other person. The

plaintiff has not acquired property as per Ext.A2 registered

document, and hence the deeming provision in Explanation I is

not available against the plaintiff. The deeming provision under

Explanation III against the principal is not applicable if the agent

fraudulently conceals the fact. The evidence on record reveals

that Defendant No.2 has fraudulently concealed the fact of the

sale of the property in favour of Defendant No.1 from the

plaintiff, and hence, the deeming provision in Explanation III is

also not available against the plaintiff.

22. In St.Mary’s Church (supra) while interpreting the phrase ‘a person is

said to have notice’ in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, this

Court held that the principal cannot avoid the authority given to

the power holder to do certain acts or deeds for transfer of

immovable property after its execution in tune with the authority;

that the acts which are done by the power holder would be
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binding on the principal as if it were done by the principal in

person; that notice of agent/power holder would amount to

notice of principal unless there is an active concealment of the

acts done by the power holder or agent, as the case may be;

that the active concealment of an act done by the agent or

power holder against the principal is the only exception to the

general rule that the notice to the agent/power holder would

amount to notice to the principal. It is further held that in the case

of registered deeds of transfer of immovable property, there

cannot be an active concealment since the principal is at liberty

to make an enquiry regarding documents executed before the

concerned Registrar/Sub Registrar within whose jurisdiction the

immovable property situates, in accordance with the law in

force; that insofar as the executant of a document is concerned,

the fact of execution of the document is actually known to him

from the time on which it was executed; that the question
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whether he was aware of the content of the document or the

nature of the document would not change the legal position

regarding notice of execution of a registered document and it

would start from the date of its execution and registration. The

subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umadevi

Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese, rep. by its Procurator

Devssia’s Son Rev. Father Joseph Kappil [2022 (3) KHC 113], cited by

the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent No.1 covers the

point considered in St. Mary’s Church (supra) and it governs the

field. In Umadevi Nambiar, it is held that two things are important

for the above interpretation clause to come into effect: (i) wilful

abstention from an enquiry or search; and (ii) gross negligence;

that Explanation I and Explanation II under the above

interpretation clause are applicable to the person acquiring an

immovable property, the transaction relating to which is required

by law to be effected by a registered instrument; and that the
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High Court has turned the above interpretation clause upside

down and held the Principal in relation to a deed of Power of

Attorney, to have had constructive notice in terms of Section 3,

of a sale effected by the agent. In view of this decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, it could not be held that the plaintiff had

notice of Ext.A2 Sale Deed from the date of its registration.

23. In the present case, the Defendant No.2 executed Ext.A2 Sale

Deed in favour of his wife-Defendant No.1 on the strength of

Ext.A4 Power of Attorney. The specific case of the plaintiff is that

the plaintiff came to know about the Ext.A2 document only in the

year 2013. The plaintiff has adduced evidence in support of the

said contention as PW1. The defendants could not make out

anything to discredit the evidence of PW1 in the cross-

examination. The beneficiary of the Ext.A2 document is

Defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 did not file any pleading in the

suit. A Memo dated 05.11.2014 was filed by the Counsel for the
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Defendants stating that the contentions in the Written

Statements of the Defendant Nos.2 and 3 are to be treated as

the contentions of the Defendant No.1. It is signed by the

Counsel as the counsel for the Defendants and not as

representing the Defendant No.1 alone. Order VI Rule 14 CPC

mandates that every pleading shall be signed by the party and

his pleader (if any). Proviso to the said Rule permits any person

duly authorized by the party to the suit to sign the pleading on

behalf of such party. All the pleadings in the suit have to be

mandatorily signed by the respective parties or their duly

authorized agents. Counsel cannot sign a pleading on behalf of

a party to the suit. The party making the pleadings is responsible

for the pleadings made by him. Such responsibility can be

attributed to the party only if the party has subscribed his

signature to the pleadings. A party can very well disown the

pleadings made by a counsel on his behalf. It is not safe for the
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Court to render its decision relying on the pleadings signed by

the counsel, as the party can disown the pleadings if the

decision turns against him. Order VI Rule 15 CPC provides for

the verification of the pleadings. It provides that every pleading

shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties

or some other person acquainted with the facts of the case, and

that it shall be signed by the person making it. Sub-Rule 4 is

inserted in the said provision by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1999, which mandates that the person

verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of

his pleadings. An affidavit of the party in support of his Written

Statement is made mandatory to make the pleadings more

authentic and responsible. A pleading without verification and

an affidavit as required under Order VI Rule 15 CPC could not

be treated as a valid pleading. It is legally permissible for a co-

defendant to adopt the contentions in the Written Statement
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filed by another defendant in the suit. It should be done in the

form of a Written Statement. A wrong practice is followed by the

Courts permitting the co-defendant to file an Adoption Memo in

order to adopt the Written Statement of another defendant. I am

of the view that adoption of the pleadings shall be done by a

defendant in a suit only through a Written Statement supported

by verification and an affidavit, and an Adoption Memo signed

by the defendant or his counsel is not sufficient. The purpose of

a Memo is only to intimate a particular fact to the Court and it

does not form part of the pleadings. In the case on hand, the

Adoption Memo is not even signed by the Defendant No.1.

Hence, even assuming that the filing of the Adoption Memo is

permissible, it could not be said that Defendant No.1 adopted

the pleadings of Defendant Nos.2 and 3. Hence, I find that there

is no Written Statement from the part of the Defendant No.1

denying the allegations in the Plaint.

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24. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Mukund

Bhavan Trust (supra) is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the

present case. It is the admitted case of the parties that the

brother of the Plaintiff, George, and his family were permitted to

occupy the residential building in the plaint schedule property

by the plaintiff. The Defendant No.1 also continued to occupy

the residential building in the plaint schedule property after

marrying Defendant No.2 who is the son of the plaintiff’s brother.

It is not a case where the Defendant No.1 started to occupy the

plaint schedule property after execution of Ext.A2 by the

Defendant No.2 in favour of the Defendant No.1. In all

probability, the plaintiff believed that the Defendants continued

possession of the plaint schedule property on the basis of the

permission given by her. Hence, it could not be said that long

possession operates as notice of title and that possession of the

Defendant No.1 for decades strengthens her claim for title.

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25. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the Order of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Ravikumar (supra) in support of his

contention. In the said case, the plaint was rejected on the

ground of limitation and the same was reversed by the High

Court. The High Court reckoned the limitation from the

cancellation of the Power of Attorney, which was assailed by the

defendant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court has found that the High Court erroneously

treated the cancellation as the starting point of limitation. In the

case on hand, Ext.A4 Power of Attorney was not cancelled and

the plaintiff is not claiming limitation period from the date of

cancellation of any power of attorney. Hence, the said decision

is not applicable to the case on hand.

26. The pleadings and the evidence of PW1 would prove that the

suit is filed within three years as provided in Article 59 of the

Limitation Act. I find that the suit is not barred by limitation.

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Point No.3

27. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that

even if it is found that the Defendant No.2 has violated Ext.A4

Power of Attorney, the remedy of the plaintiff is only to seek

compensation from the Defendant No.2 and the Plaintiff has no

right to seek any remedy against Defendant No.1 and to seek

cancellation of Ext.A2 document in favour of the Defendant

No.1. Learned Counsel relied on the principle that in case of

violation of any contract of agency, the remedy available to the

principal is only the recovery of compensation and not

repudiation of the contract entered into by the agent and as

against the third party who entered into contract with the agent,

the principal is not having any remedy. Learned counsel invited

my attention to various provisions under Chapter X of the Indian

Contract Act dealing with Agency, and going through the said

provisions, I find that the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed in
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the suit only if she proves that Ext.A2 is liable to be repudiated

under Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act. Since the learned

Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff rests the case on

Section 215, I need only to consider the applicability of Section

215 to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is

advantageous to extract Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act

along with its illustrations for a better understanding:

“215. Right of principal when agent deals, on his own

account, in business of agency without principal’s consent.-

If an agent deals on his own account in the business of the

agency, without first obtaining the consent of his principal and

acquainting him with all material circumstances which have come

to his own knowledge on the subject, the principal may repudiate

the transaction, if the case shows, either that any material fact

has been dishonestly concealed from him by the agent, or that

the dealings of the agent have been disadvantageous to him.

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Illustrations

(a) A directs B to sell A’s estate. B buys the estate for himself in

the name of C. A, on discovering that B has bought the estate for

himself, may repudiate the sale, if he can show that B has

dishonestly concealed any material fact, or that the sale has

been disadvantageous to him.

(b) A directs B to sell A’s estate. B, on looking over the estate

before selling it, finds a mine on the estate which is unknown to

A. B informs A that he wishes to buy the estate for himself, but

conceals the discovery of the mine. A allows B to buy, in

ignorance of the existence of the mine. A, on discovering that B

knew of the mine at the time he bought the estate, may either

repudiate or adopt the sale at his option.”

28. On a reading of Section 215, the said provision is attracted only

if an agent deals on his own account without first obtaining the

consent of his principal and if it is shown that material facts have
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been concealed from the principal or the dealings of the agent

have been disadvantageous to the principal. Illustration (a) is

also very much relevant as far as the present case is concerned.

The Illustration illustrates that the principal may repudiate the

same if it is found that the agent purchased the estate, which is

entrusted for sale, for himself in the name of another person, if

the agent has dishonestly concealed any material fact, or if the

sale has been disadvantageous to him. It would indicate that the

acquisition of the property need not be in the name of the agent

himself. It can be in the name of another person also. In the

case on hand, it is clear that the Defendant No.2 purchased the

plaint schedule property in the name of his wife – Defendant

No.1. As stated earlier, there is no pleading from the part of the

Defendant No.1 denying the pleading of the plaintiff that the

Defendant No.1 has no source of income to pay the sale

consideration. In the absence of any Written Statement from the
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part of the Defendant No.1, she is not entitled to adduce any

evidence in the suit. As a matter of fact, she has not mounted

the witness box to give any evidence. Even in the Written

Statements and in the additional Written Statement of the

Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, there is no pleading that the Defendant

No.1 paid sale consideration to the plaintiff. On the other hand,

the specific statement is that the consideration for the property

is received from the Defendant No.2. The defendants could not

prove any income or source of income or financial capacity of

Defendant No.1 to purchase the property on her own. On

account of the facts that the Defendant No.1 is the wife of the

Defendant No.2 and the defendants failed to plead and prove

any independent source of income for the Defendant No.1 and

payment of consideration by the Defendant No.1 to the Plaintiff,

the only conclusion which is possible is that the Defendant No.2
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has dealt with the property on his own account by obtaining the

property in the name of his wife – Defendant No.1.

29. There is no contention in the Written Statements and additional

Written Statement of the Defendant Nos.2 and 3 that Ext.A2

Sale Deed was executed by the Defendant No.2 in favour of the

Defendant No.1 after obtaining consent for the same from the

plaintiff. It is the burden of the agent to prove that he has dealt

with the property in his own account after obtaining consent

from the principal. In the case on hand, there is no evidence to

prove that the sale of the property by the Defendant No.2 in

favour of the Defendant No.1 was done after obtaining the

consent of the plaintiff. The evidence on record would clearly

reveal that Defendant No.2 had dishonestly concealed the fact

of the sale of the property to his wife/ Defendant No.1, from the

plaintiff. The trump card of the Defendant No.2 is that the plaintiff

has issued Ext.B1 Receipt for the receipt of the sale
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consideration of Ext.A2 Sale Deed. Ext.B1 is the Receipt for

Rs.10,00,000/- signed by the plaintiff with reference to Exts.A7

and A2 Sale Deeds. Ext.A2 Sale Deed was executed on

18.09.2003. Ext.B1 is dated 09.04.2005. On going through the

evidence of Defendant No.2 as DW1, it is clear that he did not

explain the need for such a Receipt and the circumstances

under which the said Receipt was obtained from the plaintiff two

years after executing Ext.A2 Sale Deed. The only statement in

the evidence of DW1 is that Ext.B1 Receipt was obtained since

his friend Joshy Paul told him that such a receipt is necessary.

He deposed that he had no knowledge of the necessity for

obtaining such a receipt at the time of execution of Ext.A2 Sale

Deed. It is in evidence that Exts.A7 & A8 documents were

executed by the Defendant No.2 as power of attorney holder of

the Plaintiff for selling her properties situated in Vandiperiyar.

The case of the plaintiff is that the Defendant No.2 obtained
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Ext.B1 Receipt on the misrepresentation that the said Receipt

is required by the buyers of her property in Vandiperiyar. In

Ext.B1, the name of the Sub Registry office of the documents

referred therein is not stated. The Defendant No.1 has no proper

explanation as to why, out of Exts.A7 & A8 documents executed

with respect to Vandiperiyar property, only Ext.A7 alone is

included in Ext.B1. The aforesaid facts lead to the probable

conclusion that Ext.B1 Receipt was obtained from the plaintiff

by Defendant No.2, misrepresenting that the documents

contained in Ext.B1 Receipt are the documents relating to the

Vandiperiyar property. If the Defendant No.2 or the Defendant

No.1 was in requirement of a receipt for payment of

consideration of the property covered by Ext.A2, they could

have obtained a receipt with respect to the same alone. The

Defendant No.2 does not require a receipt for Ext.A7 property

sold by the Plaintiff to a third person. There was no need to
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obtain a single receipt for the properties sold to different

persons. In the Written Statement of the Defendant No.2,

though the Defendant No.2 stated about a receipt issued by the

plaintiff in the year 2005, the date of the said receipt was not

stated, and the said receipt was not produced along with the

Written Statement. The details of the consideration paid for

Ext.A2 Sale to the plaintiff are not stated in the Written

Statement. Only during evidence, the Defendant No.2 has

stated that the consideration of the plaint schedule property was

Rs.7 lakhs. If the plaint schedule property was purchased by the

Defendant No.2 or Defendant No.1 from the plaintiff, as claimed

by the defendants, certainly there would have been some

discussions or communications with respect to the

consideration for the same, as the plaintiff had been residing

abroad. Nothing in this regard is either pleaded or proved.

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30. In the decision of the Karnataka High Court in U. Vijaya Kumar

(supra), the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that

where an agent employed to sell becomes the purchaser

himself, then he must show beyond reasonable doubt that it was

with the knowledge and consent of the principal and that the

price paid was the full value of the property so purchased. It is

also held that a principal who seeks to set aside a transaction

on the ground that the provisions of Section 215 of the Indian

Contract Act have been violated must take proceedings for that

purpose within a reasonable time after becoming aware of the

circumstances relied on. In the case on hand, the plaintiff has

filed the suit immediately on getting knowledge of Ext.A2 Sale

Deed. In the said decision, it is held that the burden of proof lies

on the agent to prove full disclosure or that the transaction is not

disadvantageous to the principal. I fully agree with the

propositions of law laid down by the Division Bench of the
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Karnataka High Court in U. Vijaya Kumar (supra). In the case on

hand, the Defendant No.2 has not discharged such burden of

proof. On the other hand, the evidence on record would clearly

reveal that he concealed material facts about Ext.A2 in favour

of his wife/Defendant No.1. The sale consideration of

Rs.2,50,000/- for 87.40 Ares and the residential building therein

shows that the transaction is apparently disadvantageous to the

plaintiff. There is no evidence even for the payment of the said

Rs.2,50,000/-. The plaintiff, as PW1, has specifically deposed

that the property would have fetched more than Rs.25 lakhs

when Ext.A2 was executed. Even according to the evidence of

DW1, the value of the property is Rs.7 lakhs, which he claims to

have paid to the plaintiff. It is the evidence of DW1 that the

plaintiff was available in India when Ext.A2 document was

executed, and a part of the payment was directly made to the

plaintiff. If that be so, nothing prevented the Defendant No.2
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from obtaining the sale deed directly from the plaintiff. Even

though the defendants claimed that they have several

businesses and properties, and the financial status of the

parents of the Defendant No.1 is sound, they could not produce

any evidence to substantiate the same. On the other hand, the

evidence on record, especially the evidence of PW2, who is an

independent witness and who was the friend of George, father

of the Defendant No.2, would reveal that the financial status of

the family of the plaintiff and her brother George was improved

only after the plaintiff went to Germany and started sending

money.

31. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that Sections

215 and 216 of the Indian Contract Act are not applicable to a

Power of Attorney. The contention is that in the case of Power

of Attorney, a Power Holder cannot deal on his own account,

and his deals are on the account of the principal and Section
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216 makes this more clear. It is the Sections 211 and 212 of the

Contract Act, providing for compensation, which are applicable

in the case of misconduct of the Power Holder. Learned Counsel

invited my attention to Sections 1A and 2 of the Powers of

Attorney Act, 1882, in this regard. I am unable to accept the said

contention. It is true that in the case of a Power of Attorney, a

Power holder has to deal on the account of the principal. Section

215 deals with cases in which the Power Holder, who is an agent

of the principal, deals on his own account in violation of the

Power of Attorney given to him. Hence, it could not be said that

when there is a Power of Attorney in favour of an agent, Section

215 will not be applicable. Since the plaintiff is resting her case

on Section 215 of the Indian Contract Act, I need not consider

whether she is entitled to get compensation under Sections 211

and 212 of the Indian Contract Act.

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32. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of

this Court in Mathu (supra), in which it is held that in case where

the person executing the deed is not blind, infirm or otherwise

incapacitated and no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to

him and he had the opportunity of reading the deed, the plea of

non est factum is not available. In the case on hand, there is

clear evidence that Defendant No.2 made a fraudulent

misrepresentation for obtaining Ext.B1 Receipt from the plaintiff,

and hence the said principle is not applicable to the case on

hand. Exs.A10 & A11 are the copies of the Plaint in O.S.

Nos.50/2004 and 293/2009 filed by the sister of the Defendant

No.2 to set aside the sale deeds executed by her alleging that

she was defrauded by Defendant No.2. Though the Defendant

No.2 deposed that those cases were later withdrawn, no

evidence in this regard was produced before the Court. The said

cases also would probabilize that the Defendant No.2 attempted
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to grab the properties belonging to his sister also by adopting

unfair means.

33. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of

the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Travancore Bank Ltd. (supra)

to distinguish between the fiduciary relationship between the

trustee and beneficiary and promisor and promisee and the

beneficiary of a contract. It is held in the said decision that there

is a fiduciary relationship between trustee and beneficiary,

whereas there is no such relationship between the promisor or

promisee and the beneficiary of a contract. In State of Rajasthan

v. Basant Nahata [AIR 2005 SC 3401], the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held a Power of Attorney holder acts in a fiduciary capacity and

that any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between

the donor and the donee.

34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that Section

215 of the Indian Contract Act is squarely applicable to the facts
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and circumstances of the case and all the conditions in Section

215 are satisfied to repudiate Ext.A2 Sale Deed executed by the

Defendant No.2 as Power of Attorney holder of the Plaintiff in

favour of the Defendant No.1 who is the wife of the Defendant

No.2. The Trial Court rightly decreed the suit cancelling Ext.A2

Sale Deed and issuing mandatory injunction in favour of the

plaintiff and against the defendants.

35. In view of the answers to the aforesaid points, this Appeal is

dismissed with costs.

Sd/-

M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM
JUDGE
Shg/



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