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Delhi High Court
Union Of India & Ors vs Gp Capt Pravin Arora (Retd.) on 19 August, 2025
Author: C.Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~83
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 16791/2024 & CM APPL. 71059/2024
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Dr. Vijendra Singh Mahndiyan,
CGSC with Sgt Manish Kumar Singh and
Sgt Mritunjay (Air Force Legal Cell) for
UOI
versus
GP CAPT PRAVIN ARORA (RETD.) .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Deepika Sheoran, Mr.
Baljeet Singh and Mr. Abhishek Gahlyan,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 19.08.2025
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. This petition assails order dated 19 July 2023 passed by the
Armed Forces Tribunal1 in OA 1848/2021 whereby the respondent’s
application for grant of disability pension on the ground that he suffers
from ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old) with 20% disability, has been allowed
by the AFT.
2. The issue is covered by a recent decision rendered by us in UOI
v Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso2.
1 “the AFT”, hereinafter
2 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2018
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3. Nonetheless, we have heard Dr. Vijendra Singh Mahndiyan,
learned CGSC for the petitioners, and have perused the record.
4. The respondent was released in Low Medical Category on his
being found to be suffering from ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old). From the
record, including the proceedings of the Release Medical Board3, the
following facts emerged:
(i) The respondent had served in the Indian Air Force for
over 30 years and 1 month before he was diagnosed as suffering
from ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old).
(ii) The respondent, in his self-declaration, specifically
declared that he had not been suffering from ACL Tear Rt Knee
(Old) prior to joining the Indian Air Force. The declaration
reads thus:
2 (a). Did you suffer from any disability before joining
the Armed Forces? If so give details and dates. NOThe correctness of this declaration is not doubted either by the
RMB or by the petitioner before the AFT or before this Court.
(iii) The reason regarding the ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old)
suffered by the respondent has not been attributable to military
service, as entered by the RMB reads thus:
“ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old): Yes, As per approved injury
3 “RMB”, hereinafter
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report initiated on 16 Apr 2013.”
(iv) We have already held, in our judgment in Gawas Anil
Madso, that where the applicant was not suffering from the
ailment at the time of entry into service, the RMB is required to
positively identify the cause for the ailment, to justify a finding
that it is not attributable to military service.
(v) The RMB has certified the respondent as suffering from
20% disability on account of ACL Tear Rt Knee (Old).
5. In such circumstances, we have held in the decision in Ex Sub
Gawas Anil Madso that the respondent would be entitled to disability
pension.
6. We do not deem it necessary to reproduce the findings in the
said decision, so as not to burden this judgment.
7. We have also been conscious of the fact that we are exercising
certiorari jurisdiction over the decision of the AFT and are not sitting
in appeal over the said decision.
8. The parameters of certiorari jurisdiction are delineated in the
following passages of Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan4:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in4 AIR 1964 SC 477
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that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or
tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court
or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot
be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible
and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In
dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points
cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to
issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari
Vishnu Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque5, Nagandra Nath Bora v
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam6
and Kaushalya Devi v Bachittar Singh7.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe
what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means.
What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it
must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is
apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear5 (1954) 2 SCC 881
6 AIR 1958 SC 398
7 AIR 1960 SC 1168
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that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or
Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be,
even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which
are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so
plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no
difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said
error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be
that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious
or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need
an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt
that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law
and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as
would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face
of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior
Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be
open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is
neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to
describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately
described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the
nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have
been misconstrued or contravened.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Within the limited parameters of the certiorari jurisdiction and
keeping in view the facts of the case outlined hereinabove, we find no
cause to interfere with the impugned judgment of the AFT, which is
affirmed in its entirety.
10. In addition, we find that our view stands fortified by paras 45.1,
46 and 47 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered on 23 April
2025 in Bijender Singh v UOI8, which may be reproduced thus:
“45.1. Thus, this Court held that essence of the Rules is that a
member of the armed forces is presumed to be in sound physical8 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895
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and mental condition at the time of his entry into the service if
there is no note or record to the contrary made at the time of such
entry. In the event of subsequent discharge from service on medical
ground, any deterioration in health would be presumed to be due to
military service. The burden would be on the employer to rebut the
presumption that the disability suffered by the member was neither
attributable to nor aggravated by military service. If the Medical
Board is of the opinion that the disease suffered by the member
could not have been detected at the time of entry into service, the
Medical Board has to give reasons for saying so. This Court
highlighted that the provision for payment of disability pension is a
beneficial one which ought to be interpreted liberally. A soldier
cannot be asked to prove that the disease was contracted by him on
account of military service or was aggravated by the same. The
very fact that upon proper physical and other tests, the member was
found fit to serve in the army would give rise to a presumption that
he was disease free at the time of his entry into service. For the
employer to say that such a disease was neither attributable to nor
aggravated by military service, the least that is required to be done
is to furnish reasons for taking such a view.
46. Referring back to the impugned order dated 26.02.2016, we
find that the Tribunal simply went by the remarks of the Invaliding
Medical Board and Re-Survey Medical Boards to hold that since
the disability of the appellant was less than 20%, he would not be
entitled to the disability element of the disability pension. Tribunal
did not examine the issue as to whether the disability was
attributable to or aggravated by military service. In the instant case
neither has it been mentioned by the Invaliding Medical Board nor
by the Re-Survey Medical Boards that the disease for which the
appellant was invalided out of service could not be detected at the
time of entry into military service. As a matter of fact, the
Invaliding Medical Board was quite categorical that no disability of
the appellant existed before entering service. As would be evident
from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the law has by now
crystalized that if there is no note or report of the Medical Board at
the time of entry into service that the member suffered from any
particular disease, the presumption would be that the member got
afflicted by the said disease because of military service. Therefore
the burden of proving that the disease is not attributable to or
aggravated by military service rest entirely on the employer.
Further, any disease or disability for which a member of the armed
forces is invalided out of service would have to be assumed to be
above 20% and attract grant of 50% disability pension.
47. Thus having regard to the discussions made above, we are
of the considered view that the impugned orders of the Tribunal are
wholly unsustainable in law. That being the position, impugned
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orders dated 22.01.2018 and 26.02.2016 are hereby set aside.
Consequently, respondents are directed to grant the disability
element of disability pension to the appellant at the rate of 50%
with effect from 01.01.1996 onwards for life. The arrears shall
carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum till payment. The above
directions shall be carried out by the respondents within three
months from today.”
11. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
12. Compliance with the impugned judgment of the AFT, if not
already ensured, be ensured within a period of four weeks from today.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
AUGUST 19, 2025/aky
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