Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 06.08.2025 vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 22 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28474-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No 297 of 2023.
.
Reserved on: 06.08.2025
Date of Decision: 22.08.2025.
Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal ...Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. Sidharth, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of charge sheet dated 19.12.2014 arising out of FIR bearing
RC No. 0962012A0010 dated 18.10.2012, registered with CBI, Shimla
for the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act)
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that an FIR was registered with CBI, Shimla against
Brigadier J.K. Narang, stating that Brigadier J.K. Narang joined the
Indian Army as a Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers on
14.03.1981. He served at various places. He acquired huge movable
and immovable assets in his name and in the name of his family
members, between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012. He was in possession
of assets worth ₹2,13,42,801/-. He was paid a salary of
₹42,14,191/-. He earned a profit of ₹50,00,000/- from the sale of
Plot No. C-1545 situated in Sushant Lok, Phase-I, Gurgaon, vide
sale agreement and general power of attorney. The income of
Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members under all the heads
was ₹1,37,36,473/-. Their likely savings were ₹16,16,007/-. He was
found in possession of assets worth ₹1,84,79,943/-, and he
possessed ₹1,68,63,936/- disproportionate to his known sources of
income. The CBI registered the FIR and conducted the
investigation. CBI filed a charge sheet against Brigadier J.K.
Narang, his family members and the present petitioner. It was
asserted that the petitioner/accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is
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practising as an Advocate in the High Court at Chandigarh. His
daughter, Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal, is married to Amit Singla, an
.
approved contractor of Border Road Organisation (BRO) who had
worked under the supervision of the accused J.K. Narang.
Petitioner/ accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal entered into a criminal
conspiracy with the accused, Sh. Sumant Narang & J.K. Narang.
They entered into an agreement dated 15.04.2011 with Sh. Sumant
Narang for the purchase of his plot No. A-403, Sector-6, Dwarka,
New Delhi for ₹75,00,000/-. It was mentioned in the agreement
that ₹15,00,000/- was paid in cash as an earnest money to Sumant
Narang on 15.04.2011. The agreement was executed on the stamp
paper No. S387853, which was released to Ms. Madhu, stamp
vendor, on 13.02.2012. Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is shown to have given
₹15,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 15.04.2011 and
₹10,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 11.10.2011 as an advance
payment to purchase the flat. He had entered into a criminal
conspiracy with Sumant Narang and J.K. Narang to commit forgery
by preparing a false agreement dated 15.04.2011 and used this
document as genuine to conceal the disproportionate assets of
Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members; hence, it was prayed
that action be taken against the accused.
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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the
filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present
.
petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings.
It was asserted that no party to the agreement claimed that it was
forged. Only the CBI is claiming that the document is forged. No
sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement, and the parties
entered into an agreement stipulating that the agreement to sell
would not be acted upon. ₹25,00,000/- would be returned by
Sumant Narang to the petitioner/accused with interest. As a result,
₹27,00,000/- was transferred by the petitioner to Sumant Narang
through a cheque. The basic ingredients of Sections 463, 464 and
467 of IPC are not satisfied. The petitioner is not a maker of the
document, and he cannot be held liable for its forgery. The
ingredients of the conspiracy were not satisfied. The petitioner is
being harassed because his son-in-law is a registered contractor
with the Border Security Organisation. He never worked with the
accused J.K. Narang. The petitioner cannot be held liable because
his son-in-law was associated with BRO. The allegations in the
charge sheet do not constitute the commission of any cognizable
offence; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed, the charge sheet and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.
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4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by the CBI
denying the contents of the petition and reproducing the contents
.
of the charge sheet. It was asserted that the agreement was
executed on 15.04.2011 on the stamp paper No. S387853. An
addendum was executed on 11.10.2011. The stamp paper No.
S387853 was not in existence before 13.02.2012. It was issued to Ms.
Madhu on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record by her on the same
day. Ms. Madhu also denied that the entry mentioned in the stamp
paper pertained to her. She stated that the licence No. 169 belongs
to Raj Kumar, another stamp vendor. Raj Kumar revealed that the
stamp paper was not issued to him, and it was not sold by him. The
witnesses to the agreement, Sh. Kashmir Singh and Sh. Dinesh
Prashad, were also interrogated. Kashmir Singh revealed that the
agreement already had the signatures of the petitioner and Sumant
Narang. No person had signed the document in his presence. He put
the signatures on the document on the petitioner’s request. Dinesh
Parshad was also not present in the office. Dinesh Prashad stated
that he had put the signatures on the request of Smt. Loveleen Kaur
Dhaliwal, the petitioner’s daughter. No transaction of money took
place in the presence of the witnesses. Petitioner’s son-in-law,
Amit Singla and daughter Loveleen Dhaliwal Singla were the
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owners of LSR Logistics, Private Limited, which was engaged in
transportation and road work with BRO. Kamal Singh, Director of
.
LSR Logistics, stated that he and Ravinder went to the petitioner’s
office and put their signatures on the agreement as per the
directions of Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal. No money was paid in his
presence. The petitioner actively participated in the creation of the
documents. The original sale agreement and the addendum were
never produced, even though the notices were served under Section
91 of the CrPC. The agreement and addendum were prepared with
the intention of screening the ill-got money of Brigadier J.K.
Narang. The income tax return for the year 2011-2012 and 2012-
2013 shows that Sumant Narang had filed ‘Nil’ ITR, which shows
that no money was paid to him. The agreement to sell and
addendum were prepared after the registration of the FIR against
Brigadier J.K. Narang. The statement of account of the petitioner
does not show any funds flow. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
5. I have heard Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel,
assisted by Mr. Sidharth, learned counsel for the petitioner/
accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the
respondent/ CBI.
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6. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner/ accused, submitted that the allegations against the
.
petitioner are false. The petitioner did not prepare any forged
document. The transaction between the parties was genuine. The
money was repaid to Sumant through cheques, which show the
bona fide nature of the transaction. Even if the plea of the CBI is
accepted as correct that the stamp paper was released in the year
2012, writing an agreement bearing the date of 2011 does not
constitute any forgery. There was no intention to cheat any person.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be
quashed.
7. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the
respondent/ CBI, submitted that the statement of stamp paper
vendors shows that the stamp paper was not sold to the petitioner/
accused in the year 2012. The agreement came into existence in the
year 2011, whereas the stamp paper was released in the year 2012.
The agreement was executed to inflate the income of co-accused
J.K. Narang. The contents of the agreement are false. No sale deed
was executed between the parties, which shows that the agreement
was a sham and was executed to avoid the inquiry pending against
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the co-accused. This Court should not enquire into the factual
aspects while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed
.
that the present petition be dismissed.
8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
r to
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P.,
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is
now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be
applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has
summarised some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a seriesof decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
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2025:HHC:28474-DBof myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
.
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
r (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
.
with a view to spite him due to a private and
personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the
concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are
instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”
10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither
controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision.
However, given the broad and profound nature of this
authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The
conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
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intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
.
course of several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) thedispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague
and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to
settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
11. It was held in Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1148, that the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is
the exception and not the rule. It was observed:
7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr. P.C. has engaged
this Court on numerous occasions [Ref: State of Kar-
nataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699; Sunder Babu v. State
of Tamil Nadu (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P.
(2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2020) 13 SCC 435.] The observations made in State of Kar-
nataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 by a Bench of three
Hon’ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this power most
aptly in the following terms:
“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
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2025:HHC:28474-DBcourt, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible
rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with.
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for theproper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon
them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression
in the section which merely recognises and preserves
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whethercivil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a
wrong in the course of administration of justice on theprinciple quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section,
the court does not function as a court of appeal orrevision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though
wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by thetests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantialjustice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for the advancement of
justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authorityso as to produce injustice, the court has the power to
prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if
it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse
of the process of the court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
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whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.”
.
12. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977)
2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the
criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of
the Court. It was observed on page 703:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court
is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse
of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice requirethat the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the
High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal
matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose,
which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In acriminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution,
the very nature of the material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court inquashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justicehas got to be administered according to laws made by the
legislature. The compelling necessity for making theseobservations is that without a proper realisation of the object
and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the
inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the
State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate
the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”
13. The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
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33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy
of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established
and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and
courts in India. There are some established principles of law.
which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the
process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)],
observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of
its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its
process.
***
The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction) to
prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure
must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an
accused person from oppression or prejudice.”
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case
observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :
(1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word
“abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with
the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor
to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly
supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3
All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process,
the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the
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stay of prosecution could arise in the following
circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair
.
trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the
process because it offends the court’s sense of justice and
propriety to be asked to try the accused in the
circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R
164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of
the court to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of atechnicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the
defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part
of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94:
1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands
can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where thecourt concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair
trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be
unfair for the defendant to be tried.”
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine
on the individual facts of each case.
14. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC
488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising
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jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page
498:
.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above theaverments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection,
try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of acase but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. MultipleFIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances that the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the
issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge, as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on thetypes of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR.
The Court drew a fine distinction between the consideration
of materials that were tendered as evidence and the
appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be
considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda
Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,
(2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)
“5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of
justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its
powers court would be justified in quashing any
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proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the
.
court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint
is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court
summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable
appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process,
no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect
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and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument
in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta
.
to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death.” (emphasis supplied)
15. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
16.
The statement of Madhu reads that each stamp vendor
is required to enter the date, serial number of the register, serial
number of the stamp paper sold, denominations of the stamp
paper, address of the purchaser and signatures of the purchaser in
the register. The entry number is to be endorsed on the back of the
stamp paper with date, name and address of the purchaser and the
purpose of purchase. Stamp paper bearing the serial No. S387853
was issued to her on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record in the
register on 13.02.2012. Serial No. 398 dated 01.04.2011 was recorded
on behalf of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, and the licence No. 169 did
not pertain to her. The sale of stamp paper was not possible on
01.04.2011.
17. This statement clearly shows that the stamp paper used
for writing the document was issued on 13.02.2012, and no
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agreement could have been executed on it on 01.04.2011. Hence, the
agreement was ante-dated.
.
18. Statement of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, reads that he
has not sold stamp paper No. S387853. The entry on the back of the
photocopy of the stamp paper was not in his hand, and serial No.
398 was entered in the register on 04.04.2011. The stamp available
on the back of the photocopy of the stamp paper did not bear his
stamp. The license number was distorted, and the entry no. 398
was not made by him.
19. The statement of this witness shows that the entry on
the back of the stamp paper was not made by him, and he had not
put his stamp. Therefore, prima facie, a false entry was made on the
back of the stamp paper showing the sale of the stamp paper on
01.04.2011 vide entry No. 398 pertaining to this witness. This
witness specifically denied that he had made the entry and put the
stamp; hence, his statement prima facie shows a forgery of the
entry made on the reverse of the stamp paper.
20. There is no explanation for executing the document on
01.04.2011 on a stamp paper issued on 13.02.2012. The ante dating of
the agreement to sell prima facie supports the version of the CBI
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that this was done to help the co-accused by providing the source
of income when no source of income existed.
.
21. The CBI mentioned in the charge sheet that no funds
were transferred from the account of the petitioner. The income tax
return filed by Sumant Narang was also ‘Nil’, suggesting that no
money was received by him. Therefore, the recitals in the
agreement to sell that the amount of ₹15,00,000/- was paid by the
petitioner and was received by Sumant Narang are prima facie
incorrect.
22. It was submitted that, as per the FIR, the check period
was between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012, and the execution of the
agreement on 11.04.2012 was beyond the check period, which would
not have helped the co-accused. This submission overlooks the fact
that the advance payment of ₹25,00,000/- in cash was shown to
have been made on 15.04.2011 and 10.11.2011 to Sumant Narang,
within the check period. This prima facie corroborates the version
of the CBI that the payment of ₹25,00,000/- was shown to have
been made within the check period to inflate the income of Sumant
Narang, a family member of J.K. Narang.
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23. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the
petitioner returned ₹27,00,000/- to Sumant Narang when it was
.
found that execution of the sale deed was not possible, which
shows the bona fide nature of the transaction. This submission is
not acceptable. The CBI registered the FIR on 18.10.2012. The
agreement between the petitioner and Sumant Narang to cancel the
agreement to sell was executed on 10.10.2013 after the registration
of the FIR. Hence, it was a post-litem transaction and does not show
any bona fide.
24. It was submitted that there is a distinction between a
false document as understood in law and a document whose
contents are false. A document is not a false document because it
contains false recitals. There can be no dispute with this
preposition of law. However, in the present case, the falsity of the
contents was with a view to help the co-accused regarding the
money received by him during the check period, and prima facie
shows that it was done pursuant to a conspiracy entered with the
petitioner.
25. The statements of the attesting witnesses to the
agreement to sell and the addendum also show that the documents
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were not executed in their presence, and money was also not
exchanged in their presence. They were presented with a document
.
and were asked to sign it. Kamal Singh stated that he and Ravinder
went to the petitioner’s office and signed an agreement between
Sumant Narang and the petitioner as per the directions of Loveleen
Dhaliwal, the daughter of the petitioner. Kashmir Singh also stated
that the petitioner asked him to sign some papers as a witness.
Dinesh Prashad, another witness, was also not present. No persons
had put their signatures in his presence. The agreement was duly
signed by K.S. Dhaliwal and Sumant Narang. Dinesh Prashad also
stated that he was asked by the daughter of the petitioner to put his
signatures on the agreement. Kashmir Singh, another witness, was
not present in the office.
26. These statements prima facie show that the documents
were not executed in the presence of the attesting witnesses. There
is no requirement that the signatures should be put in the presence
of attesting witnesses because as per Section 3 of Transfer of
Property Act an acknowledgement of the signature is sufficient but
in the present case the fact that the attesting witnesses were asked
by the petitioner and his daughter and not by the petitioner and
Sumant to put the signatures prima facie show that the petitioner
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and his daughter were responsible for the preparation of the
document. Hence, the submission that the petitioner is not the
.
maker of the document and cannot be held liable is not acceptable.
27. It was submitted that no person had made any
complaint regarding the falsity of the documents. Only the CBI has
come up with a plea that the document contained false recitals.
This submission will not help the petitioner. As per the CBI, the
documents were brought into existence to help the co-accused J.K.
Narang and mislead the CBI. It was a consensual transaction
between the petitioner and Sumant Narang; therefore, no person
would have complained about the same, and only CBI, which was
intended to be misled by the execution of the agreement, would
have made the complaint.
28. Reference was made to the various documents annexed
to the petition. However, it is impermissible for the Court
exercising inherent jurisdiction to look into the documents
forming part of the charge sheet, especially when the authenticity
of the documents is not established. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC
1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face
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of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no
offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract
.
anything. It was observed:
“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only
if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying
the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test
is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are,without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is
made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing
the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of the present Code.”
29. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the
fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding
under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to
be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari fileda photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in
Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the presentpetitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is
neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this
document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is
not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C.”
30. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in
Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.
Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
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“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of
the witnesses, if any, recorded. While judging the
correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the.
documents, which were not filed before the lower Court.
Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh
documents, in view of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and
another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the
said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears
that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of
the statement made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint is malafide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be
no justification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Station and an
offence is registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary importance. It is thematerial collected during the investigation and the
evidence presented in Court which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fidesagainst the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by itself be the basis for quashing theproceedings”.
31. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was
observed on page 142:
“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the
complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from
the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the
offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the
veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it
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2025:HHC:28474-DBbased on the evidence collected during the course of the
trial.”
32. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
.
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was
held:
13. All these documents, which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial,
but the same are not material at the stage of decidingwhether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court
was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place
any reliance on these three documents.
33. A
similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC
86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was
observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by
the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where theoffence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not
been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer
for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that theHigh Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if
the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there
before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition
that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not
do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’
powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always
available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone the
High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing
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2025:HHC:28474-DBSection 482CrPC not being substantially different from the
tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section
204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the.
complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and thatproceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible
if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so
demand.” (Emphasis supplied).
34. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are
false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down
in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the
Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go
into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was
observed:-
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to thereliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing ofthe proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the
present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even
if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of
an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of
the considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the
case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in
the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
.
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once
the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of
the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in thissubmission, keeping in mind the position of this Court
in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State ofGujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court
while deciding the question of whether the High Court
could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of
FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the policeduring the pendency of the Section 482 petition,
observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is beingcharged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same is not made out even prima facie from
the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheethad been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph
Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellant were prima facie made out from thecomplainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc.
or not.”
35. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial
while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed on page 397:
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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be.
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited
jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any
sufficient material is available to proceed further against
the accused for which the accused is required to be tried
or not’.”
36. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025
SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent
jurisdiction should treat the contents of the FIR as correct. It was
observed: –
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint
to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save
in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in
a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process
should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not
be used in a routine manner according to its whims or
caprice.”
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37. This position was reiterated in Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1216, wherein it was observed:
.
37. This Court, in a catena of decisions, has observed that it is
not for the courts to embark upon an enquiry into the
reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIRat the stage of quashing of the proceedings. However, it is of
paramount importance that the allegations made against the
accused, if taken at face value, must disclose the commission
of an offence, whether from the FIR, the chargesheet, orother relevant materials. It is incumbent upon the courts to
exercise their discretionary powers where the materials on
record indicate that the criminal proceedings are being
misused as instruments of oppression or harassment.
38. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to
determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in
it.
39. It is undisputed that the CBI has filed the charge-sheet
before the learned Trial Court. Hence, the learned Trial Court is
seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial
Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
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2025:HHC:28474-DBapplication before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer might
have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any suchdischarge application is filed, the trial court shall look into
the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
40. No other point was urged.
41.
dismissed. to
Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is
42. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the
miscellaneous applications, if any.
43. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
22nd August 2025
(Anurag)
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