Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 18.08.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 22 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28476
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 1752 of 2025
Reserved on: 18.08.2025
Date of Decision: 22.08.2025
Dayanand …Petitioner
versus
State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was
arrested vide FIR No. 232 of 2023, dated 26.11.2023, registered
for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
(hereinafter referred to as “ND&PS”) registered at Police Station
Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2025:HHC:28476
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested
by the police at Siund Manikaran Road on 26.11.2023 at 03.25
PM. There is a variation in the quantity/ weight of the
contraband in various documents. The petitioner is the sole
earning member of the family; his aged parents and wife are
dependent upon him. The petitioner has been behind the bar for
about two years, and there is no likelihood of the trial being
concluded at the earliest. The matter is listed for prosecution
evidence since 13.08.2024. The statements of independent
witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. The petitioner
is ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions which
the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
26.11.2023. They were checking the vehicles near Thakur Dhaba
at Siund Manikaran road at 02.45 PM. The accused came from
village Jachni at about 03.25 PM. He returned after seeing the
police and threw the backpack, he was carrying, into a Naala.
The police apprehended the petitioner and checked the backpack
in the presence of two independent witnesses. The police
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2025:HHC:28476
recovered 1.360 Kgs of charas from the backpack. The police
seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The weight of
charas was found to be 1.350 Kgs in the proceedings under
Section 52A of the NDPS Act. As per the result of the analyses,
the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. Its
actual weight was found to be 1.333 Kgs in the laboratory. The
prosecution has cited fifteen witnesses, out of whom eight have
been examined. The matter is now listed for recording the
statement of the investigating officer on 01.12.2025.
4. I have heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. There is variation in the weight of the
contraband mentioned in the various documents, which makes
the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The learned Trial Court
has listed the matter after a gap of five months, and the
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The charge-
sheet has been filed before the Court, and no fruitful purpose
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would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was
found in possession of 1.350 Kgs of charas, which is a
commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act apply to the present case. The petitioner is unable to satisfy
the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC
768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page
783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence,
the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused,
5
2025:HHC:28476the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing
the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004
SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of
U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri)
425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar,
(2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as
under:-
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly
related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered
to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for
the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a)
CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the
need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the
presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the
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2025:HHC:28476accused is not misused to impede the investigation,
overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice.
The relevant observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused
and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct
the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can
legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed
in the following terms:–
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a
court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable
condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the
circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the case
do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
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2025:HHC:28476realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant
or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The
factors to be taken into consideration while considering an
application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the
severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the
nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or
apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses;
the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the
accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his
abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the
accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the
accused and larger interest of the public or the State and
similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising
jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not
expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of
the complainant, and that too, without any trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. A perusal of the status report shows that the weight
of the charas was found to be 1.360 Kgs, 1.350 Kgs and 1.333 Kgs
on the spot, in the proceedings under Section 52A of the NDPS
Act, and in the laboratory, respectively. It was submitted that
there is a variation in the weight of the charas, which makes the
prosecution’s case highly suspect. This submission is not
acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Sohan Lal alias Bhau
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2025:HHC:28476
and others Vs. State of H.P. and others, 2019 STPL 3203 HP, that if
there is a variation in the report of analysis and the certificate
issued under Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, the certificate will
prevail. It was observed: –
10. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid
exposition of law that the samples drawn and certified by
the learned Magistrate in compliance with sub-sections
(2) and (3) of Section 52-A are primary evidence and,
therefore, had to be taken as true and any contradiction in
such certification with the final report prepared by the
prosecution, the quantity mentioned in the final report
obviously had to give way to the certification so made by
the Court under Section 52-A of the Act ibid.
13. Therefore, as per the judgment, the certificate issued
by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, that the weight of the
charas was found to be 1.350 Kgs has to be accepted as correct,
and the weight mentioned by the police on the spot and in the
laboratory is to be ignored. Therefore, no advantage can be
derived from the so-called variation in the weight.
14. The status report shows that the petitioner was
arrested on 26.11.2023. The prosecution has cited fifteen
witnesses, out of whom eight have been examined. The matter is
now listed before the learned Trial Court on 01.12.2025 for
recording the statement of PW13. A perusal of the photocopy of
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the order sheet dated 19.07.2025 shows that two witnesses were
examined on that day, and one witness was summoned for
01.12.2025, nearly five months from the date of the hearing.
There is no explanation as to why the learned Trial Court had
summoned only one witness out of the remaining seven
prosecution witnesses and why the matter was listed after
nearly five months from the date of the hearing. The fact that
the matter was listed after five months and that too for the
examination of one witness shows the inability of the learned
Trial Court to expeditiously conclude the trial. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1693 that if the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
Court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide the right of
speedy trial to the accused, then the bail should not be declined
on the ground that the crime is serious. It was observed at page
820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court
concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or
any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article
10
2025:HHC:2847621 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused,
not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting
agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the
accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been
infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.
15. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed on page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
and in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
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15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as
an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution.
The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that
any possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while
dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial
we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an
integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty
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enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be
the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought
to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment
as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation
of his fundamental right under Article 21.
Would he be entitled to be released
unconditionally, freed from the charge
levelled against him on the ground that
trying him after an unduly long period of
time and convicting him after such a trial
would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence
being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a
fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised
by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to
speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution
and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz.
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and
explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a
balancing test to determine whether this right had been
denied in the particular case before it.”
16. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person
cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial
being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been
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2025:HHC:28476deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable
length of time without any prospect of the trial being
concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of
the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded
looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials
have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for
such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their
being found guilty of the offences for which they have
been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived
at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary.”
17. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or
the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised
the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To
put it differently, no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial, especially when the law
presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even
where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail,
such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that
after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any
other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt
down, and cannot be measured over and above the right
of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
14
2025:HHC:28476(see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
18. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right
to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right
of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008)
17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict
between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is
alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of
innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at
the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kar-
tar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375]
made observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Asso-
ciation. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR
1123] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment,
namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted,
curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial
discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials
would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
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2025:HHC:28476
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624,
para 17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
19. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are
appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s
response to Parliament, the National Crime Records
Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of
4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime
Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-
2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these,
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were
undertrials.
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24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates
are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the
Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss
of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy
of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out
to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by
ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [
Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s
Concept of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/
Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials–especially in cases where special laws
enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily.”
20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of
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the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was
observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1
SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges
is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law
for depriving a person of liberty cannot be
“reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of
such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable,
fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental right
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time
and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar,
(1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman
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Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court
re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held
that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option:
(Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269,
para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It
is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant,
as the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways
of law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial.”
21. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial
is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare
for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the
trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
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All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
22. It was submitted that the petitioner was found in
possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and he is not
entitled to bail without satisfying the twin conditions laid down
in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This submission is not acceptable.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim
v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
352 that where the accused is entitled to bail due to his long
incarceration, the fetters of Section 37 will not apply. It was
observed at page 178:
22. The standard to be considered, therefore, is one where
the court would look at the material in a broad manner
and reasonably see whether the accused’s guilt may be
proved. The judgments of this Court have, therefore, em-
phasised that the satisfaction which courts are expected
to record i.e. that the accused may not be guilty, is only
prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not
call for meticulous examination of the materials collected
during investigation (as held in Union of India v. Rattan
Mallik [Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 831] ). Grant of bail on ground of undue
delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of
the Act, given the imperative of Section 436-A which is
applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Saten-
der Kumar Antil [Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC
51 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] ). Having regard to these factors,
20
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the Court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case,
the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail
23. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and
the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms
and conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he
influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by
the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media accounts,
the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five
days from the date of the change.
24. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
21
2025:HHC:28476
25. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Superintendent of Sub Jail Kullu at
Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. and the learned Trial Court through
FASTER.
26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
22nd August, 2025
(Anurag)
KARAN Digitally signed by
KARAN SINGH
SINGH Date: 2025.08.22
16:39:52 +0530