Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs M/S Alternative For India Development … on 14 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:24134-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 77 of 2025
With
I.A No.12989 of 2024
1. The State of Jharkhand, through Secretary, Information Technology,
having its office at Project Building, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi-
834004
2. Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of Information Technology (JAP-IT),
An Autonomous Body under Department of Information Technology & e-
governance, Government of Jharkhand registered under the Society
Registration Act, through its Chief Executive Officer, its registered office
at Engineering Hostel No.1, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi 834004.
......... Petitioners
Versus
M/s Alternative for India Development having its corporate office at Plot
No. 1, VGN Nagar (Iyyapathangal), PO-Kattupakkam, PS & District-
Chennai, through one of the Director, Sri K.T. Arasu, Son of K.K.
Kumaraswamy Nadar, presently residing at Albert Compound,
Pathalkudwa, P.O-G.P.O, Ranchi, P.S-Lower Bazar, District-Ranchi
.... ... Claimant/Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
Mr. Shreya Mishra, AC to AG
Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
For the Respondent : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
Mr. Yashdeep Kanhai, Advocate
Mr. Arya Vardhan Singh, Advocate
Ms. Divya Choudhary, Advocate
Ms. Amrita Singh, Advocate
---------
C.A.V on 15.07.2025 Pronounced on 14.08. 2025
Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
The instant petition has been preferred for review of the order dated
21.07.2023 passed by this Court in Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018
whereby and whereunder the judgment dated 25.06.2018 passed in
Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned Presiding
Officer, Commercial Court, Ranchi, has not been interfered with.
2025:JHHC:24134-DB
Factual Matrix
1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said part of the Arbitral
Award dated 02.06.2017 passed by the learned Arbitrator, an
Arbitration Case No. 01 of 2016, whereby the claimant awarded with
revenue support for total number of 594 Common Service Centers as
well as Supplementary Award dated 07.07.2017 as also against the
rejection of the part of the counter claim and against the order dated
11.08.2017 passed in the said Arbitration Case No. 01 of 2016 by the
learned Sole Arbitrator, the appellant filed an application under Section
34 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 being the Commercial
(REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 before the learned Commercial Court,
Ranchi.
2. The learned Commercial Court heard the application and has
passed the judgment on 25.06.2018 dismissing the said petition.
3. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 25.06.2018 passed in
Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned
Commercial Court, Ranchi, the Commercial Appeal being Commercial
Appeal No.07 of 2018 has been preferred.
4. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 21.07.2023 has
refused to interfere with the order dated 25.06.2018 passed in
Commercial (REVOC) Case No. 05 of 2017 by the learned
Commercial Court, Ranchi, against which present review petition has
been preferred.
5. It needs to refer herein that against the order dated 21.07.2023 the
appellant has preferred SLP being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary
No(s).43925 of 2023 but the same was dismissed vide order dated
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19.01.2024 by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
6. Thereafter the present review petition has been filed.
Argument by the learned counsel for the State-petitioners:
7. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, the learned Advocate General appearing for the
State of Jharkhand assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Anand, the learned AAG-
III has taken the ground that the error has been crept up in the arbitral
Award as also the order passed in a proceeding under section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as also the order passed in
Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018 the order which is being sought to be
reviewed by filing the instant review to the extent of calculation of
amount said to be not proper.
Response of the learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent-claimant
8. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-
claimant has vehemently opposed the prayer on merit since the instant
review is barred by limitation of 429 days for which one interlocutory
application being I.A No.12989 of 2024 has been filed for condonation
of said delay.
9. However, he has submitted that the instant review petition is
nothing but only to frustrate the execution proceeding which is pending
before the competent executing Court that too, the Arbitral Award after
having been affirmed up to the level of the Hon’ble Apex Court has
also been acted upon by making the payment of principal amount.
10. The only dispute has been raised on behalf of the review petitioner
regarding the error crept up in the calculation of the interest amount as
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would be evident from the order passed by the learned Scrutiny Court
dated 01.07.2025. But herein altogether different grounds have been
taken of wrong calculation of the entire amount as per the entitlement
as has been held by the learned Arbitrator which has been taken into
consideration by the Court having jurisdiction under section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act as also by this Court while passing
order in Commercial Appeal No. 7 of 2018 which has also been upheld
by dismissal of SLP filed by the review petitioner-State.
11. It has further been submitted that the review petition has purposely
been filed only to frustrate the execution proceeding and that too, by
taking altogether different grounds while the said grounds before the
learned Executing Court was with respect to interest.
12. It has been submitted that no cause has been shown said to be
sufficient to establish the ground of condonation of delay of 429 days
which itself is evident from the delay condonation application
particularly, at paragraph-11 which cannot be said to be sufficient cause
to condone the delay that too, when Arbitral Award has been acted upon
by making payment of the principal amount having raised the question
of incorrectness in the calculation of the interest.
13. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-claimant
has submitted that limitation in filing the appeal under section 13 (1-A)
of the Commercial Act, 2015 and even accepting that the relaxation
has been carved by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
“Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Private Limited (2021) 6 SCC 460, but in the said
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judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court even after considering the
object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under
the Arbitration Act and Commercial Courts Act, has laid down the
proposition that delay can be condoned by way of exception and not by
way of rule. It has been laid down that in a fit case in which a party has
otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay
beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be condoned,
always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that opposite
party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be
lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.
14. It has been submitted that the instant review petition has been filed
with limitation to frustrate the execution proceeding that too, when the
Award passed by the learned Tribunal has been acted upon so far it
relates to disbursement of principal amount is concerned and what is
being said by making the ground of review the same cannot be said to
be a ground once the principal amount has been paid in favour of the
appellant-claimant, rather the dispute only is with respect to quantum
of interest . Therefore, the present review petition which has been filed
belatedly is nothing but to frustrate the execution proceeding, therefore,
the delay may not be condoned.
Analysis
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the ground available in the review petition as also the factual
background of the present review petition.
16. It is necessary to be referred the factual aspect herein before dealing
with the interlocutory application filed for condonation of delay to
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assess and to come to conclusion that the delay is to be condoned or not
at this stage.
17. The dispute regarding the commercial transaction has been raised
by the claimant, the respondent herein, which ultimately culminated
into appointment of arbitrator who has given Award dated 02.06.2017,
the relevant paragraph of the same is being quoted hereunder as:
Therefore on the basis of the findings and conclusion arrived upon
hereinabove, my award is as follows:-
I. Respondents is awarded with Rs 9,47,706/- (Rupees Nine Lac
Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred and Six) towards the claim
made under the head of the 70% share of the amount received by
the Claimant from the citizens by offering the government services
plus a lump sum amount of Rs 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lac)
towards the delay caused in disbursement of the said amount of the
share of the State Government.
II. Respondents is awarded with right to impose non roll -out
penalty for the total 6 number of CSCs for the period from 26th
November 2012 (date wherein it was admitted by the Respondent in
its internal CSC Review Meeting that Claimant had rolled out 594
CSCs: a copy of which has been marked as Annexure – A to the
Reply of the Claimant to the Statement of Defence) to 26th June
2016 (date of termination of the MSA) in accordance with the
provisions laid down under Schedule 1 of the MSA, that come to a
figure of Rs. 7,84,800/-(Rupees Seven Lac Eighty Four Thousand &
Eight Hundred Only).
III. After the deduction of the amounts awarded to the Respondents
hereinabove as well as after deduction of the amount already paid
to the Claimant by way of Revenue Support, i.e. Rs. 60,66,912
(Rupees Sixty Lac Sixty Six Thousand Nine Hundred & Twelve) for
the period from October 2012 till March 2013, the Claimant is
awarded with Revenue Support for the total number of 594 CSCs
@ of Rs. 3284/ per CSC per month calculated from 26th November
2012 (date wherein it was admitted by the Respondent in its
internal CSC Review Meeting that Claimant had rolled out 594
CSCs -a copy of which has been marked as Annexure A to the Reply
of the Claimant to the Statement of Defence) to 25th June 2016
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2025:JHHC:24134-DB(date of termination of the MSA) i.e Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees
Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred &
Ten), plus the interest upon the same as per the prime lending rate
of SBI for the applicable period (since the same keeps fluctuating,
hence it is required to be calculated accordingly), to be calculated
from November 2012 till the date of such payment is actually made
to the Claimant.
The Respondent No. 2 is hereby directed to pay Rs.7,58,80,510/-
(Rupees Seven Crore Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five
Hundred & Ten), plus the interest amount as per the Award within a
period of two months.
18. Thereafter a supplementary Award dated 07.07.2017 has been
passed by the learned Arbitrator for modification of the Award dated
02.06.2017, for ready reference the same is being quoted hereunder as:
SUPPLEMENTARY AWARD
“Pursuant to the Award dated 02.06.2017, passed by the
undersigned in the present case, a petition was subsequently filed
on 09.06.2017 by the Claimant M/s Alternative for India
Development (M/s AID), under Section 33 (1) (a) of the Arbitration
& Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, stating therein that, there
has been an inadvertent typographical error at Page 15 of the
Award, wherein the date 14.05.2013 has wrongly been typed as
14.05.2017, accordingly it is prayed to correct the date as
14.05.2013.
2. The Learned Government Advocate appearing for the
Respondent has no objection to such a correction of the pointed
out typographical error at page 15 of the Award.
3. The above typographical error is apparent on face of record and
if the date is changed from 14.05.2017 to 14.05.2013 it shall not
affect the merit of case of the parties, hence let necessary
correction at page 15 of the Award is being made and the date be
read as 14.05.2013 in place of 14.05.2017. Accordingly necessary
correction is made in the Award.
4. The Claimant has further stated in the said petition that there
has been an apparent calculation mistake in calculation of the
amount paid to the SCA by SDA which is to be deducted from the
awarded Revenue Support. In the main award under Para 37 (III),7
2025:JHHC:24134-DBthe Revenue Support payable to Claimant has been directed to be
calculated from 26th November 2012 till 25th June 2016 and
amount of Rs. 60,66,912/- (Rupees Sixty Lac Sixty Thousand Nine
Hundred & Twelve) has been directed to be deducted as already
paid to the claimant by way of Revenue Support for the period
from October 2012 till March 2013. It has been pointed out by the
amount of Claimant in the said petition that, an Rs.17,89,386/-
(Rupees Seventeen Lac Eighty Nine Thousand Three Hundred &
Eighty Six) for the period from 1st October 2012 to 31st October
2012 and Rs. 14,91,155/- (Rupees Fourteen Lac Ninety One
Thousand One Hundred & Fifty Five) for the period from 1st
November 2012 to 25th November 2012 total amounting to Rs.
32,80,541/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lac Eighty Thousand Five
Hundred & Forty One) was paid prior to 26.12.2012 that is the
cut-off date and the same has been excessively deducted from the
awarded amount and as such it is liable to be added back to the
already awarded amount of Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore
Fifty Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten) under Para
37 (III) of the Award dated 02.06.2017.
5. That the Learned Government Advocate appearing for the
Respondent could not dispute the factual calculation error which is
apparent on face of the record and therefore it is rectified
accordingly.
6. Therefore, considering the plain interpretation of the Award
passed by me on 02.06.2017, it is visibly clear that, there has been
calculation error in computation of the said Award under Para 37
(III), wherein, an additional amount has been deducted on account
of already paid amount to the Claimant dedusted by way of
Revenue Support and hence necessary correction is made in the
computation of Award under Para 37 (III) by adding an amount
Rs. 32,80,541/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lac Eighty Thousand Five
Hundred & Forty One) which was wrongly deducted to the already
awarded amount of Rs. 7,58,80,510/- (Rupees Seven Crore Fifty
Eight Lac Eighty Thousand Five Hundred & Ten) and the awarded
amount under the Para 37 (III) of the Award be read as Rs.
7,91,61,051/- (Rupees Seven Crore Nienty One Lac Sixty One
Thousand & Fifty One).
7. Accordingly last portion of Para 12 and Para 37 (III) of the
main Award are modified to the extent indicated above.”
19. The said Award was challenged by the State by filing application
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under section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The said application
was dismissed upholding the Award. The matter came to this Court
under its appellate jurisdiction under section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 but the same has also been dismissed. The state has
preferred SLP being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).43925
of 2023 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 19.01.2024 by the
Hon’ble Apex Court.
20. The subject matter of the review as has been submitted by the
learned Advocate General appearing for the State is that all the
Common Service Centers have not been operational in one stroke and,
as such the amount required to be calculation basing upon the date of
operational of another Common Service Center.
21. This Court has considered the part of Award as available on record
with respect to the issue of consideration of claim of the appellant for
594 Common Service Centers. No such plea was agitated on behalf of
the State which is being now agitated by making the Common Service
Centers as not operational. Further, while challenging the Award under
the proceeding under section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act also,
no such ground has been taken and even before this Court.
22. The Award having been upheld upto the higher Forum and an
execution case has been filed being Commercial Execution Case No.
08 of 2017.
23. The State has appeared and paid the principal amount. For payment
of the interest amount an application was filed for recalculation of
quantum of interest for which an order was passed on 01.07.2025 by
the learned Court.
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24. The learned Court has admitted the calculation made by the
judgment debtor on the interest head to the tune of Rs.11,24,70,205/-
and has directed the judgment debtor to make payment of the aforesaid
amount within two weeks.
25. The aforesaid interest amount has not been paid and in the
meanwhile, the present review petition has been filed on 08.08.2024.
26. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the State has preferred the
review petition by taking absolutely a new ground of non -operational
of all centers in one stock which has been filed after delay of 429 days.
Therefore, this Court has to consider the issue of condonation of delay
first.
27. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State has
submitted that the delay may liberally be considered. He has relied
upon the judgment in the case of “Government of Maharashtra (Water
Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse
Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited“, (supra).
28. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects and the respective
contention of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has gone
through the application for condonation of delay.
29. There is no dispute about the position of law that delay can be
condoned irrespective of the period of delay if the sufficient cause
being shown by the party concerned.
30. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made
in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14
SCC 81], wherein, it has been held at paragraphs 9 to 15 which read
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hereunder as:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint
of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v.
Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC
1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012
SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and
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no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal
[(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v.
Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is
the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According
to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the
Limitation Acts.–The courts have expressed at least three differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely,
(1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove
a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited
limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and
therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what
may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or
laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005)
7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 :
AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating
and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution12
2025:JHHC:24134-DBBench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts
to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
31. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or
it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case
must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it
has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
32. It is thus evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that the said
judgment has been passed on consideration of the issue of condonation
of delay while entertaining the application under Section 5 of the
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33. Thus, it is evident that the aforesaid judgment has considered the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to be made applicable in
a case where the delay is to be condoned depending upon the sufficient
cause if shown by the concerned litigant that is the general principle of
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
34. Further the “sufficient cause” will only be said to be sufficient
cause if the party concerned without any negligent approach has
followed the legal procedure in filing the appeal with all due diligence
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment as rendered in the
case of Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited”
(supra).
35. It needs to refer herein that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has
been brought into force even though the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 was in vogue the day when the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 was enacted. But, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, there was no rigid principle has been made applicable in
condoning the delay and that is the reason the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 has been enacted by carving out a forum as under Section 13 of
the Act 2015 thereof.
36. It is not in dispute taking into consideration the object and intent of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the intent of enactment of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 wherein the paramount consideration
of the legislation is for early conclusion of the dispute, therefore, the
provision has been enacted under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 that the appeal can be filed against the order passed by the
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concerned court within the period of 60 days without giving any
stretchable time as would appear from the provision of Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which reads as under:
“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions. – [(1) Any person aggrieved by the
judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level of a
District Judge may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Court
within a period of sixty days from the date of judgment or order.
(1-A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising
original civil jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial
Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty
days from the date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a
Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act and section
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal
shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division or
Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.”
37. It is evident from the provision of section that the specific
stipulation is made by the statutory command that the appeal is
preferred within a period of 60 days.
38. It is evident from the aforesaid object that the commercial disputes
are to be read to its logical end expeditiously hence, in the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 the appeal has been mandated to be filed within a
period of 60 days, by not making any provision for condoning the delay
meaning thereby the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act has
been taken out from the fold of Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
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39. Further, the aforesaid provision does not refer about the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as per the original
enactment. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Private Limited (Supra) has taken into consideration the
aforesaid issue by taking into consideration the fact that the rigid
principle of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but the applicability of Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1996 has been made applicable with all rigidity
if the provision of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 will
be taken into consideration.
40. Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of “Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited” (supra) has considered
the issue of applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act subject to
availability of sufficient cause by answering the issue as to whether
even the sufficient cause is being shown the limitation in filing the
appeal is to be condoned or not.
41. The Hon’ble Apex Court, by taking into consideration the very
object and intent of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as under the
relevant paragraph has considered the issue of applicability to condone
the delay whereby and whereunder the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has been held to be acceptable but with the condition
that the same is to be applied with all circumspection in a case where
there is delay if caused in filing the appeal by taking into consideration
the bona fide approach of the litigant concerned and it is not in the
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negligent manner.
42. This Court since has referred the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) Represented by Executive Engineer) Vs. Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (supra) wherein the prayer
for condonation of delay of 131 days was there for which explanation
was furnished of file pushing and administrative exigency; further
while refusing to condone the delay of 75 days due to the procedural
approval and the ground since the appellant is a public entity under the
Energy Department of the State Government the delay caused in filing
the appeal has been said to be bona fide and as such deserves to be
condoned but such explanation, does not find the same as sufficient
ground for condonation of delay. Even the delay of 200 days in filing
the appeal was refused to be condoned while passing order in S.L.P. (C)
No. 18079 of 2020, for ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid judgment are being quoted herein: –
“53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still
arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to
appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of
limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V.
International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC
109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow condonation
of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an
open-ended provision in which any amount of delay can be
condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these
two extremes that we have to steer a middle course.
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy
resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not
elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by
the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient17
2025:JHHC:24134-DBcause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent
and stale claims. …………………………………….
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to
be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90
days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has
otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short
delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture
is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and
justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.
64. Coming to the facts of the appeals before us, in the civil appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No. 665 of 2021, the impugned judgment of
the High Court of Bombay, dated 17-12-2020 [State of Maharashtra
v. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine
Bom 10453] , has found that the Government of Maharashtra had
not approached the court bona fide, as follows : (Borse Brothers
case [State of Maharashtra v. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors
(P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 10453] , SCC OnLine Bom para
7)
“7. I have carefully gone through the papers. There can be no
doubt in view of the documentary evidence in the form of copy
of the application tendered by the advocate representing the
applicant for obtaining a certified copy (Ext. R-1) that in fact,
after pronouncement of the judgment and order in the
proceeding under Section 34 of the Act, the advocate
concerned had applied for certified copy on 14-5-2019. The
endorsement further reads that it was to be handed over to Mr
A.D. Patil of the Irrigation Department, Dhule, who is a staff
from the office of the applicant. The further endorsements also
clearly show that the certified copy was ready and was to be
delivered on 27-5- 2019. Inspite of such a stand and
document, the applicant has not controverted this or has not
come up with any other stand touching this aspect. It is
therefore apparent that the applicant is not coming to the
Court with clean hands even while seeking the discretionary18
2025:JHHC:24134-DBrelief of condonation of delay.
66. In the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15278 of 2020,
the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
dated 27-1- 2020 [M.P. Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. v.
Swastik Wires, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 3003] relies upon
Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v.
Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] and thereby states that the
judgment of this Court in N.V. International [N.V. International v.
State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275]
would not apply. The judgment of the High Court is wholly
incorrect inasmuch as Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg.
Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] was a
judgment which applied the provisions of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act and had nothing to do with the application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. N.V. International [N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC
(Civ) 275] was a direct judgment which applied the provisions of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and then held that no condonation
of delay could take place beyond 120 days. The High Court was
bound to follow N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of
Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] , as on the
date of the judgment of the High Court, N.V. International [N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC
(Civ) 275] was a judgment of the two learned Judges of the
Supreme Court binding upon the High Court by virtue of Article
141 of the Constitution. On this score, the impugned judgment of
the High Court deserves to be set aside.
67. That apart, on the facts of this appeal, there is a long delay of
75 days beyond the period of 60 days provided by the
Commercial Courts Act. Despite the fact that a certified copy of
the District Court’s judgment was obtained by the respondent on
27-4-2019, the appeal was filed only on 9-9-2019, the
explanation for delay being: “2. That, the certified copy of the
order dated 1-4-2013 was received by the appellant on 27-4-
2019. Thereafter the matter was placed before the CGM purchase
MPPKVVCL for the compliance of the order. The same was then
sent to the law officer, MPPKVVCL for opinion.
3. That after taking opinion for appeal, and approval of the
authorities concerned, the officer-in-charge was appointed
vide order dated 23-7-2019.
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4. That, thereafter due to bulky records of the case and for
procurement of the necessary documents some delay has been
caused however, the appeal has been prepared and filed
pursuant to the same and further delay.
5. That due to the aforesaid procedural approval and since the
appellant is a public entity formed under the Energy
Department of the State Government, the delay caused in
filing the appeal is bona fide and which deserve[s] to be
condoned.”
68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any
sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the
condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.
69. In the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 18079 of
2020, there is a huge delay of 227 days in filing the appeal, and a
200-day delay in refiling. The facts of this case also show that
there was no sufficient cause whatsoever to condone such a long
delay. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated
15-10- 2019 [Union of India v. Associated Construction Co.,
2019 SCC OnLine Del 10797] cannot be faulted on this score
and this appeal is consequently dismissed.”
43. Therefore, object of expeditious disposal of the commercial
disputes has been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of “Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited” (Supra) as per the
paragraphs which have been referred hereinabove wherein also the
object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been taken into
consideration based upon that the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down
the proposition that although the Section 5 of the Limitation Act has
limited applicability under the statutory provision as contained in the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but conferring discretionary power to the
concerned court in the rarest of rare case to condone the delay of a very
shorter period depending upon the sufficient cause as also if there is no
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2025:JHHC:24134-DB
negligent approach of the party concerned.
44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the paragraph-63 of the said judgment
has laid down that the condonation of delay in exception is to be taken
into consideration by seeing the conduct of the party whether the party
has acted bona fide or in a negligent manner, if the bona fide is there, a
short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the Court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that other side of the picture that the
opposite party may have acquired both equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.
45. The reference of the aforesaid judgment is necessary even in the
present situation, since, we are sitting in the review and not in the
appeal. This Court has dismissed the appeal way back on 21.07.2023
against which a Special Leave Petition was filed being Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).43925 of 2023 which was also dismissed
on 19.01.2024. Thereafter, the present review petition has been filed on
08.08.2024.
46. The review petition has also to be filed within the period of 30 days
which has been admitted by the learned Advocate General also, but it
has been filed after a delay of 429 days from the date of passing of the
judgment by this Court in Commercial Appeal No.7 of 2018.
47. We have considered the instant interlocutory application to asses
the cause as to whether the cause is said to be sufficient or not. Only in
paragrapoh-11 the cause has been shown, i.e., the delay has been
caused since the document of the case was in scattered manner, there is
no separate legal section and any how JAP-IT provided the relevant
documents to his counsel and after going through the records, review
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2025:JHHC:24134-DB
petition prepared and the same was sent for approval on 04.08.2024
and after approval it has been filed on 08.08.2024. For ready reference
the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“7. That after passing the order dated 19-01-2024 by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, and communicated to the concerned department
l.e. Jharkhand Agency for Promotion of Information Techonology
(JAP-IT), headed and runs under the guidance of Chief Executive
Officer, who was transferred on 26-02-2024, hence he could not
take any steps in this matter.
8. That after Joining of another C.E.O in JAP-IT on 06-03-2024
and then on 14-03-2024 history with the present status of running
case of Execution in Civil Court, Ranchi send to Secretary,
Department of Information Technology & e-Governance,
Government of Jharkhand for the necessary directions.
9. That the directions from the department came on 09-04-2024 to
JAP-IT for placing the case before Hon’ble High Court, hence from
20-01-2024 to 09-04-2024, l.e., further about 81 days could not be
taken any steps to file Review Petition, before the Hon’ble High
Court at Ranchi.
10. That the petitioners/JAP-IT at first appointed a government
pleader for taking steps before the Learned Commercial Execution
Court at Civil Court Ranchi and on 13th June 2024, JAP-IT
engaged another counsel for filing the Review Petition before the
Hon’ble High Court.
11. That the related documents of the said case was in scattered
manner, as because, there is no separate legal section and any how
JAP-IT provided the relevant documents to his counsel and after
going through the records, Review Petition prepared and the same
was sent for approval on 04-08-2024 and after approval it has been
filed on 08-08-2024″
48. As has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Borse
Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited” (supra) that the
bona fide approach of the parties to be taken into consideration for the
purpose of even condoning the delay but in exception and if the
conduct of the party is so negligent the delay is not to be condoned
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taking into consideration the interest of the other side.
49. This Court applying the said observation made by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in paragraph no.63 in the case of “Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited” (supra) and adverting to
the reason shown in paragraphs of the application for condonation of
delay which has been referred as hereinabove, wherein it has been
stated that even the file has not been kept in arranged manner rather it
was in scattered manner and in collecting the file the period of 429
days has been consumed as per the explanation furnished therein.
50. It is considered view of this Court that the cause as furnished in the
said Interlocutory Application cause cannot be said to be a sufficient
cause for the purpose of condoning the delay considering the said
reason to be a bona fide rather it is to be considered as a negligent
approach of the party.
51. This Court, therefore, is of the view that applying the principle laid
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Borse Brothers Engineers
and Contractors Private Limited” (supra) the explanation which has
been furnished in condoning the delay is not fit to be considered to be
sufficient cause to condone the delay of 429 days as an exception.
52. Accordingly, the said interlocutory application being I.A No.12989
of 2024 stands dismissed.
53. In consequence thereof, the instant review petition also stands
dismissed and disposed of as such.
54. The factual aspect of the case which has been referred hereinabove
is not for the purpose of consideration of the issue on merit, since,
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before entering into the merit the application filed for condonation of
delay is to be considered and the said factual aspect has only been for
the reproduction of the fact available on record and not for the purpose
of merit.
55. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree.
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Sudhir
Dated: 14 /8/2025
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
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