Jharkhand High Court
Chalitar Yadav @ Charitar Yadav vs The State Of Jharkhand on 21 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1411 of 2024
with
I.A. No. 6973 of 2025
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Chalitar Yadav @ Charitar Yadav, aged about 43 years son of
Bhuneshwar Yadav, resident of village- Kenduwa, P.O. & P.S. Gidhour,
District- Chatra ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Dr. Suvendu Jaipuriar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Subodh Kr. Dubey, A.P.P.
For the Informant : Mr. Arwind Kumar, Advocate
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Order No. 07/ Dated 21.08.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
I.A. No. 6973 of 2025:
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section
430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for keeping the
sentence dated 31.08.2024 in abeyance in connection with the
judgment of conviction dated 30.08.2024 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-I, Chatra in Sessions Trial No. 313 of 2023
arising out of Gidhour P.S. Case No. 36 of 2021, whereby and
whereunder, the appellant has been convicted under section 148,
323/149,341/149,342/149,302/149 of the IPC and sentenced to
undergo RI for life under Section 302/149 of IPC along with a fine of
Rs. 10,000/- and in default of fine, the applicant has been directed to
further undergo RI for 1 year. He has further sentenced to undergo
RI for 2 years under Section 148 of IPC; SI for 15 days under Section
341/149 of IPC, RI for 6 months under Section 342/149 of IPC, SI for
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6 months under Section 323/149 of IPC. All the sentences have beendirected to run concurrently.
Factual Matrix:
2. The brief facts of the case as per the written report of the informant
is as under:
On the basis of the written report of the informant, on
22.06.2021 at about 6.30 P.M., the informant along with her son
Devendra Yadav was returning from Hazaribagh to her village
Kenduwa, and in that course when they reached near Aahar
situated in village Gidhour, Ratanpur, FIR named accused persons
along with 10-12 other persons variously armed stopped the
motorcycle of Devendra Yadav; thereafter Jagarnath Pandit @
Kumahar and Mahendra Yadav caught and dragged him to some
distance where Chalitar Yadav(present applicant) fired upon him.
Jagarnath Pandit, Samar Kumar assaulted him by means of Lathi
and Bhujali. Brahamadeo Paswan and Rajendra Yadav inflicted
him by Gandasa blow, Prabhat Kumar Yadav by sword, Mahendra
Yadav by means of Tangi blow, Birendra Paswan, Shyamdeo
Yadav, Randheer Yadav, Kishori Yadav, Pradeep Paswan inflicted
blow with sharp edged weapons, and thereby committed murder
of his son Devendra Yadav.
When the informant came in rescue of Devendra Yadav, the
accused persons also assaulted her. On hearing sound of firing
when her sons Ganesh Yadav and Surendra Yadav came there,
then the accused persons fled away.
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3. On the basis of the aforesaid written application of the informant,
Gidhour P.S. Case No. 36 of 2021 was instituted and the police took
up investigation into the case and accordingly chargesheet was
submitted against the present appellant.
4. The Trial Court, after recording the evidence of witnesses,
examination-in-chief and cross-examination, recorded the statement
of the accused person and found the charges levelled against the
appellant proved beyond all reasonable doubts.
5. Accordingly, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to
undergo RI for life under Section 302/149 of IPC along with a fine of
Rs. 10,000/-. He has further sentenced to undergo RI for 2 years
under Section 148 of IPC; SI for 15 days under Section 341/149 of
IPC, RI for 6 months under Section 342/149 of IPC, SI for 6 months
under Section 323/149 of IPC. All the sentences have been directed
to run concurrently.
6. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the
applicant/appellant with the prayer for the suspension of sentence
during pendency of the instant appeal.
Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant:
7. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that
on earlier occasion also, the appellant had moved before this Court
for suspension of sentence by filing I.A. No. 11846 of 2024 which has
been dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 18.02.2025.
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8. It has been contended by the learned counsel that the appellant has
been convicted only on the basis of depositions of interested
witnesses in spite of the fact that there are several contradictions in
the testimony of material witnesses, yet the learned trial court had
relied upon the interested witnesses and gave finding contrary to
the record.
9. Further contention has been made that there are 15 witnesses in
total, out of which 3 witnesses are own relatives and they have
deposed that they witnessed the incident and they recognized the
accused, but there is lot of discrepancy in their depositions.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that it
was stated that several bullets have been fired by the appellant upon
the deceased, but only one bullet was recovered from the body of the
deceased and the prosecution has failed to prove that gunshot was
being fired by the appellant and the gun used in the incident was not
recovered by the Investigating Officer.
11. It has further been contended that the other convicts have been
released on bail by this Court order dated 08.05.2025 in I.A (Cr.)No.
5175 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1246 of 2024, I.A (Cr.) No. 4787
of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1347 of 2024, I.A (Cr.) No. 4711 of
2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1348 of 2024, I.A (Cr.) No. 4713 of 2025
in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1407 of 2024 and I.A (Cr.) No. 4712 of 2025 in
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1436 of 2024, therefore on issue of parity also
the present appellant may enlarge on bail.
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12. It has been contended that the appellant is languishing in judicial
custody since 18.03.2023.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid premise, has
submitted that, therefore, it is a fit case where the sentence is to be
suspended so that the appellant be released on bail.
Arguments advanced by the learned State counsel:
14. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent-State has vehemently opposed the submissions
advanced by the counsel for the appellant for grant of bail during
pendency of the appeal.
15. It has been contended that as per settled position of law there is no
impediment on relying upon the testimony of related witnesses and
all the related witnesses cannot be categorized as interested witness
rather in most of the cases they are natural witnesses since they
generally witnessed the alleged crime, therefore if learned trial
based upon the testimony of related witnesses has convicted the
present appellant it cannot be stated that the impugned
order/judgment suffers from an error.
16. The learned APP further submitted that if the cogent evidences of
the eyewitness are available on record, then in such cases non-
recovery of weapon used in alleged commission of crime cannot be
fatal to the prosecution case.
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17. Further, submission has been made that the convict, appellant
herein, has done cold blooded murder of the deceased after hatching
plan for several days.
18. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the aforesaid premise, has
submitted that, therefore, it is not a fit case where the appellant
deserves the privilege of bail by suspension of sentence.
Analysis:
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given
our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced at the bar
and have carefully gone through the finding recorded by the learned
trial court in the impugned judgment as also the testimony of the
witnesses and the material placed on record.
20. It is apparent from record that the appellant had earlier moved
before this Court for suspension of sentence by filing I.A. No. 11846
of 2024 which has been dismissed as not pressed vide order dated
18.02.2025.
21. Before adverting to the factual aspect of the instant case this Court
would like to refer the ratio as led by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC
123 wherein it has been held that in cases involving conviction
under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit
of suspension of sentence can be granted, for ready reference the
relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted as
under:
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“31. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra,
(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v.
Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal,
(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] , it was held by this
Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302IPC,
it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of
sentence can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v.
Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] , it was
held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving
a serious offence like murder punishable under Section
302IPC, the court should consider the relevant factors like the
nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity
of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on
bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious
offence of murder.
33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the
endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see
as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and
accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which,
ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If
the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the
affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that,
if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an
acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept
behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the
appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and
disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain
whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be
looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words,
something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the
record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima
facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable.
The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at
the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae
or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such
would not be a correct approach.”
22. Thus, it is evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid judgment is it is apparent that while considering the bail in
considering the prayer for bail, in a case involving a serious offence
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like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should
consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made
against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have
been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of
releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for
committing the serious offence of murder.
23. It is further evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid judgment that the appellate court should not reappreciate
the evidence at the stage of consideration of suspension of sentence
and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes in the case of the
prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach and at this stage
Court is only to see the prima facie case for its satisfaction.
24. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Preet Pal Singh vs.
State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 has observed that there is
difference between grant of bail in case of pre-trial arrest and
suspension of sentence, post- conviction. In the earlier case, there
may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate
of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending
on the facts and circumstances of the case, however, in case of post-
conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a
finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does
not arise. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
“35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section
439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence
under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In
the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence,
which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence,8
and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule
and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh
v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22
: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction
bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a
finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence
does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and
jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial.
Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of
sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie
merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should
be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail,
notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of
sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be
recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section
389(1) CrPC.”
25. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment, that during
considering suspension of sentence which is the post-conviction
stage, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused cannot
be available and at this stage, the Court’s only duty is to see that the
prima-facie case is made out or not and as such the detailed
appreciation of evidence is not required at this stage.
26. Further, it is also settled position of law that a witness may be
untruthful in some aspects but the other part of the evidence may be
worthy of acceptance. Discrepancies may arise due to error of
observations, loss of memory due to lapse of time, mental
disposition such as shock at the time of occurrence and as such the
normal discrepancy does not affect the credibility of a witness.
Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Jagannath
Markad & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 10 SCC 537.
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27. From the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant it is
evident that issue of parity has been emphasised along with the non-
recovery of the alleged weapon and further contention has also been
raised regarding the contradiction among the testimony of related
witnesses.
28. Per contra the learned APP has contended that there is ample cogent
evidence is available on record which is sufficient enough to prove
the culpability of the present appellant in alleged commission of
crime.
29. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position and rival
contention, this Court is now adverting to the factual aspect of the
instant case.
30. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 who are the mother and wife of the deceased and
they have been considered as an eye-witnesses by the learned trial
Court.
31. P.W.1 has categorically deposed in her testimony that the Charitar
Yadav (present applicant) fired gun shot on her son (deceased) and
on raising alarm her daughter-in-law (P.W.-2) and her sons came
along with other persons.
32. P.W 2 has deposed that on 22.06.2021 accused Charitar Yadav along
with other co-accused persons were standing on the road near the
pond and they started assaulting her husband (deceased) and
Charitar Yadav (present applicant) fired gun shot on her husband.
33. Thus, from the aforesaid testimonies it is evident that there is direct
complicity and specific attributability of the present applicant has
10
surfaced on the record. Further the specific role of present petitioner
has been narrated by these witness that he was the person who had
fired gunshot upon the deceased.
34. The aforesaid fact has been substantiated by the testimony of doctor
who has been examined as P.W.-15 and has conducted post-mortem
of the dead body of Devendra Yadav @ Deva Yadav (deceased). In his
report he has opined that there is Fire arm injury found on body of
deceased which has been caused by fire arm weapon and death was
due to hemorrhagic shock resulting from the noted injuries which
were homicidal in nature.
35. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that
all the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, therefore
their evidences are not reliable.
36. In the aforesaid context, it requires to refer herein that a related
witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by
virtue of being a relative of the victim. The Hon’ble Apex Court has
elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related”
witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called
interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result
of a litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean
that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the
accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has
a motive to falsely implicate the accused. Reference in this regard be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Mohd. Rojali Ali Vs. The State of Assam, (2019) 19 SCC 567.
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37. The issue of non-recovery of alleged weapon has been raised herein
but it is now well settled that non recovery of the weapon of crime is
not fatal to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for
conviction, if there are direct reliable witnesses as held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2021) 7
SCC 188.
Issue of Parity
38. Further the issue of parity has also been raised by the learned
counsel for the applicant and while raising the aforesaid issue of
parity the order dated 08.05.2025 passed by the co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in I.A (Cr.)No. 5175 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1246
of 2024, I.A (Cr.) No. 4787 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1347 of
2024, I.A (Cr.) No. 4711 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1348 of 2024,
I.A (Cr.) No. 4713 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1407 of 2024 and
I.A (Cr.) No. 4712 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1436 of 2024, has
been referred.
39. Per contra, the learned counsel for the state has submitted that the
case of the instant appellant is on different footing in comparison to
the other accused persons who have already been granted bail.
40. In the backdrop of the aforesaid contention, this Court is now
proceeding to examine the issue of parity. The law is well settled
that the principle of parity is to be applied if the case of the fact is
exactly similar then only the principle of parity in the matter of
passing order but if there is difference in between the facts, then the
principle of parity is not to be applied.
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41. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its
powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of
circumstances before granting bail and by only simple saying that
another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established. Reference in this regard may be taken from the
judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan
Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230,
wherein, it has been held as under:
“25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High
Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are
oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged
offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 16 SCC 508 :] , this Court has held that while applying the
principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a
capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances
before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17)“17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was
taken that the second respondent was a history-sheeter, it was
imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and
not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be
admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute
certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned
order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031]
clearly exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a matter of
fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been
charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The
High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has
to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would
tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside.
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in
which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two
orders both dated 21-12-2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of
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Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana
v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted
bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was
sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was
granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of
Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court
recorded) that he was “assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)”.
Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A-16) on the ground that he
was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10),
Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks
had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the
central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail
must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another
accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not
sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis
of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to
the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on
the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which
again cannot pass muster under the law.”
42. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarun Kumar Versus Assistant
Director Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2023) SCC
OnLine SC 1486 has observed that parity is not the law and while
applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon
the role attached to the accused whose application is under
consideration. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph, i.e.,
paragraph-18 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“.18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to
the appellant on the ground that the other co-accused who were
similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also
cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law.
While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to
focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application
is under consideration. It is not disputed in that the main accused
Sh. Kewal Krishan Kumar, Managing Director of SBFL, and KMP of
group companies and the other accused Devki Nandan Garg,14
owner/operator/controller of various shell companies were granted
bail on the ground of infirmity and medical grounds. The co-accused
Raman Bhuraria, who was the internal auditor of SBFL has been
granted bail by the High Court, however the said order of High
Court has been challenged by the respondent before this Court by
filing being SLP (Crl.) No. 9047 of 2023 and the same is pending
under consideration. In the instant case, the High Court in the
impugned order while repelling the said submission made on behalf
of the appellant, had distinguished the case of Raman Bhuraria and
had observed that unlike Raman Bhuraria who was an internal
auditor of SBFL (for a brief period statutory auditor of SBFL), the
applicant was the Vice President of Purchases and as a Vice
President, he was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
company. It was also observed that the appellant’s role was made
out from the financials, where direct loan funds have been siphoned
off to the sister concerns of SBFL, where the appellant was either a
shareholder or director. In any case, the order granting bail to
Raman Bhuraria being under consideration before the coordinate
bench of this Court, it would not be appropriate for us to make any
observation with regard to the said order passed by the High Court.
43. In the light of aforesaid settled position of law this Court has has
gone through the order dated 08.05.2025 by which other accused
persons against whom the parity was claimed, have been granted
bail.
44. From perusal of the order dated 08.05.2025 it is evident that the
allegations which have been alleged against other accused persons
have also been referred in the orders of co-ordinate Bench wherein
it has been specifically mentioned that there is general and omnibus
allegation against the other accused persons. Further the co-ordinate
Bench in the aforesaid order has noticed the specific attributability
of the present applicant in relation to fire arm injury to the deceased.
45. Thus on the basis of discussion made herein above and this Court,
after taking into consideration the fact that the culpability of the
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present appellant as discussed and referred herein above is different
in comparison to other accused persons against whom parity has
been claimed is of the considered view that the principle of parity
will not be applicable herein.
46. Thus, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove it is evident
that the P.W. 1 and P.W.-2 has categorically and consistently
deposed that the accused/applicant fired gun shot over the deceased
and further the doctor has observed that the gun shot injury as
antemortem injury and it has contributed to the injuries to which
the deceased succumbed.
47. Thus, Court while taking into consideration the direct and specific
attributability of the present applicant in the alleged commission of
crime is of the view that it is not a fit case where the sentence is to
be suspended during pendency of the instant appeal.
48. Accordingly, the instant interlocutory application being I.A. No.6973
of 2025 deserves to be dismissed, as such, stands dismissed.
49. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove will not
prejudice the case on merit, since, the criminal appeal is lying
pending before this Court for its consideration.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree,
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
N.A.F.R.
Samarth/
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