Delhi High Court
Lakhveer Singh vs National Investigation Agency on 25 August, 2025
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25th AUGUST, 2025
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.A. 471/2025
LAKHVEER SINGH .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Tanu Bedi, Mr. Mayank Tripathi,
Mr. Naresh Jain, Mr. Vijay Shukla,
Mr. Chiranjeev Mahto, Ms. Ambika
Singh, Mr. Akshat Shukla,
Advocates.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP for NIA with
Mr. Jatin, Mr. Amit Rohila and Mr.
Mathew M. Phillip, Advocates; Mr.
Sanjeev CIO, NIA (DSP)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
1. The present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section 21
of the National Investigation Agency [“NIA”] Act, 2008, to assail the order
dated 28.09.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, New
Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, Delhi [“Trial Court”] in NIA case
bearing RC No. 38/2022/NIA/DLI titled NIA vs Arshdeep Singh @ Arsh
Dalla Etc., whereby the bail application of the Appellant was dismissed.
2. The present case emanates from the registration of the NIA case
bearing RC No. 38/2022/NIA/DLI for offences under Sections 120B of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 1 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC“] and Sections 18/18B/20 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [“UAPA”] by the NIA, pursuant to the
order dated 26.08.2022 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (CTCR
Division).
3. Case initiated by the Respondent/NIA is premised on the following
information received by it through credible sources:
i. An alleged conspiracy was hatched by the members of a
criminal syndicate/gangs based in India and abroad to carry out
terrorist acts in the state of Delhi as well as other parts of the
country by executing targeted killings using lethal firearms and
explosives.
ii. Further information was received that in order to collect funds
and strengthen their logistical resources, the accused persons
have engaged in smuggling and said aforementioned accused
persons have engaged in smuggling and trafficking of illegal
arms, ammunition, explosives, narcotics and are also involved
in other criminal activities such as extortion, contract killings,
kidnapping for ransom and laundering these funds into various
businesses operated through their associates under
pseudonymous identities. It is alleged that for these purposes,
they are also involved in the creation and use of fake and forged
identity documents and in order to further commit terrorist
activities and expand their cadre, they are recruiting
impressionable youth.
iii. The sources of the Respondent/NIA had also brought to light
that to extend their reach and spread panic among the public
they are sensationalizing their terrorist acts through cyberspace
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 2 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
and social media. Further, the Respondent/NIA were also seized
with information that these accused individuals are operating
from foreign countries and from jails located in different Indian
states and are directing their operatives and associates to carry
out such terrorist acts.
iv. During the investigation into the aforementioned information
received by Respondent/NIA, it came to light that, to increase
their area of influence, the members of the gang came in contact
with extremists, especially with the associates of Pro-Khalistan
organizations in Indian jails and abroad, and other such related
supporters who aided in arranging sophisticated weapons.
According to the Respondent/NIA, it was further established
that the members of the syndicate/gang are in touch with
Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dalla, who was based in Canada
and was a Designated Individual Terrorist, who was associated
with Harshdeep Singh Nijjar, „Chief‟ of Khalistan Tiger Force.
v. It is alleged that the Appellant was active in procuring and
supplying illegal weapons, and vehicles for execution of
conspiracy and committing terror activities. The Appellant was
discovered to have been the major logistics support of the
Bambiha gang and acted as a major supplier to the Bambiha
Gang and harbourer of its members.
vi. It is alleged that the Appellant is a close associate to the
gangster Chhotu Ram @ Bhat who he used to provide with his
Mahindra Scorpio No. PB 30W 2389 to transport weapons and
gang members from one place to other.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 3 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
vii. The Respondent/NIA conducted a raid in the house of the
Appellant on 21.02.2023 during which illegal weapons, empty
magazines and ammunitions were recovered from the house of
the Appellant, including 01 revolver (.32 bore), 2 pistols (.32
bore), 01 pistol (.45 bore), 01 pump action gun (.32 bore),
DBBL Gun (12 bore), 01 rifle (0.256 bore) several live
ammunitions and other incriminating material. Tabulation of the
articles seized from the house of the Appellant by the
Respondent/NIA is given below:
Serial Description of Articles seized
No.
1. One iPhone 11, Black colour, Model no.
MHDA3HN/A, Srl No. GV4J365HN735, IΜΕΙ
355435974439217 355435973458770. With one Jio
SIM 89918670400185946165 Mob no. 9988500088
2. One 32 bore revolver, weapon no. FGL0916
3. One .32 bore pistol, weapon number- RP224669,
with one (01) empty magazine.
4. One .32 bore pistol, weapon no. 179109716-2017
(RFI-IN-2017) with two empty magazines
5. One 12 bore pump action gun 84426-2018
6. One 12 bore DBBL 12776-D/8/15
7. One 12 Bore DBBL C/5-14647 (2014)
8. Ammunition 60 nos. of 0.256 bore
9. Ammunition 82 nos. of 45 bore pistol
10. Ammunition 46 nos. of 0.32 bore pistol
11. Ammunition 21 nos. of.32 bore revolver
12. Ammunition 141 nos. of 12 bore
13. Documents
a) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 631910310000312 of Bank of IndiaSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 4 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
b) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 0193000102058939 of PNB
c) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 14821750000058 of HDFC
d) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 14821750000058 of HDFC
e) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 14821690003158 of HDFC
f) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 50100033289990 of HDFC
g) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3423468150 of Central Bank of India
h) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3582047273 of Central Bank of India
i) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3365380020 of Central Bank of India
j) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3582047749 of Central Bank of India
k) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3582768331 of Central Bank of India
l) Photocopy of passbook bearing account
number 3582047761 of Central Bank of India
m) One leaf of cheque bearing account number
14821140002841 of HDFC in the name of
Parminder Kaur
14. Photo copy of owner property document (house,
page no. 01 to 06, in Punjabi language)viii. The CFSL Report of the said arms reveals that they were in
working order. Resultantly, the Appellant was arrested by the
Respondent/NIA on 22.02.2023.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 5 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
ix. Outcome of the investigation as stated in the First
Supplementary Chargesheet dated 09.08.2023 filed before the
Special Court, NIA, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, is that at
one end, the conspirators sitting abroad, in association with
accused persons from jail, continue to operate through their on-
ground associates being executioners/financiers, harbourers and
weapons‟ suppliers, including the Appellant herein.
x. As per the Respondent/NIA‟s case, these persons have indulged
in terrorizing singers, sports persons, innocent civilians,
businessmen, property dealers, builders, etc., for extortion of
terror funds and procuring weapons locally, or through Pakistan
based conspirators for execution of terror activities.
xi. The Respondent/NIA‟s findings in the Chargesheet dated
09.08.2023 also reveals that on the basis of the seizure of items
from the Appellant‟s house, the Respondent/NIA was certain of
the fact that the Appellant indulged in procuring and supplying
of illegal weapons and vehicles for execution of the conspiracy
and committing terror activities.
xii. It is also alleged that the Appellant provides major logistics
support to the Bambiha gang in association with Chhotu Ram
@ Bhat, who also happened to be the Appellant‟s childhood
friend. In turn, Chhotu Ram @ Bhat has been associated with
other members inter alia Sukhdool Singh @ SukhaDuneke, a
prominent member of the Bambiha group.
4. The Chargesheet dated 09.08.2023 was produced before the learned
Trial Court and at present, the trial is at the stage of framing of charges.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 6 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
5. Meanwhile, the Appellant preferred a bail application under Section
43D(5) of UAPA, which came to be dismissed by the learned Trial Court
vide the Impugned Order dated 28.09.2024. Aggrieved thereby, the
Appellant has preferred the present Appeal before this Court, challenging the
Impugned Order, inter alia, on the following grounds:
i. The Appellant was not informed of the grounds of his arrest by
the Respondent/NIA in writing, which is contrary to the law
laid down by the Apex Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India
&Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576, Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254, and Vihaan v. State of Haryana,
2025 SCC Online SC 269.
ii. The Appellant was merely provided with the Arrest Memo
which contained nothing and thereby fails to fulfill the
requirements under Section 43B of UAPA as well as Article 22
of the Constitution of India.
iii. The learned Trial Court has failed to discuss how the mere
possession of weapons, licensed or unlicensed is an offence
under UAPA, as there is neither evidence nor allegation that
these weapons were used in the commission of any terrorist act
or were bought from a terrorist or were in the process of being
supplied to a terrorist.
iv. The learned Trial Court has failed to consider that there was no
evidence that the car lent by the Appellant to the accused
Chhotu Ram @ Bhat was lent at a time when Chhotu Ram @
Bhat was not an accused in the instant case.
v. The Appellant is implicated in the present case only for his
knowing co-accused Chhotu Ram @ Bhat as his childhood
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 7 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
friend, who is not even a terrorist, but only alleged to be a
member of Bambiha Gang. Even so, Bambiha Gang is not a
declared terrorist organization. There is no linkage with the
other 20 accused persons, let alone the lead accused in the FIR,
being Arshdeep Singh.
vi. It is stated that the rejection of bail by the learned Trial Court is
in ignorance of the principles of bail jurisprudence.
6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has further relied on the
judgments of the Apex Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, (2022) 14 SCC 766, Jahir Hak v.
State of Rajasthan, (2022) 18 SCC 389, Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra
&Anr., (2023) 15 SCC 56, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra &Anr.,
(2024) 6 SCC 591, Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8
SCC 254, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra &Anr., (2024)
9 SCC 813, Sheikh Javed Iqbal @Ashfaq Ansari @Javed Ansari v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1821, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of
India, (2024) 10 SCC 574, Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 322, Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India &
Ors., (1996) 2 SCC 616, and Angela Harish Sonatakke v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 3 SCC 723.
7. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Tyagi, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the
Respondent/NIA vehemently seeks dismissal of the instant Appeal on the
following grounds:
i. A huge cache of illegal arms and ammunition of prohibited bore
of foreign origin was recovered from the Appellant in the raid
conducted by the Respondent/NIA at his residence on
22.02.2023. By placing reliance on the judgment rendered by a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 8 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
coordinate bench of this Court in Joginder Singh v. NIA, 2025
SCC OnLine Del, it is submitted that this alone would
disentitle the Appellant from being released on bail, even if all
other evidence against him is ignored.
ii. The Appellant has failed to satisfy this Court that his case
qualifies the tripod test, as crystallized in the judgment of the
Apex Court in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab &Ors.,
(2024) 5 SCC 403. Owing to his connection with a terror
syndicate, past reputation, and connection with foreign
operatives based out of Canada, it is reasonably apprehended
that the Appellant will suborn witnesses and flee the
jurisdiction. As such, the Appellant‟s case does not satisfy the
tripod test.
iii. There is no violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India
the Appellant was arrested after due communication of grounds
of arrest, and the Appellant had duly acknowledged the same on
the Arrest Memo dated 22.03.2023,
iv. The Appellant is accused of offences which are part of Chapter
IV and VI of the UAPA and therefore, the limitation of Section
43D(5) of the UAPA shall be applicable.
v. A perusal of the Chargesheet as well as the material collected
during investigation would show that there exist reasonable
grounds for believing the accusations against the Appellant are
prima facie true and in view of the limitation of Section 43D(5)
of UAPA, he is not entitled to be released on bail.
vi. The limitation of Section 43D(5) of UAPA is in addition to the
restrictions under the CrPC or any other law for the time being
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 9 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
in force on granting of bail and in this regard, the Appellant has
failed to make out a case that the accusations against the
Appellant are not prima facie true. The Appellant has thus,
failed to satisfy the additional rigors applicable to a bail
application.
vii. In light of the above and other incriminating evidence, there is
sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case
against the Appellant and his involvement in various violent
protests and anti-national activities.
8. In support of his contentions, learned SPP for the Respondent/NIA has
relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in National Investigation
Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, and coordinate
benches of this Court in Umar Khalid v. State of National Capital Territory
of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3423, and Mohd. Amir Javed v. State 2023
SCC OnLine Del 5777.
9. The only material available for deciding the present appeal filed
against the Order dated 28.09.2024 by which the bail application of the
Appellant stands dismissed is the chargesheet along with statements under
Section 161 Cr.P.C and the recoveries. During the course of hearing, the
Respondent/NIA has produced the witness statements of Jagsir Singh,
Tarsem Singh and Hardeep Singh, which depict the presence of weapons in
the residence of the Appellant as well as the association of the Appellant
with Chhotu Bhat. Relevant extracts therefrom are being reproduced
hereunder:
“PW-349
Statement of Jagsir Singh s/o Malkit Singh, r/o Guru
Teg Bahadur Nagar, Village Giderbaha, Sri Muktsar
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 10 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
Sahib, Punjab in connection with case No. RC-
38/2022/NIA/DLI under section 161 Cr.P.C recorded
on 28.07.2023.
1 state that, my name is Jagsir Singh s/o Malkit Singh,
I am working for Lakhvir Singh s/o Jarnail Singh for
the last 20 years and assist him in farming work. On
21.02.2023 NIA conducted raid in the morning and
seized 09 weapons with live ammunitions.
I further state that, in the year 2016 Lakhvir Singh got
issued license in my and other servants and purchased
arms and ammunitions in our and others servant’s
name. Further stated that, I never used weapon issued
in my name, Lakhvir Singh kept all weapons with him
and these were being used by him and associates as
per their requirement.
I further state that Lakhvir Singh is very close to
gangster Chhotu Ram @ Bhat and their associates and
Chhotu Ram @ Bhat and his gang members often used
to visit Lakhvir’s House and stay there with weapons.
Further, Not only this Chhotu Ram @ Bhat also used
Lakhvir’s arms & ammunitions and Mahindra Scorpio
bearing No. PB 60 W 2389 frequently to ctransport
weapons and his gang members.
The above statement read over to me in vernacular.
************
PW-346Statement of Tarsem Singh s/o Gurdeep Singh, r/o
Near Water Works, Peori, Village-Gidderbaha, Sri
Muktsar Sahib, Punjab in connection with case No.
RC. 38/2022/NIA/DLI under section 161 Cr.P.C
recorded on 28.07.2023,1 state that, my name is Tarsem Singh s/o Gurdeep
Singh, I am working for Lakhvir Singh s/o Jarnail
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 11 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
Singh and assist him in farming work. On 21.02.2023
NIA conducted raid and seized my licencecy weapons
with live ammunitions.
1 further state that, in the year 2016 Lakhvir Singh
himself got issued license in my anme and purchased
arms and ammunitions. Further, I never used my
weapon issued in my name.
I further state that Lakhvir Singh kept my weapon with
him and used as per his requirement.
I further state that gangster Chhotu Ram @ Bhat often
visited house of Lakhvir Singh with their associates
and stay there with weapons. Further, Chhotu Ram
Bhat and his associates also used Lakhvir’s Mahindra
Scorpio bearing No. PB 60 W 2389 for their persons
works.
The above statement read over to me in vernacular.
**************
PW 158
Statement of Hardeep Singh s/o Balraj Singh, r/o
Dandiwal Patti, Village-Gidderbaha, Sri Muktsar
Sahib, Punjab in connection with case No. RC
38/2022/NIA/DLI under section 161 Cr.P.C recorded
on 28.07.2023.
1 state that, my name is Hardeep Singh s/o Balraj
Singh, I am working for Lakhvir Singh s/o Jarnail
Singh for the last 15 years and residing at his house.
On 21.02.2023 ΝΙA conducted raid in the morning time
and seized weapons and ammunitions.
I further stated that, in the year 2016 Lakhvir Singh got
issued my weapon license and purchased arms andSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 12 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
ammunitions. Further, Lakhvir Singh always kept my
weapon and used the same as per his requirement.
I further stated that Lakhvir Singh is closed to gangster
Chhotu Ram @ Bhat and Chhotu Ram @ Bhat always
visit Lakhvir Singh’s house with their associates with
weapons.
I further stated that, Lakhvir Singh provides arms &
ammunitions and Mahindra Scorpio bearing No. PB
60 W 2389 to Chhotu Ram @ Bhat time to time as and
when he needed.
The above statement read over to me in vernacular.”
10. We have considered the arguments put forth by the learned counsels
for the parties and have carefully perused the material on record.
11. As is evident, the Respondent/NIA‟s case, primarily commences from
the receipt of information regarding a conspiracy to revive the Khalistan
Secessionist movement in Punjab. Upon investigation, the Respondent/NIA
unearthed 22 accused persons who were involved with each other in various
capacities, towards the common objective of carrying out terrorist acts in the
state of Delhi as well as other parts of the country by executing targeted
killings using lethal firearms and explosives.
12. Investigation carried out by the Respondent/NIA further revealed that
certain individuals named in the list of 22 accused persons were linked to
Pro-Khalistan organizations, albeit those which are not a part of the First
Schedule to the UAPA. Be that as it may, since the present case involves
allegations of offences under the UAPA along with other charges under the
IPC and Arms Act, it is apposite to consider the bail provision envisaged
under Section 43D of UAPA before analyzing the factual matrix.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 13 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
“Section 43D. Modified application of certain
provisions of the Code.
43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the
Code.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code or any other law, every offence punishable under
this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence
within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the
Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause
shall be construed accordingly.
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a
case involving an offence punishable under this Act
subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),–
(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and
“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as
references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety
days” respectively; and
(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be
inserted, namely:–
“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete
the investigation within the said period of ninety days,
the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the
Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the detention
of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days,
extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty
days:
Provided also that if the police officer making the
investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes
of investigation, for police custody from judicial
custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file
an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall
also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police
custody.
(3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a
case involving an offence punishable under this Act
subject to the modification that–
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 14 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof
(i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a
reference to “the Central Government or the State
Government.”;
(ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be
construed as a reference to “order of the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may
be”; and
(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to ‘the State
Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the
Central Government or the State Government, as the
case may be”.
(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in
relation to any case involving the arrest of any person
accused of having committed an offence punishable
under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,
no person accused of an offence punishable under
Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be
released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public
Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being
heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be
released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a
perusal of the case diary or the report made under
section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is prima facie true.
(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-
section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the
Code or any other law for the time being in force on
granting of bail.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 15 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections
(5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is
not an Indian citizen and has entered the country
unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in
writing.”
13. The legal position for bail under the UAPA is continuously evolving,
depending upon factors such as the kind of offences, period of incarceration,
etc. However, the first and foremost component still remains that the
accused shall not be released on bail if the allegations are prima facie true.
This legal position was further examined in the judgment of the Apex Court
in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2024) 5 SCC 403, wherein,
at the very outset, it was observed that unlike in the conventional bail
matters, under the UAPA, the legislative intent is to make “Jail, the rule and
Bail, the exception.” The Apex Court, while analyzing another judgment
pronounced by it in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, further laid down specific guidelines for
considering bail applications under Section 43D(5) UAPA, and the relevant
portions are being extracted below:
” 18. The approach of the High Court, to say the least,
contends the learned Attorney General, was tenuous
and not permissible at the stage of consideration of
prayer for bail. The analysis done by the High Court is
bordering on being perverse as it has virtually
conducted a mini trial at the stage of consideration of
the prayer for bail. According to the appellant, the
charge-sheet filed against the respondent was
accompanied by documentary evidence, statements of
prospective witnesses and other evidence which
indicated complicity of the respondent and reinforcedSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 16 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
the aspect that the accusations made against him were
prima facie true. It is submitted that at the stage of
consideration of bail, the totality of the evidence
available against the respondent must be reckoned and
ought to be taken into account as it is, without anything
more. The question of admissibility of such evidence
would be a matter for trial. The sufficiency or
insufficiency of the evidence cannot be the basis to
answer the prayer for grant of bail. It is contended that
after considering the statements of protected witnesses
recorded under Section 164 of the Code, the same
reinforces the accusations made against the respondent
(Accused 10) as being prima facie true. Accordingly, it
is submitted that the High Court order be set aside and
the application for bail preferred by the respondent
(Accused 10) be rejected.
19. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the
other hand, submits that the High Court justly came to
hold that no evidence was forthcoming to indicate the
complicity of the respondent in the commission of the
alleged offences and that the documents and evidence
relied upon by the investigating agency were not
enough to sustain the accusations, much less as being
prima facie true. It is submitted that the accusations
made against the respondent in the charge-sheet do not
fall under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act. Further,
the pivotal document, No. D-132(a) was not sufficient
to fasten any criminal liability upon the respondent. As
a matter of fact, the said document is a loose sheet of
paper and cannot be looked at in view of the mandate
of Section 34 of the Evidence Act. To buttress this
submission, reliance has been placed on CBI v. V.C.
Shukla [CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 761] . In any case, the said document itself
cannot and does not prima facie suggest that the funds,
as shown, were received and disbursed in the manner
described in the document. Further, there is no
independent corroboration forthcoming much less toSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 17 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
establish the complicity of the respondent in attracting
the imperatives of Section 17 of the 1967 Act.
20. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent that even if the contents of the said
document were taken as it is, with the exception of
Accused 4 (Altaf Ahmad Shah alias Fantoosh), no
other person to whom the amount was paid or from
whom the amount was received, has been arrayed as
an accused in the charge-sheet. The statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161 or Section 164
CrPC do not mention anything about the involvement
of the respondent in commission of the stated offences.
The statements of the co-accused cannot be considered
as admissions, much less used against the respondent.
Further, there was no evidence to indicate the
involvement of the respondent in the larger conspiracy
much less regarding terrorist activity. It is submitted
that the High Court was justified in analysing the
materials on record to satisfy itself as to whether the
accusations made against the respondent were prima
facie true. That enquiry was permissible in terms of the
exposition in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v.
State of Maharashtra [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] and Chenna Boyanna Krishna
Yadav v. State of Maharashtra [Chenna Boyanna
Krishna Yadav v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 SCC
242 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 329] . According to the
respondent, no fault can be found with the High Court
and the view taken by the High Court, being a possible
view, did not require any interference in exercise of the
power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It
is finally submitted that this Court, if it so desires, may
impose additional conditions whilst upholding the
order of bail passed by the High Court.
21. Before we proceed to analyse the rival
submissions, it is apposite to restate the settled legalSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 18 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
position about matters to be considered for deciding
an application for bail, to wit:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the charge;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail. (State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi
[State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21,
para 18 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1960 (2)] .)*****
23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the
duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise.
Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court,
which has had an occasion to deal with similar special
provisions in TADA and Mcoca. The principle
underlying those decisions may have some bearing
while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the
offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the
special enactments such as TADA, Mcoca and the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 19 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is
a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be
recorded by the Court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty”
of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for
the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating
agency in reference to the accusation against the
accused concerned in the first information report,
must prevail until contradicted and overcome or
disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it,
shows the complicity of such accused in the
commission of the stated offence. It must be good and
sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the
chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless
rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of
satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that
the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to
the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence
as required under the other special enactments. In any
case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is
prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of
satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge
application or framing of charges in relation to
offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless, we may take
guidance from the exposition in Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] , wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of
power of the Court to grant bail. In paras 36 to 38, the
Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 316-17)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 20 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
“36. Does this statute require that before a person
is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie,
must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty
of such offence? Is it necessary for the court to
record such a finding? Would there be any
machinery available to the court to ascertain that
once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not
commit any offence whatsoever?
37. Such findings are required to be recorded only
for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding
on the basis of materials on record only for grant
of bail and for no other purpose.
38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the
restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail
should not be pushed too far. If the court, having
regard to the materials brought on record, is
satisfied that in all probability he may not be
ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may
be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards
his likelihood of not committing an offence while
on bail must be construed to mean an offence
under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be
it a minor or major offence. … What would
further be necessary on the part of the court is to
see the culpability of the accused and his
involvement in the commission of an organised
crime either directly or indirectly. The court at
the time of considering the application for grant
of bail shall consider the question from the angle
as to whether he was possessed of the requisite
mens rea.”
And again in paras 44 to 48, the Court observed :
(SCC pp. 318-20)
“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion,
does not lead to the conclusion that the court must
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 21 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for
bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If
such a construction is placed, the court intending
to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the
applicant has not committed such an offence. In
such an event, it will be impossible for the
prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of
the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the
legislature. Section 21(4) of Mcoca, therefore,
must be construed reasonably. It must be so
construed that the court is able to maintain a
delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal
and conviction and an order granting bail much
before commencement of trial. Similarly, the
court will be required to record a finding as to
the possibility of his committing a crime after
grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro
must be an offence under the Act and not any
other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the
future conduct of an accused, the court must
necessarily consider this aspect of the matter
having regard to the antecedents of the accused,
his propensities and the nature and manner in
which he is alleged to have committed the
offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of
considering an application for grant of bail,
although detailed reasons are not necessary to be
assigned, the order granting bail must
demonstrate application of mind at least in
serious cases as to why the applicant has been
granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to
weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at
a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.
However, while dealing with a special statute like
Mcoca having regard to the provisions contained
in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 22 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
court may have to probe into the matter deeper so
as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the
materials collected against the accused during the
investigation may not justify a judgment of
conviction. The findings recorded by the court
while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly
would be tentative in nature, which may not have
any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial
court would, thus, be free to decide the case on
the basis of evidence adduced at the trial,
without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.
47. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
[Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004)
7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] this Court
observed : (SCC pp. 537-38, para 18)
„18. We agree that a conclusive finding in
regard to the points urged by both the sides
is not expected of the court considering a
bail application. Still one should not forget,
as observed by this Court in Puran v.
Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC
338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] : (SCC p. 344,
para 8)
“8. … Giving reasons is different from
discussing merits or demerits. At the stage
of granting bail a detailed examination of
evidence and elaborate documentation of
the merits of the case has not to be
undertaken. … That did not mean that
whilst granting bail some reasons for
prima facie concluding why bail was
being granted did not have to be
indicated.”
We respectfully agree with the above dictum of
this Court. We also feel that such expression of
prima facie reasons for granting bail is a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 23 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
requirement of law in cases where such orders on
bail application are appealable, more so because
of the fact that the appellate court has every right
to know the basis for granting the bail. Therefore,
we are not in agreement with the argument
addressed by the learned counsel for the accused
that the High Court was not expected even to
indicate a prima facie finding on all points urged
before it while granting bail, more so in the
background of the facts of this case where on facts
it is established that a large number of witnesses
who were examined after the respondent was
enlarged on bail had turned hostile and there are
complaints made to the court as to the threats
administered by the respondent or his supporters
to witnesses in the case. In such circumstances,
the court was duty-bound to apply its mind to the
allegations put forth by the investigating agency
and ought to have given at least a prima facie
finding in regard to these allegations because they
go to the very root of the right of the accused to
seek bail. The non-consideration of these vital
facts as to the allegations of threat or inducement
made to the witnesses by the respondent during
the period he was on bail has vitiated the
conclusions arrived at by the High Court while
granting bail to the respondent. The other ground
apart from the ground of incarceration which
appealed to the High Court to grant bail was the
fact that a large number of witnesses are yet to be
examined and there is no likelihood of the trial
coming to an end in the near future. As stated
hereinabove, this ground on the facts of this case
is also not sufficient either individually or coupled
with the period of incarceration to release the
respondent on bail because of the serious
allegations of tampering with the witnesses made
against the respondent.‟
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 24 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
48. In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of
T.N. [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of
T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 481] this
Court observed : (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16)
„16. … The considerations which normally weigh
with the court in granting bail in non-bailable
offences have been explained by this Court in
State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit Singh, (1962)
3 SCR 622 : AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ
215] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they
are — the nature and seriousness of the offence;
the character of the evidence; circumstances
which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable
possibility of the presence of the accused not
being secured at the trial; reasonable
apprehension of witnesses being tampered with;
the larger interest of the public or the State and
other similar factors which may be relevant in the
facts and circumstances of the case.‟””
14. Notably, the Apex Court in NIA v. Watali (Supra) observed that the
Court in seisin of a bail application, is not bound down to examine or dissect
the evidence present before it, as the grant or rejection of bail is an exercise
vastly different from that of discussing the merits and demerits of a case.
15. Having recalled the basic principles on grant of bail under UAPA, this
Court shall now address the main thrust of arguments advanced by the
Appellant, being that his arrest by the Respondent/NIA was illegal and as
such, violated Article 22 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 43B
of UAPA. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Pankaj Bansal (supra), paragraphs whereof relevant for discussion are being
extract below:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 25 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
“38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of
the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person
who is arrested shall be detained in custody without
being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for
such arrest. This being the fundamental right
guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of
conveying information of the grounds of arrest must
necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended
purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 PMLA
enables the person arrested under Section 19 thereof to
seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the
twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied,
such a person would not be entitled to grant of bail.
The twin conditions set out in the provision are that,
firstly, the court must be satisfied, after giving an
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the
application for release, that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty
of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. To meet this
requirement, it would be essential for the arrested
person to be aware of the grounds on which the
authorised officer arrested him/her under Section 19
and the basis for the officer’s “reason to believe” that
he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the
2002 Act. It is only if the arrested person has
knowledge of these facts that he/she would be in a
position to plead and prove before the Special Court
that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not
guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail.
Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as
mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and
Section 19 PMLA, is meant to serve this higher
purpose and must be given due importance.
39. We may also note that the language of Section 19
PMLA puts it beyond doubt that the authorised officer
has to record in writing the reasons for forming the
belief that the person proposed to be arrested is guilty
of an offence punishable under the 2002 Act. Section
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 26 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
19(2) requires the authorised officer to forward a copy
of the arrest order along with the material in his
possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the
adjudicating authority in a sealed envelope. Though it
is not necessary for the arrested person to be supplied
with all the material that is forwarded to the
adjudicating authority under Section 19(2), he/she has
a constitutional and statutory right to be “informed” of
the grounds of arrest, which are compulsorily recorded
in writing by the authorised officer in keeping with the
mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA. As already noted
hereinbefore, it seems that the mode of informing this
to the persons arrested is left to the option of ED’s
authorised officers in different parts of the country i.e.
to either furnish such grounds of arrest in writing or to
allow such grounds to be read by the arrested person
or be read over and explained to such person.”
16. The principles laid down in Pankaj Bansal (supra), being that in a case
under PMLA, were held to be akin to Section 43B(1) of UAPA by the Apex
Court itself in another judgment namely Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254. The Apex Court specifically observed that upon
the application of the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay
down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on
charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the
UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied. Relevant paragraphs of
the Prabir Purkayastha (supra) judgment are being extracted below:
“17. Upon a careful perusal of the statutory provisions
(reproduced supra), we find that there is no significant
difference in the language employed in Section 19(1) of
the PMLA and Section 43B(1) of the UAPA which can
persuade us to take a view that the interpretation of the
phrase `inform him of the grounds for such arrest’
made by this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 27 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
should not be applied to an accused arrested under the
provisions of the UAPA.
18. We find that the provision regarding the
communication of the grounds of arrest to a person
arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is
verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the
PMLA. The contention advanced by learned ASG that
there are some variations in the overall provisions
contained in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 43A
and 43B of the UAPA would not have any impact on the
statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to
inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested
under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest
because as stated above, the requirement to
communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both
the statutes. As a matter of fact, both the provisions
find their source in the constitutional safeguard
provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India. Hence, applying the golden rules of
interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very
important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested
on charges of committing an offence either under the
PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly
construed and applied.
19. We may note that the modified application of
Section 167 CrPC is also common to both the statutes.
Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the
interpretation of statutory mandate laid down by this
Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal(supra) on the
aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of
arrest in writing has to be applied pari passu to a
person arrested in a case registered under the
provisions of the UAPA.
20. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Court that any person arrested for allegation of
commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA
or for that matter any other offence(s) has a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 28 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about
the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such
written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the
arrested person as a matter of course and without
exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to
the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary
and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be
the only effective means for the arrested person to
consult his Advocate; oppose the police custody
remand and to seek bail. Any other interpretation
would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of
the Constitution of India.
21. The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most
sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed under
Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Any
attempt to encroach upon this fundamental right has
been frowned upon by this Court in a catena of
decisions. In this regard, we may refer to following
observations made by this Court in the case of Roy
V.D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC 590:-
“7. The life and liberty of an individual is so
sacrosanct that it cannot be allowed to be
interfered with except under the authority of law.
It is a principle which has been recognised and
applied in all civilised countries. In our
Constitution Article 21 guarantees protection of
life and personal liberty not only to citizens of
India but also to aliens.”
Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental right,
guaranteed by Articles, 20, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India, would have to be dealt with
strictly.
22. The right to be informed about the grounds of
arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India and any infringement of this fundamental right
would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere
fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 29 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
would not validate the illegality and the
unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting
the accused and the grant of initial police custody
remand to the accused.”
17. Further, the Apex Court in Vihaan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC
Online SC 269, has observed that an arrest gets vitiated for non-compliance
of the constitutional requirement of Fundamental Rights under Articles 21
and 22. The Apex Court has specifically laid down how this compliance
under Article 22(1) takes place:-
“18. Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is concerned,
compliance can be made by communicating sufficient
knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest
to the person arrested. The grounds should be effectively and
fully communicated to the arrestee in the manner in which he
will fully understand the same. Therefore, it follows that the
grounds of arrest must be informed in a language which the
arrestee understands. That is how, in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj
Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC
(Cri) 450] , this Court held that the mode of conveying the
grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to
serve the intended purpose. However, under Article 22(1),
there is no requirement of communicating the grounds of
arrest in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the right of
every person arrested to consult an advocate of his choice and
the right to be defended by an advocate. If the grounds of
arrest are not communicated to the arrestee, as soon as may
be, he will not be able to effectively exercise the right to
consult an advocate. This requirement incorporated in Article
22(1) also ensures that the grounds for arresting the person
without a warrant exist. Once a person is arrested, his right to
liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important
fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person
concerned must understand on what grounds he has been
arrested. That is why the mode of conveying information of the
grounds must be meaningful so as to serve the objects stated
above.”
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 30 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
18. Notwithstanding the aforesaid observations, the Apex Court in Ram
Kishor Arora v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 599 has observed as
follows:
“23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj
Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024)
7 SCC 576] also noticing the inconsistent practice
being followed by the officers arresting the persons
under Section 19 PMLA, directed to furnish the
grounds of arrest in writing as a matter of course,
“henceforth”, meaning thereby from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of the
word “henceforth” implied that the said requirement
of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to the
arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not
mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said
judgment. The submission of the learned Senior
Counsel Mr Singhvi for the appellant that the said
judgment was required to be given effect
retrospectively cannot be accepted when the judgment
itself states that it would be necessary “henceforth”
that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is
furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course
and without exception. Hence, non-furnishing of
grounds of arrest in writing till the date of
pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal
case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC
576] could neither be held to be illegal nor the action
of the officer concerned in not furnishing the same in
writing could be faulted with. As such, the action of
informing the person arrested about the grounds of his
arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 PMLA
as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as
held in Vijay Madanlal [Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022
SCC OnLine SC 929] .
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 31 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
24. Insofar as the facts of the present case are
concerned, it is not disputed that the appellant was
handed over the document containing grounds of
arrest when he was arrested, and he also put his
signature below the said grounds of arrest, after
making an endorsement that “I have been informed
and have also read the abovementioned grounds of
arrest.” The appellant in the rejoinder filed by him has
neither disputed the said endorsement nor his
signature below the said endorsement. The only
contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr
Singhvi is that he was not furnished a copy of the
document containing the grounds of arrest at the time
of arrest. Since the appellant was indisputably
informed about the grounds of arrest and he having
also put his signature and the endorsement on the said
document of having been informed, we hold that there
was due compliance of the provisions contained in
Section 19 PMLA and his arrest could neither be said
to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied)
19. In the abovementioned Judgment, the Apex Court has held that the
Judgment of Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576, had only a
prospective application. In any event, keeping in view the law laid by the
Apex Court in Ram Kishor Arora (supra), this Court notes that in the present
case, it is not disputed that the Appellant was provided with the Arrest
Memo at the time of his arrest, i.e., on 22.02.2023. Further, this Arrest
Memo, which bears the signature of the Appellant, also contains a question
as to whether the grounds of arrest have been explained, if possible, in his
mother tongue to the accused. The answer to this question has been written
as „yes‟. Immediately on the next day, i.e., on 23.02.2023, the Appellant was
produced before the learned Trial Court, in an application filed by the
Respondent/NIA seeking police custody of the Appellant. Vide order dated
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 32 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
22.02.2023, the Respondent/NIA‟s application was allowed by the learned
Trial Court. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is
unable to agree with the argument of the Appellant that his arrest by the
Respondent/NIA was illegal and stands vitiated. It cannot be forgotten that a
huge cache of arms and ammunition has been recovered from the house of
the Appellant.
20. Now, delving specifically into the allegation of a conspiracy which
has been brought forth by the Respondent/NIA against the Appellant and 21
other accused persons, this Court deems it first to refer to Section 18 of the
UAPA, which is being extracted below:
” Section 18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.
18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.–Whoever
conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets,
advises or incites, directly or knowingly facilitates] the
commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to
the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment
for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
21. This Court also deems it appropriate to refer to the observations of the
Apex Court on the offence of conspiracy in Kehar Singh and Ors. v. The
State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609, which are being extracted
below:
“275. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy
and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the
same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of
acts of various parties to infer that they were done in
reference to their common intention. The prosecution
will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence.
The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such
evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 33 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
enquire whether the two persons are independently
pursuing the same end or they have come together to
the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not
render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is,
however, essential that the offence of conspiracy
required some kind of physical manifestation of
agreement. The express agreement, however, need not
be proved. Nor actual meeting of the two persons is
necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words
of communication. The evidence as to transmission of
thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be
sufficient.”
22. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4
SCC 659, has also observed that conspiracy can be proved by circumstances
and other materials. The relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as
under:-
“24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead
us to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy
knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or
a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some
cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods
or services in question may be inferred from the
knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to
establish that a particular unlawful use was intended,
so long as the goods or service in question could not be
put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate
offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be
necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring
home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the
conspirators had the knowledge of what the
collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the
collaborator would put the goods or service to an
unlawful use.”
23. The sum and substance of the allegations against the Appellant is he
provided logistic support (arms and ammunitions) to the Bambiha Gang, of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 34 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
which Chotu Ram @ Bhat was a part. This Chotu Ram @ Bhat, according to
the Chargesheet filed by the Respondent/NIA is an associate of Sukhpreet @
Budha (A-3), who in turn was connected to Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh
Dalla (A-1), a designated individual terrorist, who in turn was associated
with Harshdeep Singh Nijjar, the erstwhile „Chief‟ of Khalistan Tiger Force.
Of these persons, Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dalla has been declared as a
Proclaimed Offender on 08.08.2023.
24. As per the Chargesheet, Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh Dalla in
connivance with others who are arraigned as accused persons by the
Respondent/NIA, is known to extort money from Indian businessmen,
singers, sportspersons and others, by threatening them of dire consequences
if the demands are not met. An important revelation from the Chargesheet
appears to be that arms and ammunitions are generally supplied across the
India-Pakistan border on the directions of Arshdeep Singh Gill @ Arsh
Dalla. In this syndicate, the Appellant has been investigated as a ground
level facilitator/ provider of logistic support.
25. The instance of recovery of large arms and ammunition from the
house of the Appellant, the corroboration thereof by the prosecution
witnesses and the failure of the Appellant to accord any valid explanation for
their presence, gives this Court sufficient reasons to believe that a prima
facie case is made out against the Appellant.
26. Upon a perusal of the Chargesheet, this Court is of the opinion that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the
Appellant are prima facie true. Even otherwise, this Court does not have the
power to question the investigative findings of the Respondent/NIA at this
stage, where the trial is yet to begin, neither does this Court have the power
to examine the merits and demerits of the evidence. This Court is of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 35 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15
opinion that in case the Appellant is released on bail, the chances of the
Appellant indulging in the very same activities cannot be ruled out the
chances of the accused being a flight risk, cannot also be ruled out.
27. It is trite law that the Court while examining the issue of prima facie
case as required under sub-section (5) of Section 43D, is not expected to
hold a mini trial, which is in line with the law laid down by the Apex Court
in Thwaha Fasal (supra).
28. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the Appellant has not been
able to discharge the burden upon him in order to secure Bail. Accordingly,
in view of the foregoing discussion, the present Appeal is dismissed.
29. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove shall not
tantamount to be an expression on the merits of the Appellant‟s case pending
before the learned Trial Court or be read as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the case. These observations are confined to the consideration of
the prayer for Bail alone.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
AUGUST 25, 2025
hsk/AP
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA CRL.A.471/2025 Page 36 of 36
Signing Date:25.08.2025
18:08:15