Allahabad High Court
Sukh Ram Singh vs State Of U.P. And Another on 25 August, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Judgment reserved on: 13.08.2025 Judgment delivered on: 25.08.2025 Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:146629 Court No. - 35 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 742 of 1994 Appellant :- Sukh Ram Singh Respondent :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Appellant :- Devnedra Dahma,Shiv Kumar Singh Counsel for Respondent :- S.C. Hon'ble Sandeep Jain,J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) has been preferred by the landowner against impugned judgment and order dated 22.01.1993 passed by Third Additional District Judge, Aligarh rejecting the Land Acquisition Reference No. 11 of 1990, Sukhram Singh versus State of UP, by holding that the Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) has awarded the correct amount of compensation and also, that the reference is time barred.
2. Facts in brief are, that for constructing, Amarpur canal(rajvaha) from kilometre 26009 to 35706, for transmitting the waters of Central Ganges canal, land acquisition proceedings were initiated for acquiring 8.62 acre land, situated in village Jirauli Dor,Tehsil and Pargana Kol, District Aligarh, on behalf of the Executive Engineer, Madhya Ganga canal, Construction Division Second, District Aligarh. A notification under section 4(1) of the Act was published on 22.10.1979, which was published in the Gazette on 8.3.1980, and subsequently, a declaration under section 6 of the Act was made on 7.2.1980, which was published in the Gazette on 22.3.1980. After inviting the objections of the affected landowners, the Collector passed the award No. 426/1980-81 on 11.12.1980. A declaration under section 12(2) of the Act, was also made on 11.12.1980. The possession of the appellants land was taken on 16.1.1981.
3. Besides others, the appellant Sukh Ram’s land belonging to khata number 186, Chuck No. 329, having area of one beegha, three Biswa, 17 biswansi(0.68 acres) situated in village Jirauli Dor,was acquired for the above purpose. The appellant was held entitled to receive compensation at the rate of rupees 479.15 per acre ,for his 0.68 acre land, amounting to rupees 325.82, besides this, he was also awarded solatium at the rate of 15% amounting to ₹48.87, in total, the appellant was awarded compensation of ₹ 374.69, under section 11 of the Act.
4. The Collector determined compensation on the basis of sale deed(exemplar) dated 20.7.1979, pertaining to an area of 2.413 acre. The Collector considered five sale deeds pertaining to the same village, but he rejected the other four exemplars on the ground that they were of lands, which were situated far away from habitation and acquired land and also were of the period, which was not proximate to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The compensation was determined on the basis of exemplar dated 20.7.1979 by concluding that the land pertaining in this exemplar, is very close to habitation, which is relatively distant to the acquired land. It was further held that, this land is similar to the acquired land, regarding facilities available for irrigating the land and its suitability for agriculture.
5. The appellant moved an application on 3.3.1989 before the Collector to refer the matter for enhancement of compensation under section 18 of the Act, to the reference court on the ground that he had no information prior to February, 1989 about the acquisition, since he never received any notice from the Collector, never received the copy of the award, never received the compensation, as such, he had no knowledge about the acquisition proceedings, as such, he could not make an application earlier for getting the matter referred for enhancement of compensation.
6. The Collector referred the matter under section 18 of the Act on 25.4.1989, to the District Judge, Aligarh who passed an order dated 25.5.1990 , since prima-facie it appeared that the reference was time barred, that question of limitation will be decided at the time of adjudication at the time of trial, after framing an issue and hearing the State, provided the State takes such plea in its written statement.
7. The reference court framed the following issues on 9.10.1991, which are stated as under:-
(i) Whether the compensation paid to the plaintiff is insufficient? If yes, the entitled rate?
(ii) Whether the instant reference is barred by limitation?
(iii) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled ?
8. The reference court while deciding issue no.1, came to the conclusion that the exemplar on the basis of which the Collector has awarded compensation, is correct and accordingly, the reference court came to the conclusion that the appellant is not entitled to receive enhanced compensation, than what has already been awarded by the Collector. The reference court while deciding issue no. 2, came to the conclusion that the appellant moved an application on 3.3.1989 for having the matter referred, which was time barred, because the appellant failed to examine the person from whom he got the knowledge belatedly. The reference court also concluded that since two notifications have already been issued and the possession of the land has already been taken on 16.1.1981, as such, the reference has been moved after about nine years, which is hopelessly time barred. In view of the above conclusions, the reference court dismissed the reference by impugned judgment and order dated 22.1.1993, aggrieved against which, the landownerappellant has preferred the instant first appeal under section 54 of the Act.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was not having any knowledge of the award passed by the Collector because no notice was ever received by him during acquisition proceedings, no notice after pronouncement of award was sent to the appellant, no copy of the award was sent to the appellant, as such, the appellant being a poor illiterate farmer never became aware of the award and as such, he could not file reference within the stipulated time prescribed under section 18 of the Act.
10. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant for the first time became aware of the award of the Collector in the month of February, 1989 and thereafter, he obtained the certified copy of the award and then, he became aware that a paltry compensation has been awarded to him, on the basis of exemplar dated 20.7.1979, which is not applicable, because the other exemplars ,which were about two years prior to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, show that the land was sold for a price which was many times more than reflected in the exemplar dated 20.7.1979.
11. Learned counsel further submitted that the reference court committed illegality in concluding that the reference is time barred because the limitation is to be considered from the date of knowledge i.e. when the appellant became aware of the award passed by the Collector. Learned counsel further submitted that it has to be seen when the appellant had constructive knowledge of the award and from that date, the limitation for filing reference under section 18 of the Act is to be calculated. He further submitted that the reference court has simply calculated the limitation from the date of taking possession of the land ignoring that, the appellant had constructive knowledge of the acquisition only in February 1989. He submitted that the reference has been filed on 3.3.1989, which is within the limitation period, if calculated from the date of knowledge of the award.
12. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant is entitled to get compensation on the basis of exemplar which has been executed for the highest consideration, as such, the Collector has committed illegality in awarding the compensation on the basis of exemplar ,which denotes the lowest sale consideration.
13. Learned counsel further submitted that the Collector only awarded solatium at the rate of 15%, whereas, since the reference was decided in the year 1993, the appellant is entitled to get solatium at the rate of 30%, additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and enhanced interest at the rate of 15% per annum, under section 28 of the Act.
14. With these submissions, it was prayed that the impugned judgment and order of the reference court be set aside and this appeal be allowed and consequently, the appellant be awarded enhanced compensation, solatium, additional compensation and enhanced interest, in accordance with law. Learned counsel in support of enhancing compensation on the basis of highest exemplar, relied upon the case of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot and others vs. State of Punjab and others (2012) 5 SCC 432.
15. Per contra, learned additional standing Counsel submitted that the appellant was aware of the acquisition proceedings and deliberately, did not appear before the Collector. The possession of the land was taken in the year 1981, but the reference was made in 1989, which is hopelessly time barred, as such, the reference court has rightly concluded that the reference was time barred. He further submitted that the compensation has been awarded on the basis of exemplar dated 20.7.1979, which is proximate in time to the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act, as such, the Collector has not committed any illegality in determining the compensation on the basis of this exemplar. He further submitted that since the award by the Collector was made on 11.12.1980, which is, prior to April 30, 1982 as such, the appellant is not entitled to get additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and enhanced solatium at the rate of 30% and also enhanced interest under section 28 of the Act. With these submissions, it was prayed that this appeal be rejected.
16. I have heard the learned counsel of both the sides and perused the record.
17. This appeal raises the following factual and legal issues, which needs to be determined by this Court:-
(1) Whether the reference made by the appellant is time barred?
(2) Whether the Collector was justified in determining the compensation on the basis of lowest exemplar dated 20.7.1979, according to which the land transaction took place at the rate of rupees 1435.97 per acre, and ignoring the other exemplars, which were executed about a year or two prior, from the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act?
(3) Whether the appellant is entitled to get enhanced solatium at the rate of 30%, additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and enhanced interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the additional amount of compensation awarded to him by this Court.
Issue number:1
18. The Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Das and others vs. State of UP and others (2010) 3 SCC 545, held as under:-
“Re: Question (c)
18. Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 requires a person interested who has not accepted the award, to make an application to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter for determination of the court, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award whichever period first expires, if he or his representative was not present before the Collector at the time of making of the award.
19. The reason for providing six months from the date of the award for making an application seeking reference, where the applicant did not receive a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, while providing only six weeks from the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act for making an application for reference where the applicant has received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is received, the landowner or person interested is made aware of all relevant particulars of the award which enables him to decide whether he should seek reference or not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know that an award has been made, he would require further time to make enquiries or secure copies so that he can ascertain the relevant particulars of the award.
20. The term date of the Collector’s award occurring in clause (b) of the proviso, has been interpreted by this Court in several cases. We may refer to a few of them.
21. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition Officer [AIR 1961 SC 1500] this Court held: (AIR pp. 1503-04, paras 5-6)
5. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words the date of the award occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.
6. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the Office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression the date of the award used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collector’s award used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.
22. In State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum [AIR 1963 SC 1604] this Court reiterated the principles stated in Harish Chandra Raj Singh [AIR 1961 SC 1500] and further held as follows: (Qaisar Jehan Begum case [AIR 1963 SC 1604] , AIR p. 1607, para 5)
5. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra case [AIR 1961 SC 1500] is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
24. When land is acquired and an award is made under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector becomes entitled to take possession of the acquired land. The award being only an offer on behalf of the Government, there is always a tendency on the part of the Collector to be conservative in making the award, which results in less than the market value being offered.
25. Invariably, the land-loser is required to make an application under Section 18 of the Act to get the market value as compensation. The land-loser does not get a right to seek reference to the civil court unless the award is made. This means that he can make an application seeking reference only when he knows that an award has been made.
26. If the words six months from the date of the Collector’s award should be literally interpreted as referring to the date of the award and not the date of knowledge of the award, it will lead to unjust and absurd results. For example, the Collector may choose to make an award but not to issue any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, either due to negligence or oversight or due to any ulterior reasons. Or he may send a notice but may not bother to ensure that it is served on the landowner as required under Section 45 of the Act. If the words date of the Collector’s award are literally interpreted, the effect would be that on the expiry of six months from the date of award, even though the claimant had no notice of the award, he would lose the right to seek a reference. That will lead to arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between those who are notified of the award and those who are not notified of the award.
27. Unless the procedure under the Act is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, it will run the risk of being branded as being violative of Article 14 as also Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. To avoid such consequences, the words date of the Collector’s award occurring in proviso (b) to Section 18 requires to be read as referring to the date of knowledge of the essential contents of the award, and not the actual date of the Collector’s award.
28. The following position therefore emerges from the interpretation of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act:
(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the award.
29. A person who fails to make an application for reference within the time prescribed is not without remedy. It is open to him to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act, on the basis of an award of the court in respect of the other lands covered by the same acquisition notification, if there is an increase. Be that as it may.
30. When a person interested makes an application for reference seeking the benefit of six months’ period from the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his representative) was not present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the award during a period of six months prior to the filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the person interested was present either in person or through his representative when the award was made, or that he had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had attested the mahazar / panchnama / proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. It is evident from the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Das (supra) that when a person interested makes an application for reference seeking the benefit of six months, from the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he(or his representative) was not present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice under section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the award during the period of six months prior to the filing of the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is for the land acquisition Collector to establish that the person interested was present either in person or through his representative when the award was made, or that he had received a notice under section 12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested had received or withdrawn the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had attested the mahazar/Panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or any statement on oath or evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue/ municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so.
20. In the application seeking reference, the appellant specifically mentioned that he had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings because he never received any notice from the Collector and for the first time he became aware of the award in February ,1989 and thereafter, he obtained the certified copy of the award and only then he became aware of the contents of the award and then he became aware that only a paltry amount has been awarded to him and as such he moved an application for seeking reference.
21. The landowner appellant Sukhlal appeared in the witness box in the reference court and examined himself as PW-1 and deposed that before passing of the award, no notice was ever received by him. He also remained unaware that an award had been passed. He deposed in his examination-in-chief that for the first time he became aware of the award in February, 1989 and then after obtaining the copy of the award, he had filed reference. He further deposed that the compensation awarded has not been obtained by him because it is meagre.
22. Sukhlal deposed in cross-examination that he was informed about the award by his neighbour Lal Singh, who resides in village Moosepur, whose land is nearby to his acquired land, whose land was also acquired by the government. He also admitted that their lands were acquired for the same canal(rajvaha). He admitted that Lal Singh had enquired from him whether he received any compensation or not and then he was told about the acquisition. He also admitted that prior to that, a canal was dug in his land. He further deposed that he never received any notice from the Collector.
23. The respondents pleaded in their written statement before the reference court, that the appellant was well aware of the acquisition proceedings because notices were sent to him, which were received by him, but he neither appeared nor adduced any evidence, as such, the appellant deliberately preferred reference belatedly ,which is barred by limitation.
24. It is evident that in support of the above pleadings, the respondents have not filed any documentary or oral evidence, to prove, that the appellant was sent notices during acquisition proceedings, which were received by him, the appellant was aware of the award of the Collector and he deliberately did not prefer reference, within the stipulated period of limitation. The respondents could have very well filed documentary evidence of the receipt of notices by the appellant, but no such documentary evidence was ever filed before the reference court. Even no witness was examined by the respondents in support of their above contentions. In view of this, the statement of Sukhlal PW-1 remains uncontroverted, that he had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and for the first time he became aware of it in February, 1989. There is no evidence to presume that the appellant was having knowledge of the award prior to February, 1989. In view of this, the application dated 3.3.1989 seeking reference under section 18 of the Act, cannot be held to be barred by limitation, because it was made within six months from the date of actual knowledge of the award. In view of this conclusion, the reference court has recorded a perverse finding that the reference was time barred. Accordingly, this issue is decided in the negative and it is held that, the reference was preferred within time.
Issue No.2
25. The Apex Court in the case of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust(Registered), Faridkot and Others vs. State of Punjab and others (2012) 5 SCC 432, while considering the applicability of exemplars in awarding compensation in land acquisition cases, held as under:-
14. As pointed out above, the Reference Court failed to take note of the highest exemplar, namely, the sale transaction under Ext. A-61 dated 22-7-1977. In this regard, it is useful to refer the decision of this Court in M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector of Madras [(1969) 1 MLJ 45 (SC)] . In this case, this Court has held thus : (MLJ pp. 46-47)
where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on behalf of the Government, that representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. In any case we see no reason why an average of two sale deeds should have been taken in this case.”
15. In State of Punjab v. Hans Raj [(1994) 5 SCC 734] this Court has held that method of working out the average price paid under different sale transactions is not proper and that one should not have, ordinarily recourse to such method. This Court further held that the bona fide sale transactions proximate to the point of acquisition of the lands situated in the neighbourhood of the acquired lands are the real basis to determine the market value.
16. This Court in Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa [(2010) 13 SCC 710 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 788] , after relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur and Hans Raj held in para 20 as under 🙁 SCC p. 715)
20. The legal position is that even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bona fide transaction, will be considered.
Again, in para 23, it was held that the averaging of the prices under the two sale deeds was not justified.”
17. It is clear that when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, it is the general rule that the highest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied that it is a bona fide transaction, has to be considered and accepted. When the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a bona fide transaction entered into between a willing purchaser and a willing seller near about the time of the acquisition. In our view, it seems to be only fair that where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on behalf of the Government, the transaction representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. It is not desirable to take an average of various sale deeds placed before the authority/court for fixing fair compensation.
18. Based on the above principles, the market value as per Ext. A-61 dated 22-7-1977 was Rs 1,39,130.43 per acre (approx. Rs 1.40 lakhs per acre). The said sale deed was two-and-a-half years prior in time than Section 4(1) Notification dated 22-12-1979. There is no reason to eschew the above sale transaction. It is also pointed out that the lands covered under Ext. A-61 are nearer to the lands of the appellants under acquisition.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. It is evident that the Apex Court in the case of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust(supra) has held that when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, it is the general rule that the highest of the exemplars, if the Court is satisfied that it is a bonafide transaction, has to be considered and accepted. It was further held that when the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a bona fide transaction entered into between a willing purchaser and a willing seller near about the time of the acquisition. It was further held that where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on, on behalf of the State, the transaction representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest, unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. It was further held that it is not desirable to take an average of various sale deeds placed before the authority/court for fixing fair compensation.
27. This principle of law has been reiterated recently by the Apex Court in the case of Manohar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1519, in which it was held as under:-
“46. It was sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3 (MIDC) that the Reference Court has rightly used the principle of averaging of sale price of sale exemplars at Sr. No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 for determination of market value of acquired land. However, it is clear from a reading of paragraph 20 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Anjani Molu Dessai vs. State of Goa & Another (2010) 13 SCC 710 that the legal position is that even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bonafide transaction will be considered. Further, only where there are several sales of similar lands whose prices range in a narrow bandwidth, the average thereof can be taken, as representing the market price. The said position of law was reiterated in the judgment of this Court in the cases of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (supra) and Mohammad Yusuf & Others vs. State of Haryana & Others (2018) 16 SCC 105.
47. Even in the case of Major General Kapil Mehra & Others vs. UOI & Another (2015) 2 SCC 262, relied upon by the learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 (MIDC), it has been held that where there are several sales of similar lands, more or less, at the same time, whose prices have marginal variation, averaging thereof is permissible.
48. The position of law being thus and further on account of the fact that the lands acquired in the present case are in a prime location, we are of the considered opinion that no occasion arose for the Reference Court to deviate from the well-settled position of law and that the claimants/ Appellants deserve the benefit of the highest sale exemplar dated 31st March 1990. Not only that but in the event, the values of the sale instances taken into consideration by the Reference Court had a marginal variation, averaging thereof would have been permissible. But the sale exemplars taken into consideration by the Reference Court, in the present case, were the ones from Sr. Nos. 1 to 6 and they ranged from Rs. 25,000/- per Acre to Rs. 72,900/- per Acre. In such a case, the averaging thereof was clearly not permissible.”
28. The S.L.A.O. considered five exemplars, the relevant details of which are mentioned below:-
S. No.
Exemplar-1
Exemplar-2
Exemplar-3
Exemplar-4
Exemplar-5
Date of Sale
20.7.1979
9.8.1978
24.11.1977
30.9.1977
29.9.1977
Field No.
70
339
374
121
323
Area sold
(in acre)
2.413
7.674
0.975
0.939
0.683
Consideration (in Rs.)
3,465/-
17,400/-
7,500/-
6,000/-
6,000/-
Quality of soil
Bada aavi parata
Matiyara-2
Khakhi parata
Matiyara-2
Khakhi parata
Matiyara-2
aavi
Matiyara-2
Khakhi parata
Rate(in Rs.)
9.56
4.81
4.81
5.37
4.82
Distance from habitation
Near
Far
Far
Far
Very far
Distance from acquired land
Far
Far
Far
Very far
Very far
Consideration per acre (in Rs.)
1,435.97
2,267.39
7,692.31
6,389.77
8,784.77
29. It is evident that the Collector only considered exemplar No. 1 dated 20.7.1979 because it was executed only about three months prior to the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act. He noted that the land pertaining to this sale deed is situated close to habitation, is irrigated and the quality of the soil is Bada aavi parata. The other exemplars dated 9.8.1978, 24.11.1977, 30.9.1977 and 29.09.1977 were not considered by him on the ground that they were not proximate to the date of acquisition. He held that since the other exemplars were of a period which was a year or two, prior to the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act as such, they were not relevant for determining compensation in this case. He noted that the land sold in the other 4 exemplars, was situated far away from habitation and also from the acquired land, as such, he chose to ignore these exemplars.
30. It is not disputed that the land sold in all the above referred exemplars, is agricultural land, situated in the same village. It is also well settled that the cost of land depends upon its distance from habitation, its quality of soil and whether it is irrigated or not. In the instant case, all the lands referred to in the 4 above-mentioned exemplars, which were not considered suitable for determining compensation, are fertile and irrigated, but were not close to habitation and the acquired land. The appellant deposed in his examination-in-chief that he reaped two crops in a year, but sometimes, he managed to get three crops. He also deposed that his land was irrigated from private tubewell and the quality of soil was domatt, the circle rate of which was at that time ₹ 10,000 per beegha and he demanded in the reference, compensation at the rate of ₹ 15,000 per beegha. He further deposed that even as per the sale deed of the year 1977, his land was valued more than what was determined, while passing the award. He further deposed that the quality of the soil of his land was domatt, not pilia. The respondent had not adduced any contrary evidence.
31. It is apparent that 0.68 acre land of the appellant was acquired by notification under section 4(1) of the Act dated 22.10.1979 ,but the compensation has not been awarded on the basis of exemplar dated 29.9.1977, which pertains to land 0.683 acre, which was almost similar in area, to the acquired land of the appellant. According to the exemplar dated 29.9.1977, land 0.683 acre was sold for ₹ 6,000/-, which was situated far away from habitation and the acquired land, but even then the consideration per acre ₹ 8,784.77 was much more than that of exemplar dated 20.7.1979, in which the land was situated near habitation but relatively distant to acquired land. Since in exemplar dated 20.7.1979, the land sold was situated near habitation, it was priced more than the land of exemplar dated 29.9.1977 which was situated very far away from habitation, but the land sold on 20.7.1979 was priced at the rate of only rupees 1435.97 per acre, which was much less than ₹ 8,784.77 per acre, which the land situated very far away from habitation fetched. It is also apparent that the exemplar dated 20.7.1979 and 9.8.1978 pertain to larger piece of land, which are almost 3.5 times and 11 times larger than the acquired land of appellant. In view of this, the exemplar dated 20.7.1979 and 9.8.1978 are irrelevant for determining the correct market value of the acquired land of the appellant. It is also apparent that exemplar dated 24.11.1977 and 30.9.1977 also pertain to land, which was almost 1.5 times larger than the acquired land of the appellant, as such, these exemplars are also not applicable in the instant case.
32. During hearing of this appeal, it was enquired from the learned additional standing counsel what the term ”aavi parata” denotes, which has been used by the Collector in the award. It was pointed out that previously this Court had asked the State to file supplementary affidavit for clarifying this point and in compliance of that order dated 31.7.2018, the State has filed supplementary affidavit which denotes as under:-
“अतः बैनामा नं०-01 के आधार पर अर्जन भूमि पी०-02 खाकी परता रेट 1-94 पैसे की दर प्रति एकड़ मु० 291-39 पैसे पी०-01 खाकी परता रेट 3-19 पैसे की दर मु० 479-15 पैसे पी०-01 आवी परता रेट 4-44 पैसे की दर मु० 666-91 पैसे मटि० 02 आवी परता रेट 5-37 पैसे की दर मु० 806-60 पैसे तथा मटि० 01 आवी किस्म परता रेट 6-62 पैसे की दर मु० 994-36 पैसे प्रति एकड़ नियत करता हूँ।
उक्त से स्पष्ट है कि तत्कालीन विशेष भूमि अध्याप्ति अधिकारी अलीगढ़ द्वारा निम्नानुसार किस्म जमीन के आधार पर दर निर्धारण किया गया है।
क्र0सं0
किस्म जमीन
परता रेट/ सर्किल रेट प्रति बीघा
दर प्रति एकड़
1
पी०-2 खाकी (पीलिया दोयम खाकी)
1.94 पै०
291.39
2
पी०-1 खाकी (पीलिया अब्बल खाकी)
3.19 पै०
479.15
3
पी०-1 आवी (पीलिया अब्बल आवी)
4.44 पै०
666.91
4
मटि०-2 आवी (मटियार दोयम आवी)
5.37 पै०
806.60
5
मटि०- 1 आवी (मटियार अब्बल आवी)
6.62 पै०
994.36
उपरोक्त से स्पष्ट है कि तत्कालीन विशेष भूमि अध्याप्ति अधिकारी अलीगढ़ द्वारा आवी शब्द का अर्थ किस्म जमीन एवं परता शब्द का अर्थ सर्किल रेट के लिये प्रयोग किया गया है।”
33. The supplementary affidavit, discloses that there are several types of soil and depending upon the quality of the soil, its market value is determined. The affidavit discloses that in this case, the quality of the soil of the acquired land of appellant was pilia awwal khaki (P-1 khaki), having circle rate of ₹ 3.19 per beegha, which amounts to rupees 479.15 per acre. Since, one beegha land = 0.62 acre, as such, on the basis of circle rate of ₹ 3.19 per beegha, the cost per acre cannot be rupees 479.15. This shows that the supplementary affidavit has been filed, without application of mind, which does not explain the basis on which the Collector has awarded compensation to the appellant. The standing Counsel has not been able to explain how the Collector has determined compensation payable to the appellant at the rate of rupees 479.15 per acre, when on the basis of exemplar-1 relied upon, the rate comes to rupees 1435.97 per acre. This clearly demonstrates the arbitrary and whimsical manner in which the compensation has been determined by the Collector.
34. The land owner PW-1 has deposed in his examination-in-chief in the reference court, that his land was priced more than rupees 10,000/- per beegha even prior to the date of acquisition, which has not been controverted by the respondents, by adducing contrary evidence before the reference court.
35. In view of the above evidence on record, this Court is of the opinion that the Collector and the reference court both have committed illegality in awarding compensation at the rate of rupees 479.15 per acre to the appellant. The appellant is entitled to get compensation on the basis of exemplar-5 dated 29.9.1977, which pertains to a land transaction made more than two years prior to the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act, regarding land which was situated far away from habitation and acquired land, but in the same village, which is more disadvantageous from the land of exemplar-1 dated 20.7.1979, which was proximate to habitation but distant to acquired land. It is apparent that the land which is having more disadvantage, is getting a better price than land, which is in relatively advantageous position, which itself proves that the exemplar-1 chosen by the Collector and approved by the reference court, does not reflect the true market value of the acquired land of the appellant. It is also apparent that the land sold in exemplar-5(0.683 acre) is almost similar to the acquired land(0.68 acre) of the appellant, as such, even if the land of exemplar-5 was sold almost two years prior to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, even then, the appellant is entitled to get compensation at the same rate, at which the land of exemplar-5 was sold. It is also apparent that the same principle has been followed while awarding compensation by the Apex Court in the case of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust(supra) and Manohar (supra).
36. It is also well settled that the land owner is also entitled to get yearly increase in the value of land. The Apex Court in the case of General Manager, ONGC Ltd. vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and Another (2008)14 SCC 745, has held that where the acquired land is in urban/semi-urban areas, increase can be to the tune of 10% to 15% per annum and if the acquired land is situated in rural areas, increase can be between 5% to 7.5% per annum. In Union of India vs. Harpat Singh and others (2009) 14 SCC 375, the Apex Court applied the rule of 10% increase per annum.
37. Since the exemplar-5 dated 29.9.1977 pertains to a land transaction which took place more than two years prior to the date of notification under section 4(1) of the Act, as such, the appellant is entitled to increase in the value of land at the rate of 7.5% per annum but, since the land mentioned in the above transaction, is of a soil(matiyar doyam aavi) which is of a superior quality, than the soil(pilia awwal khaki) of the acquired land of the appellant(as per the record), as such, the appellant is not entitled to get the increased value of the land, in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (supra)and Harpat Singh (supra).
38. In view of the above discussion, the appellant is entitled to get, on the basis of the highest exemplar-5 dated 29.9.1977, compensation for his acquired land at the rate of ₹ 8,784.77 per acre. Issue No.2 is decided, accordingly.
Issue No. 3
39. From the discussion made hereinbefore, it is evident that the reference court committed illegality in concluding that the reference was time barred and the Collector has awarded the correct amount of compensation to the appellant.
40. It is evident that the amending Act No. 68 of 1984, awarding enhanced solatium at the rate of 30%, additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and granting enhanced interest at the rate of 15% per annum came into effect from 24.9.1984. It is also true that in this case the award of the Collector was made on 11.12.1980, which is prior to the introduction of amending Bill(which was subsequently enacted as Act No. 68 of 1984) in the Parliament i.e. 30.4.1982. Since, the reference was illegally dismissed on 22.1.1993, which is after the enforcement of the amending Act No. 68 of 1984 w.e.f 24.09.1984, as such, the appellant is also entitled to get enhanced solatium at the rate of 30%, additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and enhanced interest under section 28 of the Act ,at the rate of 15% per annum, for the enhanced compensation awarded by this Court, in the instant appeal. Issue No. 3 is decided, accordingly.
41. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the Collector has committed illegality in awarding less amount of compensation to the appellant and the reference court has further aggravated that illegality, by upholding the above compensation and also dismissing the reference as time barred. It is also true that since the reference court dismissed the reference as time barred, it could not have gone into the merits of the compensation awarded by the Collector, but still, the reference court erred in upholding the compensation awarded by the Collector.
42. In view of the above analysis and the conclusion reached while deciding the above issues, the appellant is entitled to get compensation for his acquired land at the rate of ₹ 8,784.77 per acre, solatium at the rate of 30% on this amount, additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum and also under section 28 of the Act, enhanced interest at the rate of 15% per annum.
43. Accordingly, the instant first appeal is allowed. However in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs.
44. The office is directed to prepare the decree accordingly.
Order Date :- 25.8.2025
Jitendra/Himanshu/Mayank
(Sandeep Jain, J.)