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Jharkhand High Court
Pradip Kumar Sahu vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The Mines … on 26 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:25679-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.1343 of 2018
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Pradip Kumar Sahu, aged about 48 years, son of Madusudan Sahu,
resident of Ward No.2, Chandkop, P.O. & P.S.-Lohardaga, District-
Lohardaga (Jharkhand).
.... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Mines Commissioner,
Department of Mines & Geology, Government of Jharkhand,
having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda,
District-Ranchi.
2. The Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District-
Lohardaga.
3. The District Mining Officer, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District-
Lohardaga.
4. The Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District-
Lohardaga.
5. Sri Rakesh Kumar Yadav, son of Late Krishna Gope, resident of
Village-Kutmu, P.O. & P.S. & District-Lohardaga, at present
resident at New Area, Kurchery More, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. &
District-Lohardaga.
.... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA
Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA
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C.A.V. on 07.08.2025 Pronounced on 26/08/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking for the following reliefs: –
(i) For issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction for quashing the order dated
29.12.2017 (Annexure-9) passed in Revision
Case No. 89/2016 by the learned Court of
Mines Commissioner, Ranchi (Respondent
No. 1); whereby and whereunder the
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revision preferred by the petitioner and
private respondent no. 5 has been
disallowed in purported exercise of power
under Rule 9(1)(d) r/w 9(1)(e) and 9(12) of
the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession
(Amendment) Rules, 2017 (hereinafter
referred to as the JMMC (Amendment) Rules
(Annexure-8), although the same is not
applicable with respect to the leasehold area
of less than 05 Hectares;
(ii) The petitioner further prays for a
direction upon the respondent authorities to
consider its application for grant of mining
lease of stone over an area of 3.5 acres of
land pertaining to Khata No. 125, Plot No.
215 and 218 located in Mouza Patratu
Mahuatoli in the District of Lohardaga as
necessary environmental clearance, mining
plan, Environment Impact Assessment
Report etc. have been submitted by the
petitioner before the respondent authorities.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under: –
(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that he has submitted an
application on 01.11.2014 for grant of mining lease of stone
over an area of 3.05 Acres of land appertaining to Khata
No.125, Plot No.215 and 2017, located in Mouza-Patratu
Mahuatoli within the District of Lohardaga.
(ii) Upon the application for grant of mining lease, the
respondent no.4, the Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga,
vide letter no.525(M) dated 05.11.2014 directed the
petitioner to submit the environmental clearance report
approved by the Ministry of Environment & Forest.
(iii) The petitioner has already obtained no objection certificate
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2025:JHHC:25679-DBissued by the Circle Officer; Kisko vide letter as contained
in memo no.562 dated 24.12.2014. Thereafter, the
Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga vide letter dated
13.07.2015 approved the mining plan.
(iv) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority,
Jharkhand vide letter no.620 dated 30.09.2015 has also
approved the environmental clearance to the petitioner for
the project of stone deposit of plot no.215 and 218 under
Khata No.125, measuring an area of 3.05 Acres situated at
Mouza-Patratu Mahuatoli within the District of Lohardaga.
(v) It is the case of the writ petitioner that in spite of entire
efforts made by the petitioner in relation to submission of
NOC and environmental clearance certificate, no order in
relation to grant of mining lease was communicated to the
petitioner.
(vi) In the meanwhile, the private respondent no.5 has applied
for grant of mining lease of stone in mouza Patratu under
Khata No.125, Pot No. 215/P over an area of 01 Acre.
(vii) Thereafter, the District Mining Officer, Lohardaga, instead of
taking a decision on the application submitted by the writ
petitioner, had asked the petitioner to submit another
application for grant of mining lease of stone over the same
area.
(viii) It is the further case of the writ petitioner that the private
respondent no.5 did not meet with the legal requirement
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and his application dated 01.12.2015 for grant of mining
leased was not fit for consideration. Against the deemed
rejection of the application dated 01.12.2015, the private
respondent no.5 had moved a revision application under
Rule 62 of the JMMC Rules, 2004 for setting aside the non-
communicated order of deemed rejection and for not
settling the said piece of land under Khata No.125, Plot
No.215/P over an area of 01 Acre with anyone, which was
numbered as Revision Case No.89 of 2016.
(ix) Although, the private respondent no.5 had filed revision
application and prayed for non-settlement of the
overlapping area, but, has not arrayed the petitioner as a
party respondent in the revision application.
(x) The writ petitioner came to know about the revision
application filed by the private respondent no.5, has filed
an intervention application in Revision Case No.89 of 2016
so that he may apprise the learned court of the Mines
Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi regarding the factual
position and suppression and concealment made by the
private respondent no.5. Thereafter, the intervention
application filed by the petitioner has been allowed.
(xi) It is the case of the petitioner the Mines Commissioner,
Jharkhand, Ranchi in a most mechanical and casual
manner without appreciating and considering the fact that
the requirement of Letter of Intent has been in relation to
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mining leasehold of more than 05 hectares, has rejected
the revision application preferred by the private respondent
no.5, in which, the petitioner has intervened and allowed to
put his stand.
(xii) The petitioner has complied with the statutory requirements
hence, the order impugned dated 29.12.2017 is illegal and
arbitrary and as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law,
which is under challenge in this writ petition.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
3. Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has
submitted that the revisional authority while passing the
impugned order dated 29.12.2017 has not appreciated the
existing statute in correct prospective.
4. It has been contended that no adverse order has ever been
communicated to the petitioner regrading rejection of his
application and he has complied with the statutory requirements
for grant of mining lease.
5. It has further been submitted that the applied lease hold area has
been less than 05 hectares and the petitioner has submitted
entire requisites and in spite of that, no decision has been taken
by the authority concerned.
6. The submission, therefore, has been made that the order dated
29.12.2017 passed by the authority concerned is not sustainable
in the eyes of law.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State
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7. Per Contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA appearing for the
respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of the provision of
Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017
and 2019, wherein, it has been provided that the mining licenses
are to be granted only by virtue of auction.
8. It has been contended that the petitioner has not challenged the
deemed rejection of his application made on 08.01.2016 for the
grant of lease and straight away had come before this Court.
9. It has further been contended that in terms of Rule 9 (1) (d), Rule
9 (1) (e) and Rule 9 (12) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession
(Amendment) Rules, 2017 which prescribe that if any LOI has not
been granted prior to the notification by which the amendment
has been carried out, all applications for grant of lease will
become ineligible and is equally applicable for the area which is
less than 5 Hectares and as such, the claim of the Petitioner is
not maintainable.
10. It has been contended that the authority concerned, on
consideration of legal implication of the aforesaid provision, since,
has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any
interference.
Analysis
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition and the
documents available on record.
12. It is evident from the record that the petitioner has made an
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application for a grant of a lease for stone-mining in Mouza
Patratu, Thana No. 146, Khata No. 125 and Plot No. 215 (P) and
2018 (P) District- Lohardaga on 01.11.2014 but there was an
overlap of an area to the extent of 0.60 Acre in Plot No. 216 (P)
with one Manoj Kumar Sahu who has also made an application
on 13-10-2014 and also, there was overlapping of an area to the
extent of 0.35 Acre in Plot No. 215 (P) with one Rakesh Kumar
Yadav and as such the application of the Petitioner has not been
considered.
13. It is further submitted that the Petitioner again applied for the
grant of stone lease on 08-01-2016 in Mauza: Patratu, Khata
No.125, Plot No.: 215 (P) and 2018 (P) admeasuring an area of
3.00 Acres which was also found to be overlapped with the area
mentioned with the other applicants, namely, Rakesh Kumar
Yadav and Manoj Kumar Sahu and as such, the application could
not be considered and was deemed rejected in terms of Rule 11
(ग) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004.
14. In the background of the aforesaid fact, the seminal issue which
requires consideration herein that whether the learned Court of
Mines Commissioner, Ranchi (Respondent No. 1) while
dismissing the revision preferred by the petitioner and private
respondent no. 5, has correctly applied the implication of Rule
9(1)(d) r/w 9(1)(e) and 9(12) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as
the JMMC (Amendment) Rules.
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15. This Court, before dealing with the aforesaid issue deems it fit
and proper to refer the provision of Rule 9(घ), 9(ङ), Rule 9(च),
Rule 9(छ) and Rule 9(12) and 11(क) and 11 (ख) and (ग) of the
JMMC Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis.
“9(घ) इस अधिसूचना के धनगगत होने की धतधि से पूर्ग में सरकारी क्षेत्र
एर्ं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर खनन पट्टे हेतु प्राप्त
आर्ेदन पत्र स्वतः अयोग्य हो जाएं गे ।
9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
प्राप्त र्ैसे आर्ेदन पत्र धजसमें इस अधिसूचना धनगगत होने की धतधि से
पूर्ग झारखण्ड लघु खधनज समनुदान धनयमार्ली, 2004 के धनयम 11
अंतगगत Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) धनगगत हो चुका है, उसे
इस अधिसूचना के धनगगत होने की धतधि से 180 धदनों के अंदर
पयागर्रण स्वीकृधत एर्ं खनन योजन अधनर्ायग रूप से समधपगत करना
होगा, अन्यिा उनका आर्ेदन स्वतः अस्वीकृत हो जाएगा।
9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
प्राप्त खनन पटे को जो करकामेर् र् एर्ं पयागर्रणीय स्वीकृधत खनन
योजना प्राप्त नही राहत र्ैसे खर कालधतरोधहत हो गये हो, उनके पट्टे
की अर्धि पट्टा स्वीकृधत/नर्ीनीकरण की धतधि से 31 माचग,
2022तक के धलए अर्धि धर्स्ताररत मानी जाएगी, बशते धक
अधिसूचना की धतधि के पूर्ग खनन पट्टा की अस्वीकृधत/रद्द/व्ययगत
होने का आदे श, नहीं पाररत धकया गया है, परन्तु र्ैसे खानन पट्टे पर
कोई खनन तब तक नहीं धकया जा सकेगा, जब तक खनन हेतु
आर्श्यक पयागर्रणीय स्वीकृधत/र्न एर्ं पयागर्रण धर्भाग की
स्वीकृधत/खनन योजना स्वीकृधत प्राप्त नहीं हो जाता है। आर्ेदक को
सभी र्ांधित अनापत्ती 180 धदनों के अंदर समधपगत कना होगा।
9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
स्वीकृत/नर्ीकृत खनन पट्टे की अर्धि यधद उनकी स्वीकृधत/नर्ीकरण
की अर्धि 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाद की धतधि हो, तो उनकी अर्धि
उनकी स्वीकृधत/नर्ीकरण की अर्धि तक धर्धिमान्य रहेगी।
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9(12) धनयम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (ि) तिा 9 (10) पूर्ग
से स्वीकृत/आर्धदत लघु खधनज के 5.00 हेक्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम क्षेत्र पर
भी लागू होंगें।
11(क) खनन पट्टा की स्वीकृधत के धलए दाखखल प्रत्येक आर्ेदन के
धलए उसकी प्राखप्त को तारीख के 120 धदनों के भीतर आशय का पत्र
धनगगत धकया जायेगा।
(ख) खनन पट्टा के प्रत्येक आर्ेदन की स्वीकृधत सक्षम प्राधिकार से
प्रतरणीय स्वच्छता प्रमाण पत्र दाखखल करने के 30 धदनों के भीतर कर
धदया जायेगा।
(ग) खनन पट्टा की स्वीकृधत के धलए दाखखल आर्ेदन पत्र पर 120
धदनों के अंदर आशय का पत्र (एलओआई) धनगगत नहीं होने की खिधत
में आर्ेदन पत्र स्वतः कालधतरोधहत होकर अस्वीकृत माना जायेगा। ”
16. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (ङ) and (च),
wherein, the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt
with initially for the period of 90 days, thereafter, it was
extended upto the period of 180 which is to be renewed on the
basis of making proper application by the applicant. The
provision of Rule 9(च) provides that in any case, ever after
renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended
beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment
incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto
the period of 31.03.2022.
17. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license
has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force
of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.
18. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(ि) as
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referred above that the license if renewed or extended the
validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license
will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be
any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the
provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of
auction.
19. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted
and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(च) will be
applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.
20. It is evident from the aforesaid Rule particularly Rule (ग) of rule
11 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004
that the application submitted for grant of mining lease and
consequent to that if LOI has not been issued within 120 days,
it will be deemed to be rejected.
21. Here, in the instant case, the petitioner had applied second time
on 08.01.2016 i.e., prior to issuance of Amended Rule, for grant
of mining lease on aforesaid land.
22. It is further evident from record that the application of Rakesh
Kumar Yadav, private Respondent No. 5 which was made on 01-
12-2015 was also deemed rejected on 31-03-2016 and the said
private respondent, namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav had filed the
Revision Case No. 89 of 2016 on 02-05-2016 challenging the
deemed rejection and for grant of sufficient time.
23. It is submitted that the Petitioner intervened in that application
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and objected the claim of the applicant, namely, Rakesh Kumar
Yadav but the Petitioner has never challenged the deemed
rejection of his own application and has never been issued LOI
for the said lease.
24. In the meantime, the Government of Jharkhand promulgated the
Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017
with effect from 22-02-2017 and as per Rule 9 (1)(घ) of the said
rules, it has been brought that if any LOI has not been granted
prior to this notification, all the applications would become
ineligible. Moreover, Rule 9 (12) of the said Rules also mentioned
that Rule 9 (1)(घ) is also applicable to area which is less than 5
Hectares and as such, taking note of the above-mentioned facts
and rules, the revision preferred by the Private Respondent,
namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav had been dismissed and the
application of the Petitioner deemed rejected and was never been
challenged. Therefore, it is considered view of this Court that the
prayer of the Petitioner is not fit to be allowed.
25. It needs to refer herein that the application preferred by the writ
petitioner for grant of mining lease in the year, 2016 remained
pending and ultimately, the amendment has come in the year
2017 in the provisions
of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules wherein as per
Rule 9(1)(d) r/w Rules 9(1)(e) and 9(12), it has been envisaged
that all pending applications for grant of mining lease shall be
automatically cancelled except those wherein the letter of intent
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had been issued before notifying the said Rules.
26. Admittedly, no letter of intent was issued in favour of the petitioner
and his application for lease was kept pending and therefore, in
view of the amended provisions of
the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules as noted above,
the writ petitioner does not have a vested right for making
consideration with respect to his application for mining lease.
27. It needs to refer herein that the protection is to be given to a
person concerned only where the right will be said to be
vested on the principle of accrued right. It requires to refer the
definition/meaning of vested/accrued right.
28. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become property of some particular person or
persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future
benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute
vested rights.
29. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition)
at page1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject
to no contingency; complete; established by law as a
permanent right, vested interest.
30. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed
right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is
created. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also
acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right”. It
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had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to
enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be
rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the
legislature. Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or the so-
called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against public
interest and convenience which are sought to be served by
amendment of the law.
31. Thus, “vested right” is a right independent of any contingency.
Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation
of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law
specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a
course.
32. In the light of the definition of the “vested right”, it is evident
that right accrues to person or persons attached to an
institution or building or anything whatsoever, meaning
thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a vested right, he is to
substantiate before the court of law that the right has been
created in his favour by an order passed by the competent
authority in accordance with law.
33. It is evident from the definition of the vested right that right
would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in
nature and if that be so, the question of prejudice or following
of principles of natural justice will arise.
34. The settled position of law is that once the right has been
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accrued, the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility
criteria will not be considered to be a reason to recall the
benefit already granted due to the reason that a vested right
has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the definition of
vested right as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in MGB
Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at
paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:–
“11. The word “vested” is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as:
“Vested.–fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having
the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not
contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent.
Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become property of some particular person or
persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits,
or contingent interest inproperty founded on anticipated
continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested
rights’.”
12. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International
Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure
subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a
permanent right; vested interest.
13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency
and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person
concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by
operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been
derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be
changed.”
35. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right
is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the
proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R.
Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph 24 which
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reads hereunder as:–
“24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights”
or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the
impugned provisions which had been given retrospective
operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of
promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the
employees. The said expressions have been used in the
context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was
sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and
thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in
force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment
having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking
away a benefit already available to the employee under the
existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are
unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with
the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [AIR 1967 SC 1889], B.S.
Vedera [AIR 1969 SC 118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal
Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33].”
36. This Court is now to examine that merely keeping the
application pending will be said to create a right said to be
vested right.
37. The answer of this Court will be in negative, reason being that,
merely making an application cannot be said to be accrual of
right and hence, in absence of any right having been accrued
in favour of the petitioner, no relief can be granted contrary to
the statutory provision.
38. Based upon the discussion made hereinabove, it is considered
view of this Court that the revisional court has correctly
appreciated the relevant amended provisions in
the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules and also has
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taken into consideration the aforesaid statutory restrictions and
therefore, rejected the claim of the writ petitioner.
39. It needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been filed for
issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the order dated
29.12.2017 passed by Mines Commissioner.
40. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ
of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error
apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice,
reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs.
Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477,
wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226
has been frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A
writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of
it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ
can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with
the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the
Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of
fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of16
2025:JHHC:25679-DBthe appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the
said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is
within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised.”
41. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad
Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as
hereunder: –
“21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ
of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be
issued, the following propositions may be taken as
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or17
2025:JHHC:25679-DBfails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3)
The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of
a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its
purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear
the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings
in certiorari.”
42. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and
Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while
discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold
at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:
“12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will
be useful to notice the general principles indicating the
limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be
exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari
can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction.
The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed
out by this Court in Syed Yakoob‘s case (supra).
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in
recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on18
2025:JHHC:25679-DBevidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to
admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases
the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction
extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a
result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them
or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their
jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.”
43. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason
assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the
authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error,
hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with.
44. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.
45. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
19
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