Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Gulzar Ahmad Dar And Ors vs Union Territory Of Jammu And Kashmir & … on 29 August, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 25.07.2025
Pronounced on: 29.08.2025
Case No.:- WP(C) No. 2036/2024
Gulzar Ahmad Dar and Ors
.....Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Tasaduq Hussain Khawja, Advocate with
Mr. Imaan Abdul Muizz, Advocate.
Vs
Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir & ors.
..... Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Hakeem Aman Ali, Dy. AG for R-1.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
(Per: Sanjay Dhar-J)
1. The petitioners, through the medium of the present petition,
have challenged the judgement dated 30.03.2021 passed by
Central Administrative Tribunal, Jammu Bench (hereinafter
to be referred to as ‘Tribunal’) to the extent it provides for
fixing of seniority of the petitioners, who have been
inducted/promoted against leave or training reserve
vacancies, below those candidates, who have been
2 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
inducted/promoted against regular vacancies. Challenge
has also been thrown to Govt. Order No. 316-JK (GAD) of
2021 dated 07.04.2021 whereby seniority of the petitioners
has been re-fixed. Besides this, the petitioners have sought
a direction upon the respondents to either quash all
promotions that have been made on the basis of seniority
list dated 07.04.2021 or in the alternative, to accord
promotions to the petitioners retrospectively by treating
them as senior in accordance with seniority list issued in the
year 2011.
2. According to the petitioners, they were members of various
feeding services of Jammu and Kashmir Administrative
Service and they were appointed to these services after
qualifying Jammu and Kashmir Combined Competitive
Services Examination in the year 1999. The petitioners as
well as the private respondents, who were also members of
the various feeding services of Jammu and Kashmir
Administrative Service and who also belong to the 1999
batch, were considered for promotion to time scale of
Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service (hereinafter to
be referred to as ‘JKAS’) in the year 2008 in accordance
with Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service Rules of
1979 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘Rules of 1979’)
3 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
whereafter they were inducted in the time scale of JKAS in
the year 2008.
3. It has been submitted that the seniority list of the officers,
promoted in the year 2008, was issued in terms of Govt.
Order No. 743-GAD of 2011 dated 24.06.2011 after inviting
objections and considering the same. It has been further
submitted that said seniority list became a subject matter of
long drawn litigation initially before this Court and
ultimately before the learned Tribunal. The learned
Tribunal, in terms of the impugned judgment dated
30.03.2021, upheld the seniority list dated 24.06.2011 but
it was observed by the learned Tribunal that the officers
appointed against leave and training vacancies cannot be
placed above those who have been promoted against regular
vacancies.
4. Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment of the learned Tribunal,
the seniority list of 2011 came to be revised by the
Government, which led to issuance of fresh seniority list
dated 07.04.2021, which is under challenge in the present
writ petition.
5. It has been submitted by the petitioners that they were
ranking superior to the private respondents in the seniority
list of 2011, which was issued on the basis of merit obtained
4 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
by the candidates during the selection process conducted in
accordance with the Rules of 1979 but because of the
aforesaid observations made by the learned Tribunal, the
petitioners have been pushed down in the seniority list
thereby affecting their rights to be promoted to higher scales
of pay as also their induction in Indian Administrative
Services (IAS). The petitioners are stated to have made
representations to the official respondents seeking
restoration of their seniority in accordance with the seniority
list of 2011 but they have not taken any action, which
compelled the petitioners to approach this Court by way of
the present writ petition.
6. The petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment of
the learned Tribunal to the extent it has resulted in re-
fixation of seniority of the petitioners on the grounds that
the classification made by the learned Tribunal between the
vacancies falling under leave and training reserve category
and those termed as regular vacancies is misplaced and
without any legal basis. It has been contended that as per
the Rules of 1979, leave and training vacancies are part of
the cadre borne on the service to which the petitioners and
the private respondents belong and all these posts have
been duly sanctioned and form part of the strength of the
5 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
cadre, therefore, treating the promotion/induction of the
petitioners in the time scale in a different manner has no
legal basis.
7. It has been further contended that the learned Tribunal has,
without any basis, assumed that only duty posts are regular
posts and the leave and training vacancies are non-regular
posts. It has been contended that once the learned Tribunal
had upheld the validity of seniority list of 2011, it was not
open to it to make the impugned observations. It has been
further contended that the impugned seniority list of 2021
has been issued without observing principles of natural
justice and once final seniority list was issued by the official
respondents in the year 2011, it had no jurisdiction to issue
a fresh seniority list in the year 2021.
8. The writ petition has been contested by the official
respondents by filing their reply. In their reply, it has been
submitted that during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the
induction of officers appointed to various departmental
feeding services in the year 1999 against the slots, which
had become available from the year 2004 onwards, could
not be considered as a result of which none of the officers
belonging to 1999 batch were inducted nor any officer from
subsequent batch of 2001 could be inducted in time scale of
6 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
JKAS. It has been submitted that the Establishment cum
Selection Committee had observed that in respect of certain
departmental feeding services, the members of the service
cannot be considered for their induction into time scale of
JKAS in the normal course due to non-availability of slots,
therefore, it was recommended that leave reserve/training
reserve vacancies shall be utilized as an exception for
ensuring induction of members of departmental feeding
services, both direct and promotees appointed upto
31.12.1999.
9. It has been submitted that in view of the aforesaid decision,
the committee considered the service records of 49 officers of
the different feeding services of overall merit as reflected in
their APRs and recommended their induction into the time
scale of JKAS against leave/training reserves. Out of these
49 officers, the petitioners were also inducted in the time
scale of JKAS against leave/training reserved posts. After
the induction of officers in the time scale of JKAS, a
tentative select list of officers was issued vide Government
Order No. 485-GAD of 2010 dated 21.04.2010 and
objections were invited. Upon receipt of representations
against the tentative select list, a committee was constituted
by the Government which submitted its report on
7 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
15.02.2011. On the basis of the recommendations of this
Committee, a final seniority list of officers appointed to time
scale of JKAS between 01.01.2004 to 01.12.2008 was issued
by the Government in terms of Government Order No. 743-
GAD of 2011 dated 24.06.2011.
10. It has been submitted that the aforesaid seniority list
including Rule 15(4) of J&K Administrative Service Rules,
2008 which provided for retrospective effect of appointment
on the basis of vacancies became subject matter of challenge
in various writ petitions filed before the High Court, which
were later on transferred to the learned Tribunal. The said
petitions came to be decided by the learned Tribunal vide
impugned judgment dated 30.03.2011, which contains the
impugned observations with regard to promotion of officers
inducted against leave reserve/training reserve posts.
11. It has been further submitted that in the light of the
impugned observations made by the learned Tribunal,
impugned seniority list dated 07.04.2021 was issued by the
Government as it decided to implement the judgment of the
learned Tribunal. Accordingly, officers promoted against
leave reserve/training reserve posts including the petitioners
were placed below the officers, who were promoted/inducted
against regular vacancies.
8 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
12. It has been submitted that leave reserve/training reserve
posts cannot be equated with regular posts and because
there were no regular vacant posts available for according
promotion to the petitioners, as such, in order to prevent a
situation whereby a junior batch officer would have stolen a
march over the petitioners, who belong to a senior batch, as
a one-time exception, it was decided to utilize leave
reserve/training reserve posts for according
promotion/induction to them.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record of the case including the record produced by the
official respondents.
14. To be precise, the dispute raised in the present petition is
with regard to the placement of the petitioners in the
seniority list of officers inducted to time scale of JKAS in the
year 2008. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were
inducted to time scale of JKAS in the year 2008 against
leave reserve/training reserve vacancies and not against the
regular vacancies. While the petitioners claim that leave
reserve/training reserve vacancies being part of the cadre of
the service as defined under Rules of 1979, which govern the
instant case, as such, it was not open to the learned
Tribunal to take a view that leave reserve/training reserve
9 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
vacancies are not part of the cadre and, therefore, could not
have been utilized for according promotion to the petitioners
and that the same has been done only as a measure of
administrative exigency which does not fit into the one
under the rules. It has been submitted that the learned
Tribunal has fallen into error by making a distinction
between leave reserve/training reserve vacancies and the
regular vacancies.
15. The official respondents, on the other hand, claim that as
per the Rules of 1979, promotions/induction into time scale
of JKAS for the officers belonging to feeding cadre services
can be made only against the slots available against the
particular service of the feeding cadre and because these
slots were not available in the feeding cadre service to which
the petitioners belong, normally they could not have been
inducted/promoted in the year 2008 but in order to save a
situation whereby the officers of a subsequent batch would
have stolen a march over the petitioners, who belonged to
the 1999 batch, as a special concession, the leave
reserve/training reserve vacancies were utilized and this
concession given to the petitioners does not entitle them to
be placed above/alongside the officers, who have been
10 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
inducted/promoted against the regular slots allotted to the
respective feeding cadre services.
16. Before going into the merits of the afore-noted contentions
raised by the parties, a glaring aspect of the matter, which
stares at the face of the petitioners is the inordinate delay on
their part to challenge the judgment of the learned Tribunal
and the consequent seniority list dated 07.04.2021, is
required to be addressed.
17. It is to be noted that the petitioners were parties to the
proceedings before the Tribunal and their seniority was
under challenge before the Tribunal. It is not a case where
the petitioners were not aware about the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Tribunal. The petitioners
have approached this Court in September, 2024 while as the
impugned judgment has been passed by the learned
Tribunal on 30.03.2021 meaning thereby that the
petitioners have approached this Court after a lapse of about
three and half years of passing of the impugned judgment.
18. The issue that arises for determination is whether or not
this Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction
in the facts and circumstances of this case having regard to
inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and the
established principle of law that delay defeats equity.
11 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
19. The effect of delay in filing a writ petition upon the rights of
a litigant has been a subject matter of determination before
the Supreme Court in a number of cases. It would be apt to
refer to some of these precedents to understand the legal
position on this aspect.
20. The Supreme Court has, in the case of ‘State of
Uttaranchal and anr Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari
and Ors‘, (2013) 12 SCC 179, while dealing with the issue
relating to effect of delay and laches, observed as under:
“16. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents
could have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on
the junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not
to do so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is
interesting to note that when the regular selection took
place, they accepted the position solely because the
seniority was maintained and, thereafter, they knocked
at the doors of the tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as
noon day that the cause of action had arisen for assailing
the order when the junior employee was promoted on ad
hoc basis on 15.11.1983.
17. In C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and
another a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the concept
of representations and the directions issued by the court
or tribunal to consider the representations and the
12 WP(C) No. 2036/2024challenge to the said rejection thereafter. In that context,
the court has expressed thus: –
“Every representation to the Government for
relief, may not be replied on merits.
Representations relating to matters which
have become stale or barred by limitation, can
be rejected on that ground alone, without
examining the merits of the claim. In regard to
representations unrelated to the Department,
the reply may be only to inform that the matter
did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations
with incomplete particulars may be replied by
seeking relevant particulars. The replies to
such representations, cannot furnish a fresh
cause of action or revive a stale or dead
claim.”
21. In State of ‘Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam, (2007)10 SCC
137′, the Supreme court observed as under:
“Some of the respondents might have filed representations
but filing of representations alone would not save the period
of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court
of law to determine the question as to whether the claim
made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or
laches on the part of a Government servant may deprive
him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article
14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of
that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans
in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.”
13 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
22. Again in ‘Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board and ors Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4
SCC 108′, the Supreme Court has observed as under:
“13. First, we shall deal with the facet of
delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others
the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by
Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, which
is as follows: –
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval,
which might affect either party and cause a balance of
14 WP(C) No. 2036/2024justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as relates to the remedy.”
14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, while dealing
with exercise of power of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of
the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be
judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is
for that reason, a person‟s entitlement for relief from a
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it
against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on
the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to
necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the
person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the
discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such
power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or
blameworthy conduct.
15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal
and others etc. etc. the Court observed that it is well
settled that power of the High Court to issue an
appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is
discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its
discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been
further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of
delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary
remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is
15 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
bring in injustice.
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh
the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same.
The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage
should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in
the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and
laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant
who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
“procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second,
law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟
delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose
not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to
scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored
without any justification. That apart, in the present case,
such belated approach gains more significance as the
respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his
duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the
responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on
the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the
16 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to
such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the
contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect
others. Such delay may have impact on others‟ ripened
rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been
treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to
give indulgence to such indolent persons – who compete
with „Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle‟.
In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve
any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ
court should have thrown the petition overboard at the
very threshold.”
23. The Supreme Court in the case of ‘P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu‘, 1975 (1) SCC 152 has held that a
person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his
head should approach the court at least within six months
or at the most, within a year of such promotion. The Court
further went on to observe that it is not that there is any
period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers
under Article 226 or is it that there can never be a case
where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the
passage of a certain length of time but it would be a sound
and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to
exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the
case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for
relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then
17 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to
unsettle, settled matters.
24. Applying the aforesaid legal position with regard to effect of
delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in
approaching the Court to the facts of the instant case, it is
clear that the petitioners have slept over their rights for
about three and a half years and have approached this
Court belatedly. Their only explanation for this delay is that
they made representations with the official respondents,
which were not considered. Copies of a couple of
representations have been annexed with the petition. There
is nothing on record to suggest that these representations
were actually received by the official respondents. In fact,
these representations do not even bear the date on which
the same were made and even in the petition it has not been
mentioned as to on which date these representations were
delivered by the petitioners with the official respondents.
25. The Supreme Court in ‘State of Tamil Nadu Vs.
Seshachalam‘, (2007) 10 SCC 137, has clearly held that
filing of representations alone would not save the period of
limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of
law to determine the question as to whether the claim made
by an applicant deserves consideration. Again the Supreme
18 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
Court in the case of ‘Union of India and ors Vs. Chaman
Rana & Anr, 2018(5) SCC 798 has held that merely
repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient
explanation for delay in approaching the court for grant of
relief.
26. In the face of aforesaid legal position, even it is assumed
that representations were made by the petitioners to the
official respondents, the same would not save the situation
from them particularly when the official respondents have
not even responded to these representations. Even
otherwise, making of representations by the petitioners in
the facts and circumstances of the instant case was an
unnecessary exercise because the official respondents had
issued the impugned seniority list on the basis of the
judgment passed by the learned Tribunal and once the
official respondents decided to accept the said judgment,
they had no option but to comply with the same and issue
the impugned seniority list. The representations of the
petitioners could not in any case have made any difference.
The only option available with the petitioners to avoid the
consequences of judgment of the learned Tribunal was to
challenge the said judgment by way of appropriate
19 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
proceedings which the petitioners did only after three and a
half years without there being explanation for the delay.
27. Although there is no limitation period prescribed for filing
writ proceedings, yet the High Court generally refuses to
exercise its writ jurisdiction if the proceedings are not filed
within a reasonable time. What should be the reasonable
time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. Generally speaking reasonable time for
challenging a judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal
would be the period of limitation prescribed for filing a
Letters Patent Appeal. Thus, reasonable period for the
petitioners to approach this Court to invoke writ jurisdiction
against the impugned judgment of Central Administrative
Tribunal would have been sixty days or at the most within a
period of six months from the date of passing of judgment by
the Tribunal, but the petitioners have invoked the writ
jurisdiction of this Court after a lapse of about three and
half years. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners
were party to the proceedings before the Tribunal before
which their seniority was under challenge there is no
justification for them to have consumed so much of time in
approaching this Court.
20 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
28. As per the own case of the petitioners during the
interregnum not only fresh seniority list on the basis of the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal has
been issued by the official respondents in April, 2021 but
official respondents have also made promotions to Super
Time Scale of Service and have further initiated the process
of inducting the officers in Indian Administrative Services
(IAS) on the basis of seniority list of 2011. Thus, the
petitioners have allowed the situation to change inasmuch
as the officers have been promoted to higher scales of pay on
the basis of the judgment of the learned Tribunal. In view of
this altered situation, it can be safely inferred that the
petitioners have waived their rights by their conduct as a
result whereof the private respondents have been put in a
position that if they are reverted back to the earlier seniority,
it would work harshly against them. The petitioners, by their
lethargic conduct, have allowed the subsequent
developments to take place and this is an important factor
which would weigh with this court in deciding whether or
not to exercise writ jurisdiction.
29. For what has been discussed hereinbefore, this Court
refuses to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction on
account of inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of
21 WP(C) No. 2036/2024
the petitioners in approaching this Court. Thus, without
going into the merits of the rival contentions raised by the
parties, this writ petition is dismissed on the grounds of
delay and laches.
(SANJAY DHAR) (VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL)
JUDGE JUDGE
JAMMU
29.08.2025
Naresh/Secy.
Whether order is speaking: Yes
Whether order is reportable: Yes
...
Naresh Kumar
2025.08.29 16:48
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
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