Hena Naseem vs State Of Uttar Pradesh on 26 August, 2025

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Supreme Court – Daily Orders

Hena Naseem vs State Of Uttar Pradesh on 26 August, 2025

Author: Aravind Kumar

Bench: Aravind Kumar

                                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.     OF 2025
                           @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.14844/2023


                      HENA NASEEM                                                 …APPELLANT

                                                         VERSUS



                      STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                  …RESPONDENTS



                                                       ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant had invoked the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court

of Allahabad by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition

No.15956/2023 for quashing of the FIR dated 28.09.2023 registered in

Crime No.557/2023 under Section 3(1) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-

Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 Police Station – Kotwali, District

– Azamgarh and having suffered a dismissal of the Writ Petition has

knocked the doors of this Court reiterating the prayer made in the Writ

Petition.

3. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties, we

notice that an FIR No.258/2023 was registered against the appellant and
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
two others for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468,
Date: 2025.08.29
17:02:44 IST
Reason:

386 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which had triggered the

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registration of FIR against petitioner under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters

and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (for short ‘Act’). In the

said FIR, Mr. Arif has also been arraigned as an accused along with

petitioner’s husband.

4. This Court had an occasion to consider the contours of the

definition of “gang” as defined under the Act and the circumstances under

which a person is said to be indulged in anti-social activity for Section

2(b), which defines the expression “gang” can be invoked. It was held in

the matter of Vinod Bihari Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,

2025 SCC OnLine 1216 as under:

“18. At this stage, we shall refer to the definition of “gang”
as set out in Section 2(b) of the Act of 1986. The definition
reads thus:

“(b) “Gang” means a group of persons, who acting
either singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or
show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or
otherwise with the object of disturbing public order
or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary,
material or other advantage for himself or any other
person, indulge in anti-social activities, namely—
[…]”

19. Section 2(b) of the Act of 1986 should be read
alongside Rule 3 of the Rules of 2021, which states as follows:

“3. Conditions of criminal liability.- (1) The offences
mentioned in sub sections (i) to (xxv) of clause (b) of
Section 2 of the Act shall be punishable under the Act
only if they are:—

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(a) committed for disturbing public order; or

(b) committed by causing violence or threat or
display of violence, or by intimidation, or
coercion or otherwise, either singly or
collectively, for the purpose of obtaining any
unfair worldly, economic, material, pecuniary or
other advantage to himself or to any other
person.”

20. The definition of “gang” under Section 2(b) of the Act
of 1986 comprises the following essentials;

i. A group of persons i.e., there can be no gang of
one person;

ii. The group of persons, acting either individually or
collectively, indulges in anti-social activities as
enumerated in clauses (i) to (xxv) of Section 2(b);
iii. Indulgence in such anti-social activities is by
means of violence, or threat, or show of violence, or
intimidation, or coercion, or otherwise;
iv. Use of such means is with the object of disturbing
public order, or gaining any undue temporal,
pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or
any other person.

21. It is apparent that the definition of the term “gang” is
not attracted by mere association with a miscreant group. For
such a group to metamorphize into a gang, it must engage in
anti-social activities enumerated in clauses (i) to (xxv) of
Section 2(b), and these must be committed for the object
mentioned thereunder. In essence, a group of persons falls
within the ambit of Section 2(b) only when the requirements
set forth in Rule 3 are satisfied.

22. This Court in Shraddha Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
reported as (2022) 19 SCC 57, held that an accused can be
termed as “gangster” when he as a member of a gang, has
indulged in any of the enumerated anti-social activities,
whether by means expressly stated or otherwise, with the
object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself
or any other person. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:

“25. A group of persons may act collectively or any
one of the members of the group may also act
singly, with the object of disturbing public order
indulging in anti-social activities mentioned in
Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act, who can be

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termed as “gangster”. A member of a “gang” acting
either singly or collectively may be termed as a
member of the “gang” and comes within the
definition of “gang”, provided he/she is found to
have indulged in any of the anti-social activities
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act.

xxx

27. As per the settled position of law, the provisions
of the statute are to be read and considered as it is.

Therefore, considering the provisions under the
Gangsters Act, 1986 as they are, even in case of a
single offence/FIR/charge-sheet, if it is found that
the accused is a member of a “gang” and has
indulged in any of the anti-social activities
mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act,
such as, by violence, or threat or show of violence,
or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the
object of disturbing public order or of gaining any
undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other
advantage for himself or any other person and
he/she can be termed as “gangster” within the
definition of Section 2(c) of the Act, he/she can be
prosecuted for the offences under the Gangsters
Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx

25. From the above exposition of law, a group of persons
may be said to constitute a gang only when they, either singly
or collectively, indulge in any of the anti-social activity
enumerated in clauses (i) to (xvv) of Section 2(b), by means
specified therein, or otherwise, and most importantly, with the
object of disturbing public order, or securing any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself
or any other person.

5. In the background of aforesaid principles laid down by this Court,

our attention has been invited to the facts on hand to contend petitioner

does not fall in the definition of ‘Gang’ and it is a solitary FIR relating to

an immovable property and prima facie it seems to be a family dispute. It

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would not detain us for too long to arrive at conclusion that the invocation

of the Gangsters Act insofar as the appellant is concerned was not

warranted. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, in the base FIR

registered in FIR No.557/2023 under the provisions of the Gangsters Act

would indicate that the dispute of cheating or forging of the documents and

joining in action for perpetrating such acts was alongwith her husband and

Mr. Arif as a ground to invoke Gangsters Act. Surprisingly, FIR

No.335/2017 which has been furnished in the list of chart produced by the

State also does not implicate the appellant and only refers to her co-

accused, i.e., Arif as an accused in the said FIR. On this short ground itself

the invocation of the Gangsters Act insofar as the appellant would not be

sustainable. Hence, we set aside the impugned order passed by the High

Court, allow the Writ Petition and quash the FIR No.557/2023 registered

under Section 3(1) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities

(Prevention) Act, Police Station – Kotwali, District – Azamgarh only

insofar as the present appellant is concerned and making it is explicitly

clear that we have not expressed any opinion with regard to the complicity

or otherwise of Mr. Arif and Mr. Salman, (the husband of the appellant).

Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed, the FIR No.557/2023 dated

28.09.2023 petition alone is quashed and Writ Petition stands allowed to

the extent only. We also make it clear that as far as the base FIRs namely

FIRs No.258/2023, 675/2023 as well as 335/2017 are concerned, it shall

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proceed in accordance with law and no opinion on merits of the said FIRs

are expressed in these proceedings.

6. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………J.
(ARAVIND KUMAR)

……………………………J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 26, 2025.

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ITEM NO.25               COURT NO.15               SECTION II
               S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.14844/2023
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 11-10-2023
in CRLMWP No.15956/2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad]

HENA NASEEM Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondent(s)

IA No. 154926/2025 – APPLICATION FOR TAKING ON RECORD
IA No. 5456/2025 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 262443/2024 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 68836/2024 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 6216/2024 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 88597/2025 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 236281/2023 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 5455/2025 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
IA No. 262441/2024 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
IA No. 68833/2024 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
IA No. 88586/2025 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
Date : 26-08-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Pradeep Kumar Mathur, AOR
Ms. Jemtiben Ao, Adv.

Mr. Chiranjeev Johri, Adv.

Mr. Chandra Nand Jha, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Ms. Srishti Singh, AOR
Mr. Divyanshu Sahai, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. The appeal stands allowed in terms of the signed order placed
on the file.

3. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     (NEHA GUPTA)                                   (AVGV RAMU)


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SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT       COURT MASTER (NSH)




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