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Jharkhand High Court
M/S. Esh Ispat Private Limited vs The Principal Commissioner on 26 August, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2025:JHHC:25720-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (T) No. 4444 of 2025
1. M/s. ESH Ispat Private Limited, Industrial Area, Balidih, Bokaro
Steel City, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand, PIN-827014
through its authorized signatory-cum- Director, Punit Kumar, aged about
38 years, S/o. Sri Surendra Kumar Rai, R/o. Plot no. 128, Lohanchal
Colony, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. Sector-12 & P.S. Sector-12, Bokaro Steel
City, District Bokaro.
2. Punit Kumar, age about 38 years, S/o. Sri Surendra Kumar Rai,
R/o. Plot no. 128, Lohanchal Colony, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. Sector-12 &
P.S. Sector-12 Bokaro Steel City, District Bokaro, Jharkhand.
... ... ... Petitioners
Versus
1. The Principal Commissioner, Central Goods and Service Tax &
Central Excise, Central Revenue Building, 5A, Main Road, Ranchi, P.O.-
GPO & P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi.
2. The Commissioner (Appeal), CGST & Central Excise Hqrs, having
its office at 2nd and 3rd Floor, Grand Emerald Building, Ashok Nagar, P.O.
Ashok Nagar, P.S. Agrora, District Ranchi.
3. The Additional Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise Hqrs, having
its office at 2nd and 3rd Floor, Grand Emerald Building, Ashok Nagar, P.O.
Ashok Nagar, P.S. Agrora, District Ranchi.
... ... ... Respondents
---------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
---------
For the Petitioner: Mr. Abhay Prakash, Advocate
For the CGST: Mr. P.A.S. Pati, Advocate
Mr. Shivam Singh, Advocate
Mr. Anurag Vijay, Advocate
---------
03/Dated: 26.08.2025
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. (Oral)
1. The instant writ petition has been filed for grant of the following
substantive relief:-
“for directing the respondent no. 2. the Commissioner (Appeal) to
accept the appeal which the petitioners now intend to file under
section 107(1) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017,
against the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Additional
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBCommissioner, CGST & CX Hqrs, Ranchi, as the same stands
beyond the statutory limit as prescribed under section 107(1) of
CGST Act, considering the extra-ordinary circumstances of the
petitioners preventing him to file the appeal, by condoning the delay
of about 2 months 10 days.
OR/In Alternative
For quashing of the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the
respondent no. 3 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), as the same
has been passed without proper application of mind and without
considering the entirety of the reply (undated) filed on behalf of the
petitioners and duly received by the respondent office on
11.10.2023.
AND
During the pendency of the present writ application, the
respondents may be constrain from taking any coercive steps as
against the petitioners for recovery of the alleged amount as
determined vide order dated 13.01.2025.”
2. Clearly the relief as claimed for is totally misconceived for the
reason that Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
(in short ‘the Act’) stipulates the procedure for filing of appeal before the
appellate authority which reads as under:
“107. Appeals to Appellate Authority:
(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under
this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union
Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority
may Appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed
within three months from the date on which the said decision or
order is communicated to such person.
(2) ……………………..
(3) ……………………..
(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the Appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Appeal
within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the
case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one
month”
…………………………………………..”
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3. A plain reading of Section 107 of the Act makes it absolutely clear
that the appellate authority has no power to allow an appeal to be
presented beyond the period of one month from the date of filing of such
appeal.
4. How this provision is to be construed would be determined on the
basis of somewhat similar provision contained in the Central Excise Act
which came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
“Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur, (2008) 3 SCC 70. The Hon’ble Supreme Court therein was
considering a case wherein the Commissioner had dismissed the appeal
on the ground that it was time barred and filed beyond the period of 30
days from the expiry of the period of 60 days, as prescribed for filing of a
statutory appeal. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the
matter reached before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was argued that
the Commissioner has no power to condone the delay. However, the High
Court could condone the delay by exercising power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India since such power is untrammelled by the
statutory provision. Negating the above contention, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in paragraph 8 observed as under:-
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the
Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to
condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under
the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can
be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation Act“)
can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section
35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred
within three months from the date of communication to him of the
decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBappeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be
presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this
clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in
terms of the proviso further 30 days’ time can be granted by the
appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the
appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be
presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes
the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30
days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for
preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section
5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were
therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone
the delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period.”
5. The three Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise Vs. M/s Hongo India (P)
Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791, while dealing with the issue of
condoning the delays beyond the period specified in Section 35-H of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 reiterated the view of Singh Enterprises
(Supra) and held that time limit prescribed for making reference and
appeal to High Court is absolute and unextendable by the Court under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We shall have to reproduce relevant
observations contained in para 32, which reads as under: –
“32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B,
35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and
reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only
from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other
words, the language used in other provisions makes the position
clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain
the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of
60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an
appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBshowing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is
complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court
was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.”
6. In Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors. Versus
M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, reported in
(2020) 19 SCC 681 while dealing with the question as to whether the High
Court can exercise the power of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India ought to entertain challenge to the assessment order
on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against the order
stood foreclosed by the law of limitation.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of power
of appellate authority to condone delay under Section 31 of the Andhra
Pradesh Value Added Tax, 2005 held that a complete mechanism is
provided for challenging the assessment orders, that mechanism solely
has to be followed, neither the writ Court nor Section 5 of the Limitation
Act can condone the delay beyond prescribed statutory period. We shall
have to reproduce the relevant observations contained in Paras 16, 17,
18, 19, 22, 23 and 25, which reads as under:-
“16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary
powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial
powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties.
Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in
mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision
otiose. In a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
ONGC v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corpn. Ltd., the statutory
appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the
maximum time-limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125
of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBappeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As
a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days.
Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the
delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal,
an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed
to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the
said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh
Enterprises v. CCE, CCE v. Hongo (India) (P) Ltd., Chhattisgarh SEB
v. CERC and Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt. and
concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be
invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum
prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.
17. The principle underlying the dictum in this decision would
apply proprio vigore to Section 31 of the 2005 Act including to the
powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Notably, in this decision, a submission was canvassed by the
assessee that in the peculiar facts of that case (as urged in the
present case), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution, so that complete justice can be done. This
argument has been considered and plainly rejected in the following
words: (ONGC case, SCC pp. 48-51, paras 12-16)
“12. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak while explicating and
elaborating the principles under Article 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji,
J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus: (SCC p. 656, para 50)
’50. … The fact that the rule was discretionary did not alter
the position. Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme
Court to pass any order to do complete justice between the
parties, the court cannot make an order inconsistent with the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
No question of inconsistency between Article 142(1) and
Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the
majority of the Judges of this Court said that Article 142(1)
did not confer any power on this Court to contravene the
provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article
145 confer power upon this Court to make rules,
empowering it to contravene the provisions of the
fundamental right. At AIR pp. 1002-03, para 12 : SCR p. 899
of the Reports, Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBpowers of this Court are no doubt very wide and they are
intended and “will always be exercised in the interests of
justice”. But that is not to say that an order can be made by
this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It was emphasised
that an order which this Court could make in order to do
complete justice between the parties, must not only be
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the
substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. The
court, therefore, held that it was not possible to hold that
Article 142(1) conferred upon this Court powers which could
contravene the provisions of Article 32.’
13. The said decision has been clarified by a Constitution
Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, wherein
M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking
for the majority, ruled that: (SCC pp. 634-35, para 83)
’83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions
in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of
this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These
issues are matters of serious public importance. The
proposition that a provision in any ordinary law
irrespective of the importance of the public policy on
which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the
Supreme Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and
erroneous. In both Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr.,
as well as A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, cases the point
was one of violation of constitutional provisions and
constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of
inconsistency with statutory provisions were really
unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the
ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional
rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the
Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing of criminal
proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section
320 or 321 or 482 Cr PC or all of them put together. The
power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level
and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or
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2025:JHHC:25720-DBprovisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto,
act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional
powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or
limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the
scheme of a particular law, taking into account the
nature and status of the authority or the court on which
conferment of powers — limited in some appropriate
way — is contemplated. The limitations may not
necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental
considerations of public policy. Shri Sorabjee, learned
Attorney General, referring to Garg case, said that
limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from
“inconsistency with express statutory provisions of
substantive law” must really mean and be understood as
some express prohibition contained in any substantive
statutory law. He suggested that if the expression
“prohibition” is read in place of “provision” that would
perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that
such prohibition should also be shown to be based on
some underlying fundamental and general issues of
public policy and not merely incidental to a particular
statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly
incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are
subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That
would convey the idea that statutory provisions override
a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of
expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under
Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete
justice” of a cause or matter, the Supreme Court will
take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive
statutory provision based on some fundamental
principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its
power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does
not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142,
but only to what is or is not “complete justice” of a cause
or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of
the exercise of the power. No question of lack of
jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.’
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14. In this regard, another Constitution Bench in Supreme
Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India opined : (SCC pp. 437-38,
para 56)
’56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which
emphasis has been placed by us from the Union
Carbide case, A.R. Antulay case and Delhi Judicial
Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, go to show that they
do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the
observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg
case. It is one thing to say that “prohibitions or limitations
in a statute” cannot come in the way of exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice
between the parties in the pending “cause or matter”
arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to
say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142,
this Court can altogether ignore the substantive
provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass
orders concerning an issue which can be settled only
through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This
Court did not say so in Union Carbide case either
expressly or by implication and on the contrary it has
been held that the Supreme Court will take note of the
express provisions of any substantive statutory law and
regulate the exercise of its power and discretion
accordingly. …’
15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that
the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union
of India, has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in
Antulay case or in Union Carbide Corpn. case with the
principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr.
Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the
legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate
that delay can be condoned for a further period not
exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain
underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as
has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case. As the
pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC, lays down
quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on
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the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to
expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be
aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an
appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation
within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and,
therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to
be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard
being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different
way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature,
when the statute commands that this Court may condone the
further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the
ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It
is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it
is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse
to Article 142 of the Constitution.
16. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to the
passage in Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Electricity
Deptt. There, the Court had referred to Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. It fundamentally relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v.
CCE, wherein the Court after referring to certain authorities,
analysed thus : (M.P. Steel Corpn. case, SCC p. 91, para
43)
’43. … when a certain period is excluded by applying the
principles contained in Section 14, there is no delay to
be attributed to the appellant and the limitation period
provided by the statute concerned continues to be the
stated period and not more than the stated period. We
conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section 14
which is a principle based on advancing the cause of
justice would certainly apply to exclude time taken in
prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with
due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a
decision on the merits of the case.’
(emphasis in original and supplied)
Similarly, in State v. Mushtaq Ahmad, this Court
opined that where minimum sentence is provided for an
offence then no court can impose lesser punishment on
ground of mitigating factors.
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18. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this
Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take
a different approach in the matter in reference to Article 226 of the
Constitution. The principle underlying the rejection of such argument
by this Court would apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd., which had
adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in
Panoli Intermediate (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and also of the
Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Co. v. CCE. The logic
applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these
decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31
of the 2005 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is
not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a
given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the
statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order
by way of writ petition on the ground that the same is without
jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction — by overstepping or
crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law
and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice,
where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such
a challenge and can also non-suit the petitioner on the ground that
alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the
writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner chooses to approach the
High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days
prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot
disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and
entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing
so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in ONGC. In other words, the fact
that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would
issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent
regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of
the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention
behind the stated provision otiose.
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22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that
case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument
that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the
assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of
maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature
of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the
extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31
of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is
incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of
fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such.
23. Arguendo, reverting to the factual matrix of the present case, it
is noticed that the respondent had asserted that it was not aware
about the passing of assessment order dated 21-6 2017 although it is
admitted that the same was served on the authorised representative
of the respondent on 22-6-2017. The date on which the respondent
became aware about the order is not expressly stated either in the
application for condonation of delay filed before the appellate
authority, the affidavit filed in support of the said application or for
that matter, in the memo of writ petition. On the other hand, it is seen
that the amount equivalent to 12.5% of the tax amount came to be
deposited on 12-9-2017 for and on behalf of respondent, without
filing an appeal and without any demur — after the expiry of statutory
period of maximum 60 days, prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005
Act. Not only that, the respondent filed a formal application under
Rule 60 of the 2005 Rules on 8-5-2018 and pursued the same in
appeal, which was rejected on 17-8-2018. Furthermore, the appeal in
question against the assessment order came to be filed only on 24-9
2018 without disclosing the date on which the respondent in fact
became aware about the existence of the assessment order dated
21-6-2017. On the other hand, in the affidavit of Mr Sreedhar Routh,
Site Director of the respondent Company (filed in support of the
application for condonation of delay before the appellate authority), it
is stated that the Company became aware about the irregularities
committed by its erring official (Mr P. Sriram Murthy) in the month of
July 2018, which presupposes that the respondent must have
become aware about the assessment order, at least in July 2018. In
the same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent Company was
not aware about the assessment order, as it was not brought to its
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notice by the employee concerned due to his negligence. The
respondent in the writ petition has averred that the appeal was
rejected by the appellate authority on the ground that it had no power
to condone the delay beyond 30 days, when in fact, the order
examines the cause set out by the respondent and concludes that
the same was unsubstantiated by the respondent. That finding has
not been examined by the High Court in the impugned judgment and
order at all, but the High Court was more impressed by the fact that
the respondent was in a position to offer some explanation about the
discrepancies in respect of the volume of turnover and that the
respondent had already deposited 12.5% of the additional amount in
terms of the previous order passed by it. That reason can have no
bearing on the justification for non-filing of the appeal within the
statutory period. Notably, the respondent had relied on the affidavit of
the Site Director and no affidavit of the employee concerned (P.
Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager-Finance) or at least the other
employee [Siddhant Belgaonker, Senior Manager (Finance)], who
was associated with the erring employee during the relevant period,
has been filed in support of the stand taken in the application for
condonation of delay. Pertinently, no finding has been recorded by
the High Court that it was a case of violation of principles of natural
justice or non-compliance of statutory requirements in any manner.
Be that as it may, since the statutory period specified for filing of
appeal had expired long back in August 2017 itself and the appeal
came to be filed by the respondent only on 24-9-2018, without
substantiating the plea about inability to file appeal within the
prescribed time, no indulgence could be shown to the respondent at
all.
25. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the High Court ought
not to have entertained the subject writ petition filed by the
respondent herein. The same deserved to be rejected at the
threshold.”
8. Even otherwise, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act is a
specific statute and a self-contained code. Section 107 of the Act has an
inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the applicability of the
Limitation Act. It is a trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will
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apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act
specifically provides for the limitation and in absence of any clause
condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed
period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the
above provision.
9. In the present case, the petitioner has come to this writ Court after
the limitation has expired for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Act
and obviously the writ petition cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that the delay cannot be condoned by this Court.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated
above, we find the writ petition to be not maintainable. The writ petition is
accordingly, dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Pending Application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
A.F.R.
APK/VK.
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