Jharkhand High Court
Md. Zahiruddin Aged About 81 Years Son Of … vs The State Of Jharkhand on 19 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A No.298 of 2025
1. Md. Zahiruddin aged about 81 years son of Late Gani Haidar
2. Shamim Akhtar aged about 55 years
3. Nayeem Akhtar aged about 52 years
4. Imtiyaz Akhtar aged about 50 years
5. Sohail Akhtar aged about 47 years
All sons of Late Md. Abubakar
All residents of Hathikhana, Doranda, P.O and P.S-Doranda, District-
Ranchi (Jharkhand) ...... Petitioners/Appellants
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
2. Secretary, Department of Registration, Government of Jharkhand
Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
3. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District
Ranchi.
4. District Land Acquisition Officer, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District
Ranchi. ......... Respondents/Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For the Resp-State of Jharkhand: Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr.SC-II
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Order No.09/Dated: 19th August, 2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
I.A. No.6885 of 2025
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay of 356 days in preferring
L.P.A No.298 of 2025.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the State, however, has vehemently
opposed the application for condonation of delay by submitting that there
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is delay of 356 days in preferring the present appeal and, as such, the
application for condonation of delay as also the instant appeal may be
dismissed.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the
pleadings made in the instant interlocutory application to assess as to
whether the reason so assigned in the application for condonation of delay
is to be considered to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 356
days.
4. We are conscious with the fact that the delay is to be condoned in
exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act
depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party seeking
condonation of delay.
5. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made
in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC
81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9
to 15 hereunder: –
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces
no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint
of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.
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However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v.
Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC
1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012
SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and
no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal
[(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v.
Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is
the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
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been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably
and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have expressed
at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes
of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property
v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5
SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating
and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be
a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
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condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
6. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is
bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath
Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan,
(1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157.
7. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
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particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,
(2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient
cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive
a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when
no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to
a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished
would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent
upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula
for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay
caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts
should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the
cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-
jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation
furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while
considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact
that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable
right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However,
by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the
explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are
high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the
case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party
against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction
and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision
on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass
upon the parties either way.”
8. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal
Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case,
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there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-
12, it has been held as hereunder:
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof
of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of
the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay.
This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the
party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope
of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after
sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it. In this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always
material and relevant when the court is dealing with
applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and
14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be
invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided
only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the
present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion
should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart
from the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack of
diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been
adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s
application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within
the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid
ground.”
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9. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause
for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether
it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a
right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to
look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part.
10. This Court adverting to the ground taken in the instant
interlocutory application as also come to the consideration as to whether
the ground shown for condoning the delay of 356 days can be said to be
sufficient cause or not.
11. Expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means
that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”.
12. The cause for condoning the delay has been shown in the
application for condonation of delay, particularly, paragraph nos.5, 6 and
7 of the instant interlocutory application.
13. It is pleaded that there were two original writ petitioners, namely,
Md. Abu Bakar and Md. Zahiruddin who were old aged person and
suffering from so many old age ailments and due to the said reason, the
present Letters Patent Appeal could not be filed in time.
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14. It has further been averred that after death of the original writ
petitioner no.1, namely, Md. Abu Bakar, who died on 18.08.2023 leaving
behind his sons/legal heirs, who have decided to file the present Letters
Patent Appeal after death of his father and, as such, the delay is occurred
which is not deliberately rather beyond the control of the legal heirs of the
original petitioner no.1.
15. As per the law laid down for condoning the delay that the issue
of limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken in hyper technically
manner, this Court is of the view that what has been stated in paragraph
nos.5, 6 and 7, therefore, cannot be said to be not having sufficient reason
being filing the appeal after delay of 356 days.
16. This Court, considering the reason assigned in paragraph nos. 5
6, and 7 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view that the
same is sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay of 356
days in filing the appeal.
17. Accordingly, I.A. No. 6885 of 2025 is allowed.
18. Consequently, the delay of 356 days in filing the present appeal
is hereby condoned.
I.A. No.1684 of 2025
19. The present interlocutory application has been filed for
substitution of the legal heirs of the original writ petitioner no.1, namely,
Md. Abu Bakar who died on 18.08.2023 leaving behind his sons/legal
heirs, who have been arrayed as appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters
Patent Appeal being L.P.A No.298 of 2025.
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20. The learned counsel for the respondent-State has raised no
objection to the same.
21. Accordingly, the application for substitution being I.A No.1684
of 2025 is hereby allowed.
22. Since, the substituted applicants/appellants have already been
arrayed as the appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters Patent Appeal
being L.P.A No.298 of 2025 and, as such, there is no need to make
necessary correction in the array of the appellant.
L.P.A No.298 of 2025
23. With the consent of both the parties, the matter is being heard on
merit.
24. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is
directed against the order dated 17.07.2023 passed in W.P(C) No.6576 of
2018 by which the learned Single Judge has declined to entertain the writ
petition on the ground of delay and laches and dismissed the said writ
petition whereby and wherein the original writ petitioners, who are the
successor in interest of the original Raiyat, have challenged the order
dated 30.09.2015 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi
who has declined either to pay compensation or to release the land in
favour of the original writ petitioners.
Factual Matrix
25. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ
petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:
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(i) It is pleaded that the lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463,1464
and 1470 under Khata No: 11 in Mouza-Hinoo measuring a total
area of 3.15 acres was recorded in the name of Sk. Akbar Ali,
son of Sk. Khuda Bux in the Revisional survey Records of right.
(ii) It is pleaded that Sk. Akbar Ali died leaving behind his legal heirs
including the petitioners.
(iii) It is pleaded that the petitioners are the legal heirs of Sk. Akbar
Ali. Upon death of Sk. Akbar Ali, the petitioners inherited right,
title and interest over the lands-in-question.
(iv) It is pleaded that by Memo No: 2584 dated 09.04.1943, several
pieces of lands including the plots-in-question were acquired for
the purpose of construction of Aerodrome, Ranchi.
(v) It is pleaded that although the construction of Ranchi Aerodrome
was completed, the but lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and
1464 under Khata No.11 remained unutilized, rather the same
fell beyond the boundary-wall of the Ranchi Aerodrome.
(vi) It is pleaded that in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule-
75/A (i) of the Defence of India Rules read with Notification
No.1336-OR/42 dated 25.04.1942 of the Government of India,
the then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi-cum-Collector
requisitioned the lands described in the schedule including the
lands appertaining to Plot No: 1463 and 1464.
(vii) It is pleaded that after completion of the Ranchi Aerodrome, the
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi prepared a list of such lands
which were declared surplus. The list of such lands includes the
lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and 1464 belonging to Sk.
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Akbar Ali, the ancestor of the petitioners. The petitioners could
obtain a plain copy of such list of the lands from the Office of the
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
(viii) It is pleaded that by letter No. 191 dated 29.04.1995, the Home
(Spl.) Department of the then Government of Bihar issued a
Guideline for verification of the concerned papers relating to the
lands requisitioned for the purpose of Aerodrome in the district
of Ranchi.
(ix) It is pleaded that by letter No: 314 dated 29.11.1995, the
respondent No.4 deputed Amin of land Acquisition Section,
Ranchi to submit a Status report of the aforesaid lands -in-
question.
(x) It is pleaded that one Anamika Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti
preferred a writ application for quashing the letter No.3080 dated
29.01.1996 whereby and whereunder the Station Commander
prohibited the said Samiti/Society from commencing any
construction work. The said writ application was registered as
C.W.J.C. No: 1024 of 1996 (R). While dismissing the said writ
application vide order dated 12.02.1999, this Hon’ble Court was
pleased to direct the respondents not to interfere with the
petitioner and other similarly situated persons who were having
right, title and possession over the lands except by obtaining an
order of Court of competent jurisdiction.
(xi) It is pleaded that although such status report was submitted by
the concerned Amin in respect of the plots of the petitioners, but
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neither any step was taken nor anything was communicated to
the petitioners.
(xii) It is pleaded that thereafter, by letter No. 46 dated 19.01.2009,
the Special Secretary, Revenue & Lands Reforms Department of
the Government of Jharkhand directed the respondent No.3 to
submit a report after enquiry in respect of the objections raised
by the petitioners. Even copy of the said letter was forwarded to
the petitioners.
(xiii) It is pleaded that on 16.06.2009, both the petitioners jointly made
a representation before the Governor, Jharkhand with copies to
the respondents concerned with a request to release their lands or
to pay compensation in lieu thereof. The copies of such
representation were served in the office of the concerned
respondents on 22.06.2009.
(xiv) It is pleaded that on 29.09.2011, the petitioners submitted a joint
representation before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector,
Ranchi requesting him either to pay price at the present market
rate or to release their lands.
(xv) It is pleaded that the lands appertaining to Plot Nos. 1463 and
1464 appertaining to Khata No: 11 were shown surplus after
completion of the Ranchi Aerodrome, still the lands of those
plots remain unused for decades and so far Plot No: 1470 is
concerned, it neither find place in the List of Plots under
requisition nor it has been used as such, and therefore, instead of
repeated requests and after having respective reports from the
concerned Amin and instead of specific direction issued from the
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office of the respondent No.2, no step has yet been taken by the
respondent No.3 and his subordinates and hence the petitioners
had been left with no option other than to invoke the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court for redressal
of their grievance in WP. (C) No: 410 of 2013.
(xvi) It is pleaded that by an order dated 21.10.2013, this Hon’ble
Court was pleased to dispose of W.P. (C) No: 410 of 2013
directing the respondent No:3 to pass order in accordance with
law on the representation forwarded to him within three months
from the date of receipt of the order and communicate the same
to the petitioners.
(xvii) It is pleaded that on 20.11.2013, the petitioner made a
representation before the respondent No:3 along with copy of the
order passed by this Hon’ble Court in W.P. (C) NO: 410 of 2013.
(xviii) It is pleaded that by letter issued under Memo No:306 dated
05.04.2014, the respondent No:4 asked the petitioners to appear
before him for hearing.
(xix) It is pleaded that accordingly, on 16.07.2014, both the petitioners
appeared before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi.
(xx) It is pleaded that subsequently, by letter No:97 dated 4.02.2015,
the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi requested the
Director, Indian Airport Authority, Birsa Munda Airport, Ranchi
to submit a report with regard to the land appertaining to Plot No:
1463, 1464and 1470 under Khata No:11 measuring an
area of 3.15 acres.
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(xxi) It is pleaded that by letter NC: 188 (11) – dated 27.02.2015, the
District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi issued a reminder to
the Director, Indian Airport Authority Birsa Munda Airport,
Ranchi.
(xxii) It is pleaded that ultimately, the petitioner had to prefer Cont.
Case (C) No:822 of 2016 in which on 25.01.2017, the respondent
No:4 filed a Show Cause enclosing therewith the order dated
30.09.2015.
(xxiii) It is pleaded that by an order dated 28.04.2017, Cont. Case (C)
No: 822 of 2016 was dropped with a liberty to the petitioner to
challenge the impugned order dated 30.09.2015.
(xxiv) It is pleaded that by the impugned Order dated 30.09.2015, the
respondent No:4 observed that the lands in-question was
acquired for the purpose of construction of Runway of the
Airport and the respondent No: 4 contacted the Director, Indian
Airport Authority, Ranchi who intimated that the said land has
been transferred in the name of the Airport Authority of India
and Compensation has been paid. On the basis of such
instructions, the respondent no. 4 purported to have observed
that the compensation amount might have been paid to the
ancestors of the petitioners and their claims have been rejected.
(xxv) It is pleaded that that no payment of compensation has been made
either to the ancestors of the petitioners or to them as alleged in
the impugned Order.
26. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached before this
Court by filing W.P(C) No.6576 of 2018.
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27. It is evident from the factual aspect that the land in question has
been claimed by the writ petitioners, who are the grand sons of the original
title holder by making the ground that the land in question although has
been acquired in 1943-44, but no compensation has been paid in favour of
the predecessors in interest of the original writ petitioners.
28. The claim was agitated before the District Land Acquisition
Officer, Ranchi who vide order dated 30.09.2015 has rejected to extend
the amount of compensation in favour of the predecessors in interest of the
writ petitioners.
29. The said order dated 30.09.2015 has been assailed by filing a writ
petition being W.P(C) No.6576 of 2018 before the learned Single Judge.
30. The learned Single Judge has considered the legality and
propriety of the said decision and came to a conclusion that that the land
having said to be acquired sometime in the year 1943-44, however, the
claim has been raised sometime in the year 2015, i.e., after delay of more
than 70 years.
31. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, gone into the principle
of applicability of the delay and laches and accordingly vide order dated
17.07.2023 dismissed the said writ petition, which is the subject matter of
the present appeal.
32. It needs to mention here that the original writ petitioner no. 1 had
died on 18.08.2023 i.e. after passing of the order by the learned Single
Judge leaving behind his sons/legal heirs, who have been arrayed as
appellant nos.2 to 5 in the present Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A
No.298 of 2025
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Submission on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioners:
33. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners/appellants has taken the following grounds:
(i)That the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the very
basic factor that the land although has been acquired by the State
to be handed over in favour of the Civil Aviation Authority for
the purpose of construction of Airport at Ranchi.
(ii) It has been contended that the compensation amount has
not been paid, rather the District Land Acquisition Officer,
Ranchi has come out with the reasoning in the impugned order
that no record has been found available and that led the District
Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi to reject such claim.
(iii) It has been contended that keeping the record is the
exclusive domain and bounded duty of the State and its authority
and if the same is not available, the same cannot be taken as a
ground to negate the claim for compensation.
34. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into
consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, but instead of considering
the same, the learned Single Judge has gone into the applicability of the
principle of delay and laches and, hence, the impugned order suffers from
error.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State:
35. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
State to defend the impugned order has raised the following grounds:
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(i) It has been contended that keeping the record is the exclusive
domain of the State and its functionary but it is also equally
applicable that the claim cannot be allowed to be agitated after a
long period of 70 years as the case herein is and that is the reason
the principle of delay and laches has been carved out by considering
the fact about the availability of the documents vis a vis the
approach of the litigants in approaching the Court of Law.
(ii) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge has, therefore,
taken the aforesaid ground and claim of the writ petitioners has been
rejected on the principle of delay and laches that too, without any
explanation.
36. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid grounds has
submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge needs no
interference and the present appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis:
37. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the
impugned judgment as also the relevant facts as available in the pleadings.
38. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the
ground of applicability of the principle of delay and laches, since, the claim
has been agitated by making an application before the District Land
Acquisition Officer, Ranchi sometime in the year 2014 pertaining to the
acquisition of the land of the year 1943-44.
39. The question of applicability of principle of delay and laches
since is the reason for dismissing the writ petition and, as such, this Court
is to consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
18
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
the principle of delay and laches will be applicable which has been made
applicable by the learned Single Judge can it be said to be justified?
40. The position of law is well settled that so far as the exercising of
the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned,
there is no issue of applicability of limitation, however, the delay and
laches is to be applied for the reason that since the writ jurisdiction is the
Court of equity and, as such, the litigant concerned being aggrieved be
expected to approach the Court within a reasonable period.
41. The further reason is that if the litigant is not conscious with his
right and after long period suddenly approaching the Court for redressal of
his grievance such benefit of extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to the
High Court is not to be made available to such litigant.
42. Further, there is no dispute of the proposition of law that the writ
court being the court of equity is to entertain the writ petition, if the writ
court is being approached within a reasonable period of time.
43. It is also equally settled that in the proceeding under Article 226
of the Constitution of India the principle of limitation is not applicable but
the delay and laches is applicable so that the court of equity may not be
approached after inordinate delay. Reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy
v. State of T.N.(1975) 1 SCC 152 wherein at para 2, their Lordship have
held as under:
“2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the second respondent
who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as
Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding
the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer
and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that
time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ19
2025:JHHC:24261-DBpetition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the
second respondent without considering the appellant’s case was
arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that
such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which
statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view
of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved
by it he should have approached the court even in the year 1957, after
the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result.
One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the court questioning
that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after
Respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the
head of the appellant he did not come to the court questioning it. There
was a third opportunity for him to have come to the court when
Respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers
over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the
tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the court.
In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for
the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should
have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The
conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. In
any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they
were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except
overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider
the appellant’s case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only
Respondent 2 but also Respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant’s
juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957, apparently on the ground
that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the
appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of
his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have
come to the court on every one of these three occasions. A person
aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should
approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of
such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the
courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can
never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the
passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise
exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their
extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do
not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow
things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale
claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner’s petition20
2025:JHHC:24261-DBshould, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such
petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the court
and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances
as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in
dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.”
44. In State of M.P. &Ors Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors reported in
(1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power
of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of
the petitioner in filing the writ petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle
of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit
a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction
because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the
justice. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment is being quoted as under:
24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an
appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary
and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If
there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ
petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court
may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised
upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction
because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may
intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an21
2025:JHHC:24261-DBimportant factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it
necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions
of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where
there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are
created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to
interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or
illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court
one in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of
India [(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR Page 9
1014] and the other in Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector [(1980) 1 SCC
180 : AIR 1980 SC 112 : (1980) 1 SCR 491] . We may point out that
in R.D. Shetty case, even though the State action was held to be
unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this
Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ
petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the
acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that
period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure,
aggregating to about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting
up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or
delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for
there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party
rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere
and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of
justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to
interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their
very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter
within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesis every discretion must
be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat
it.
45. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal
Council v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 by referring to the judgment
rendered in Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 524 has
observed that although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing
a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily,
writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.
22
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
46. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid settled proposition of law
that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside.
A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is
exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.
47. Further, this Court is conscious with the fact that being a
constitutional Court, it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when
an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to
scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.
48. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but,
in most circumstances, inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic
norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and
second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay
does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
49. The law is well-settled that if no claim has been raised fairly
within the reasonable period, then such litigation is not to be reopened on
the principle of applicability of delay and latches. However, it is equally
settled that all the delay and laches will not fatal to entertain the writ
petition, if the delay caused in preferring the writ petition has sufficiently
been explained, then certainly the writ petition is to be entertained.
23
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
50. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court
is now adverting to the factual aspect of the case. The land in question has
been said to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sometime
in the year 1943-44. The original land owners have not raised any litigation
by filing any application before the concerned authority.
51. This Court has posed a pin pointed question to the learned
counsel appearing for the appellants whether there is any averment in the
pleadings regarding the reference of issuance of notice under section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
52. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted
that no such instruction is available with him and that is the reason no such
statement has been made even before the writ Court or even in the present
memo of appeal.
53. The question therefore is that when the litigant himself is not
knowing that as to whether notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 has been issued or not, how can they claim amount
of compensation that too, being claimed by the successor in interest after
delay of about more than 70 years of the acquisition as per the pleadings.
54. The acquisition is only to be made on the basis of the statutory
provision and at that time only one provision was available, i.e., the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 which provides the provision from the stage of
issuance of notice under section 4, the objection under section 5, its
consideration under section 6 and thereafter the declaration under section
11 and then award under section 17 of the said provision.
55. This Court, in absence of any document either notice under
section 4 or objection under section 5 or even an award under section 17
24
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
of the Act and in absence of any statement to that effect in the pleading, is
of the view that if in such premise the principle of delay and laches has
been held applicable by the learned Single Judge the same cannot be said
to suffer from an error.
56. The substituted writ petitioners/appellants since have agitated the
claim before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi and, as such, it
was the bounded duty of the applicant therein to bring all the facts in the
notice of the District Land Acquisition Officer.
57. The argument which has been advanced on behalf of the learned
counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners that the document is to be kept
in the custody of the authority.
58. There is no denial of the said fact, but it is also not possible to
keep all the documents of the period of more than 70-80 years and if the
writ petitioners or the predecessor in interest has not approached to the
Court within a reasonable period, then it is not available for such litigant
to put claim upon the State functionary and, therefore, the principle of
delay and laches, in such circumstances, is having bearing.
59. The Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of disbursement of amount
of compensation has rendered judgment wherein the compensation was
sought for after lapse of 21 years and in those circumstances, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has dismissed the application on the ground that after 21 years
no direction can be passed for making payment of the amount of
compensation, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead)
through Lrs. and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others [(2019) 15 SCC
25
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
33] wherein at paragraph at para-7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which
reads hereunder as:
“7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches
and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right
not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no
limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain
proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches
and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the
litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable
explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those
cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the
action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought
within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and
cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over,
however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is
a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed
period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may
condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation
is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of
limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period
of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that
case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the
cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and
every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not
properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a
case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient
cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within
the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross
negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings
within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be
denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on
the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced
with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable
to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a
long time then such right is non-existent.”
60. It is evident from the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Baljeet Singh (supra) which was a case for seeking a
26
2025:JHHC:24261-DB
direction for compensation in lieu of acquisition of land and the Hon’ble
Apex Court has declined to condone the delay of 21 years.
61. This Court, after having discussed the factual as well as the legal
issues and after going through the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge has found that the learned Single Judge has given its finding on the
basis of the applicability of the principle of delay and laches in view of the
fact that the land, as per the admitted case of the appellants/writ petitioners
was acquired sometime in the year 1943-44.
62. The learned Single Judge has given the finding of applicability
of the principle of delay and laches by putting reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Apex Court which have been recorded in the findings of
the learned Single Judge at paragraph no.6, 7 8 and 9, for ready reference
the same are being quoted hereunder as:
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs.
Dugal Kumar” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 295 has held as under:
24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner,
there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the
appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of
the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an
appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the
grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner
invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the
motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to
exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.
7. In the case of “Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan”
reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the
applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out
in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports27
2025:JHHC:24261-DB[(1969) 1 SCC 185]. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “City and Industrial
Development Corpn. Vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors.“, reported
in (2009) 1 SCC 168, held as under:
26. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High
Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of
mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed
as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the
person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained
delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a
writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is
that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not
encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters
where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the
interregnum.
9. In the case of “Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of U.P & Another” reported
in (2011) 15 SCC 383, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ
petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking
directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not
uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands
voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the
community as for example, construction of an access road to the
village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a
bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for
such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible
value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on
account of passage of time or on account of developments or
improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up
with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without
acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are
made after several decades, the State would be at a
disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records
to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated
and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated
writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are
liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may.”
63. This Court, after considering the judgment rendered by Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (supra) as also considering the
fact that the learned Single Judge has also given the finding of applicability
of the principle of delay and laches the claim for compensation has been
filed after lapse of 70 years, which is admittedly after inordinate delay, that
too without explanation, is of the view that the order passed by the learned
Single Judge requires no interference.
28
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64. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the view that
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge needs no interference.
65. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and, as such, L.P.A No.298
of 2025 stands dismissed.
66. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Sudhir
AFR
29
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