Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Mohini Biswas vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 6 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 2073 of 2022
With
CRAN 2 of 2023
Mohini Biswas
-Vs-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sukanta Chakraborty,
Mr. Roomyadip Saha.
For the State : Mr. S.S.Imam,
Mr. Arabinda Manna.
Hearing concluded on : 10.12.2024
Judgment on : 06.01.2025
2
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of proceeding in Special Case No. 25/22 pending before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Barasat, North 24-
Parganas and the Charge Sheet being No. 292/22 dated 2/5/2022 under
Section 323/341/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 and Section 3 of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 arising out of Titagarh P.S. Case No. 172/22 dated 5.3.2022
under Section 341/323/325/379/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. The petitioner’s case is that she is the third wife of Ranajit Das. The
complainant herein being the opposite party no. 2 is the first wife of
the said Ranajit Das.
3. The present case has been initiated by the first wife of the Ranajit
Das wherein it has been alleged as follows :-
“………That on 27/01/2022 at about 9;00 A.M.
while your complainant‟s daughter was passing
by lift to buy some groceries items nearby the
residence of your complainant, then the above
named accused person reached came in front
the lift and started to shout at the complainant‟s
daughter in a very aggressive manner and not
only that the accused person assault the
complainant‟s daughter with slaps and also to
threatened the complainant‟s daughter that she
will implicate her father i.e. the complainant‟s
husband in some false cases again….”
4. It is further alleged that hearing hue and cry the complainant and
witnesses came to the spot and rescued the complainant’s daughter
3
from the clutches of the above named accused person/petitioner herein
and thereafter the accused person also allegedly told to the complainant
“Tora Nichu Jatir Log besi kotha bolbena, tora nich niche thakbi”.
Not only that the accused person allegedly threatened the complainant
that she will kidnap the complainant’s daughter and traffic her for
prostitution.
5. The State has placed the case diary.
6. Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989, lays down as follows:-
“3. Punishments for offences atrocities:-
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,–
(a) puts any inedible or obnoxious substance into
the mouth of a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe or forces such member to
drink or eat such inedible or obnoxious
substance;
(b) dumps excreta, sewage, carcasses or any
other obnoxious substance in premises, or at the
entrance of the premises, occupied by a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;
(c) with intent to cause injury, insult or
annoyance to any member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, dumps excreta, waste
matter, carcasses or any other obnoxious
substance in his neighbourhood;
(d) garlands with footwear or parades naked or
semi-naked a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe;
(e) forcibly commits on a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe any act, such as
removing clothes from the person, forcible
tonsuring of head, removing moustaches,
4painting face or body or any other similar act,
which is derogatory to human dignity;
(f) wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land,
owned by, or in the possession of or allotted to,
or notified by any competent authority to be
allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, or gets such land transferred;
(g) wrongfully dispossesses a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his
land or premises or interferes with the enjoyment
of his rights, including forest rights, over any
land or premises or water or irrigation facilities
or destroys the crops or takes away the produce
therefrom.
Explanation.–For the purposes of clause (f) and
this clause, the expression “wrongfully” includes-
(A) against the person’s will;
(B) without the person’s consent;
(C) with the person’s consent, where such
consent has been obtained by putting the
person, or any other person in whom the person
is interested in fear of death or of hurt; or
(D) fabricating records of such land;
(h) makes a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe to do “begar” or other forms of
forced or bonded labour other than any
compulsory service for public purposes imposed
by the Government;
(i) compels a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe to dispose or carry human or
animal carcasses, or to dig graves;
(j) makes a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe to do manual scavenging or
employs or permits the employment of such
member for such purpose;
(k) performs, or promotes dedicating a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe woman to a deity,
idol, object of worship, temple, or other religious
institution as a deva dasi or any other similar
practice or permits aforementioned acts;
5
(l) forces or intimidates or prevents a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe–
(A) not to vote or to vote for a particular
candidate or to vote in a manner other than that
provided by law;
(B) not to file a nomination as a candidate or to
withdraw such nomination; or
(C) not to propose or second the nomination of a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe as a candidate in any election;
(m) forces or intimidates or obstructs a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, who
is a member or a Chairperson or a holder of any
other office of a Panchayat under Part IX of the
Constitution or a Municipality under Part IXA of
the Constitution, from performing their normal
duties and functions;
(n) after the poll, causes hurt or grievous hurt or
assault or imposes or threatens to impose social
or economic boycott upon a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or
prevents from availing benefits of any public
service which is due to him;
(o) commits any offence under this Act against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe for having voted or not having voted for a
particular candidate or for having voted in a
manner provided by law;
(p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or
criminal or other legal proceedings against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe;
(q) gives any false or frivolous information to any
public servant and thereby causes such public
servant to use his lawful power to the injury or
annoyance of a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe;
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view;
6
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place
within public view;
(t) destroys, damages or defiles any object
generally known to be held sacred or in high
esteem by members of the Scheduled Castes or
the Scheduled Tribes.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this clause, the
expression “object” means and includes statue,
photograph and portrait;
(u) by words either written or spoken or by signs
or by visible representation or otherwise
promotes or attempts to promote feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill-will against members of the
Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes;
(v) by words either written or spoken or by any
other means disrespects any late person held in
high esteem by members of the Scheduled
Castes or the Scheduled Tribes;
(w) (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging
to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, when such act of touching
is of a sexual nature and is without the
recipients consent;
(ii) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual
nature towards a woman belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing
that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe.
Explanation.–For the purposes of sub-clause (i),
the expression “consent” means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the person by words,
gestures, or any form of non-verbal
communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific act:
Provided that a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe who does not offer
physical resistance to any act of a sexual nature
is not by reason only of that fact, is to be
regarded as consenting to the sexual activity:
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Provided further that a woman’s sexual history,
including with the offender shall not imply
consent or mitigate the offence;
(x) corrupts or fouls the water of any spring,
reservoir or any other source ordinarily used by
members of the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes so as to render it less fit for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used;
(y) denies a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe any customary right of passage
to a place of public resort or obstructs such
member so as to prevent him from using or
having access to a place of public resort to which
other members of public or any other section
thereof have a right to use or access to;
(z) forces or causes a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to leave his house,
village or other place of residence:
Provided that nothing contained in this clause
shall apply to any action taken in discharge of a
public duty;
(za) obstructs or prevents a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any
manner with regard to–
(A) using common property resources of an area,
or burial or cremation ground equally with others
or using any river, stream, spring, well, tank,
cistern, water-tap or other watering place, or any
bathing ghat, any public conveyance, any road,
or passage;
(B) mounting or riding bicycles or motor cycles or
wearing footwear or new clothes in public places
or taking out wedding procession, or mounting a
horse or any other vehicle during wedding
processions;
(C) entering any place of worship which is open
to the public or other persons professing the
same religion or taking part in, or taking out, any
religious, social or cultural processions
including jatras;
(D) entering any educational institution, hospital,
dispensary, primary health centre, shop or place
of public entertainment or any other public place;
8
or using any utensils or articles meant for public
use in any place open to the public; or
(E) practicing any profession or the carrying on of
any occupation, trade or business or employment
in any job which other members of the public, or
any section thereof, have a right to use or have
access to;
(zb) causes physical harm or mental agony of a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe on the allegation of practicing witchcraft or
being a witch; or
(zc) imposes or threatens a social or economic
boycott of any person or a family or a group
belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months but
which may extend to five years and with fine.]
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,–
(i) gives or fabricates false evidence intending
thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that
he will thereby cause, any member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to be
convicted of an offence which is capital by the
law for the time being in force shall be punished
with imprisonment for life and with fine; and if
an innocent member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe be convicted and executed in
consequence of such false or fabricated evidence,
the person who gives or fabricates such false
evidence, shall be punished with death;
(ii) gives or fabricates false evidence intending
thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that
he will thereby cause, any member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe to be
convicted of an offence which is not capital but
punishable with imprisonment for a term of
seven years or upwards, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than six months but which may extend to
seven years or upwards and with fine;
9
(iii) commits mischief by fire or any explosive
substance intending to cause or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby cause damage to any
property belonging to a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than six months but which may extend to
seven years and with fine;
(iv) commits mischief by fire or any explosive
substance intending to cause or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby cause destruction of
any building which is ordinarily used as a place
of worship or as a place for human dwelling or
as a place for custody of the property by a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe, shall be punishable with imprisonment for
life and with fine;
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment
for a term of ten years or more against a person
or property 2[knowing that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe or such property belongs to such member],
shall be punishable with imprisonment for life
and with fine;
3[(va) commits any offence specified in the
Schedule, against a person or property, knowing
that such person is a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property
belongs to suchmember, shall be punishable
with such punishment as specified under the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences
and shall also be liable to fine;]
(vi) knowingly or having reason to believe that an
offence has been committed under this Chapter,
causes any evidence of the commission of that
offence to disappear with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment, or
with that intention gives any information
respecting the offence which he knows or
believes to be false, shall be punishable with the
punishment provided for that offence; or
(vii) being a public servant, commits any offence
under this section, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
10
than one year but which may extend to the
punishment provided for that offence.”
7. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2011, the Supreme Court held that:-
“9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties
at some length, we are of the opinion that two
questions fall for our consideration in the present
appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can
be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings
arising out of a „noncompoundable offence? If
yes, then whether the power to quash
proceedings can be extended to offences arising
out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?
10. So far as the first question is concerned, it
would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent
decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal
& Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1999)5 SCC 238, wherein, a two Judge Bench
of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V.
Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted
with an identical question. Answering in the
affirmative, it has been clarified that the
jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C
cannot be construed as a proscription against
the invocation of inherent powers vested in this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on
the powers of the High Courts under Section
482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the
touchstone for exercising the extraordinary
powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this
Court or the High Court, as the case may be,
after having given due regard to the nature of the
offence and the fact that the victim/complainant
has willingly entered into a
settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings
in exercise of their respective
constitutional/inherent powers.
11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further
postulated that criminal proceedings involving
nonheinous offences or offences which are
predominantly of a private nature, could be set
11
aside at any stage of the proceedings, including
at the appellate level. The Court, however, being
conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders
may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by
securing a compromise through brute force,
threats, bribes, or other such unethical and
illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a
settlement is struck postconviction, the Courts
should, interalia, carefully examine the fashion
in which the compromise has been arrived at, as
well as, the conduct of the accused before and
after the incident in question. While concluding,
the Court also formulated certain guidelines and
held:
“19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such
powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised
carefully in the context of quashing criminal
proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and
effect of the offence on the conscious of the
society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any;
(iii) Voluntary nature of compromise
between the accused and the victim; & (iv)
Conduct of the accused persons, prior to
and after the occurrence of the purported
offence and/or other relevant
considerations.”
[Emphasis Applied]
12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we
affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal
(Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this
Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash
a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary
compromise between the complainant/victim and
the accused.
13. We, however, put a further caveat that the
powers under Article 142 or under Section
482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction
matters only where an appeal is pending before
one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the
premise that an order of conviction does not
attain finality till the accused has exhausted
his/her legal remedies and the finality is sub-
judice before an appellate court. The pendency of
legal proceedings, be that may before the final
Court, is sinequanon to involve the superior
12
court‟s plenary powers to do complete justice.
Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post
the attainment of all legal remedies, the
annulment of proceedings on the basis of a
compromise would be impermissible. Such an
embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused
from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a
settlement/compromise will always be loaded
with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We
have already clarified that the purpose of these
extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any
hollowhearted agreements between the accused
and the victim but to do complete justice by
effecting genuine settlement(s).
14. With respect to the second question before
us, it must be noted that even though the powers
of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far-
reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a
vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any
restrictions contained therein, cannot be
constructed as a limitation on the Court‟s power
to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to
say that this Court can altogether ignore the
statutory provisions or other express prohibitions
in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note
of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the
use of its power and discretion accordingly. The
Constitution Bench decision in the case of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India
& Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409 ¶ 48, has
eloquently clarified this point as follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any
cause or matter pending before it”. The very
nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except
perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by
“ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter
before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is
well recognised and established that this Court
has always been a law maker and its role
13travels beyond merely disputesettling. It is a
“problemsolver in the nebulous areas” (see K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655
: 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive
statutory provisions dealing with the subject-
matter of a given case cannot be altogether
ignored by this Court, while making an order
under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional
powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any
statutory provisions but at the same time these
powers are not meant to be exercised when their
exercise may come directly in conflict with what
has been expressly provided for in a statute
dealing expressly with the subject.”
15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences
arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST
Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its
approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically
enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation
and harassment against members of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a
recognition of the depressing reality that despite
undertaking several measures, the Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be
subjected to various atrocities at the hands of
uppercastes. The Courts have to be mindful of
the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in
view the express constitutional safeguards
enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the
Constitution, with a twinfold objective of
protecting the members of these vulnerable
communities as well as to provide relief and
rehabilitation to the victims of castebased
atrocities.
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the
Court that the offence in question, although
covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private
or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence
has not been committed on account of the caste
of the victim, or where the continuation of the
legal proceedings would be an abuse of the
process of law, the Court can exercise its powers
to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when
considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of
a compromise/settlement, if the Court is
satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act
would not be contravened or diminished even if
14
the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere
fact that the offence is covered under a „special
statute‟ would not refrain this Court or the High
Court, from exercising their respective powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section
482 Cr.P.C.
17. Adverting to the case in hand, we note
that the present Appellant has been
charged and convicted under the
unamended Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST
Act7, which was as follows:
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,–
xxxx
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent
to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
xxxx”
18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as
the present, the Courts ought to be even more
vigilant to ensure that the complainant victim
has entered into the compromise on the volition
of his/her free will and not on account of any
duress. It cannot be understated that since
members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our
country, they are more prone to acts of coercion,
and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level
of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of
compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the
accused party. What factors the Courts should
consider, would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
19. Having considered the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case in light of the
aforestated principles, as well as having
meditated on the application for compromise, we
are inclined to invoke the powers under Article
142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedings
with the sole objective of doing complete justice
15
between the parties before us. We say so for the
reasons that:
Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x)
of the SC/ST is to deter castebased insults and
intimidations when they are used with the
intention of demeaning a victim on account of
he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case,
the record manifests that there was an
undeniable preexisting civil dispute between the
parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very
beginning, has been that the alleged abuses
were uttered solely on account of frustration and
anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the
genesis of the deprecated incident was the afore-
stated civil/property dispute. Considering this
aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be
incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one
being overarchingly private in nature, having
only subtle undertones of criminality, even
though the provisions of a special statute have
been attracted in the present case.”
8. In the present case, the allegations (if any) were made not with the
intent to humiliate based on caste identity nor made in a public
place. No member of the public was admittedly present. Thus, there
was no witness to the said incident.
9. There is no material on record to show the presence of any ingredient
to make out a prima facie case in respect of any of the offences
alleged against the petitioner herein.
10. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Sahu Vs The State Of
Chhattisgarh., Criminal Appeal No(S). of 2024, (Arising out of
SLP(Crl.) No(s). 6367 of 2023), it was held:-
“9. We have gone through the FIR and the sworn
testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant as
extracted in the judgments of the High Court as
16well as that of the trial Court. The case as
projected in the FIR and the sworn testimony of
the prosecutrix would reveal that the
prosecutrix/complainant was engaged for doing
household jobs in the house of the accused
appellant who tried to outrage her modesty while
the prosecutrix/complainant was doing the
household chores. Apparently thus, even from
the highest allegations of the prosecutrix, the
offending act was not committed by the accused
with the intention that he was doing so upon a
person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. This
issue was dealt with by this Court in the case
of Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of
Maharashtra1 wherein it was held as below:-
“9. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that
whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence
under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
against a person or property on the ground that
such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to
such member, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for life and with fine. In the
present case, there is no evidence at all to the
effect that the appellant committed the offence
alleged against him on the ground that the
deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of
Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that
the victim should be a person who belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that
the offence under the Penal Code, 1860 is
committed against him on the basis that such a
person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such
ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of
the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we
think, both the trial court and the High Court
missed the essence of this aspect. In these
circumstances, the conviction under the
aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as
by the High Court ought to be set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In the said judgment, this Court dealt with a
case involving offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the
17
SC/ST Act. The language of Section 3(1)(xi) of the
SC/ST Act is pari materia as the same also
provides that the offence must be committed
upon a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes with the intention that it was
being done on the ground of caste.”
11. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). ……… of 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the Supreme Court
held:-
“15. This Court has an occasion to consider the
ambit and scope of the power of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal
proceedings in Vineet Kumar and Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017)
13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It
may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of
the above judgment where the following was
stated:
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present
case it is necessary to consider the ambit and
scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC
saves the inherent power of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined the
scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC and laid down several
principles which govern the exercise of
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC
699 held that the High Court is entitled to quash
a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought
to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the
following has been stated :
18
„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding
if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a
court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests and the like would justify the
High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher
than the ends of mere law though justice has got
to be administered according to laws made by
the legislature. The compelling necessity for
making these observations is that without a
proper realisation of the object and purpose of
the provision which seeks to save the inherent
powers of the High Court to do justice, between
the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction.‟
41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and
object of advancement of justice. In case solemn
process of Court is sought to be abused by a
person with some oblique motive, the Court has
to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The
Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the
case falls in one of the categories as illustratively
enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Judicial
process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be
allowed to be converted into an instrument of
operation or harassment. When there are
materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fides and
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7
as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
19Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which is to the
following effect :
„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fides and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge.‟ Above Category
7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present
case. Although, the High Court has noted the
judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not advert to the
relevant facts of the present case, materials on
which final report was submitted by the IO. We,
thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit
case where the High Court ought to have
exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
and quashed the criminal proceedings.”
16. The exposition of law on the subject relating
to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent
power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled
and to the possible extent, this Court has defined
sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised. This Court has
held in para 102 in State of Haryana and
Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992
Supp. (1) 335 as under :
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
20
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
21
17. The principles culled out by this Court have
consistently been followed in the recent
judgment of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online
SC 315.”
12. The parties are the first and third wife of Ranjit Das. Thus there
is a personal/private dispute between them. There are no
witnesses to the alleged incident.
13. The present case falls under category 1, 3 and 7 of Para 102 of
Bhajan Lal (Supra).
14. The Supreme Court in Deepak Gaba and Ors. vs State of Uttar
Pradesh and Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, on
January 02, 2023, held:-
“21. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
assertions made in the complaint and the pre-
summoning evidence led by respondent no. 2 –
complainant fail to establish the conditions and
incidence of the penal liability set out under
Sections 405, 420, and 471 of the IPC, as the
allegations pertain to alleged breach of contractual
obligations. Pertinently, this Court, in a number
of cases, has noticed attempts made by
parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal
courts, by filing vexatious criminal
complaints by camouflaging allegations
which were ex facie outrageous or pure civil
claims. These attempts are not be entertained
and should be dismissed at the threshold. To
avoid prolixity, we would only like to refer to the
judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited and
Others v. K.M. Johny (2011) 13 SCC 412, as it
refers to earlier case laws in copious detail. In
Thermax Limited and Others (Supra), it was
pointed that the court should be watchful of the
difference between civil and criminal wrongs,
though there can be situations where the
allegations may constitute both civil and criminal
22wrongs. The court must cautiously examine the
facts to ascertain whether they only constitute a
civil wrong, as the ingredients of criminal wrong
are missing. A conscious application of the said
aspects is required by the Magistrate, as a
summoning order has grave consequences of
setting criminal proceedings in motion. Even though
at the stage of issuing process to the accused the
Magistrate is not required to record detailed
reasons, there should be adequate evidence on
record to set the criminal proceedings into motion.
The requirement of Section 204 of the Code is that
the Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the
evidence brought on record. He/she may even put
questions to complainant and his/her witnesses
when examined under Section 200 of the Code to
elicit answers to find out the truth about the
allegations. Only upon being satisfied that there is
sufficient ground for summoning the accused to
stand the trial, summons should be issued.
Summoning order is to be passed when the
complainant discloses the offence, and when there
is material that supports and constitutes essential
ingredients of the offence. It should not be passed
lightly or as a matter of course. When the violation
of law alleged is clearly debatable and doubtful,
either on account of paucity and lack of clarity of
facts, or on application of law to the facts, the
Magistrate must ensure clarification of the
ambiguities. Summoning without appreciation of
the legal provisions and their application to the
facts may result in an innocent being summoned to
stand the prosecution/trial. Initiation of prosecution
and summoning of the accused to stand trial, apart
from monetary loss, sacrifice of time, and effort to
prepare a defence, also causes humiliation and
disrepute in the society. It results in anxiety of
uncertain times.
24. We must also observe that the High Court,
while dismissing the petition filed under Section
482 of the Code, failed to take due notice that
criminal proceedings should not be allowed to be
initiated when it is manifest that these proceedings
have been initiated with ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance and with a view to spite the opposite
side due to private or personal grudge. Allegations
in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence
on record, when taken on the face value and
23accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence
alleged. The inherent powers of the court can and
should be exercised in such circumstances. When
the allegations in the complaint are so absurd or
inherently improbable, on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient wrong for proceeding against
the accused, summons should not be issued.”
15. Thus keeping in mind the judgments of the Supreme Court, the
materials in the present case in respect of the petitioner, do not make
out a prima facie case against the petitioner of committing offences as
alleged and as such permitting the case to proceed would amount to
abuse of the process of law/court. Accordingly, in the interest of
justice, the proceedings in this case is liable to be quashed.
16. CRR 2073 of 2022 is thus allowed.
17. The proceeding in Special Case No. 25/22 pending before the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Barasat, North 24-Parganas and
the Charge Sheet being No. 292/22 dated 2/5/2022 under Section
323/341/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 and Section 3 of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act ,
1989 arising out of Titagarh P.S. Case No. 172/22 dated 5.3.2022 under
Section 341/323/325/379/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioner
namely Mohini Biswas.
18. There will be no order as to costs.
24
19. All connected Application stand disposed of.
20. Interim order if any stands vacated.
21. Copy of this judgment be sent to the Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
22. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)