Ramswaroop And Anr vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:1905) on 10 January, 2025

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Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Ramswaroop And Anr vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:1905) on 10 January, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:1905]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                    S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 870/2014

1. Ramswaroop S/o Late Shri Ramuram, B/c Prajapat, R/o Gali
No.9, Bhurtiya Dadhich Colony, Soorsagar, Jodhpur.
2. Smt. Koyli @ Kaushalya Devi W/o Late Shri Ramuram, B/c
Prajapat, R/o Gali No.9, Bhurtiya Dadhich Colony, Soorsagar,
Jodhpur.

                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
State of Rajasthan
                                                                   ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. Rajendra Choudhary
For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Narendra Gehlot, PP with
                                  Mr. OP Choudhary



          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

Judgment

10/01/2025

Instant criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been

filed by the appellants challenging the judgment dated 21.11.2014

passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Prevention of Women

Atrocities, Jodhpur Metropolitan, in Sessions Case No.89/2013 by

which the learned trial court convicted the appellants for offence

under Section 498A IPC and sentenced them to undergo three

years SI along with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of

fine to further undergo two months SI.

Brief facts of the case are that on 09.12.2010, complainant

Santosh Kumar submitted a first information report at Police

Station Soorsagar to the effect that two years ago, marriage of his

sister Akta was solemnized with appellant No.1 Ramswaroop. After

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the marriage, the accused-appellants started harassing the

complainant’s sister for bringing less dowry. The complainant

further alleged that on 09.12.2010, the accused appellants

murdered his sister Akta for dowry. On the said complaint, Police

registered an FIR against the accused appellants and started

investigation.

On completion of investigation, the police filed the challan for

offence under Sections 304B & 498A IPC. Thereafter, the trial

court framed the charge against the accused-appellants, who

denied the charges and claimed trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as sixteen witnesses and also exhibited certain documents.

Thereafter, statements of the accused-appellants were recorded

under section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, three witnesses were

produced by the appellants.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide

impugned judgment dated 21.11.2014 convicted and sentenced

the accused-appellants for offence under Section 498A of IPC.

Hence, this criminal appeal.

Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted a custody report

dated 04.11.2022 received from the Central Jail, Jodhpur,

according to which, the appellant No.1 Ramswaroop has already

served total sentence of three years and has been released from

jail. The said report is hereby taken on record.

Since the appellant No.1 has already served the total

sentence of three years and has already been released from jail,

therefore, the criminal appeal qua appellant No.1 Ramswaroop is

dismissed.

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[2025:RJ-JD:1905] (3 of 7) [CRLA-870/2014]

So far as appellant No.2 is concerned, counsel submits that

she is a lady, aged about 75 years and she remained in custody

for some time and she has no other criminal antecedents and she

has been sentenced to three years imprisonment for offence under

Section 498A IPC, therefore, appellant No.2 may be granted

benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. To

buttress his contentions, counsel has relied upon the judgment of

this Court in the case of Dalla Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan

[2022 (2) Cr.LR (Raj.)].

Learned counsel for the accused-appellants however, makes

a limited prayer that the accused-appellant No.2 may be granted

benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

“4. Power of court to release certain offenders on
probation of good conduct.– (1) When any person is
found guilty of having committed an offence not
punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the
court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion
that, having regard to the circumstances of the case
including the nature of the offence and the character of
the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of
good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force, the court
may, instead of sentencing him at once to any
punishment direct that he be released on his entering into
a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive
sentence when called upon during such period, not
exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the
meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:

Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an
offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his
surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular
occupation in the place over which the court exercises
jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during
the period for which he enters into the bond.

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[2025:RJ-JD:1905] (4 of 7) [CRLA-870/2014]

(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the
court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of
the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3)…

(4)…

(5)… ”

On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the

appeal and submits that looking to the overall facts and

circumstances of the case and the well reasoned speaking order

passed by the learned court below, the accused-appellant No.2 is

not entitled for any indulgence by this Court.

Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the

record of the case.

In Arvind Mohan Sinha Vs. Amulya Kumar Biswas (1974) 4

SCC, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-

The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure
and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if
spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully
rehabilitated in society.

In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so
that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the
hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who
strays into the path of crime ought, in the interest of
society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not
always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may
lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and
poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the
importance of environmental influence in the commission
of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender
can be reformed and rehabilitated in society.”

In Brij Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan RLW 2022 Raj 945, a

Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under:-

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“Under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act nature
of offence is one of the major-criteria for determining
whether benefit of this provision should be given to the
concerned offender or not. His age would be another
relevant factor and the circumstance in which the offence
was committed may be 3rd important consideration… ”

In Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 198,

while reiterating the ratio decidendi laid down in Dalbir Singh Vs.

State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82, the Hon’ble Apex Court

observed as under:

“… The Court has further opined that though the
discretion as been vested in the court to decide when and
how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision
itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the
convicted person on probation of good conduct must
appear to the Court to be expedient…”

In Lakhvir Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab and Ors.

(2021) 2 SCC 763 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court of India, with

regard to the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

vis-a-vis those Acts wherein a minimum sentence of imprisonment

has been prescribed by the legislature, observed as under:-

“Even though, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PC
Act
‘) prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for
not less than 1 year, an exception was carved out keeping
in mind the application of the Act. In Ishar Das (supra),
this Court noted that if the object of the legislature was
that the Act does not apply to all cases where a minimum
sentence of imprisonment is prescribed, there was no
reason to specifically provide an exception for Section
5(2)
of the PC Act. The fact that Section 18 of the Act
does not include any other such offences where a
mandatory minimum sentence has been prescribed
suggests that the Act may be invoked in such other
offences. A more nuanced interpretation on this aspect
was given in CCE v. Bahubali (1979) 2 SCC 279. It was
opined that the Act may not apply in cases where a

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specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory
minimum sentence, and the law contains a non-obstante
clause. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case
of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special
legislation enacted after the Act.5 It is in this context, it
was observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das
(Supra
) that the court cannot award a sentence less than
the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. We
are of the view that the corollary to the aforesaid legal
decisions ends with a conclusion that the benefit of
probation under the said Act is not excluded by the
provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence Under
Section 397 of Indian Penal Code, the offence in the
present case.
In fact, the observation made in Joginder
Singh v. State of Punjab ILR (1981) P & H 1 are in the
same context.”

This Court observes that there is no material on record that

the accused-appellant No.2 has any criminal antecedents. Thus,

this Court, after taking into due consideration the legislative intent

of the Act and the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

Arvind Mohan (supra), Mohd. Hashim (supra) and in Lakhvir

Singh, and by this Hon’ble Court in Brij Lal (supra), deems it

appropriate to extend the benefit of the Act to the accused-

appellant No.2.

Resultantly, the present appeal is partly allowed. While

maintaining the conviction of the present accused-appellant No.2

Smt. Koyali @ Kaushalya for the offence under Section 498-A IPC,

as recorded by the learned Court below in the impugned

judgment, this Court interferes only with the sentence part of the

said judgment, and directs that the appellant no.2 shall be

released on probation, under Section 4 of the Act, upon her

furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and two

sureties in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the

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learned trial court with a further undertaking that she shall

maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of two years and

shall not repeat the offence.

The fine amount is hereby maintained. Two months’ time is

granted to deposit the fine amount before the trial court. The fine

amount, if any, already deposited by the appellant No.2 shall be

adjusted. If the appellant No.2 fails to deposit the fine amount,

she shall undergo the default sentence. The appellant no.2 is on

bail. She need not surrender. Her bail bonds stand discharged

accordingly. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of

the learned court below be sent back forthwith.

(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
96-MS/-

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