Madras High Court
C.Anandane vs State Rep. By
Author: P.Velmurugan
Bench: P.Velmurugan
Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 16.12.2024
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON : 09.01.2025
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.VELMURUGAN
Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018
---
C.Anandane ...Appellant in Crl.A.No.710/18
Ashok Anand ...Appellant in Crl.A.No.724/18
Vs.
State rep. by
The Inspector of Police,
SPE:CBI ACB, Chennai,
Through Public Pr osecutor,
for CBI, Chennai. ...Respondent in both the Appeals
(RC MAI 2006 A 0001)
Prayer in both the Appeals: These Criminal Appeals are filed under
Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. 1973 to set aside the judgment of conviction
passed against the appellants in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008 dated 30.10.20218 by
the learned Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases (Principal
Sessions Judge), Puducherry.
For Appellants : Mr.V.Raghavachari, Senior Advocate for
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Mr.A.Kripakaran in Crl.A.No.710/18
Mr.R.Rajarathinam for
Mr.M.S.Govindarajan in Crl.A.No.724/2018
For Respondents : Mr.N.Baskaran, Spl. Public Prosecutor for
CBI Cases in both the Appeals
*****
COMMON JUDGMENT
Both the Criminal Appeals are arising out of the same judgment of
conviction passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge for cases under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008, dated
30.10.2018.
2 In this case, A1 is the appellant in Crl.A.No.710 of 2018 and
A2 is the appellant in Crl.A.No.724 of 2018. For better understanding the
appellants are hereinafter referred to as A1 and A2.
3 The sum and substance of the case of the prosecution in
nutshell is A1, as a public servant was working as a General manager,
Puducherry Agro Service and Industries Corporation Limited, Pondicherry
and Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of
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Puducherry. During the period from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006 A1 acquired
assets, which were disproportionate to his known source of income and was
in possession of assets in his name and his family members i.e. A2 his son
and his deceased wife, who was arrayed as A3, to the extent of
Rs.3,75,30,221.11 and A2 and A3 abetted A1 in the commission of offence.
On the culminations of the investigation, prosecution laid charge sheet
before the learned Special Judge for cases under Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, (in short “PC Act”) Act, Puducherry, for the offence under
Sections 109 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against A1,
A2 and A3.
4 The learned Special Judge has taken the charge sheet on file in
Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008 and after hearing both sides and perusing entire
materials and having prima faice satisfied, framed charges for the offence
under Sections 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act and Section 109 IPC r/w
Section 13(1) (e) r/w 13(2) of PC Act.
5 In order to prove the charges, on the side of the prosecution, 85
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witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 to 85 and 377 documents were marked
as Exs.P1 to P377. On the side of the defence, the Chartered Accountant was
examined as D.W.1 and 37 documents were marked as Exs.D1 to D37.
6 On completion of trial and hearing of arguments advanced on
either side, the learned Special Judge, come to the conclusion that the
prosecution has proved its case and hence by judgment dated 30.10.2018
convicted the first accused for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2)
of PC Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year and imposed fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), in
default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. The
second accused was convicted for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w
13(2) of PC Act r/w 109 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year and imposed fine of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh only), in default, to undergo rigourous imprisonment for
a period of three months. Further the learned Special Judge, ordered
confiscation of the disproportionate assets.
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7 Aggrieved over the said judgment of conviction and sentence,
the first and second accused are before this Court with the separate criminal
appeals.
8 Even though the learned Senior Counsel for A2 and the learned
counsel for A1 argued separately and extensively, their submissions are on
the same line and hence the arguments are summed up as follows.
8.1 There are deficiencies in the very registration of FIR itself. It is
well settled legal principle that a preliminary enquiry must be conducted
prior to the registration of an FIR, in order to gather sufficient information
that establishes a prima facie case for the commission of an offence,
especially in the cases under the PC Act. The learned Senior Counsel
placing reliance on the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an enquiry at pre-FIR is
desirable more particularly in case where the allegations are of misconduct
of corrupt practice acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to his
known sources of income.
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1. (2021) 5 SCC 469 (Charan Singh vs. State of Maharashtra)
2. AIR 1971 SC 520 (P.Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras)
3. (2014) 2 SCC 1 (Lalitha Kumari vs. State of UP)
4. (2011) 4 SCC 402 (Ashok Tshiring Bhuta vs. State of Sikkim)
8.2 The FIR itself was registered improperly in violation of the CBI
Manual, which also says a preliminary enquiry should be conducted after
obtaining approval of the competent authority. Further in the case of Nirmal
Singh Kahlon vs. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441, the
Supreme Court noted that the CBI, when lodging an FIR, must follow its
manual, which provides for the conduct of preliminary enquiry and the
Court affirmed that a prima facie case can only be established after
completing the preliminary enquiry, which serves to determine whether the
complaint warrants formal investigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
reiterated the same in many of its judgments. Further the testimony of
P.W.75 reveal that he registered the FIR as per the directions (Ex.P346)
issued by the Superintendent of Police, CBI, whereas, as per the CBI
manual, the Director of CBI has to authorise, in respect of Group A
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Government Servants.
8.3 The investigation in the present case appears to be flawed and
motivated against the appellants, since proper sanction was not obtained
prior to filing of charge sheet against A1 and no meaningful opportunity was
provided to account their alleged disproportionate assets. The lack of any
explanation in the impugned judgment concerning the change of check
period only alludes to the fact that the investigation in the present case was
not free and fair, which is fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, which was also reiterated in the decisions reported
in (1992) 1 SCC 225 and (2013) 10 SCC 192.
8.4 The sanctioning authority (P.W.5) performed an empty
formality by granting the sanction order without performing its duties as
required under law and hence the failure of the sanctioning authority to
evaluate the materials before granting sanction for prosecution violates the
mandatory requirements under Section 19 of the PC Act, which was also
emphasised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Singh
Brahmajeet Singh Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 5
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SCC 294 that a sanction order is invalid if there is no evidence of
independent application of mind. The above fact has also been clarified by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CBI vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
reported in AIR 2014 SC 827 and State of Punjab vs. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti
reported in (2009) 17 SCC 92. In the present case no proper sanction was
procured and hence the proceedings is rendered void ab initio.
8.5 A bare perusal of the notice issued by the Investigating Officer
dated 17.05.2007 (Ex. P. 374) does not disclose the check period and the
notice merely stated that the check period starts from 01.01.1997 but not the
end of check period. Therefore the appellants could not make their effective
response to the said notice. P.W.85 has stated that he had issued notices to
A1 and A2 to provide an explanation regarding the value and cost of the
assets, but, the prosecution has not marked any such notice and hence an
adverse inference ought to have been placed against the prosecution in terms
of Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
8.6 Further, the observations of learned Special Judge that the
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appellants have been given an opportunity to raise objections through the
investigating officer, but they failed to avail that opportunity, is erroneous.
Right to Silence emanates from Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. It
is the prerogative of the accused to remain silent till prosecution proved the
necessary ingredients of charges. It is trite law that the prosecution has the
duty to prove a person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ex.P372 and
Ex.P373 show that the appellants were required to attend the C.B.I office to
answer certain questions and explain their position and to bring relevant
documents, if, any, and produce them in support of their answers/
explanation. Pertinently, Ex.P374 is a long questionnaire given to the
appellants to furnish the information as stated therein. Ex.P374 is almost
similar to long sting of questions as observed in the judgment reported in
AIR 1978 SC 1025 and hence there was no requirement to answer to
Ex.P374 and Ex.P272 to 274 cannot be looked into nor referred to in the
impugned judgment. Therefore investigation had not been in consonance
and confirmity with law and such illegalities cannot later be sanctified in
subsequent proceedings as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Sing Bhullar reported in (2011) 14
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SCC 770.
8.7 The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof in
establishing that the appellants are guilty for the offence under Section
13(l)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. To substantiate a charge
under Section 13 (1) (e) of PC Act, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the
accused is a public servant; (b) the nature and extent of the pecuniary
resources or property which where found in his possession; (c) it must be
proved as to what were his known source of income and (d) it must prove,
quite objectively, that resources or property found in the possession of the
accused were disproportionate to his known source of income. A criminal
trial against an accused begins only upon framing of charges and in the
present case the trial never began qua A3 and hence there is no question of
abetting against A3, but the learned Special Judge has made an observation
that A3 is also liable under Section 109 IPC. Therefore finding of the
learned Special Judge relating the appellants along with A3 suffers from
infirmities.
8.8 The learned Special Judge held A2 guilty for offence of
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abetment under Section 109 of IPC, but, a bare perusal of the observations
made in regard to the same, none of the observations indicate any of the
elements required under Section 107 punishable under Section 109 IPC. The
prosecution did not examine the persons who were witnesses the registration
of sale deed for the lands alleged to have purchased by the appellants to
show whether A1, A2 and A3 were present during the time of registration. It
is an admitted fact that A2 purchased properties out of his own funds and
there is no case contrary to this which has been made out by the prosecution.
The only situation which is being sought to be used against A2 is that the
seller of the lands had his land surrounded by land of A1. Without prejudice,
the said submission even if taken on face value does not establish that A2 is
an abettor. In fact, PW57 who is a power of attorney holder of the seller of
the lands has not said a single word incriminating against A2. Further
merely the fact that father is surety/guarantor for availing loan by the son
i.e., A2 does not establish that A2 has abetted A1 to acquire property
disproportionate to his known source of income or has resulted in creation of
property by A1. The findings of learned Special Judge that the prosecution
has established that accused persons including A2 had transactions during
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check period and purchased properties is incorrect and further cannot be the
basis for inferring that A2 is guilty of abetment under section 107 of IPC. In
this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranganayaki Vs. State by
Inspector of police reported in AIR 2005 SC 418 observed that “The offence
of abetment created under second clause of Section 107 IPC requires that
there must be something more than mere conspiracy. There must some act
or illegal omission in pursuance of that conspiracy.”
8.9 The learned Special Judge while passing the impugned
judgment erred in not appreciating the testimony of defence witness,
Rajendiran, DW1, which makes it clear that the above finding of the learned
Judge is without any reasons. Further, Ex.D36 and D37 were the documents
submitted by A1 as required under the law, being a government servant, the
Trial Court ought to have given due consideration to the said documents. In
this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab
reported in AIR 1963 SC 151, held that the purpose of adducing evidence is
to prove fact. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines evidence which means
and includes all statements which the court permits or is required to be made
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and such evidence, if adduced, must be taken into consideration. The scope
of Courts to examine witnesses at any stage of trial/proceedings have been
dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5
SCC 741 while emphasizing on the power of the court under Section 311
Cr.P.C. The learned counsel further relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the cases of Anil Sharma vs. State of Jharkhand reported
in (2004) 5 SCC 679 and Krishna Swami vs. Union of India reported in
(1992) 4 SCC 605.
8.10 Exhibits D1 to D5 and D10 to 28 were already brought on
record by the prosecution but were being read selectively. The learned
Special Judge has relied upon certain parts of the afore-mentioned
documents, though the law requires that he read the entire document to reach
a logical conclusion. Some documents were produced by the appellant as he
received the same under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The exhibits D6 to D9 were
marked using the IT documents filed by A2 for the period from 01.04.2004
to 31.03.2006 through prosecution witness R. Govindan, PW-23. The
learned Special Judge completely ignored the income of A2 for these two
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years since they were not produced by the prosecution despite the fact that
they are public documents.
8.11 The findings of the learned Special Judge in the impugned
judgment that it is unsafe to rely on income mentioned in such IT returns
which did not reflect in the previous IT returns, are ex-facie devoid of any
merit, unfounded and erroneous in law. Admittedly the check period was
enlarged in both directions, the same remained unknown to the appellant as
it was extended after the registration of the FIR. Therefore, merely the fact
that FIR has been registered cannot be read as an instance to reject the ITR‘s
on the ground that according to the FIR the said ITRs would fall outside the
check period. The Income Tax Returns filed by A2 and A3 are legal
documents assessed and accepted by the Income Tax Department. The
prosecution has neither challenged these returns under the Income Tax Act
nor presented any conclusive evidence to demonstrate exaggeration. As per
the decisions in the case of Krishnanand Agnihotri vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, reported in 1977 1 SCC 816, ITRs duly filed and assessed should
be given due weight, and any claim of exaggeration must be supported by
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concrete evidence. In this case, no independent audit or investigation
disproving the legitimacy of the ITRs has been conducted by the
prosecution.
8.12 Items 39, 40 of Statement B which relate to pledging of jewels,
the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that they were acquired during
check period. Merely because they were pledged with the concerned Banks
during 2003, 2004, and 2005, it cannot be inferred or presumed that those
jewels were acquired during check period. Further P.W.85, Investigating
Officer deposed that he did not collect any documents concerning the
purchase or procurement of the said jewels and there is no evidence to
establish that the same were acquired or purchased during the check period.
Therefore the jewels owned by A2 as described at Sl.No.39 of Statement B,
having a total value of R.6,39,115/- have been wrongly included as assets
owned during the illegally enlarged check period. The evidence of P.W.31
and P.W.37 and Exhibits Ex.P.197 to 206 and Ex.P239 and Ex.P240 does
not disclose that the jewelry pledged were purchased during the check
period. Even P.W.85 admitted that the jewels were not identified during
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investigation and no materials were gathered to establish the age or the price
of the jewels, as required by law, either through an expert or jewel appraiser.
8.13 The learned Special Judge while passing the impugned
judgment has erroneously included the properties mentioned at Sr.No.16, 17,
25, 26, 27, 31 and 33 having a total value of Rs.11,09,000/- in Statement B.
In this regard, reliance could not have been placed upon Ex.P308 and
Ex.P310 as the same were not certified copies of original registered
documents. The Sale Deeds of the same have neither been procured nor
produced by Investigating Officer in the Court. The Investigating Officer has
only examined the SRO of the respective village and relied upon a letter
Exs.P291, P308 and P310 issued by the SRO to him. P.W.49 and P.W46
speak about Ex.P291, Ex.P308, and Ex.P310 which merely contain
particulars of the documents including document numbers, date of
registration, Survey No., village and extent, name and address of seller,
name and address of purchaser, sale consideration, Registration charges, and
stamp duty. These documents, cannot be equated with certified copies
though they are given by concerned Sub-Registrars, since the documents
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cannot fall under Section 63 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( in short “the
Evidence Act”) as those documents are not made from the original
documents nor can be compared with the original. Section 61 of the
Evidence Act provides that the contents of document may be proved either
by primary evidence or by secondary evidence. The evidence of P.W.46 and
P.W.49 and Exhibits P.291, 308 and 309 as relied upon by the learned
Special Judge is to be eschewed from consideration. They have no
evidentiary value and are at best, weak pieces of evidence. In this regard,
reliance is placed on the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Nani Bai v. Geeta Bai, reported in AIR 1958 SC 706.
8.14 Therefore, it is for the prosecution to establish or prove as to
why it has not obtained certified copies from the Sub-Registrars. It is not the
case of P.W85 that he sent letters to concerned Sub-Registrars to furnish
certified copies of sale deeds relating to the sale transactions in favour of the
accused. No document is filed to show that he addressed letters to the Sub-
Registrars to furnish certified copies. Hence, the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proof. It is only after the discharge of the said
burden, the onus of proof shifts to the accused to account satisfactorily the
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pecuniary resources, which has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Mussauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 14 SCC
541. The failure on the part of the prosecution to submit crucial documents,
including seized invoices and records, warrants an adverse inference under
Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116,
highlighted that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused weakens
the prosecution’s case. Further prosecution has to stand or fall on its own
legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases has held as above:
1. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC
116
2. R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737
3. Anand Ramachandra Chougulev.Sidarai Laxman Chougala, (2019) 8
SCC 508.15 A2 is the sole proprietor of Ashok Steels. Ex P152 dated
30.08.2005, shows the business name as Ashok Steels. Further, P.W.29
stated that the cash credit account of Ashok Steels from 13.06.2002 to
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stated that Income Tax Returns of A2 for financial year 2005-2006 is Ex.D6
which is accepted by the Income Tax Department. As seen from Ex.D.6
ITR for assessment year 2005-2006 (financial year 2004-2005) filed by A2
is on 31.10.2005 i.e., prior to registration of the present case. Further, gross
profit under Ex.D6 is Rs.8,66,559/-. It also clearly goes to show that Ashok
Steels invested Rs.41,65,018/- for school building. The source for the
purchase of stocks may be through capital, credit, or, sales and it cannot be
split to match the corresponding investments. Ex.D6 relates to Ashok Steels
and Part-B shows that the nature of business was steel and cement dealer and
net profit was Rs.11,10,166/-. Admittedly, EX.D.6 is not disputed or denied
by the prosecution. While the learned Special Judge relied upon Ex.P79 to
Ex.P81 regarding Sl.No.49 of Statement-C to show that A2 had shown his
income as Rs.5,83,007/- which is admittedly from 01.04.2001 to 31.03.2005,
the learned Judge ignored the income of A2 from 01.04.2005 to 07.01.2006.
Ex.P79 makes it clear that the income tax return of A2 for the financial year
2000-2021 shows that exact value received from steel and cement sales is
Rs.30,80,668/-. Further, by the end of 31.03.2021, Ashok steels had a credit
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of Rs.13,77,731/-. It also shows that he was doing liquor business and he
paid Rs.1,42,872/- towards excise duty. For financial year 2002-2003,
Ashok paid Rs.2,20,396/- towards excise duty. Similarly, Ex.P80 Income tax
returns for the financial year 2003-2004 also shows that A2 is a cement and
steel dealer. Moreover, from the evidence of prosecution, it is also clear that
A2 was also doing agriculture by raising sugarcane. Ex.D29 is prepared
from records produced by A2 to D.W.1 for verification. Admittedly, the
same is not shown to be incorrect and hence, admitted being true and
reliable. As per trial Court, the income of A2 is Rs.10,06,127/-, but,
whereas, as per audited cash flow including depreciation found in Ex.D29
the income of A2 as Rs.64,92,436.22/- the difference is Rs.54,86,309, which
must be added in Statement C. Further S.No.57 of Statement D pertains to
money received from Shri Ram Chit Funds to the tune of Rs.32,740/-. The
said money has to be added as income in Statement C and must be removed
from expenditure in Statement D. The bonus received by A1 to the tune of
Rs. 47,650/- is based on the 5th pay commission and admittedly the same is
not reflected in Ex.P.31. Therefore, Rs.47,650/- must be added to Statement
C. The loan procured by A1 to purchase a personal computer for a sum of
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Rs.72,000/- as deposed by P.W.14 and Ex.P52 has not been considered.
Therefore, a sum of Rs.72,000/- must be included in Statement C. In 1998, a
departmental enquiry was initiated by Chief Vigilance Office against A1
based on a memorandum dated 21.10.1998, Ex.D.37. During the enquiry, A1
disclosed that A2 and A3 have independent source of income by running a
super market, Handy Super Store and are not dependent uponA1,Ex.P.84 to
87 and Ex.P.121. The capital for the business was through loans from
Punjab National Bank, a term loan of Rs.5,00,000/- and working capital loan
of Rs.5,50,000/-, the same was recorded during the enquiry, Ex.D.37.
Further, the agricultural income of Rs.1,92,500/- from lands inherited from
the respective ancestors in the year 2000 and 1975 respectively were also
disclosed and marked as Ex. D. 34. The Chief Vigilance Office has accepted
the explanation of A1 after detailed enquiry, and found that A2 and A3 are
not the dependents of A1. The records of the departmental proceedings are
marked as Ex. D. 37.
8.16 The learned Special Judge has incorrectly included the
properties of the Trust as properties of the appellants in Sr.No.36–38 & 50 of
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Statement-B and Sr.No.47–50 & 82-91 of Statement D, Ex.P270-278,
concluding that the trust was created only to escape from the clutches of law.
There were no circumstances in the evidence of prosecution to infer that it is
created to escape from the clutches of law. Even the investigating officers or
any other witnesses did not speak on this aspect. Further, the trust was
registered on 05.09.2001 and certified copy of trust is marked as Ex.P293
which is registered in the office of the District Registrar as Document
No.1061 of 2001. It is a public charitable trust and is a creature of statute
and the same was submitted by P.W.46 to Investigating Officer. After
obtaining permission to run the Schools for the academic year 2005- 2006,
A2 had to submit the accounts to the income tax authorities only after
closure of financial year and not to the Registrar of Companies as the trust is
registered with the Office of the District Registrar, Pondicherry. As per
Ex.270, Ex.274, Ex.275, the trust address is 5, New Saram, Pondicherry,
whereas the address of A1 as per Ex.P372, Ex.P 375 is 3, V.Subbaiah Street,
Ellapillaichavadi, Pondicherry. The finding of learned Special Judge that
Ex.P.270 to Ex. P278 reveal the office address of the trust was given the
address of A1, is incorrect. Further, A2 is managing the trust properties and
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therefore, as a Managing Trustee, he can sign the application dated
29.11.2004 as in Ex.P270 for proposal to open a new school by name Aditya
Vidyashram Montessori School from LKG to 1st Standard. Moreover, the
said educational agency is Shri Vidya Educational Trust and necessary fee
for opening of school was paid under Ex.P271. Ex.P.272 and 273 are the
fixed deposit receipts in the name of trust. The Director of School
Education, Pondicherry, granted provisional permission as per Ex.P274.
Similarly, A2 as managing trustee gave an application dated 29.11.2004 for
permission to open school “Aditya Vidyashram Residential School “from
LKG to VIII standard in the academic year 2005-2006. Under Ex.P276, the
necessary fee was paid to the Education Department by the Trust. Ex.P277
and 278 fixed deposits were shown in the name of trust. Under Ex.P 279, the
provisional permission was granted on 17.08.2005.
8.17 Even P.W.42, who is Secretary to Government of Pondicherry,
Health and Education Department had clearly stated that both the
applications for schools are signed by A2 as Managing Trustee. Therefore,
there is no scope or possibility for the trust to file income tax returns or to
maintain accounts for the financial year 2005-2006 as the school and hostel
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buildings were under construction and further prosecution registered the case
against accused on 04.01.2006. Further, the evidence of P.W48 and Ex.P307
make it clear that a copy of Balance Sheet along with a statement of receipt
and expenditure audited by chartered accountant was not filed by the
society. Further, reliance placed by the learned Special Judge on the case of
State of Tamilnadu Vs. Suresh Rajan, 2014 AIR SCW 942 is erroneous as
there is no ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court within the
meaning of Article 141 of Constitution of India that the trust properties
cannot be included in the individual account. The prosecution has wrongly
identified loss in sale of land and has been recorded the same in S.No.44A of
Statement D. Therefore, Rs.1,32,200/- must be deducted from Statement D.
Presumption of expenditures in relation to domestic expenditure is
impermissible in law. Therefore, S.No.19 of Statement D for a sum of
Rs.6,41,845/- must be deducted. Presumption of marriage expenses of
daughters is impermissible in law. Therefore, Rs.8,25,000/- in S.No.21 of
Statement D must be deducted. No requirement under Law for the Public
Servant to disclose the assets and liability of family members,whose income
is above Rs.1,500/- per month because they are not wholly dependent on the
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Public Servant, but the trial Court, relying on Rule 18 of the Central Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 observed that A1 did not disclose the details
of assets held by his family members, which is erroneous.
8.18 The properties owned by the Trust cannot be indicated or
included as properties of the accused, merely because the trust has not
maintained proper books of accounts and operates from the premises owned
by A1. The books of Accounts were maintained in ordinary course of
business. The same ought to be excluded from Statement B and Statement
D. Further, as per the evidence of P.W.48, Aditya Residential School,
Poraiyur, is registered under Companies Act as mentioned in the Ex.P307,
which is incorrect. Ex.P307 shows that the society has to file a copy of
balance sheet along with statement of receipt and expenditure audited by
chartered accountant. The subject in this document is mentioned as Aditya
Vidhyasharam Residential School. P.W.85 stated that on 16.03.2007 he
examined E.S.Ganesh of the office of the Registrar of Companies as P.W.48
with reference to the society in the name of Aditya Vidyashram School.
Both the schools are under control and management of Sri Vidya Narayana
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Trust. This is evidenced from Exs.P.270 to 279. Therefore, the observation
of the learned Special Judge that according to the evidence of P.W.48, no
balance sheet and statement of income and expenditure was filed by the
trust, is totally incorrect as there was no oral or documentary evidence
adduced by prosecution to show that the statement of receipt and
expenditure of Sri Vidya Narayana Educational Trust was called by P.W.85.
Therefore, values of items 36, 37 and 38 regarding purchase of vehicles
stand in the name of Trust, Item 50, the FDR stands in the name of Trust
cannot be included in Statement-B. Similarly, Sl.No.44 of Statement-C of
Rs.66,636.75 has to be deleted. The value of properties namely Item Nos.36,
37, 38 and 50 have to be deleted from Statement -B.
8.19 The Bank charges and interest received by A2 and A3
(deceased) have already been excluded from their respective net income
mentioned in their respective ITRs for the said years 2000–05 and 2005–06
Ex.P79 to P81. Therefore, inclusion of the same in Statement D would
amount to double accounting. At Sl.No.81, a sum of Rs.3,82,000/- has been
indicated as a loss from purchase and sale of JCB Excavator. Admittedly,
the income earned through JCB rental, was wrongly not included by the
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learned Special Judge, stating that the same was exaggerated. However, even
accepting the figures as proposed by the learned Special Judge, the JCB has
not resulted in any losses, and in fact has only resulted in profits from sale of
the same. Accordingly, the same must be excluded from Statement D.
8.20 Reports recorded by police during the course of investigation in
the presence of witnesses including search and seizure, making inventory of
articles, contain both admissible and inadmissible portions. Only objectives
findings like inventory of articles as mentioned in the reports Ex.P339 and
Ex.P344 are only admissible. If the report is based on some information
given by any person including the accused person, it is not admissible on the
rule of hearsay as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rameswar Dayal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1558.
P.W.73, who conducted search and inventory under Ex.P339 specifically
stated that he prepared the report by collecting the information about the
value of the said goods, the date of purchase and method of purchase from
the second accused and his mother. Any statement made by person accused
of an offence is inadmissible under Section 162 of Cr.P.C except for a
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limited purpose, if a portion of such statement falls under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. Therefore, collecting information as stated by P.W.73 from
the accused is contrary to Section 161 (2) of Cr.P.C. Investigating Officer
P.W.75 and the so-called independent witnesses P.W.72 and Govindan did
not speak anything as to how they came to the conclusion that the inventory
articles were acquired by accused during check period and the value of
articles. They are not proper and competent persons to assess the value of
inventory articles and approximate year of acquisition. Therefore, the two
reports Ex.P.339 and Ex.P.344 insofar as they refer to the year of acquisition
and value of articles as allegedly stated by the accused are not admissible in
law. Therefore, total value of inventory articles of Ex.P339 and Ex.P344 is
Rs.4,58,295/- and the same has to be deducted from Statement-B. The
estimate of the entire project comprising the School, Hostel, Staff Quarters,
and Stadium is Rs.2,24,23,183/-and the same was approved by P.W.50,
Town Planning Authority, Puducherry. A2 has mobilized funds by
borrowing Rs.50,00,000/- as a term loan from Indian Overseas Bank in
2003. The Branch Manager of IOB (P.W.27), has spoken about at same
(Pg.79, Vol.I), and marked as Ex.P.136 (Pg.978,Vol.II). The stocks worth
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Rs.41,65,018.90/-were infused from Ashok Steel for the construction of the
building in 2004, the said investments are sourced from the loans availed by
M/s Ashok Steels and the same is also evidenced from the loans mentioned
in the liability column. The above investments are disclosed in the respective
ITR marked as Ex.D.6, which has been accepted by the Special Court. At the
end of the check period i.e., on 07.01.2006, the hostel building was complete
but the school building was incomplete. The Staff Quarters and Stadium
were yet to be constructed. After the end of check period, further loan of
Rs.1,75,00,000/- were borrowed from Indian Overseas Bank in October
2006 by pledging the land and building. Since it is after the check period, the
same was not collected by the investigation agency and submitted before the
Court. The construction of the buildings were completed in FY 2006-07 at a
cost of Rs.2,02,07,435.77 (Hostel Building Value is Rs.77,82,674.75 plus
School Building value of Rs,1,24,24,761.02) as per ITR returns.
8.21 Regarding the land surrounding the above purchased land, the
grand-father of A2 transferred the land to A1, and A1 transferred the said
land to A2 on the same date, on 03.04.2002, in R.S.No.1/4, 11/1, 99/5, 99/4,
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99/1, 74/4, vide Document Nos.682/2002, registered at SRO, Villianur,
marked as item No.32 of Statement B and the value of the said land has been
given by the prosecution as zero ‘0’, because it is an ancestral property. The
learned Special Judge merely relied upon the value mentioned in sale deed
which is not produced and proved and learned Judge deducted Rs.5,13,000/-.
The certified copy of original sale deed which will show about the sale
consideration is the best piece of evidence. However, the same is not
produced by prosecution nor given any explanation for not producing the
same. Hence only an amount of Rs.90,000/- is to be added to item 28 of
statement ‘B’, instead of Rs.9,50,000/-. As a result, a sum of Rs.8,60,000/-
has to be deducted from Statement ‘B’.
8.22 The valuation of the School Building ought to have been taken
as provided in Ex.D25 as deposed by P.W.64, i.e., a sum of Rs.1,34,08,000/-
instead of Rs. 2,06,90,769/- as taken by the learned Special Judge. P.W.85
admitted in cross examination that he has noted in Ex.368 at Sl.No.34 of
statement B that the cost of construction of the school building was given by
IOB panel valuer of IT Department and valuation officer. Therefore, it is
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clear that assessment of the value of buildings were based on the request
made by the bank and by A2 as observed by the learned Special Judge. The
evidence of P.W.64 and the recitals in Ex.D25, established beyond doubt
that the cost of construction of school and hostel building is Rs.1,34,08,000/-
. Admittedly, P.W.64 was not declared as hostile by the prosecution. P.W.23
who was the income tax officer, Pondicherry, till 2007 had also categorically
admitted that Ex.D6 is the copy of the income tax returns of A2 for
financial year 2005 and 2006. Moreover, Ex.D6 is not denied or disputed by
the prosecution. In this document, the balance sheet of A2 clearly shows that
he invested Rs.41,65,018.90/- It is pertinent to note this document has not
been referred to in the impugned judgment by the learned Special Judge
despite being specifically raised by A2 in his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. Being a dealer in cements and steel items, A2 was
entitled to discounted rates in procuring the same. Therefore, the correct
valuation to be accepted is the sum of Rs.1,34,08,000/-.
8.23 The calculations presented by the appellants demonstrate a
clear and logical methodology. The opening and closing asset values, as
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reflected in Statements A and B, are drawn from verified documentary
evidence, including financial records and property valuation reports. Income
earned during the check period, shown in Statement C, has been calculated
based on authentic records such as Income Tax Returns and business-related
documents. Expenditures incurred during the check period, detailed in
Statement D, are supported by valid documentation, including household
expenditure details and verified invoices. These figures collectively establish
a surplus of Rs.27,51,126.50/- in Statement F, conclusively proving that the
appellants had sufficient legitimate income to account for the assets acquired
during the check period. The calculations further show that assets acquired
during the check period, as detailed in Statement E, amount to
Rs.1,42,74,463.70/-, which is well within the likely savings of
Rs.1,45,30,529.25/- computed in Statement F. This surplus demonstrates
that there is no disproportionate acquisition of assets, and all financial details
have been satisfactorily explained through legitimate sources of income and
expenditures. Section 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988, requires the prosecution to
establish that the accused is in possession of assets disproportionate to their
known sources of income. This provision necessitates the prosecution to
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prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the assets were not acquired through
legitimate means or independently earned by family members. In this case,
the surplus of Rs.27,51,126.50/- shown in Statement F negates the allegation
of disproportionate assets. Section 20 of PC Act provides for a presumption
against the accused only when the prosecution successfully establishes the
existence of disproportionate assets. The burden of proving disproportionate
assets lies squarely on the prosecution. It must establish, with credible
evidence, that the assets are beyond the means of the accused and cannot be
accounted for. In this case the prosecution has failed to discharge this
burden. The evidence presented by the appellants, including verified income
and expenditure records, negates the presumption under Section 20 of PC
Act and demonstrates that all assets have been acquired through legitimate
means.
8.24 The adjustments made by the Trial Court in reducing the
disproportionate assets percentage from 256% to 110.60% highlight the
flaws in the prosecution’s original computation. Despite this reduction, the
inclusion of independent income sources and properties unrelated to A1
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further skews the findings. In light of the above arguments, the prosecution
failed to establish a case of disproportionate assets or abetment under
Section 109 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
C.Chenga Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 193,
emphasized that errors in valuation and computation undermine the
credibility of the prosecution’s case. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Vasant Rao Guhe v. State of M.P., (2017) 14 SCC 442 held that
metamorphosis of figures without alteration of charge is impermissible in
law. The defense has effectively countered each claim with credible
evidence and legal precedents, warranting a dismissal of the allegations
against A1, A2, and A3. In light of the above, the calculations presented by
the appellants are accurate, transparent, and supported by credible evidence.
The prosecution’s failure to establish disproportionate assets beyond
reasonable doubt undermines their case, and the surplus shown in Statement
F conclusively disproves the allegations against the appellants. Therefore the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant prays to set aside the conviction
and sentence imposed on the appellants in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2008.
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9 The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent would submit that during the period from 01.01.1997 to
07.01.2006, A1 acquired assets which were disproportionate to his known
source of income and was in possession of assets in his name and in the
name of his family members i.e Ashok Anand (A2) and his deceased wife
Vijayalakshmi (A3) to an extent of Rs.3,75,30,22.1.11/-, which were
disproportionate to his known sources of income for which he could not
satisfactorily account for and the percentage of the disproportionate assets is
256%. FIR was registered by PW 75 (Krishnamoorthy) based on the source
information and subsequently, searches were conducted at the premises of
A1 and A2. P.W.75 called for explanation from the accused for the
properties acquired by them. A1 submitted Statements I to VI, which is
EX.P.25 in which he had declared only the properties held and acquired by
him. In the said statement A1 has not declared the properties of A3 wife and
A2 son. As per the rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1964, it is mandatory for every Public Servant to declare the transactions of
immovable and movable properties, including Jewellery, held by him either
in his own name or in the name of his family members. This CCS Conduct
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Rules is applicable to the Public Servants of Puducherry Government also.
The Investigating Officer called for explanation from the accused for the
properties acquired by them. However, the accused have not availed the
opportunity given to them. Therefore, PW 75 (Krishnamoorthy) has taken
the income as per the salary particulars and income of A2 and A3 from the
Income Tax Returns particulars here to the date of registration of FIR. After
registration of FIR A2 and A3 filed their Income Tax Returns with
exaggerated figures and A2 & A3 have not produced any evidence to show
their sources of huge income that was filed before the Income Tax Returns.
A2 and A3 abetted A1, therefore they are liable to be prosecuted under
section 109 of IPC.
9.1 A3 died and the charges against A3 was also abated. In
Statement A of the Charge Sheet, 8 items were shown and A1 and A2
admitted all the 8 items. A2 contended that an immovable property standing
in the name of A2 was not considered. A2 claimed that the value of property
was Rs.14,000/- but the prosecution has not given any value to the property.
Therefore, the learned Judge has included an immovable property for the
value of Rs.14,000/- and after including the sum of Rs.14,000/- in Statement
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A, the total value of the assets in Statement A has been arrived at
Rs.16,01,431/- instead of Rs.15,87,431/- as calculated by the prosecution.
The other contention raised by the accused is that the jewels were purchased
before the check period. Therefore, the value of Jewels are to be added in
Statement A. To support his contention, the defence relied upon the evidence
of P.W.85, Investigating Officer. In the cross-examination, Investigating
Officer has admitted that he has not collected any documents to show that
the documents were purchased during the check period. It is pertinent to note
that A1 has submitted Statements I to VI and in the said Statements, he has
not mentioned about the properties of his wife nor his son, particularly in
Statement IV he has not declared the jewels held by his wife. The
Investigating Officer would have taken it into consideration and added it in
Statement A, if it had been declared in Statements I to VI by the accused. In
the absence of any material produced by the accused, it cannot be added in
Statement A. The learned Judge properly held that the jewels were
purchased during the check period. It is also pertinent to note that the jewels
were pledged during the check period and the accused failed to make any
objection at the earliest point of time and such objection was raised only at
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the time of arguments. Therefore, the contention of accused is only
afterthought.
9.2 Sl. No 5 in Statement B, the household articles worth about
Rs.4,58,295/- was disputed by the accused persons. As per EX.P.339 and
EX.P.334 the valuation was arrived at the time of search and A1 and A2
during the searches in their premises signed the Mahazar and they have not
raised any objection at the time of valuation and they were not permitted to
raise the objection during trial. However, the learned Judge has added a sum
of Rs.1000/- in Sl.No.49 of Statement B. Therefore, the value of
Rs.4,59,295/- is proper and rightly held by the learned Judge. As far as SI.
No 12 in Statement B, a sum of Rs.50,000/- is received as rental advance is
concerned, the accused contested that it should be shown in Statement D as
expenditure. The rental advance paid by A1 to PW70. The defence has
argued that it should be brought under expenditure column. The said amount
is only an advance and the said amount is refundable at the time of vacation
of the house and it is properly shown in Statement B and the learned Judge
also accepted the contention of the prosecution and rejected the contention
of the defence. As far as SI. No 16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31and 33 in Statement
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B, the total value of Rs.11,09,000/- was shown in Statement D. It is argued
on behalf of the accused that the prosecution has failed to produce the
documents to show the value of properties. EX.P. 291, 308 and 310 were
submitted by the concerned Sub-Registrar, who is a competent authority and
he has given the said Exhibits in his Official capacity. Therefore, the
Exhibits are proper to show the value of properties and the learned Judge
accepted the arguments of prosecution and held that the sum of
Rs.11,09,000/- properly shown in Statement B. 16.
9.3 The accused has not denied the title of the properties and
disputed only the value of the property. The Sub-Registrar has taken the
value of the properties as per the documents, which cannot be disputed.
Therefore, the contention of the accused is liable to be dismissed and the
learned Judge has properly taken the value as per EX.P.291, 308 and 310.
Investigating Officer has examined the witnesses and obtained documents
regarding the value of the properties in their official capacity. Therefore, the
contention of accused that the documents were hit by Section 162 of CrPC is
incorrect and it was rightly held so by the learned Judge. The learned Judge
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has not relied upon the evidence of P.W.53 and therefore has deducted a sum
of Rs.4,37,000/- from Statement B in SI. No.28. In the same way the learned
Judge has not relied upon the evidence of P.W.54 and therefore has deducted
a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- from Statement B in SI. No.29.
9.4 As far as Item 34 of Statement B is concerned about the
construction of the school and hostel building, the prosecution has examined
PW 34 who is a Valuation Officer from Income Tax Department and also
spoken that he has lot of experience in valuation of building. His Valuation
Report is marked as EX.P.219 and additional Report is EX.P. 220. P.W.34
has given reasoned valuation and he valued the school building as
Rs.2,42,17,614/- and the hostel building as Rs.1,27,20,239/-. It was pointed
out that P.W.34 is not competent person to value the building. However, the
accused have not pointed out the mistake in valuation. The accused
contented that P.W.64 in his evidence deposed that he valued the building at
Rs.1,34,08,000/- and EX.D25 also reveals the same value. P.W.64 valued
the properties of A2 and he filed the Valuation Report in EX.P145. As per
his report the value of the building is Rs.2,06,90,769/- and the land value is
Rs.87,39,000/-. It can be seen from the evidence of P.W.64 that EX.P.145
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was given for the purpose of bank loan and the valuation report of EX.D25
was given for the purpose of Income Tax. The same valuer has given two
reports which is inconsistent to each other. The accused has not disputed the
value of the property except for disputing the designation of PW34.
Therefore, the learned Judge has taken the value of the building as per
EX.P.145 and deducted a sum of Rs.1,77,41,960/- from Statement B. As far
as Item No 21 and 39 of Statement B are concerned, the value of the jewels
is not declared and mentioned in Statements I to VI by A1. Therefore, it
cannot be treated as property purchased before the check period and it can
only be treated as property purchased during the check period.
9.5 As far as Item No. 47 of Statement B is concerned, as per
EX.P.311 to EX.P. 313, A2 has applied in his individual capacity and made
payment of Rs.48,628/-. Therefore, it is rightly held by the learned Judge
that Item No 47 is not belong to the Trust. As far as Item No.22 and 40 of
Statement B are concerned, the jewels were pledged during the check period
and the jewels were with the bank at the end of the check period. Therefore,
the learned Judge rightly held that the value of Jewels as per EX.P.194, 201
and 202. Item No 51 is properly considered by the learned Judge. After
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carrying out the said corrections in Statement B, the learned Judge has taken
the value of assets in Statement B as Rs.2,84,21,181/- instead of
Rs.4,69,03,141.29 as calculated by the prosecution. As far as Item No.1 in
Statement C is concerned, the Bonus and pay commission arrears were
received by A1 as per EX.P. 31. Therefore, the contention of A1 was rightly
rejected by the learned Judge. There is an argument regarding Item No.2 and
8 in Statement C were admitted by the prosecution and an amount of
Rs.540/- and Rs.1000/- was added in Item No 2 and 8. The same way there
was an arithmetical error in calculating GPF amount which was given as
Rs.2,60,000/- as GPF withdrawals between 2003 and February 2006. On
01.02.2006 a sum of Rs.58,000/- was received after the check period.
Therefore, Rs.58,000/- has to be deducted from Item No. 11 and it is rightly
held so by the learned Judge. In the same way, in Item No.12 a sum of
Rs.4,000/- is wrongly added and that has to be deducted and the correct
amount is Rs.50,000/- and this correction has also been rightly held by the
learned Judge.
9.6 As far as Item No.32 in Statement C is concerned, the Income
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Tax Returns of A3 for the AY 2005-2006 shown as Rs.1,23,336/- by the
prosecution. The Income Tax Returns of A3 for the AY 2004-2005 and AY
2005-2006 in EX.P. 78, EX.D 8 and EX.D 30, the evidence of PW 33 and
DW 1 accrues to Rs.7, 24,870/-. After filing of FIR, A3 has increased her
income without any basis and filed her Income Tax Returns. Therefore, the
learned Judge has considered the income of A3 which is shown as
Rs.1,23,336/- for the AY 2005-2006 as proper and correct. For the AY
2008-2009 it is shown in the Income Tax Returns that she earned income
through agriculture and milk vending business. However, she has not filed
any proof for the milk vending and agricultural income. Therefore, the
learned Judge is correct in rejecting the contention of the accused. Therefore,
the learned Judge has properly taken a sum of Rs.1,23,336/- for the AY
2006-2007 of A3. 32. As far as Item 44 in Statement C is concerned the
income is Rs.66,336.75/- but the accused contested that it is the income of
the Trust and it cannot be added in Statement C. The defence miserably
failed to produce any document in support of their contention for existence
of the Trust and further there is no book of accounts produced before the
Court to support their contention and it was properly held by the learned
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Judge that it should be brought in Statement C. The learned Judge
categorically analysed about the Trust in Paragraph 128 of the Judgment.
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9.7 As far as Item No 49 in Statement C is concerned, the
prosecution has shown a sum of Rs.5,83,050/- as income of A2 as per the
Income Tax Returns for the AY 2000-2001 to 2004-2005. The defence has
produced the document in EX.D29 to show that the income of A2 during the
check period was Rs.64,92,436/-. The Learned Judge has taken a sum of
Rs.5,83,007/- as income of A2 and rejected the EX.D.29 as A2 has shown
exaggerated income in the Income Tax Returns without any documentary
support. The learned Judge rightly added the sum of Rs.25,000/- towards
GPF withdrawals and Rs.1,73,000/- towards the sale value of the land in
Statement C. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the claim of the accused
for a sum of Rs.72,000/- towards computer advance and Rs.1,01,799/-
towards jewel loans. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the contention of
the accused with regard to jewel loan of Rs.49,612/- and the sale value of
JCB for an amount of Rs.5,17,047/- as profit of sale. The learned Judge
rightly added the rental income of JCB for years 2005 and 2006 as
Rs.3,57,400/- based on the Income Tax Returns of A2 for the year 2005 and
rejected the contention of A2 that the rental income of JCB for the year 2006
is Rs. 9,48,687/-. 36. Therefore, after carrying out the said corrections in
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Statement C, the learned Judge has taken the value of income in Statement C
as Rs.1,57,67,032/- instead of Rs. 1,46,67,636 as calculated by the
prosecution. As far as Item No 19 in Statement D is concerned, the learned
Judge has rightly accepted the contention of the prosecution and held that
1/3 of the income as domestic expenditure. As far as Item No 21 in
Statement D is concerned, the learned Judge has held that while the
prosecution has shown the marriage expenditure as Rs.8,25,000/- yet it
could produce evidence for only Rs.45,000/- and therefore the learned Judge
has taken a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as marriage expenditure instead of
Rs.8,25,000/- which was shown by the prosecution in Statement D. As far as
Item Nos.30 to 43 in Statement D are concerned, the learned Judge has
rightly rejected the contention of the accused.
9.8 As far as Item No. 44 of Statement D is concerned, the
prosecution has shown a sum of Rs.1,73,000/- as loss suffered by A3 in
selling the property. The learned Judge has deducted the said amount from
Statement D. As far as Item Nos 45, 47 to 50, 51 to 56, 59 to 61, 64 to 67, 68
to 80 in Statement D are concerned, the learned Judge has rightly rejected
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the contention of the accused. As far as Item No 81 of Statement D is
concerned, the learned Judge has held that the loss of Rs.3,82,000/- on
account of the sale of JCB is not to be included in Statement D expenditure
for the reason that the learned Judge has already considered the rental
income on account of JCB at Paragraph 140 of the Judgment. Therefore,
after carrying out the said corrections in Statement D, the learned Judge has
taken the value of Expenditure in Statement D as Rs.63,84,122/- instead of
Rs. 68,82,147/- as calculated by the prosecution. After the corrections
carried out in Statement A, B, C and D, the learned Judge has held that the
disproportionate assets of the accused to the tune of Rs.1,74,36,839/- instead
of Rs.3,75,32,656/- as calculated by the prosecution and the learned Judge
has reduced the percentage of disproportionate Assets from 256% to
110.60%.
9.9 In view of the above facts, the Appeals filed by the appellants
are liable to be dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned Special
Judge needs no interference of this Court.
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10 Heard the rival submissions made by the respective counsel for
the appellants and the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent
and carefully perused the materials available on record.
11 It is the specific case of the prosecution that A1, as a public
servant was working as a General Manager, Puducherry Agro Service and
Industries Corporation Limited, Pondicherry and Superintending Engineer,
Public Works Department, Government of Puducherry. During the period
from 01.01.1997 to 07.01.2006 A1 acquired assets, which were
disproportionate to A1’s known source of income and was in possession of
assets in his name and his family members i.e.A2 his son and his deceased
wife, who was arrayed as A3, to the extent of Rs.3,75,30,221.11 and A2 and
A3 abetted A1 in the commission of offence.
12 P.W.75, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, on receipt of
source information, after obtaining authorisation from the Superintendent of
Police, ACB, CBI, Chennai, had registered FIR and made search in the
house and office of A1 and also house of A2. Thereafter prepared search list
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018
Ex.P342 and shown value of the articles and the inventory list to A1 and
after collecting particulars of salary of A1 for the period from 1995-2005
along with GPF advance particulars of Al, handed over the entire case file to
P.W.84, Additional Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, who
recorded statements and collected documents. Thereafter further
investigating was taken up by P.W.85, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
CBI, ACB, Chennai, who examined remaining witness and after recording
statements and collecting documents, he laid the Final Report before the trial
Court. As per the version of prosecution, details of assets, liabilities and
income and expenses are shown in Statements A to D which reads as
follows:
STATEMENT – ‘A’
Assets held at the beginning of the check period
Sl. Period Description of the Immovable and Amount
No Movable Property
1 29.3.1985 Plot No.4 measuring 2638.64 Sft in 1,09,730.90
Plotted Development Scheme of
Pondichery Housing Board Saram of A1
2 1988-1989 Construction of house No. 5 New Saram 9,29,200.00
Pondichery of A1
3 20.09.1990 Purchase of land R.S No. 102/03 in 7,000.00
Reddiyarpalayam Village vide Document49/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Sl. Period Description of the Immovable and Amount
No Movable Property
No 2469/90 registered at SRO Oulgaret
in the name of Ms Anuradha of A1
4 30.01.1992 Purchase of land R.S No. 1/3 &2/5 in 21,500.00
Villianur Village vide Doc.133/92
registered at SRO Villianur of A1
5 13.04.1993 200 shares of Pondicherry Gazetted 2,000.00
Officers Co-Operative Credit Society Ltd
of Rs 100/- each of A1
6 Various house hold articles found in 11,000.00
residential premises of A1 and A2.
7 20.10.1982 Purchase of land R.S No. 86/4(Part) in 12,000.00
Reddiyarpalayam, Document No
2477/82 registered at SRO , Puducherry
of A3
8 25.10.1996 Purchase of land R.S No. 99/2/A/1, 4,95,000.00
100/1, 100/2 in Thirukanchi owned by
Shoram, Emaile Salari Jone son of
Remon Savari through PA holder Shri P
Nataraja Chettiar vide doc No 5337/96 of
A3
Total 15,87,430.90
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STATEMENT -'B'
Assets held at the end of the check period
Sl. Details of Immovable & Movable Value of Property
No. Properties (including stamp
fee)
1 29.03.85 Plot No.4 measuring 2,638.84 sq ft 1,09,730.90
in Plotted Development Scheme of
Pondichery Housing Board in Saram Revenue
Village of A1
2 1988-89 Construction of House at No.5, New 9,29,200.00
Saram, Pondichery (on the above plot) as per
Statement-I submitted by Shri Anandane.(A1)
3 20.09.90 Purchase of land in R.S. No. 102/3 7,000.00
in Reddiarpalayam village vide doc.No.
2469/90 registered at SRO Oulgaret in the
name of Ms Anutha of A1
4 30.01.92 Purchase of land in RS No. 1/3 & 21,500.00
2/5 Villianur Village document No. 133/92
registered at SRO Villianur of A1
5 Various house hold articles found in 4,58,295.00
residential premises of A1 and A2.
6 125 shares of Pondichery Gazetted Officers 12,500.00
Co-Operative Credit Society Ltd of Rs 100/
each of A1
7 Balance in SB A/c. No.19562 at Indian Bank, 176.00
Ariyankuppam
8 Balance in SB A/c. No.12115 at PNB, 163.00
Pondicherry
9 Balance in SB A/c No.8319 at Union Bank of 1,135.00
India, Pondichery Branch
10 Corporation Bank, Pondichery Branch SB 3,081.751/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Sl. Details of Immovable & Movable Value of Property
No. Properties (including stamp
fee)
A/C No.3487 balance amount
11 Purchase of Sumo Victa PY-01-AA 3999 5,88,280.00
From VST Motors on 14.03.2005 by A1
12 Advance given to House owner Smt. Vijaya 50,000.00
by A1
13 20.10.82 Purchase of land in RS No. 86/4 12,000.00
Reddiyarpalayam document No. 2477/82
registered at SRO Pondichery. In favour of
A3
14 Acquisition of land in R.S. No.86/4A by A3 00.00
15 Purchase of land in R.S.No.75/2 in 00.00
Thirukanchi by A3
16 07.04.2003 Purchase of Land in RS No. 16/3 1,70,000.00
& 16/3 Villianur Village document No.
783/03 registered at SRO Villianur by A3
17 20.10.04 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/2 & 4,00,000.00
2/4 Villianur Village document No. 3536/04
registered at SRO Villianur by A3
18 12/1999 Purchase of Falt “C” in IIIrd Floor 5,95,400.00
Comfort Apartment, 5th and 6th Cross
Natesan Nagar, Pondichery along with
undivided of share of land in RS No. 172/2 by
A3
19 27/9/2004 Purchase of Tempo 3wheeler 1,83,613.00
Minidor Pickup from Vinayaga Tempo,
Puduchery by A3
20 23/7/2004 Purchase of 3 Nos Bajaj GC 1000 3,54,000.00
goods carrier from Villianur Associates,
Puduchery by A352/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Sl. Details of Immovable & Movable Value of Property
No. Properties (including stamp
fee)
21 Value of Jewels pledged to REPCO Bank 3,42,735.00
Ltd, Pondichery of gross weight of 1147.700
and net weight 939 grams by A3
22 Jewels loan at Poraiyur Primary Agriculture 1,01,779.00
Co-Operativve Credit Society, Pondichery of
gross weight of 220.600 and net weight 182.4
grams by A3
23 ICICI bank A/C No 005605001788 in the 10,193.27
name of Hanndy Super Store balance amount
of A3
24 ICICI bank A/C No 005605002148 in the 33,530.72
name of Vinayaga Agencies balance amount
of A3
25 24.8.98 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/1 58,000.00
Osudu Village document No. 1816/98
registered at SRO Villianur by A2
26 24.8.98 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/12 6,000.00
Osudu Village document No. 1818/98
registered at SRO Villianur by A2
27 26.3.99 Purchase of land in RS No. 75/3 1,35,000.00
Osudu Village document No. 624/99
registered at SRO Villianur by A2
28 08.6.00 Purchase of land in RS No. 10/1 & 9,50,000
06/2 Villianur Village document No. 2439/00
& 2440/00 registered at Joint/ Addl SRO
Puduchery by A2
29 Amount paid to Shri. Deivasigamani for 3,00,000.00
purchase of land by A2
20.8.2001 Purchase of land in RS No. 84/7 &53/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Sl. Details of Immovable & Movable Value of Property
No. Properties (including stamp
fee)
84/10 in Osudu Village document No.
1740/01 registered at SRO Villianur by A2
30 20.8.2001 Purchase of land in RS No. 84/7 & 90,000.00
84/10 in Osudu Village document No.
1740/01 registered at SRO Villianur by A2
31 27.02.2002 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/3 1,00,000.00
Villianur Village document No. 425/02
registered at SRO Villianur by A2
32 Transfer of lands in Villianur village from G. 00.00
Kannaiyan to A1& subsequent transfer from
A1 to A2
33 17.4.2002 Purchase of land in RS No. 2/6 1,50,000.00
Villianur Village document No. 777/02
registered at SRO Villianur by A2
34 Construction of School and Hosterl Buildings 3,84,32,729.00
asper the IOB valuation by A2
35 18.02.2005 Purchase of Chevrlet Tavera from 8,93,368.00
Sundaram Motors by A2
36 01.06.2005 Purchase of Veh No.TN27C 5969 1,50,000.00
from Suguneswara Motors(p) Salem by A2
37 Purchase of Mahendra Maxi Car PY 01 D 1,30,000.00
4423 from P.K.Baskar by A2
38 Purchase of TN 49X 4041 from D. Kalavathi 1,25,000.00
on 08.06.2005 by A2
39 Value of Jewels pledged to REPCO Bank 6,39,115.00
Ltd, Pondichery of gross weight of 2043.800
and net weight 1751 grams by A2
40 Jewels loan at Poraiyur Primary Agriculture 49,612.0054/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Sl. Details of Immovable & Movable Value of Property
No. Properties (including stamp
fee)
Co-Operativve Credit Society, Pondichery of
gross weight of 105 and net weight 94.5
grams by A2
41 SBT, Pondicherry Current A/C No 1257 4,323.45
balance amount by A2
42 UBI Current A/C No 101-11148 in the name 13,609.00
of M/s Ashoka Steel balance amount by A2
43 Corporation Bank Current A/C No 01/000978 4,257.5
Ashoka Steel balance amount by A2
44 IOB, Reddiarpalayam Current A/C No 303 in 3,692.25
the name of A2 balance amount
45 TMB Current A/C No 318972 in the name of 2,767.5
A2 balance amount
46 F.D A/C 4768 in the name of A2 in REPCO 25,432.00
Bank Ltd
47 F.D A/C 5097 in the name of A2 in REPCO 25,106.00
Bank Ltd
48 F.D A/C 5703 in the name of A2 in REPCO 22,817.00
Bank Ltd
49 Daily Deposit A/C 4262 in the name of A2 in 1,000.00
REPCO Bank Ltd
50 FD in the name of the School of A2 1,75,000.00
51 Investment shares of UBI in the name of A3, 32,000.00
Gopika Devi and Rathi
Total 4,69,03,141.29STATEMENT – ‘C’
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018Income earned during check period – Details of Income
Sl. Details of Income Period of Income Amount
No.
1 Salary received from PASIC January 1997 to 1,15,765
Dec 1997 by A1
2 Salary received from PWD From 22.12.1997 to 32,062
13.08.1998 by A1
3 Salary received from PWD From 14.08.1998 to 15,743
03.11.1998 by A1
4 Salary received from PWD From 04.11.1998 to 1,76,377
14.11.2000 by A1
5 Salary received from PWD From 15.11.2000 to 3,49,287
28.11.2003 by A1
6 Salary received from PWD From Dec.2003 to 2,16,191
30.04.2005 by A1
7 Salary received from PWD From 01.05.2005 to 1,25,538
31.12.2005 by A1
8 GPF withdrawal from PWD 14.08.1998 to 28,759
03.11.1998 by A1
9 GPF withdrawal from PWD 04.11.1998 to 1,68,000
14.11.2000 by A1
10 GPF withdrawal from PWD 15.11.2000 to 1,33,000
28.11.2003 by A1
11 GPF withdrawal from PWD Dec. 2003 to 1,54,000
30.04.2005 by A1
12 GPF withdrawal from PWD From 01.05.2005 to 54,000
31.12.2005 by A1
13 Amount received from July 2004 600
Doordarshan Kendra by A1
14 Outstanding balance of loan 2,20,810
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Sl. Details of Income Period of Income Amount
No.
given by Pondicherry Gazetted
Officers Co-Operative Society
to A1
15 Outstanding balance in salary A1 4,858
loan A/c 554/80 at Indian Bank,
Ariyankuppam
16 Balance Car loan A/C No Car loan A/C No 3,92,811
379506520470317 of UBI 379506520470317
of UBI
17 Outstanding balance in Loan A1 31,800
given by PPACCS
18 Interest Credit to ED SB A/c. A1 49
Canara Bank
19 Interest Credit at SB Account A1 140
19652 at Indian Bank
20 Interest Credit at SB Account A1 249
121156 at PNB
21 Interest Credit at SB Account A1 865
8319 at UBI
22 Interest Credit at SB Account A1 428
3487 at Corporation Bank
23 Debit balance in SB A/C No A1 2,087
000019479 at Canara Bank
24 Housing Loan from CANFIN A3 1,76,206
Home Ltd
25 CC A/C No. 142 of Handy A3 5,12,158.83
Super Store at Punjab National
Bank
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Sl. Details of Income Period of Income Amount
No.
26 Term Loan A/C No. 12567 of A3 4,84,000
Handy Cafeteria at PNB
27 Vehicle loan A/C No. MTL 131 A3 3,62,110
at SBT
28 CC A/C No. 1004 at SBT A3 1,034,204
29 Agriculture Jewels loan at A3 28,600
PPACS
30 2 Loans at PPACS A3 69,200
31 3 Jewels loan at REPCO A3 4,20,000
32 Income as per IT return 2005- A3 1,23,336
06
33 Car loan MTL 184 at SBT A2 5,14,550
34 TL Suvida A/C No. A2 3,00,000
67001927913 at SBT
35 CC A/C No 540547 of M/s A2 1,001,749.5
Ashoka Steel at UBI
36 Term Loan of IOB A2 50,00,000
37 Loan from PPACCS A2 31,000
38 Jewels loan from PPACCS A2 35,700
39 Development loan A/C No A2 1,85,571
1143 M/s Ashoka Steel at
REPCO Bank
40 Outstanding of development A2 00.00
loan A/c No.947 of M/s Ashok
Steels at REPCO Bank released
on 23.06.2004
41 3 Jewels loan from REPCO A2 8,00,000
Bank
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Sl. Details of Income Period of Income Amount
No.
42 Outstanding balance in loan 00
under agreement
43 Divident received from UBI in A2 4,560
the name of A3 and Gopika
Devi
44 Current A/C 347 of IOB A2 66,636.75
balance
45 Muthukuviyal Deposit interest Rs 1.1 lakhs made 11,419
on 09.07.2001
46 Interest received in Daily A1 356
Deposit Account 3165 at Repco
Bank
47 Interest received in Daily A1 217
Deposit Account 3723 at Repco
Bank
48 Interest received in Daily A1 522
Deposit Account 2680 at Repco
Bank
49 Income shown in IT return of AY 2000 to 2005 5,83,050
A2
50 Income Tax refund – do- 3,49,071
51 Sale of land at Vanoor village, A1 3,50,000
Tindivanam by sale deed
795/99
Total 1,46,67,636.08
STATEMENT – ‘D’
EXPENDITURE INCURRED DURING CHECK PERIOD
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
1 Repayment of HBA principal amount by 07/09/1998 68,750.00
A1
2 Payment of Interest on HBA by A1 11.02.1999 71,815.00
3 CAN Card Visa bearing No. Oct 97 to Sep 5,982.00
454363301070942 of A1 03
4 Telephone bill for No. 2243565 by A1 Dec98 to 1,29,084.00
5 Donation given by A1 for renovation of 15.10.04 200.00
Senate Hall of University Madras
6 Payments made to Regn Fee, 8,900.00
Hypothecation entry fee and one time
tax reservation of fancy number and
termination of HPA entry. by A1
7 Rent paid for premises at No 3 by A1 Jan 2004 to 2,16,000.00
Dec 2005
8 Registration and stamp duty paid for 8,990.00
settlement deed No 681/02 by A1
9 Interest and Bank charges debited in ED 1,709.00
SB A/c 000019479 at Canara Bank by
A1
10 Interest and Bank Charges SB A/c. 65.00
19562
11 Interest and Bank charges debited in ED 780.00
SB A/c 12115 at Punjab National Bank
by A1
12 Interest and Bank charges debited in ED 1,350.00
SB A/c 8319 at Union Bank of India
13 Interest and Bank charges debited in 77,680.00
Vehicle Loan A/c No. 470159 of A1 at
UBI for Veh No. PY-01-V-4005
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
14 Interest and Bank charges debited in 37,811.00
Vehicle Loan A/c No.
379506520470317 of A1 at UBI
15 Interest and Bank charges debited in SB 100.00
A/c 01/003487 at Corporation Bank
16 Insurance and registration charges for 31,083.00
SUMO Victa
17 Intereset paid on loans taken from 9,992.00
PPACCS
18 Interest paid on loan taken from 1,62,987.00
PGOCCS ltd
19 Domestic expenditure 6,41,845.00
20 Interest debited in salary A/c No. 554/80 26,508.00
in Indian Bank
21 Expenditure for the marriage of his two 8,25,000.00
daughters
22 Loss suffered in purchase and sale of 1,53,580.00
Qualies
23 Registration and one time tax paid for 7,800.00
vehicle No. PY-01AA 3999
24 NIC premium for policy No. 501506 07.07.2003 51,332.00
to
07.07.2005
25 Interest paid in Salary Loan A/C No. 13,061.00
DLS/01/99/0003 at Corporation Bank
26 Tuition and examination fee paid to 66,515.00
SRM Engg College
27 Repair and damage of Qualis Toyota 34,368.00
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
28 IT and surcharge paid by A3 asper IT 9,718.00
returns for Ays 2005-06
29 Registration and Stamp Duty for 7,947.00
Settlement Deed 549/97 by A3
30 Registration and stamp duty for 34,392.00
settelment deed No 1453/97 by A3
31 Registration and stamp duty for 17,948.00
settelment deed No 783/03 by A3
32 Registration and stamp duty for 3,098.00
settelment deed No 3536/04 by A3
33 Interest and Bank charges debited in 90.00
Current A/c No.1601 at PNB by A3
34 Interest and Bank charges debited in C C 2,42,671.00
A/c No.142 at PNB by A3
35 Interest and Bank charges debited in C 3,225.00
urrent A/c No.1602 at PNB by A3
36 Interest and Bank charges debited in 65,110.00
MTL A/c No.131 at SBT by A3
37 Interest and Bank charges debited in C C 1,63,024.00
A/c No.1004 at SBT by A3
38 Interest and Bank charges debited in C 1,975.23
A A/c No.005605002148 at ICICI by A3
39 Interest and Bank charges debited in C 1,503.87
A A/c No. 005605001788 at ICICI by
A3
40 Interest debited in Housing Loan No 2,24,206.00
1404 of CANFIN Home Ltd by A3
41 Interest paid for 3 closed Jewel Loans at 10.12.2005 50,472.00
REPCO Bank
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
42 Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan 14,350.00
taken from PACCS ltd by A3
43 Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan 6,155.00
taken from PACCS ltd by A3
44 Loss suffered in purchase and sale of 1,73,000.00
Land in RS 99/2/A/1 by A3
44 Loss suffered in purchase and sale of 1,32,200.00
A Land in RS 75/2 by A3
45 BSNL Mobile expenditure by A2 07/05 -96 to 9,756.00
01/06 -2006
46 IT and surcharge paid by A3 AY 2000 to 4,65,010.00
05
47 Fee paid to Pondicherry Planning 48,628.00
Authority by A2
48 Fee paid to Directorate of School 29/11/2004 200.00
Education for permission to open School to
by A2 08/12/2005
49 Stamp Duty and registration charges for 216.00
Trust Deed 1061/01
50 Registration Fee for School 50.00
51 Paid For Daily Thanthi News Paper 03.09.02 to 14,500.00
28.11.02
52 Paid For Dinakaran News Paper 25.12.02 to 15,000.00
05.01.03
53 Paid For Tamil Murasu News Paper 6,500.00
54 Payment made to Dinamalar for 31.10.02 5,000.00
Advertisement
55 Payment made on Air Media Net work 15.12.02 10,000.00
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
56 Payment made to Malaimalar for 11.09.02 8,400.00
Advertisement
57 Amount received from Sri RAM Chits 32,740.00
58 Paid to LIC Prmium in Policy No. 1,76,786.00
73161248 and 713670394
59 Registration and stamp duty for 5,900.00
settelment deed No 1816/98
60 Registration and stamp duty for 658.00
settelment deed No 1818/98
61 Registration and stamp duty for 13,596.00
settlement deed No 624/99
62 Registration and stamp duty for 5,512.00
settlement deed No 2439/2000
63 Registration and stamp duty for 46,022.00
settlement deed No 2440/2000
64 Registration and stamp duty for 13,781.00
settlement deed No 1740/2001
65 Registration and stamp duty for 10,599.00
settlement deed No 425/2002
66 Registration and stamp duty for 8,994.00
settlement deed No 682/02
67 Registration and stamp duty for 15,872.00
settlement deed No 777/02
68 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 15,047.00
1257 in SBT
69 Interest Bank charges MTL A/C No. 184 19,550.00
in SBT
70 Interest Bank charges CC A/C No. 9,28,703.00
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
54047 in UBI
71 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 3,283
10111148 in UBI
72 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 11,949.5
01000978 in Corporation Bank
73 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 7,940.75
303 in IOB
74 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 1,453.75
347 in IOB
75 Interest Bank charges TL TCD A/C No. 2,86,754.00
207500031 in IOB
76 Interest Bank charges Current A/C No. 7,062.5
318972 in TMB
77 Interest on development loan A/C 804in 2,956.00
REPCO
78 Interest on development loan A/C 947 in 11,726.00
REPCO
79 Interest on development loan A/C 1143 5,473.00
in REPCO
80 Interest on Jewel loan A/C 10/14 in 1,28,666.00
REPCO
81 Loss and purchase sale of JCB 3,82,000.00
82 Interest on loan from Kotak Bank 2,17,006.00
83 Insurance JCB 08.01.03 to 47,240.00
08.01.05
84 Registration fee for JCB 725.00
85 Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan 17,309.00
taken from PACCS ltd
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Sl. Details of Expenditure Period of Amount
No. Expenditure Rs.
86 Interest paid on closed Agriculture loan 2,654.00
on Jewel taken from PACCS ltd
87 Insurance premium for veh no. TN 27 C 13,260.00
5969
88 Temporary registration charges for 36,671.00
Tavera
89 Registration fee one time tax paid for 7,800.00
veh. No PY-01-AA6999
90 Registration fee one time tax paid for 2,600.00
veh No PY-01-AA6999/ PY01 AF 7179
91 Primary permit for veh. No TN 49 X 2,000.00
4104
92 Registration fee one time tax paid for 1,520.00
veh No PY 01 S 0789 and PY 01 S 3435
93 Insurence for above vehicle 1,390.00
94 Insurance premium for veh No PY 01 S 15.3.02 to 1,225.00
3435 13.03.05 for
two yrs and
15.03.03 and
15.03.2004
one year
Total 68,82,146.8
13 The trial Court, after hearing both the parties and based on the
oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, found the
first accused (A1) guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(e)
r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment
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for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only), in
default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and found A2
guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of P.C.Act
r/w Section 109 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only), in
default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.
14 Now this Court has to answer the questions as to whether the
appellants have satisfactorily accounted the disproportionate assets found by
the prosecution and whether the prosecution has proved its case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
15 Before entering into the merits of the case, it is useful to refer
the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein, the meaning
for “KNOWN SOURCE OF INCOME” has been discussed in detail:
(1) C.S.D.Swami –Vs- State reported in AIR 1960 SC 7
Now, the expression ” known sources of income ” must
have reference to sources known to the prosecution on a
thorough investigation of the case. It was not, and it67/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018could not be, contended that ” known sources of income
” means sources known to the accused. The prosecution
cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know
the affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters ”
specially within the knowledge” of the accused, within
the meaning of s. 106 of the Evidence Act. The
prosecution can only lead evidence, as it has done in the
instant case, to show that the accused was known to
earn his living by service under the Government during
the material period.
(2) State of Maharastra -Vs– Wasudeo Ramachandra Kaidalwar
reported in 1981 (3) SCC 199“The provisions of section 5(3) have been subject of
judicial interpretation. First the expression “known
sources of income” in the context of s.5(3) meant
“sources known to the prosecution”.”(3) State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta reported in (2004) 1
SCC 691..Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13
corresponds to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of
section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194768/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018(referred to as ‘Old Act‘). But there has been
drastical amendments. Under the new clause, the
earlier concept of “known sources of income” has
undergone a radical change. As per the explanation
appended, the prosecution is relieved of the burden
of investigating into “source of income” of an
accused to a large extent, as it is stated in the
explanation that “known sources of income” mean
income received from any lawful source, the receipt
of which has been intimated in accordance with the
provisions of any law, rules orders for the time
being applicable to a public servant. The expression
“known sources of income” has reference to
sources known to the prosecution after thorough
investigation of the case. It is not, and cannot be
contended that “known sources of income” means
sources known to the accused. The prosecution
cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to
know the affairs of an accused person. Those will be
matters “specially within the knowledge” of the
accused, within the meaning of Section 106 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ‘Evidence
Act‘). The phrase “known sources of income” in
section 13(1)(e) {old section 5(1)(e)} has clearly the
emphasis on the word “income”. It would be primary
to observe that qua the public servant, the income
would be what is attached to his office or post,
commonly known as remuneration or salary. The
term “income” by itself, is elastic and has a wide
connotation. Whatever comes in or is received, is
income. But, however, wide the import and
connotation of the term “income”, it is incapable of
being understood as meaning receipt having no
nexus to one’s labour, or expertise, or property, or
investment, and having further a source which may
or may not yield a regular revenue. These essential69/117
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“income”. Therefore, it can be said that, though
“income” is receipt in the hand of its recipient,
every receipt would not partake into the character
of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return
he gets of his service, will be the primary item of his
income. Other incomes which can conceivably are
income qua the public servant, will be in the regular
receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment. A
receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime, or
immoral secretions by persons prima facie would
not be receipt from the “known sources of income”
of a public servant.
(4) State of Tamil Nadu v. R.Soundirarasu – 2023 (6) SCC 768:
34.Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act including Explanation
thereto reads as under:
“13.Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A public
servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct—
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has,
at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources
of income” means income received from any lawful source and
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such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions
of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a
public servant.”
35. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the
expression “known sources of income” and states that this
expression means the income received from any lawful source and
also requires that the receipt should have been intimated by the
public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or
orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. This
Explanation was not there in the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 (for short “the 1947 Act”). Noticing this fact in Jagan M.
Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N.,
(2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] , this Court has
observed as under:
“7. A bare reading of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act shows
that any act done or any action taken or purported to have been
done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Act, shall,
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be
deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the
corresponding provisions of the Act. It does not substitute Section
13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2) is
applicable ‘without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897’. In our opinion, the application of71/117
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would offend Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which, inter
alia provides that repeal shall not (i) affect the previous operation
of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder, or (ii) affect any investigation, legal proceedings or
remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment. Section 13, both in the matter of
punishment as also by the addition of the Explanation to Section
13(1)(e) is materially different from Section 5 of the 1947 Act. The
presumption permitted to be raised under the Explanation to
Section 13(1)(e) was not available to be raised under Section
5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act. This difference can have a material
bearing on the case.”
36. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act has
the effect of defining the expression “known sources of income”
used in Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The Explanation to
Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act consists of two parts. The first
part states that the known sources of income means the income
received from any lawful source and the second part states that
such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in
accordance with the provisions of law, rules and orders for the
time being applicable to a public servant.
37. Referring to the first part of the expression “known
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sources of income” in N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P. [N.
Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4
SCC (Cri) 454] , this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 86-87,
para 17)
“17. ‘… 6. The emphasis of the phrase “known sources of
income” in Section 13(1)(e) [old Section 5(1)(e)] is clearly on the
word “income”. It would be primary to observe that qua the
public servant, the income would be what is attached to his office
or post, commonly known as remuneration or salary. The term
“income” by itself, is elastic and has a wide connotation.
Whatever comes in or is received is income. But, however, wide
the import and connotation of the term “income”, it is incapable
of being understood as meaning receipt having no nexus to one’s
labour, or expertise, or property, or investment, and being further
a source which may or may not yield a regular revenue. These
essential characteristics are vital in understanding the term
“Income”. Therefore, it can be said that, though “income” in
receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not
partake the character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever
return he gets from his service, will be the primary item of his
income. Other income which can conceivably be income qua the
public servant will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property,
or (b) his investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft
crime or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be
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receipt from the “known source of income” of a public servant.’
[Ed. : As observed in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta,
(2004) 1 SCC 691 at p. 697, para 6] ”
38. The above brings us to the second part of the
Explanation, defining the expression “such receipt should have
been intimated by the public servant” i.e. intimation by the public
servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or orders
applicable to a public servant.
39. The language of the substantive provisions of Section
5(3) of the 1947 Act before its amendment, Section 5(1)(e) of the
1947 Act and Section 13(1)(e)of the 1988 Act continues to be the
same though Section 5(3) before it came to be amended was held
to be a procedural section in Sajjan Singh v. State of
Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464] .
Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before it came to be amended w.e.f.
18-12-1964 was interpreted in C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D.
Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] , and it was observed : (C.S.D.
Swami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] , AIR pp. 10-
11, paras 5-6)
“5. Reference was also made to cases in which courts had
held that if plausible explanation had been offered by an accused
person for being in possession of property which was the subject-
matter of the charge, the court could exonerate the accused from
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criminal responsibility for possessing incriminating property. In
our opinion, those cases have no bearing upon the charge against
the appellant in this case, because the section requires the
accused person to “satisfactorily account” for the possession of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income. Ordinarily, an accused person is entitled to
acquittal if he can account for honest possession of property
which has been proved to have been recently stolen [see
Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The rule
of law is that if there is a prima facie explanation of the accused
that he came by the stolen goods in an honest way, the inference
of guilty knowledge is displaced. This is based upon the well-
established principle that if there is a doubt in the mind of the
court as to a necessary ingredient of an offence, the benefit of that
doubt must go to the accused. But the legislature has advisedly
used the expression “satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must
be on the word “satisfactorily”, and the legislature has, thus,
deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a
plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but
also to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of
acceptance.
6. Another argument bearing on the same aspect of the
case, is that the prosecution has not led evidence to show as to
what are the known sources of the appellant’s income. In this
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connection, our attention was invited to the evidence of the
investigating officers, and with reference to that evidence, it was
contended that those officers have not said, in terms, as to what
were the known sources of income of the accused, or that the
salary was the only source of his income. Now, the expression
“known sources of income” must have reference to sources
known to the prosecution on a thorough investigation of the case.
It was not, and it could not be, contended that “known sources of
income” means sources known to the accused. The prosecution
cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the
affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters “specially
within the knowledge” of the accused, within the meaning of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution can only lead
evidence, as it has done in the instant case, to show that the
accused was known to earn his living by service under the
Government during the material period. The prosecution would
not be justified in concluding that travelling allowance was also a
source of income when such allowance is ordinarily meant to
compensate an officer concerned for his out-of-pocket expenses
incidental to journeys performed by him for his official tours. That
could not possibly be alleged to be a very substantial source of
income. The source of income of a particular individual will
depend upon his position in life with particular reference to his
occupation or avocation in life. In the case of a government
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servant, the prosecution would, naturally, infer that his known
source of income would be the salary earned by him during his
active service. His pension or his provident fund would come into
calculation only after his retirement, unless he had a justification
for borrowing from his provident fund. We are not, therefore,
impressed by the argument that the prosecution has failed to lead
proper evidence as to the appellant’s known sources of income. It
may be that the accused may have made statements to the
investigating officers as to his alleged sources of income, but the
same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case, and if the
prosecution has failed to disclose all the sources of income of an
accused person, it is always open to him to prove those other
sources of income which have not been taken into account or
brought into evidence by the prosecution.”
40. Even after Section 5(3) was deleted and Section 5(1)(e)
was enacted, this Court in Wasudeo Ramchandra
Kaidalwar [State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra
Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] has
observed that the expression “known sources of income”
occurring in Section 5(1)(e) has a definite legal connotation
which in the context must mean the sources known to the
prosecution and not sources relied upon and known to the
accused. Section 5(1)(e), it was observed by this Court, casts a
burden on the accused for it uses the words “for which the public
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servant cannot satisfactorily account”. The onus is on the accused
to account for and satisfactorily explain the assets. Accordingly,
in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of
Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC
199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] it was observed : (SCC pp. 204-205,
paras 11-13)
“11. The provisions of Section 5(3) have been subject of
judicial interpretation. First the expression “known sources of
income” in the context of Section 5(3) meant “sources known to
the prosecution”. The other principle is equally well-settled. The
onus placed on the accused under Section 5(3) was, however, not
to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt, but only to
establish a preponderance of probability. These are the well-
settled principles : see C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D.
Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] ; Sajjan Singh v. State of
Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464]
and V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P. [V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1966 SC 1762] The legislature thought it fit to dispense with
the rule of evidence under Section 5(3) and make the possession of
disproportionate assets by a public servant as one of the species
of the offence of criminal misconduct by inserting Section 5(1)(e)
due to widespread corruption in public services.
12. The terms and expressions appearing in Section 5(1)(e)
of the Act are the same as those used in the old Section 5(3).
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Although the two provisions operate in two different fields, the
meaning to be assigned to them must be the same. The expression
“known sources of incomes” means “sources known to the
prosecution”. So also, the same meaning must be given to the
words “for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily
account” occurring in Section 5(1)(e). No doubt, Section 4(1)
provides for presumption of guilt in cases falling under Sections
5(1)(a) and (b), but there was, in our opinion, no need to mention
Section 5(1)(e) therein. For, the reason is obvious. The provision
contained in Section 5(1)(e) of the Act is a self-contained
provision. The first part of the section casts a burden on the
prosecution and the second on the accused. When Section 5(1)(e)
uses the words ‘for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily
account’, it is implied that the burden is on such public servant to
account for the sources for the acquisition of disproportionate
assets. The High Court, therefore, was in error in holding that a
public servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his
possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot be
convicted of an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section
5(1)(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible
sources of income.
13. That takes us to the difficult question as to the nature
and extent of the burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act.
The expression “burden of proof” has two distinct meanings (1)
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the legal burden i.e. the burden of establishing the guilt, and (2)
the evidential burden i.e. the burden of leading evidence. In a
criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to
establish the charge against the accused lies upon the
prosecution, and that burden never shifts. Notwithstanding the
general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the
prosecution, in the case of certain offences, the burden of proving
a particular fact in issue may be laid by law upon the accused.
The burden resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not
so onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is discharged
by proof of a balance of probabilities. The ingredients of the
offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) read with
Section 5(1)(e) are the possession of pecuniary resources or
property disproportionate to the known sources of income for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. To
substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the following
facts before it can bring a case under Section 5(1)(e), namely, (1)
it must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the
nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which
were found in his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what
were his known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution,
and (4) it must prove, quite objectively, that such resources or
property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate
to his known sources of income. Once these four ingredients are
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established, the offence of criminal misconduct under Section
5(1)(e) is complete, unless the accused is able to account for such
resources or property. The burden then shifts to the accused to
satisfactorily account for his possession of disproportionate
assets. The extent and nature of burden of proof resting upon the
public servant to be found in possession of disproportionate assets
under Section 5(1)(e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the
Court inJhingan case [V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC
1762] i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of probability.
That test was laid down by the court following the dictum of
Viscount Sankey, L.C., inWoolmington v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
1935 AC 462 (HL)] . The High Court has placed an impossible
burden on the prosecution to disprove all possible sources of
income which were within the special knowledge of the accused.
As laid down inSwami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC
7] , the prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be
expected to know the affairs of a public servant found in
possession of resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income i.e. his salary. Those will be matters specially
within the knowledge of the public servant within the meaning of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 106 reads:
‘106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,81/117
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In this connection, the phrase the “burden of proof” is
clearly used in the secondary sense, namely, the duty of
introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden cast on
the accused is well-settled. The accused is not bound to prove his
innocence beyond all the reasonable doubt. All that he need to do
is to bring out a preponderance of probability.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. While the expression “known sources of income” refers
to the sources known to the prosecution, the expression “for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account” refers to
the onus or burden on the accused to satisfactorily explain and
account for the assets found to be possessed by the public servant.
This burden is on the accused as the said facts are within his
special knowledge. Section 106 of the Evidence Act applies. The
Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is a procedural section which
seeks to define the expression “known sources of income” as
sources known to the prosecution and not to the accused. The
Explanation applies and relates to the mode and manner of
investigation to be conducted by the prosecution, it does away
with the requirement and necessity of the prosecution to have an
open, wide and roving investigation and enquire into the alleged
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sources of income which the accused may have. It curtails the
need and necessity of the prosecution to go into the alleged
sources of income which a public servant may or possibly have
but are not legal or have not been declared. The undeclared
alleged sources are by their very nature are expected to be known
to the accused only and are within his special knowledge.
(emphasis supplied) The effect of the Explanation is to clarify and
reinforce the existing position and understanding of the
expression “known sources of income” i.e. the expression refers
to sources known to the prosecution and not sources known to the
accused. The second part of the Explanation does away with the
need and requirement for the prosecution to conduct an open
ended or roving enquiry or investigation to find out all
alleged/claimed known sources of income of an accused who is
investigated under the PC Act, 1988. The prosecution can rely
upon the information furnished by the accused to the authorities
under law, rules and orders for the time being applicable to a
public servant. No further investigation is required by the
prosecution to find out the known sources of income of the
accused public servant. As noticed above, the first part of the
Explanation refers to income received from legal/lawful sources.
This first part of the expression states the obvious as is clear from
the judgment of this Court in N. Ramakrishnaiah [N.
Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4
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SCC (Cri) 454] .
42.Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid that the expression
“known source of income” is not synonymous with the words “for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account.” The two
expressions connote and have different meaning, scope and
requirements.”
16 The Investigating Officer issued notice to A1 and A2 on
14.5.2007, calling upon them to appear before him for offering their
explanations. Again, on 17.5.2007, the Investigating Officer issued notice
Ex.P374 and on 17.9.2007 issued another notice Ex.P375 calling upon him
for satisfactory explanation. But the accused did not send any explanation,
which reveal that the accused did not avail the opportunity extended by the
Investigating Officer in the manner known to law. Further the accused did
not raise any objection regarding the denial of opportunity during trial and
also sending notice by Investigating Officer to the accused, but they have
raised such objection only at the end of the trial.
17 During trial, A3 died and charges against A3 got abated. A1
and A2 alone were facing trial and have been convicted, against which, A1
and A2 are before this Court.
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18 This Court heard the rival submissions made on behalf of both
the parties and perused the oral and documentary evidence produced by the
prosecution as well as the accused and also the decisions relied on by both
the counsel.
19 This Court, as an appellate Court and as a final Court of fact
finding, it has to necessarily re-appreciate the evidence and give finding
independently.
20 Now the question that arisen for consideration in this case is as
to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts
for the offence under Section 13(1)(2) of PC Act r/w Section 109 IPC
against the accused.
21 It is settled proposition that to prove the offence under Section
13(1)(2) of PC Act, the prosecution has to prove that the accused did not
satisfactorily account the disproportionate asset. In this regard it is useful to
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refer the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
(1) CSD Sami vs. State. reported in AIR 1960 SC 7
The Legislature has advisedly used the expression
“satisfactorily account”. , The emphasis must be on the word ”
satisfactorily “, and the Legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a
burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to
how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the court that his
explanation was worthy of acceptance.
(2) K.Veerasami vs. Union of India and Ors reported in
1991 (3) SCC 655
The Legislature has advisedly used the expression
“satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must be on the word
“satisfactorily”. That means the accused has to satisfy the court that
his explanation is worthy of acceptance
(3) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and
Ors. reported in 2004(1) SCC 691
The legislature has advisedly used the expression
“satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must be on the word
“satisfactorily” and the legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a
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how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the Court that his
explanation was worthy of acceptance.
(4) K.Anbazhagan vs. Indo Doha Chemicals and
Pharmaceuticals and Ors. reported in 2017 (6) SCC 263
It was emphasised that the word “satisfactorily” did levy a
burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to
how he came by his large wealth but also to satisfy the Court that the
explanation was worthy of acceptance. The noticeable feature of this
pronouncement thus it that the explanation offered by the accused to
be acceptable has to be one not only plausible in nature and content
but also worthy of acceptance.
22 In the present case the accused were given sufficient
opportunity to show satisfactorily account the disproportionate asset, but,
they did not avail the same. A bare perusal of Exs.P372 to 375 and the
evidence of the investigating officer provided regarding opportunity for
satisfactorily account. A perusal of Ex.P376 reveal that A1 at a later stage,
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after long deliberation, requested to send separate details of statement of
assets and liabilities of A1 and A3. Further, if at all as per the accused, no
sufficient opportunity was given to them to account the disproportionate
asset, they should have raised objections at the initial stage of trial itself, but
they have raised such objections only at the end of trial. The accused have
not denied the assets stand in their name except A1 subsequently belatedly
asked for a separate statement of asset. It is not the case of the first accused
that he was not aware of this proceedings. On reading of evidence of
P.W.85, who filed Charge sheet shows that prosecution summoned several
witnesses and recorded their statements and collected documents Ex.P1 to
377. The particulars of assets and liabilities statement have already been
extracted above. Therefore it is clear that statutory provisions with regard to
notice to the accused for satisfactory account has been duly complied with
by the prosecution.
23 As far as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel with
regard to the burden of proof by the prosecution, it is useful to refer the
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following decisions of the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of Supreme Court:
K.Veerasamy Vs Union of India reported in 1991 (3) SCC 655
But the legal burden of proof placed on the accused is not so
onerous as that of the prosecution. However, it is just not throwing some
doubt on the prosecution version. The Legislature has advisedly used the
expression “satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must be on the word
“satisfactorily”. That means the accused has to satisfy the court that his
explanation is worthy of acceptance. The burden of proof placed on the
accused is an evidential burden though not a persuasive burden.
P. Nallammal –Vs- State reported in 1999 6 SCC 559
Shri K.K. Venugopal endeavoured to establish that the
offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act is to be
understood as an offshoot of the different facets of
misconduct of a public servant enumerated in clauses
(a) to(d) of the sub-section which a public servant might
commit. According to him, unless the ill-gotten wealth
has a nexus with the sources contemplated in the
preceding clauses the public servant cannot be held89/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018guilty under clause (e) of Section 13(1). Learned senior
counsel elaborated his contention like this: If a public
servant is able to account for the excess wealth by
showing some clear sources, though not legally
permissible, but not falling under any of the preceding
clauses of the sub-section, he would be discharging the
burden cast on him. He cited an example like this:
If the public servant satisfies the court that the excess
wealth possessed by him is attributable to the dowry
amount which he received from the father-in-law of his
son, the public servant is not liable to be convicted
under the aforesaid clause.
The above contention perhaps could have been
advanced before the enactment of the P.C. Act 1988
because Section 5(1)(e) of the old P.C. Act did not
contain an “Explanation” as Section 13(1)(e) now
contains. As per the Explanation the “known sources of
income” of the public servant, for the purpose of
satisfying the court, should be “any lawful source”.
Besides being the lawful source the Explanation further
enjoins that receipt of such income should have been
intimated by the public servant in accordance with the
provisions of any law applicable to such public servant
at the relevant time. So a public servant cannot now90/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018escape from the tentacles of Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C.
Act by showing other legally forbidden sources, albeit
such sources are outside the purview of clauses (a) to
(d) of the sub-section.
24 With the above guidelines and principles now, this Court as a
final Court of fact finding has to re-appreciate the entire evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses and has to analyse the legal
aspects raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the accused.
25 A1, who was a public servant, is accountable to give statements
of assets stand in his name and his family members as per Rule 18 of the
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which is extracted hereunder:
“18. Movable, immovable and valuable property (1) (i)
Every Government servant shall on his first appointment to any
service or post submit a return of his assets and liabilities, in
such form as may be prescribed by the Government, giving the
full particulars regarding – (a) the immovable property inherited
by him, or owned or acquired by him or held by him on lease or
mortgage, either in his own name or in the name of any member
of his family or in the name of any other person; (b) shares,91/117
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similarly owned, acquired, or held by him; (c) other movable
property inherited by him or similarly owned, acquired or held
by him; and (d) debts and other liabilities incurred by him
directly or indirectly.”25.1 The above Rule clearly mandates A1, who was admittedly a
public servant, to produce details of assets held either in his name or his
family members. A1 sent letter Ex.P376 after a long deliberation to give
separate statement of asset. It is not the case of A1 that there is no talking
terms between A1 and A3, who are husband and wife and living under the
same roof. Even though A3 has right to have and maintain property on her
own, as a public servant, A1 cannot simply say that he does not know
anything about the properties standing in the name of his wife A3 and it is
the bounden duty of A1 to give explanation, at least after receiving notice
from the investigating officer that what are the properties belong to him and
what are the properties belonging to his wife. Further the properties held by
A1 or his family members is the personal knowledge of A1 and he only
knows what are properties stand in his name, what is the source of income
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018and what are the liabilities and hence he should have offered his explanation
for the properties stand in his name as well as in the name of his wife A3.
There is no materials to show that A1 has shown or submitted the details of
assets held in his name or his family members to the department, during or
prior or subsequent to the check period. Therefore the contention of the
learned Senior Counsel that the wife is not dependent of A1 and she has
independent source of income is not sustainable for the purpose of this Act.
26 To support the case of the defence, the accused have examined
the Auditor as D.W.1 and marked documents as Ex.D1 to D37.
27 With regard to contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
accused regarding finding of the trial Court that the loss of Rs.3,82,000/- in
the sale of JCB is concerned, as per prosecution, the JCB was purchased for
Rs.15,95,000/- and it was sold for a sum of Rs.12,13,000/- thereby incurred
a loss of Rs.3,82,000/-. The accused denied the said loss on the ground that
already the JCB yield income. Burt, the trial Court has already added the
said income in Statement C. Further from the evidence of P.W.32, 33 and
P.W.85 and also Statements C and D, it is clear that the trial Court has
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rightly shown Rs.3,82,000/- as loss in JCB. Further A2 did not come into
witness box to disprove the case of the prosecution and it is only a defence
created by D.W.1. It is to be noted that A2 shown the rental income of the
JCB too high in ITR filed after FIR with the aid and assistance of D.W.1,
comparing with the ITRs filed before FIR and there is no proof for the same.
Therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel is not acceptable.
28 Coming to purchase of land, evidence of P.W.51, 53, 54, 55, 56
and 57 is clear that A1 instigated and instructed to sell the lands, which were
purchased not only in the name of A1 , but also in the name of A2. It is the
evidence of P.Ws.51, 53 and 54 that A1 only paid the amount and A2 did
not come to the Registration office during the time of registration. There is
no material evidence to show that A2 only paid consideration for purchase
of the said property out of his own source of income. Therefore, the
evidence of the above witnesses have clearly proved the offence of abetment
of A2.
29 It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
accused that the value shown in Ex.D.25 is the actual cost of construction of
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the School and Hostel Buildings, which is Rs.1,34,08,000/-, wheras the
learned Judge has placed reliance on Ex.P.145 and concluded the value of
the property at Rs.2,06,90,769/ given by P.W.64 stating that the same is only
before registering the FIR and Ex.D25 is after registering the FIR. Ex.P145
is only for the purpose of availing loan from the Bank and Ex.D25 is the
actual expenditure incurred. Therefore the learned trial Judge is wrong in
relying on Ex.P145.
30 With regard to the above contention, P.W.64, who is the
Consulting Engineer and Valuer has given his report Ex.P145, which shows
that the value of the buildings worth Rs.3,84,32,729/-. Even though, it is
contended that A2 has materials for the construction, which was not revealed
by A2 at the time of inspection by P.W.64, who also took photographs and
attached the same to his report Ex.P145. Therefore the contention of the
accused is only after thought in order to escape from the clutches of law.
31 The evidence of P.W.5, it is clear that based on the request from
CBI, he applied his mind and accorded sanction (Ex.P22) for Prosecution
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under PC Act against A1 under Section 19(3) and (4). In this regard, it is
pertinent to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State v
T.Venkatesh Murthy, reported in 2004 (7) SCC 763, wherein it was held as
follows:
“7. A combined reading of sub-sections (3) and
(4) makes the position clear that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code no finding, sentence and order
passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of
the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the
sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the
opinion of that court a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby.
8. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) is also relevant. It
shows that no court shall stay the proceedings under the
Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in
the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied
that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice.
9. Sub-section (4) postulates that in determining
under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned or
resulted in a failure of justice, the court shall have regard96/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018to the fact whether the objection could and should have
been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
10. Explanation appended to the section is also of
significance. It provides, that for the purpose of Section 19,
error includes competency of the authority to grant
sanction.”
32 The above decision of the Supreme Court makes it clear that no
finding, sentence and order passed by the trial Court shall be reversed or
altered by a Court in appeal. Further, from the evidence of P.W.5, it is clear
that the sanctioning authority has applied its mind and accorded the sanction
and hence this Court does not find any failure of justice.
33 Further evidence of P.Ws.7, 9 and 10 reveal abetment of A2,
wherein PASIC, in which A1 was employee, supplied cement to the Ashok
Stee, which was run by A2, for which the cheque issued by A2 was returned
and there was also complaint raised by PASIC, but subsequently on payment
by A2, the matter was settled.
34 All the documents produced by the accused have been invented
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and created only for the purpose of defence and in order to escape from the
clutches of law, which are not natural. For one example, D.W.1 has stated in
his evidence that the father of the accused is Class-I Contractor in
Puducherry and Tamil Nadu. 1st accused is 1st son of the said Cannaiyan
who was working as Superintending Engineer in Puducherry and the 2nd son
Jayakumar is the sitting MLA and the 3rd son Seetharaman was working as
Assistant Engineer. One Vijayalakshmi of Valavanur is the wife of 1st
accused. Vijayalakshmi’s parents owns 100 acres of land, cinema theatre,
rice mill, school and dairy farm. After the marriage of Vijayalakshmi with
the 1st accused, she was doing the business of dairy farm. The 2nd accused,
who is an Engineering Graduate is the son of Vijayalakshmi and 1st
accused. Their daughters are Anudha and Aarthi and they are also graduates.
Anudha and Aarthi were given to marriage and their marriage expenses were
met out by their respective grooms family. The 2nd accused married one
Gopikadevi, only daughter of one Govindasamy, who owns 150 acres of
land, rice mill, and 8 buses. The marriage expenses of the 2nd accused was
borne by the bride’s parents besides they had also adorned the wife of 2nd
accused with 200 sovereigns of gold jewels, and was given sufficient
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sridhana articles of silver and brass items, refrigerator, etc.
35 From the above statement of D.W.1, it is clear that the accused
never spent single pie for the above said marriages, which itself shows that
evidence of D.W.1 is unnatural and artificial and the same is not genuine
one. Further D.W.1 is not the competent person to speak about the marriage
expenses spent by the bride and groom of A1’s family. D.W.1, being a
Chartered Accountant, can only assist the person for filing of Income Tax
Returns. None of the persons who had personal knowledge about the same
has been examined.
36 Once as discussed above and also in the decisions quoted
above, the prosecution found disproportionate assets, the accused, being a
public servant, has to satisfactorily account them with his known source of
income, which is not known to the prosecution and the accused has to rebut
the presumption.
37 Therefore a reading of the evidence of prosecution witnesses
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and statements and also defence taken by the accused and also reading of the
judgment of the trial Court, which gone into detail and also discussed
elaborately about various documents and statement rightly held that the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, as an
appellate Court, while re-appreciating the entire evidence independently,
finds that as discussed above, the accused have not satisfactorily account the
disproportionate assets and also have not given any satisfactorily
explanation for the same. It is the personal knowledge of the accused and
they have to come forward with the explanation and they have to
satisfactorily account and convince the investigating agency, if it is done by
the accused, prosecution could not have prosecuted them further.
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38 It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that
even after demise of A3, who has independent source, the trial Court would
not have included the properties of A3 and there is no ingredient made out
against A3 and further no explanation was called for from A3. In this
regard, it is pertinent to refer a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in
2021 (18) SCC 135 (CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi):
“27. This conclusion is also supported by the judgment
of another Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami [K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC
(Cri) 734] . The judgment was in context of Section 5(1)(e) of
the old Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is similar to
Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. It was argued that : (i) a public
servant must be afforded an opportunity to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets before an investigating officer; (ii) this
must then be included and explained by the investigating
officer while filing the charge-sheet; and (iii) the failure to do
so would render the charge-sheet invalid. Rejecting this
submission, the Constitution Bench held that doing so would
elevate the investigating officer to the role of an enquiry officer
or a Judge and that their role was limited only to collect
material in order to ascertain whether the alleged offence has101/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018been committed by the public servant.
28. In his opinion for himself and Venkatachaliah, J., K.
Jagannatha Shetty, J. held thus : (K. Veeraswami [K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, para 75 :
1991 SCC (Cri) 734] , SCC p. 715, para 75)
“75. … since the legality of the charge-sheet has been
impeached, we will deal with that contention also. The counsel
laid great emphasis on the expression “for which he cannot
satisfactorily account” used in clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the
Act. He argued that that term means that the public servant is
entitled to an opportunity before the investigating officer to
explain the alleged disproportionality between assets and the
known sources of income. The investigating officer is required
to consider his explanation and the charge-sheet filed by him
must contain such averment. The failure to mention that
requirement would vitiate the charge-sheet and renders it
invalid. This submission, if we may say so, completely
overlooks the powers of the investigating officer. The
investigating officer is only required to collect material to find
out whether the offence alleged appears to have been
committed. In the course of the investigation, he may examine
the accused. He may seek his clarification and if necessary he
may cross check with him about his known sources of income
and assets possessed by him. Indeed, fair investigation requires102/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018as rightly stated by Mr A.D. Giri, learned Solicitor General,
that the accused should not be kept in darkness. He should be
taken into confidence if he is willing to cooperate. But to state
that after collection of all material the investigating officer
must give an opportunity to the accused and call upon him to
account for the excess of the assets over the known sources of
income and then decide whether the accounting is satisfactory
or not, would be elevating the investigating officer to the
position of an enquiry officer or a Judge. The investigating
officer is not holding an enquiry against the conduct of the
public servant or determining the disputed issues regarding the
disproportionality between the assets and the income of the
accused. He just collects material from all sides and prepares
a report which he files in the court as charge-sheet.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. Therefore, since an accused public servant does not
have a right to be afforded a chance to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets to the investigating officer before the
filing of a charge-sheet, a similar right cannot be granted to
the accused before the filing of an FIR by making a
preliminary enquiry mandatory.”
39 In the case on hand, as discussed above, the accused were
called for explanation and they were given sufficient opportunity to
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satisfactorily account for the disproportionate asset. But, A1, being a Public
Servant, failed to disclose the asset stand in the name of his wife A3, as
emanated under Rule 18 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1964.
40 A1 and A2 have not come to the witness box and they cleverly
invented D.W.1, who is not competent to speak about personal knowledge of
the accused and put him into box and marked documents, which were
created for the purpose of defence and evidence of D.W.1 is also unnatural.
41 Even though, it is settled law that the accused need not come
into the witness box and he can remain silent, but, when the prosecution has
produced sufficient materials by oral and documentary, it is for the accused
to come forward with satisfactory explanation for the same, especially in the
cases of disproportionate asset, since it is only personal knowledge of the
accused. In this regard, it is relevant to notice a judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of State of Karnataka v J.Jayalalitha, reported in 2017 (6)
SCC 263:
“191. Though considerable exchanges had been made
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018in course of the arguments, centring around Section 43 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, we are of the comprehension that those
need not be expatiated in details. Suffice it to state that even
assuming that the income tax returns, the proceedings in
connection therewith and the decisions rendered therein are
relevant and admissible in evidence as well, nothing as such,
turns thereon definitively as those do not furnish any
guarantee or authentication of the lawfulness of the source(s)
of income, the pith of the charge levelled against the
respondents. It is the plea of the defence that the income tax
returns and orders, while proved by the accused persons had
not been objected to by the prosecution and further it
(prosecution) as well had called in evidence the income tax
returns/orders and thus, it cannot object to the admissibility of
the records produced by the defence. To reiterate, even if such
returns and orders are admissible, the probative value would
depend on the nature of the information furnished, the findings
recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the charge
levelled. In any view of the matter, however, such returns and
orders would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or
disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of evidence
which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on
record. Noticeably, none of the respondents has been
examined on oath in the case in hand. Further, the income tax105/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018returns relied upon by the defence as well as the orders passed
in the proceedings pertaining thereto have been filed/passed
after the charge-sheet had been submitted. Significantly, there
is a charge of conspiracy and abetment against the accused
persons. In the overall perspective therefore neither the
income tax returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings
relatable thereto, either definitively attest the lawfulness of the
sources of income of the accused persons or are of any avail
to them to satisfactorily account the disproportionateness of
their pecuniary resources and properties as mandated by
Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
In the case on hand also, the accused were not examined to prove the
source of income in the manner known to law.
42 As far as contention of the accused regarding extension of
check period, it is prerogative of prosecution to fix check period and the
same is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. Pollonji Darabshaw Daruwalla, reported in 1987 Supp
SCC 379, which reads as follows:
18. .. It is for the prosecution to choose what, according
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018to it, is the period which having regard to the acquisitive
activities of the public servant in amassing wealth,
characterise and isolate that period for special scrutiny. It is
always open to the public servant to satisfactorily account for
the apparently disproportionate nature of his possession…
Further in this case, admittedly A1 is a public servant during the
check period. Section 13 (1)(e) of the PC Act is clear, which reads as
follows:
“Section 13: Criminal misconduct by a public servant:–
(1) …
(a) ….
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession
or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in
possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily
account, of pecuniary resources or property
disproportionate to his known sources of income.”
From the above said provisions and the decisions of the Supreme
Court, it is clear that there is nothing wrong in fixing the check period.
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43 It is the duty of the public servant, who are accountable for their
income and assets and liabilities. They know even when they are entering
into the service what is their assets and what would be their income. As a
model citizen, in order to get trust of the public, public servant should be
accountable for their assets. When any complaint raised against them, they
have to satisfactorily account the known source of income by giving
satisfactory explanation for the same.
44 As far as Income Tax Returns is concerned, one of the grounds
taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the ITR filed by
A2 and A3 are legal documents assessed and accepted by the Income Tax
Department and the prosecution has also neither challenged these returns nor
presented any conclusive evidence to demonstrate the exaggeration and also
to support this contention, reliance was also placed on the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnanad Agnihotri vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in 1977 (1) SCC 816. In this regard it is pertinent
to note that subsequently the Hon’ble Supreme Court has rendered its
judgment in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. N.Suresh Rajan and Others
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reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709 and the relevant portion is extracted
hereunder
“The property in the name of an income tax assessee itself
cannot be aground to hold that it actually belongs to such an
assessee. In case this proposition is accepted, in our opinion, it
will lead to disastrous consequences. It will give opportunity to
the corrupt public servants to amass property in the name of
known persons, pay income tax on their behalf and then be out
from the mischief of law.”
In the present case, merely the accused have filed ITR, subsequent to
registration of the FIR, they cannot be allowed to escape from the clutches
of law unless proved the same with sufficient materials in the manner known
to law. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of
State of Karnataka Vs. J.Jayalalitha reported in (2017) 6 SCC 263 has held
as follows:
“190. The decision is to convey that though the IT returns and
the orders passed in the IT proceedings in the instant case recorded
the income of the accused concerned as disclosed in their returns, in
view of the charge levelled against them, such returns and the orders
in the IT proceedings would not by themselves establish that such109/117
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Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018income had been from lawful source as contemplated in the
Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988 and that
independent evidence would be required to account for the same.
191. Though considerable exchanges had been made in course
of the arguments, centring around Section 43 of the Evidence Act,
1872, we are of the comprehension that those need not be expatiated
in details. Suffice it to state that even assuming that the income tax
returns, the proceedings in connection therewith and the decisions
rendered therein are relevant and admissible in evidence as well,
nothing as such, turns thereon definitively as those do not furnish any
guarantee or authentication of the lawfulness of the source(s) of
income, the pith of the charge levelled against the respondents. It is
the plea of the defence that the income tax returns and orders, while
proved by the accused persons had not been objected to by the
prosecution and further it (prosecution) as well had called in
evidence the income tax returns/orders and thus, it cannot object to
the admissibility of the records produced by the defence. To reiterate,
even if such returns and orders are admissible, the probative value
would depend on the nature of the information furnished, the findings
recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the charge levelled.
In any view of the matter, however, such returns and orders would
not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove the charge and
can at best be pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along
with the other materials on record. Noticeably, none of the
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respondents has been examined on oath in the case in hand. Further,
the income tax returns relied upon by the defence as well as the
orders passed in the proceedings pertaining thereto have been
filed/passed after the charge-sheet had been submitted. Significantly,
there is a charge of conspiracy and abetment against the accused
persons. In the overall perspective therefore neither the income tax
returns nor the orders passed in the proceedings relatable thereto,
either definitively attest the lawfulness of the sources of income of the
accused persons or are of any avail to them to satisfactorily account
the disproportionateness of their pecuniary resources and properties
as mandated by Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
192. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi
Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] in this context
had ruled that there is neither any statutory provision nor any legal
principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated
as final or binding on the other as both the cases have to be decided
on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.
……
196. This Court ruled that the fact that the accused, other than
the two Ministers, had been assessed to income tax and had paid
income tax could not have been relied upon to discharge the accused
persons in view of the allegation made by the prosecution that there
was no separate income to amass such huge property. It was
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underlined that the property in the name of the income tax assessee
itself cannot be a ground to hold that it actually belongs to such an
assessee and that if this proposition was accepted, it would lead to
disastrous consequences. This Court reflected that in such an
eventuality it will give opportunities to the corrupt public servant to
amass property in the name of known person, pay income tax on their
behalf and then be out from the mischief of law.
45 The details of statements, showing disproportionate assets as
projected by the prosecution is as follows.
Statement Details Amount
Rs.
Statement A Assets held at the beginning of the check 15,87,430.90
period
Statement B Assets held at the end of the check period 4,69, 03,141.29
Statement C Income earned during check period 1,46,67,636.08
Statement D Expenditure incurred during Check Period 68,82,146.80
E Statement B – Statement A 4,53,15,710.39
F Statement E + Statement D 5,21,97,857.19
Quantum of Disproportionate Assets (F-C) 3,75,30,221.11
Percentage of Disproportionate Assets 255.91%
DP x 100/Total Income
46 The learned trial Judge, based on the evidence and the available
materials, found the disproportionate asset for the value of Rs.1,74,36,839/-
and thereby has reduced the percentage from 255.91% to 110.59%. Mere
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defect on the part of the investigating agency may not be a ground affecting
the case of the prosecution and the accused are not entitled to get acquittal
on that ground.
47 It is true that Section 19 of PC Act is there as protection and
immunity to the public servant and if any one wants to take vengeance under
the guise of prosecution to prosecute the public servant, they cannot just like
that do the same and prior sanction should be obtained from the competent
authority. But at the same time, the public servant should not take advantage
of the protection and immunity provided under the law and escape from the
clutches of law. Therefore, when the first opportunity was offered to them,
it is the duty of the public servant to come forward with the satisfactory
explanation and when he failed to do the same, subsequently with the aid of
legal brain, they cannot try to fill the gap and escape from the clutches of
law and if this Court encourages such type of defence, no public service can
be put into clutches of law and simply they will escape from the clutches of
law taking advantage of the technicality and other defect in investigation
with the help of legal brain. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer the
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judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Rajmohan
v. CBI, reported in 2023 (1) SCC 329:
“22. Statutory provisions requiring sanction before
prosecution either under Section 197CrPC or under Section 97 of
the PC Act also intend to serve the very same purpose of
protecting a public servant. These protections are not available to
other citizens because of the inherent vulnerabilities of a public
servant and the need to protect them. However, the said protection
is neither a shield against dereliction of duty nor an absolute
immunity against corrupt practices. The limited immunity or bar is
only subject to a sanction by the appointing authority.”
48 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident
that the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
are not applicable to the facts of the present case on hand.
49 From the aforesaid discussion, the facts and circumstances of
the case and the legal and factual position, it is clear that, in this case, the
prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and that A1 has
disproportionate asset and A2 and A3 abetted for the same. This Court also
independently finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all
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reasonable doubts. There is no merit in both the appeals and same are liable
to dismissed.
50 Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. The trial Court is
directed to secure the custody of the accused A1 and A2 to serve the
remaining period of imprisonment, if any.
09.01.2025
Index : Yes/No
Speaking Order/Non Speaking Order
Neutral Citation case: Yes/no
cgi/cs
To
1. The Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases
(Principal Sessions Judge), Puducherry.
2. The Inspector of Police, SPE:CBI ACB, Chennai,
Through Public Prosecutor, for CBI, Chennai.
3. The Public Prosecutor (Pondicherry), High Court of Madras.
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P.VELMURUGAN, J
cgi
Pre-Delivery Judgment
in
Crl.A.Nos.710 and 724 of 2018
09.01.2025
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