Uttarakhand High Court
Banmeet Singh vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 7 January, 2025
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
First Bail Application No. 1760 of 2024
Banmeet Singh ........Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement ........Respondent
Present:-
Mr. Aditya Singh and Mr. M.S. Rawat, Advocates for the applicant.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain (through video conferencing), Special Counsel for
the Directorate of Enforcement, with Mr. Atul Bahuguna, Retainer
Counsel for the Directorate of Enforcement.
Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
Applicant is in judicial custody in ECIR No.
ECIR/DNSZO/4/2023, Special Summary Trial no.29 of 2024,
Enforcement Directorate Vs. Banmeet Singh, under Sections 3
and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“the
Act”), filed before the District and Sessions Court (Designated
Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA),
2002) Registered at Dehradun Sub-Zonal Officer. He has
sought his release on bail.
2. The background of the case is as follows: The
applicant was investigated with regard to the offences of drug
trafficking and money laundering in the United States of
America. He was arrested in the month of April, 2019, in the
United Kingdom on extradition request of the US authorities
on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. The
applicant entered into a plea agreement with the US
authorities on 05.01.2024. He was convicted, but his sentence
was reduced to 60 months. On 19.04.2024, the applicant was
2
released. On his arrival in India, he was interrogated and
finally arrested. It has been the case of the Enforcement
Directorate (“ED”) that as per the information received from
the US authorities, the applicant along with his brother
Parvinder Singh was operating an international drug
trafficking group named as the Singh DTO (Drug Trafficking
Organization). That used vendor marketing sites on the dark
web, numerous free advertisements on clear websites, and a
network of narcotic and controlled-substance distributors and
distribution cells to sell drugs. In exchange, the Singh
Organization received drug trafficking proceeds in the form of
crypto currency and laundered these proceeds through crypto
currency wallets. The Singh Organization received the drug
trafficking proceeds through the sales on dark web markets,
then laundered those proceeds through crypto currency
transactions. Both brothers, i.e. the applicant and Parvinder
Singh, used the monikers “Liston” and “Listonishere” on a
variety of dark web markets. After his arrest in India, the
statement of applicant was recorded under Section 50 of the
Act. The statement of Parvinder Singh was also recorded
under Section 50 of the Act.
3. It is the case of the ED that in US court, the
applicant was prosecuted and convicted with regard to some
Bitcoins (“BTC”), which he had earned through his drug
trafficking business. Before the US authorities, the applicant,
3
as per the ED, has given a statement that he had split the
business with his brother Parvinder Singh and 4250 BTC were
transferred to Parvinder Singh. According to the ED, Parvinder
Singh had denied acquisition of 4250 BTC. He had though
revealed possession of some BTC, which have been taken into
custody by the ED.
4. Complaint has already been filed by the ED in the
matter. In Para 10.2.21, 10.2.22 and 10.2.23, the averments
that have been made in the complaint are as follows:-
“10.2.21 That Banmeet Singh did not have any legitimate
source of income in India as well as in United Kingdom
during the period 2012 to 2017, and he stayed mostly at
the United Kingdom during the said period along with his
wife Amarpreet Kaur Chawla. On being asked, both
Banmeet Singh and Amarpreet Kaur Chawla could not
produce any proof for their legitimate source of income
during the said period. Thus the foreign inward remittances
received in their accounts are nothing but a part of
proceeds of crime. Thus the proceeds of crime in the
instant case have been mixed with legitimate source (in
case of Surjeet Singh) in order to disguise the tainted
money i.e. proceeds of crime project it as untained.
10.2.22 That the foreign inward remittances received in
the bank accounts of Banmeet Singh, Amarpreet Kaur
Chawla and Surjeet Singh were further rotated to various
other accounts belonging to them so as to disguise the
origin of funds and project those as untainted money. The
rotation of funds through various accounts to make them
appear as untainted money is a classic example of Money
Laundering. This clearly proves the malafide intention of
Banmeet Singh and Amarpreet Kaur Chawla of projecting
4the illegally earned money through sale of illegal drugs as
untainted and utilizing the same for their personal use.
10.2.23 Further, the remaining PoC in the instant case i.e.
4250 Bitcoins is still untraceable and is suspected to be in
possession of the Banmeet Singh or Parvinder Singh,
investigation in respect of the same is undergoing.”
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit
that the applicant has already been tried and convicted by the
US authorities with regard to all BTC, which he had. It is
argued that, in fact, the applicant had been prosecuted and
convicted for drug trafficking as well as money laundering.
The applicant, it is argued, cannot be prosecuted in India
again.
7. Reference has been made to Article 14 sub-clause
7 of the International Covenants of Civil and Political Rights,
1966 and Section 2 of the Protection of Human Rights Act,
1993, which reads as follows:-
“Article 14 sub-clause 7. No one shall be liable to be tried
or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the
law and penal procedure of each country.”
“2. Definition.- (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,–
5
……………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………
(d) “human rights” means the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the
International Covenants and enforceable by courts in
India.”
8. Learned counsel for the applicant has also raised
the following points in his submissions:-
(a) The US authorities have made mutual legal
assistance request to India revealing all the
bank accounts, but those accounts were not
freezed. It is argued that the money in those
accounts were not considered as Proceeds of
Crime (“PoC”) or else the accounts could have
been freezed by the US authorities under
Section 60(2) of the Act.
(b) The applicant is not in possession of 4250
BTC.
(c) The applicant has not stated before any
authority that he had 4250 BTC, which he
split with his brother Parvinder Singh.
(d) The statement of the applicant under Section
50 of the Act, was procured by beating him
6under coercion. It is not substantive
evidence; it cannot be taken into
consideration unless corroborated in material
particulars. Particularly, it is argued that the
applicant has retracted from his statement. It
has less value.
(e) In support of his contention, learned counsel
for the applicant has placed reliance upon
the principles of law, as laid down in the case
of A. Tajudeen Vs. Union of India, 2015 (4)
SCC 435 2015 4 SCC 435, Kunal Gupta Vs.
E.D, C.R.M. (SB) 84 of 2024, Sujay Krishna
Bhadra Vs. ED, CRM (SB) 227 of 2023,
Commissioner of Customs (Imports) Vs.
Ganpati Overseas, (2023) 10 SCC 484 and
Adnan Nisar Vs. DoE, in Bail Application
No.3056 of 2023.
(f) In the case of A. Tajudeen (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held:-
“28. Having given our thoughtful
consideration to the aforesaid issue, we are of
the view that the statements dated 25-10-1989
and 26-10-1989 can under no circumstances
constitute the sole basis for recording the
finding of guilt against the appellant. If
findings could be returned by exclusively
relying on such oral statements, such
statements could easily be thrust upon the
7persons who were being proceeded against on
account of their actions in conflict with the
provisions of the 1973 Act. Such statements
ought not to be readily believable, unless there
is independent corroboration of certain
material aspects of the said statements,
through independent sources. The nature of
the corroboration required, would depend on
the facts of each case. In the present case, it is
apparent that the appellant A. Tajudeen and
his wife T. Sahira Banu at the first opportunity
resiled from the statements which are now
sought to be relied upon by the Enforcement
Directorate, to substantiate the charges
levelled against the appellant. We shall now
endeavour to examine whether there is any
independent corroborative evidence to support
the above statements.”
(g) In the case of Kunal Gupta (supra), it is
observed as follows:-
“8. ……………………………………………Also, it is trite
law that statement under section 50 of the PMLA
cannot be treated as substantive piece of evidence
and can at best lend corroboration to the material
available against the accused in course of
investigation.”
(h) In the case of Sujay Krishna Bhadra
(supra), the principles of law as laid down in the
case of A. Tajudeen (supra) have been followed.
(i) In the case of Ganpati Overseas (supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“43.1. Mr Yashpal Sharma in his statement also
stated more or less the same thing as stated by Mr
Suresh Chandra Sharma. He was arrested on 15-3-
1999 itself under Section 135 of the Customs Act.
8
However, he was enlarged on bail on 30-3-1999 by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi subject to
deposit of Rs 30 lakhs within a specified period,
which he paid. It has come on record that the
Additional Sessions Judge in his bail order dated 26-
5-1999 had mentioned that the statement of Mr
Yashpal Sharma recorded under Section 108 of the
Customs Act may not have been a voluntary one. It
may be mentioned that Mr Yashpal Sharma vide his
letter dated 25-8-1999 had retracted the statement
made by him under Section 108 of the Customs
Act. CESTAT noted the factum of retraction of the
statement and therefore, refused to give credence to
such confessional statement. In our view, no fault
can be found with the approach of CESTAT.”
(j) In the case of Adnan Nisar Vs. DoE, in
Bail Application No.3056 of 2023, with regard to
the statement under Section 50 of the Act, it is
observed as follows:-
“108. The proceedings under Section 50 of the PMLA
may be judicial proceedings for the limited purpose
mentioned therein but a confession made by an
accused in his statement under Section 50 of the
PMLA is not a judicial confession. Even with regard to
the retraction of judicial confession, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh & Ors. vs. State of
M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21 has observed that when such a
confession is found to be not voluntary and more so
when it is retracted, the conviction cannot be based on
such retracted judicial confession, in the absence of
other reliable
evidence……………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………..”
9
(k) The US authorities prosecuted and
convicted the applicant with regard to all 8131
BTC; nothing was recovered from the applicant;
applicant is not in possession of any BTC or any
PoC. Therefore, unless there is possession, no
offence under the provision of the Act is made out.
Reference has been made to the judgment in the
case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs.
Union of India and Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC
929. In Para 153, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:-
“153. In other words, the authority under the
2002 Act is to prosecute a person for offence of
money laundering only if it has reason to believe,
which is required to be recorded in writing that the
person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if
that belief is further supported by tangible and
credible evidence indicative of involvement of the
person concerned in any process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime, action under
the Act can be taken forward for attachment and
confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting
thereof in the Central Government, such process
initiated would be a stand-alone process.
(l) The proffer statement made by the
applicant before the US authorities is not a
substantive piece of evidence. It cannot be made
basis for conviction.
10
(m) In support of his averment, learned
counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on
the principles of law, as laid down in the No.92-
2205 United States Courts of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, in US Vs. Acosta-Ballardo, 8F.3d 1532
(10th Cir. 1993) Decided Nov 9, 1993, in which the
Court observed as follows:-
“Statements made by a defendant in connection
with a plea or an offer to plead may not be used
substantively or for impeachment in any civil or
criminal proceeding against the person who made
the plea or offer.”
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the ED
would submit that at this stage, the Court is not required to
determine the guilt or otherwise of the applicant. The Court is
considering bail application. At this stage, a mini trial may not
be conducted. He would submit that at this stage, the
genuineness of the case may be examined. He would refer to
the judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra), and in the case of CBI Vs. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7
SCC 452. In the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the case of Vijay
Said Reddy (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:-
“401 We are in agreement with the
observation made by the Court in Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
11Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1057] . The Court while dealing with the
application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the
merits of the case and only a view of the court based on
available material on record is required. The court will not
weigh the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is,
of course, the work of the trial court. The court is only
required to place its view based on probability on the basis
of reasonable material collected during investigation and
the said view will not be taken into consideration by the
trial court in recording its finding of the guilt or acquittal
during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during
the trial. As explained by this Court in Nimmagadda
Prasad [Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 575] , the words used in Section 45 of
the 2002 Act are “reasonable grounds for believing” which
means the court has to see only if there is a genuine case
against the accused and the prosecution is not required to
prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.”
10. In the case of Vijay Sai Reddy (supra), the Hon’ble
Court observed that :-
“34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the
accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public/State and other similar considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the
legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to
whether there is a genuine case against the accused and
that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this
12stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
11. Learned counsel for the ED would also raise the
following points in his submission:-
(i) The applicant has not been prosecuted and
convicted for 8131 BTC, which he had. In
United States, the applicant has been
prosecuted and convicted with regard to 3838
BTC, which he had surrendered.
(ii) Before the US authorities, the applicant had
given a statement that he had split his illegal
business with his brother Parvinder Singh
and 4250 BTC were transferred to Parvinder.
It is argued that this act of transferring or
splitting BTC, per se, amounts to offence
under Section 3 read with 2(ra) of the Act.
(iii) It is argued that even if for the sake of
argument if we assume that the applicant has
been convicted by the US court for the
offences, still he can be tried in Indian Courts.
He would refer to the judgment in the case of
Jitendra Panchal Vs. Narcotic Control Bureau,
(2009) 3 SCC 57. In the case of Jitendra
13
Panchal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:-
“42. While the first part of the charges
would attract the provisions of Section 846
read with Section 841 of Title 21 USC
(Controlled Substances Act), the latter part,
being offences under the NDPS Act, 1985,
would be triable and punishable in India,
having particular regard to the provisions of
Sections 3 and 4 of the Penal Code read with
Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act,
which has been made applicable in similar
cases by virtue of Article 367 of the
Constitution. The offences for which the
appellant was tried and convicted in the USA
and for which he is now being tried in India,
are distinct and separate and do not, therefore,
attract either the provisions of Section 300(1)
of the Code or Article 20(2) of the
Constitution.”
iv) In the case of Prabodh K. Mehta Vs.
Charuben K. Mehta, in First Appeal No.922 of
2013 and connected matters, the Hon’ble Full
Bench of Bombay High Court has formulated
two questions for reference, which are as
follows:-
(1)(a) Whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign
Court for the offence committed in that country can be
taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India
while exercising their judicial and/or quasi judicial
powers? And
14(1)(b) Whether such a conviction would be binding
on the Courts and authorities in India while exercising
their judicial and/or quasi judicial powers?
And they are answered as follows:-
“41. We therefore answer the first question viz
question No. (1)(a) in the affirmative.”
“42. We now propose to consider the second
question i.e. question No. (1)(b). We are of the
considered view that, though the judgment and order
of conviction of a foreign Court for the offence
committed in India can be noticed/looked into and
recognized by judicial and quasi judicial authorities in
India, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial
powers, it cannot be said that the same will be ipso
facto binding on such Courts and authorities. If we
hold that such a judgment of a foreign Court for an
offence committed in that country, is binding on the
Courts and authorities in India while exercising their
judicial and quasi judicial powers, it will amount to
directly or indirectly enforcing the judgment of the
foreign Court. What is the effect of such order of
conviction, would depend upon variety of factors such
as, nature of the proceedings, purpose for which the
said order of conviction needs to be taken into
consideration, nature of conviction and effect thereof
on the proceedings, nature of consequences of the
ultimate decision to be taken in the said proceedings,
are some of the factors which will have to be taken
into consideration while deciding as to how much and
what weightage has to be given to such judgment and
order of conviction. We are of the FA-922-13.sxw
considered view that, no hard and fast rule can be laid
for that purpose. The Courts and authorities, while
exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers will
have to take a call on the facts and circumstances of
each case and take a decision as to what is the effect
15of such judgment and order of conviction. The
question No.(1)(b) is answered accordingly.”
(v) Any case pertaining to crypto currency may be
determined where a person or company, who
owns it is domiciled. He would refer to the
judgment in the High Court of Justice
Business and Property Courts of England &
Wales Commercial Court (QBD) No. CL-2020-
000840 in the case of Ion Science Limited &
Duncan John. V. Persons Unknown Binance
Holdings Limited, Payment Ventures Limited
(unreported [2020] (Comm), in which it is
observed that, “the second of those aspects
is on the basis that the lex situs of a
cryptoasset is the place where the person
or company who owns it is domiciled. That
is an analysis which is supported by
Professor Andrew Dickinson in his book
Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law
at para.5.108. There is apparently no
decided case in relation to the lex situs for
a cryptoasset. Nevertheless, I am satisfied
that there is at least a serious issue to be
tried that that is the correct analysis.” It is
argued that 4250 BTC is in the possession of
16
the applicant, therefore, the Indian Courts
have jurisdiction to prosecute the applicant.
(vi) In the US court, the applicant was not
prosecuted for bringing the PoC within India.
He was prosecuted for bringing PoC into the
Southern State of Ohio or elsewhere. It is
argued that the word ‘elsewhere’ refers to
other States of the United States of America.
It does not refer to India. The applicant is
convicted to the corresponding scheduled
offences. It is also admitted that based on its
plea bargain, the applicant surrendered some
of the BTC, which he had.
(vii) Possession of PoC is not necessary to
prosecute a person under the provisions of
the Act.
(viii) He would refer to the judgment in the case of
US Vs Krilich Nos. 97-2721, 97-2977 United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 159
E.3d 1020 (7th Cir, 1998) decided Oct 27,
1998. In that case, the Court observed as
follows:-
17
“This agreement allowed the prosecutor
to use the proffer as evidence if Krilich were to
“testify contrary to the substance of the proffer
or otherwise present a position inconsistent
with the proffer”. Introduction of the
statements thus was proper if either his
testimony, see United States V. Goodapple,
958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1992), or
evidence that he presented through the
testimony of others, see United States v.
Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 778 (7th Cir. 1997),
United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1068 (7th
Cir. 1993), contradicted the proffer.”
12. It is the stage of bail. Much of the discussion is
not expected of. Arguments are being appreciated with the
caveat that any observation made in this order shall have
no bearing at any subsequent stage of the trial or in any
other proceedings.
13. Admittedly, in the United States indictment of
the applicant was for three charges as follows:-
(i) Conspiracy to Distribute and Possesss with
Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances
(21 U.S.C.§ 846).
(ii) Conspiracy to Import Controlled
Substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 952 (a), 960 (b) (2)
and (b) (3), and 963)
(iii) Money Laundering Conspiracy (18 U.S.C.
1956 (h) ).
18
14. Thereafter, the appellant entered into plea
agreement in the United States which, inter alia, records as
follows:-
“Defendant agrees to turn over all seed phrases and
passwords and to assist in the transfer to U.S.
Government crypto currency wallets, all of the
8,131.80350145 BTC; 8,199.31047036
BCH;8,131.80114469 BSV;8,131.80312935 Bitcoin Gold
(BTG); and 8,131.801,544.42 eCash (XEC), and currently
stored on the lockchain, remote or cold storage devices,
and/or at the above listed public addresses which
constitute the ill-gotten gains from the offences described
in Counts One and Three of the Indictment.”
15. The statement of facts with plea agreement
records that “To conceal the proceeds from the distribution
and importation of controlled substances, and to promote
the distribution and importation of controlled substances,
SINGH and his co-conspirators engaged in a conspiracy to
launder the drug proceeds by conducting wire transfers,
transferring cryptocurrency, and shipping U.S. currency
and controlled substances in the mail, from outside of the
United States to the Southern District of Ohio and
elsewhere.”
16. On this ground, on behalf of the ED it is being
argued that the applicant engaged in conspiracy to launder
the drug proceeds by conducting wire transfers,
19
transferring cryptocurrency, and shipping U.S. currency
and controlled substances in the mail, from outside of the
United States to the Southern District of Ohio and
elsewhere”. What is being argued is that the applicant has
not been prosecuted and convicted for transferring the
proceeds of crime to India from outside India. In the
judgment of United States, Southern District of Ohio, the
title and sections are recorded as 21 U.S.C.§ 846 and 18
U.S.C. 1956 (h).
17. This Court is concerned with the charges of
money laundering alone. 18 U.S.C. 1956 (2) (A) is as
follows:-
“(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or
attempts to transport , transmit, or transfer a monetary
instrument or funds from a place in the United States to
or through a place outside the United States or to a place
in the United States from or through a place outside the
United States-
(A) With the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity: or
18. 18 U.S.C. 1956 (h) is as follows:-
“(h) Any person who conspires to commit any
offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall
be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense the commission of which
was the object of the conspiracy.”
20
19. 18 U.S.C. 1956 (2) is for transferring from a
place in the United States or through a place outside the
United States or to a place in the United States from or
through a place outside the United States, monetary
instruments of funds etc. It covers everything, transferring
from outside or into the United States from United States to
outside and in Section 18 U.S.C.1956 (h) is conspiracy for
it. But the fact statements attached with the plea
statements as quoted hereinabove, is with regard to
bringing in or transferring the money or cryptocurrency etc.
within the Southern State of Ohio or elsewhere. Does not
elsewhere qualifies other adjoining States of Ohio? Can this
word “elsewhere” be extended to include India? If the word
“elsewhere” does not indicate India, does not it mean the
applicant was not convicted for transferring the proceeds of
crime from outside India to India? These and many more
related questions may fall for scrutiny during trial
20. The question is, even if a person is convicted in
the United States can he be prosecuted in India again? In
the case of Probodh (supra), the Full Bench of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court had considered the principles of law,
as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Jitendra Panchal (supra) and answered the reference
which has already been quoted hereinabove. According to
21
the settled law now that judgment and order of conviction
of a foreign court for the offence committed in that country
can be noticed/looked into and recognized by judicial and
quasi judicial authorities in India. But, it has been held in
the case of Prabodh (supra) that if the judgment of the
foreign court is held binding on the courts and authorities
in India, it would amount to directly or indirectly enforcing
the judgment of the foreign courts. It was held that the
effect of such order of conviction would depend upon
variety of facts. In the instant case also at some later stage
those factors would fall for consideration in the trial of the
applicant.
21. It is positive case of the ED that the applicant
under Section 50 of the Act has stated that in the year
2017, he and his brother Parvinder Singh did split as they
stopped the said business. In the said split Parvinder Singh
got 4250 Bitcoins. Those Bitcoins according to the ED are
still in the block chain, but they could not be accessed for
the want of passwords or key phrases. Search has already
been made to recover those passwords and key phrases. It
is further the case of the ED that in his proffer statement
recorded on 05.01.2024 in the United States, the applicant
stated as follows:-
“3. In October or November of 2017 SINGH
returned to India after living in the UK with Amarpreet
22for a few months. SINGH explained he and Parvinder
were not longer selling narcotics together, and were no
longer living together. SINGH and Parvinder discussed
splitting the BTC located in “myth, page” during this time
period. They decided that SINGH would get 3,000+ BTC
and all of the forked coins and future airdropped coins,
and that Parvinder would get 4,250 BTC. SINGH and
Parvinder started moving the funds in December 2017
and emptied the “myth, page” wallet in order to claim the
forked coins. They moved the BTC to a temporary wallet
during the time claiming the forked coins. SINGH was
unable to provide the seed phrase for the temporary
wallet at the time of the proffer due to not remembering
it. The temporary wallet was a Trezor Model 1 that was
left in the backpack Parvinder took after SINGH’s arrest.
Singh moved his funds to the “tail, bulb” wallet, which he
said Parvinder did not have access. SINGH said the
transfer was completed on December 27, 2017. SINGH
said Parvinder was obligated to assist him receive and
future forked assets. SINGH also said that one of the
airdropped coins was SEMUX, which had said was CMAX
in the earlier proffer.”
22. What is being argued is that the proffer and
statement under Section 50 of the Act is not a substantive
piece of evidence. There admissibility is not in dispute, but
their evidentiary value depends on as to whether such
statement finds independent corroboration or not?
23. Not only this, on behalf of the ED it is being
argued that the act of splitting per se attracts the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act. This aspect would also
23
require examination. The Court restrains to make any
conclusion on it, at this stage.
24. It is the case of the ED that huge amounts were
transmitted by the applicant in his or his family members
in India through foreign accounts. The applicant did not
have any other source of income from 2011 to 2017 and the
applicant did not reveal as to how he got the money. It is
argued that during the same period, the applicant was into
a drug trafficking business. To some part he has accepted
it. Therefore, remaining transactions are also from drug
trafficking and money laundering. It may be presumed
under Section 23 of the Act. Section 23 of the Act is as
follows:-
“23. Where money-laundering involves two or more
interconnected transactions and one or more such
transactions is or are proved to be involved in money-
laundering, then for the purposes of adjudication or
confiscation under Section 8, it shall, unless otherwise
proved to the satisfaction of the Adjudicating Authority,
be presumed that the remaining transaction form part of
such inter-connected transaction.”
25. Admittedly, the applicant had entered into a plea
agreement in the United States. The BTC were surrendered
and the applicant received the reduced sentence. The
money was transmitted in the Indian accounts during that
period only. In the request for assistance sought by the
24
United States Department of Justice, the United States
authorities have informed the Indian authorities that
during investigation, the US authorities identified several
Pay Pal, Money Gram and Western Union accounts
(Collectively, the funnel accounts) used by the Singh DTO
to receive proceeds on drug trafficking. The money was
transferred accordingly in the India accounts. It is also true
that under Section 60 (2) of the Act, such account have not
been freezed. What is it’s effect? How these accounts are
directly connected with the applicant? Whether the
presumption under Section 23 may be extended to
conclude that money which has been transferred from
outside India into the Indian accounts by the applicant are
proceeds of crime? These all questions would fall for deeper
scrutiny during trial.
26. Having considered the entirety of the facts, this
Court is of the view that there is no ground to enlarge the
applicant on bail. Accordingly, the bail application deserves
to be rejected.
27. The bail application is rejected.
(Ravindra Maithani, J)
07.01.2025
Jitendra
[ad_1]
Source link