Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Vikram Sikaria vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 8 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 417 of 2023
With
CRAN 3 of 2024
Vikram Sikaria
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sourav Chatterjee,
Ms. Subhasree Patel,
Ms. Saini Das.
For the State : Mr. Debasish Roy, ld. PP
Mr. Bitasok Banerjee,
Mr. Sourat Nandi.
For the Opposite Party No. 2 : None.
Hearing concluded on : 08.01.2025
Judgment on : 08.01.2025
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Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of proceeding in G.R. Case No. 600/18 arising out of Bowbazar
Police Station Case No. 163/2018 under Sections
406/420/467/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, pending before
the learned Metropolitan Magistrate 14th Court, Calcutta.
2. The petitioner’s case is as follows :-
“The petitioner, aged about 50 years, is a
businessman by profession, residing
permanently at the address mentioned in the
cause title. That sometime in 2017, the petitioner
came in contact with the opposite party no. 2
through one of his agents namely, Partha
Mukherjee, who showed the said property being
premises no. 18/2/26, Uday Sankar Sarani,
postal address being DT-14, Golf Green Urban
Complex, Phase 1, Kolkata-700095 to the
opposite party no. 2 and his wife. Thereafter,
due to a misunderstanding between the
petitioner on one hand and the opposite party no.
2 and his wife on the other hand, the opposite
party no. 2 lodged a written complaint, which
was registered as Bowbazar Police Station Case
NO. 163/2018 dated 31.05.2018 under Sections
406/420/467/468/471/120B of the Indian
Penal Code. The parties held several discussions
and mutually agreed to settle the disputes
in an amicable manner and to that effect, the
parties signed a Deed of Cancellation on
20.07.2018. In the said Deed of Cancellation, the
opposite party no. 2 has expressly declared that
he has received the entire amount of Rupees 1
(one) crore 10 (ten) lacs, which the petitioner had
to incur in order to make the said premises
habitable after demolition/alternation carried out
by the opposite party no. 2. On 18.07.2018, the
opposite party no. 2 and his wife made a
representation to the Joint Commissioner of
Police (Crime), Kolkata and expressed their
desire to put an end to the ongoing criminal
3proceeding instituted by them against the
petitioner, which was duly received by the office
of Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), Kolkata
on 20.07.2018.”
3. In spite of due service, the opposite party no. 2 is not represented.
4. Heard the learned Public Prosecutor, who has placed the case diary.
5. It appears from the materials in the case diary, more specifically the
letter sent by the de facto complainant to the Joint Commissioner of
Police (Crime), Kolkata on 18th July, 2018, that the entire dispute had
been amicably settled and the deal has been cancelled and that he has
received the total amount paid by him on full satisfaction from the
petitioner herein and that he has no grievance or claim in any manner. A
Deed of Cancellation cancelling the agreement between the parties was
duly executed.
6. It is clarified by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the initial
agreement between the parties was dated 11.12.2017 and the Deed of
Cancellation is dated 20th July, 2018.
7. Subsequently, a statement of the complainant was recorded by the
investigating officer on 20.02.2024 wherein the de facto complainant has
stated that he wants to pursue the case for the balance amount along
with interest.
8. In Sanjeev Kapoor Vs Chandana Kapoor, AIR 2020 SC 1064, on 19
February, 2020, the Supreme Court held:-
“17. Learned counsel for the appellant has also
referred to judgment of this Court in Mahua
Biswas(Smt.) vs. Swagata Biswas and another,
(1998) 2 SCC 359. In the above case, in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. parties
4compromised and started living together but later
fell apart. An objection was raised by the
husband that order of maintenance could not be
revived with which High Court agreed. This
Court revived the maintenance application by
allowing the appeal. In paragraph 3 following
was held:
“3. The matter can be viewed from either angle.
It can be viewed that there was a genuine effort
by the wife to rehabilitate herself in her
matrimonial home but in vain. The previous
orders of maintenance in a manner of speaking
could at best be taken to have been suspended
but not wiped out altogether. The other view can
be that the maintenance order stood exhausted
and thus she be left to fight a new litigation on a
fresh cause of action. Out of the two courses, we
would prefer to adopt the first one, for if we were
to resort to the second option, it would lead to
injustice. In a given case the wife may then be
reluctant to settle with her husband lest she lose
the order of maintenance secured on his neglect
or refusal. Her husband on the other side, would
jump to impromptu devices to demolish the
maintenance order in duping the wife to a
temporary reconciliation. Thus, in order to do
complete justice between the parties, we would
in the facts and circumstances activate the
wife‟s claim to maintenance and put her in the
same position as before. Evidently, she has
obtained a maintenance order at a figure which
was taken into account by the Court of the
C.J.M. Taking that into account, we order the
husband to pay to his wife and the daughter a
sum of Rs 1000 each, effective from 1-10-1997.
The sum of Rs 12,000 which was earlier ordered
by this Court to be paid to the wife and her
daughter as arrears of maintenance shall be
taken to have been duly paid uptil 30-9-1997,
irrespective of the rate of maintenance. This
streamlines the dispute between the parties. It is
made clear that it is open to the parties to claim
5such other relief as may be due to him/her by
raising a matrimonial dispute before the
matrimonial court.”
9. In Ruchi Agarwal vs Amit Kumar Agrawal & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC
299, decided on November 5, 2004, the Supreme Court held:-
“8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
however, contended that though the appellant
had signed the compromise deed with the
abovementioned terms in it, the same was
obtained by the respondent husband and his
family under threat and coercion and in fact she
did not receive lump sum maintenance and
her stridhan properties. We find it extremely
difficult to accept this argument in the
background of the fact that pursuant to the
compromise deed the respondent husband has
given her a consent divorce which she wanted,
thus had performed his part of the obligation
under the compromise deed. Even the appellant
partially performed her part of the obligations by
withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under
Section 125. It is true that she had made a
complaint in writing to the Family Court where
Section 125 CrPC proceedings were pending that
the compromise deed was filed under coercion
but she withdrew the same and gave a
statement before the said court affirming the
terms of the compromise which statement was
recorded by the Family Court and the
proceedings were dropped and a divorce was
obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
the appellant having received the relief she
wanted without contest on the basis of the terms
of the compromise, we cannot now accept the
argument of the learned counsel for the
appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the
appellant indicates that the criminal complaint
from which this appeal arises was filed by the
wife only to harass the respondents.
9. In view of the abovesaid subsequent events
and the conduct of the appellant, it would be an
abuse of the process of the court if the criminal
6proceedings from which this appeal arises is
allowed to continue. Therefore, we are of the
considered opinion to do complete justice, we
should while dismissing this appeal also quash
the proceedings arising from criminal case Cr.
No. 224 of 2003 registered in Police Station
Bilaspur (District Rampur) filed under Sections
498-A, 323 and 506 IPC and under Sections 3
and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the
respondents herein. It is ordered accordingly.
The appeal is disposed of.”
10. In the present case too the de facto complainant having got his relief,
without contest is now proceeding with the case only to harass the
petitioner inspite of having specifically put in writing in the year, 2018 to
the joint commissioner of police about the amicable settlement and not
wanting to peruse the case.
11. He has now in the year 2024, withdrawn from the said settlement inspite
of receiving the amount due.
12. In Naresh Kumar Vs The State Of Karnataka., Criminal Appeal No.
…………….. of 2024, (Arising Out Of SLP (Crl.) No. 1570 of 2021), on
12th March, 2024, the Supreme Court held as follow:-
“6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court
recognized that although the inherent powers of
a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure should be exercised
sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate
in quashing such criminal proceedings which are
essentially of a civil nature. This is what was
held:
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code the High Court
has to be cautious. This power is to be used
sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
7secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint
discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon
the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether
essential ingredients of criminal offence are
present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions
may also have a criminal texture. But the High
Court must see whether a dispute which is
essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of
criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil
remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as
has happened in this case, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal
proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the
court.” (emphasis supplied) Relying upon the
decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court
in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 14 SCC
626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot
be taken recourse to as a weapon of
harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v.
State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it
was again held that where a dispute which is
essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a
criminal offence, then such disputes can be
quashed, by exercising the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
7. Essentially, the present dispute between the
parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere
breach of contract, by one of the parties, would
not attract prosecution for criminal offence in
every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr (2023) 5 SCC
360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction
between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court,
in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala,
(2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of
contract would not give rise to the offence of
cheating, and it is required to be shown that the
accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at
the time of making the promise.
8. In the case at hand, the dispute between the
parties was not only essentially of a civil nature
but in this case the dispute itself stood settled
later as we have already discussed above. We
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see no criminal element here and consequently
the case here is nothing but an abuse of the
process. We therefore allow the appeal and set
aside the order of the High Court dated
02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings arising out
of FIR No.113 of 2017 will hereby stand
quashed.”
13. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). ……… of 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the Supreme Court held:-
“15. This Court has an occasion to consider the
ambit and scope of the power of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal
proceedings in Vineet Kumar and Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017)
13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It
may be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of
the above judgment where the following was
stated:
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present
case it is necessary to consider the ambit and
scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC
saves the inherent power of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined the
scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC and laid down several
principles which govern the exercise of
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC
699 held that the High Court is entitled to quash
a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought
to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the
following has been stated :
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„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding
if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a
court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests and the like would justify the
High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher
than the ends of mere law though justice has got
to be administered according to laws made by
the legislature. The compelling necessity for
making these observations is that without a
proper realisation of the object and purpose of
the provision which seeks to save the inherent
powers of the High Court to do justice, between
the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that
salient jurisdiction.‟
41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and
object of advancement of justice. In case solemn
process of Court is sought to be abused by a
person with some oblique motive, the Court has
to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The
Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the
case falls in one of the categories as illustratively
enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Judicial
process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be
allowed to be converted into an instrument of
operation or harassment. When there are
materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fides and
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7
as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
10Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which is to the
following effect :
„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fides and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge.‟ Above Category
7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present
case. Although, the High Court has noted the
judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not advert to the
relevant facts of the present case, materials on
which final report was submitted by the IO. We,
thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit
case where the High Court ought to have
exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
and quashed the criminal proceedings.”
16. The exposition of law on the subject relating
to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent
power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled
and to the possible extent, this Court has defined
sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised. This Court has
held in para 102 in State of Haryana and
Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992
Supp. (1) 335 as under :
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
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(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
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17. The principles culled out by this Court have
consistently been followed in the recent
judgment of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC Online
SC 315.”
14. The present case falls under category 1, 3 and 7 of Para 102 of Bhajan
Lal (Supra).
15. The dispute in the present case is prima facie civil in nature.
16. Considering the materials on record, it appears that the de facto
complainant is not willing to honour the settlement between the parties.
17. Thus, considering the conduct of the complainant, it shall be an abuse
of the process of the law/ court if the proceedings in the present case is
not quashed.
18. The materials on record prima facie do not contain the ingredients
required for the offences alleged and as such, continuation of the said
proceeding in the present case shall be against the principle of natural
justice.
19. CRR 417 of 2023 is thus allowed.
20. The proceeding in G.R. Case No. 600/18 arising out of Bowbazar Police
Station Case No. 163/2018 under Sections
406/420/467/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, pending before
the learned Metropolitan Magistrate 14th Court, Calcutta, is hereby
quashed in respect of the petitioner namely Vikram Sikaria.
21. All connected applications, if any, stands disposed of.
22. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
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23. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
24. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)