Delhi High Court
M/S Popular Sales Pvt Ltd & Ors. vs S Tarjit Singh & Ors. on 14 January, 2025
Author: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Bench: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
$-
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
+ RSA 82/2022, CM APPLs. 51372/2022 & 54268/2022
1. M/S JAINSONS WESTEND PVT LTD.
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
5/7, W.E.A. KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024 ......APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
RIO R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
G. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 1 KUMAR KAURAV
H. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
I. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
ALL C/O. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Mr.Ashutosh Lohia, Mr.Rohit Saraswat and
Ms.Princy Sharma, Advs. Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar Yadav,
Advs for R-2.)
+ RSA 83/2022 &CM APPL. 51367/2022
1. M/S JAINSONS WESTEND PVT LTD.
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
5/7, W.E.A. KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 2 KUMAR KAURAV
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024 ......APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 3 KUMAR KAURAV
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
ALL C/O. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for R-2.)
+ RSA 84/2022 &CM APPL. 51370/2022
1. M/S JAINSONS WESTEND PVT LTD.
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
5/7, W.E.A. KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024 ......APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 4 KUMAR KAURAV
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 5 KUMAR KAURAV
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for R-2.)
+ RSA 85/2022, CM APPLs. 51374/2022, 54266/2022 & 27001/2023
1. M/S SAVILLE ROW COLLECTIONS PVT LTD.
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 6 KUMAR KAURAV
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
ALL C/O. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for R-2.)
+ RSA 86/2022 &CM APPL. 51365/2022
1. M/S POPULAR SALES PVT LTD. .....APPELLANTS
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
5/7, W.E.A. KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 7 KUMAR KAURAV
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
.....APPELLANTS
(Through:. Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
d. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
e. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
f. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 8 KUMAR KAURAV
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for R-2.)
+ RSA 10/2023
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 9 KUMAR KAURAV
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
ALL C/O. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, KAROL BAGH,
NEW DELHI-110005
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for P-2.)
Versus
1. M/S JAINSONS FINANCE PVT LTD
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 10 KUMAR KAURAV
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid, Advocates.)
+ RSA 11/2023
1. M/S JAINSONS COLLECTIONS PVT LTD
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for P-2.)
Versus
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 11 KUMAR KAURAV
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid, Advocates.)
+ RSA 12/2023
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 12 KUMAR KAURAV
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for P-2.)
Versus
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 13 KUMAR KAURAV
1. M/S POPULAR SALES PVT LTD
1. M/S Popular Sales Pvt Ltd
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid, Advocates.)
+ RSA 13/2023
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 14 KUMAR KAURAV
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for P-2.)
Versus
1. M/S SAVILLE ROW COLLECTIONS PVT LTD
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 15 KUMAR KAURAV
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid, Advocates.)
+ RSA 14/2023
1. S TARJIT SINGH
S/O LATE S. SHARAM SINGH,
R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060.
2. DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR (SINCE DECEASED)
(THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
a. SMT. AMRIT GAMBHIR
W/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
b. MS. SHEETAL GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
c. MS. SIMRAN GAMBHIR
D/O LATE DR. JAGJIT SINGH GAMBHIR,
ALL R/O R-846, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110060
3. SHANTI DEVI
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(i) RAJINDER SETHI
(ii) DEVINDER PAL KAUR
(iii) S. TARJIT SINGH ( RESPONDENT NO.1 HEREIN )
(iv) DR. JAGIIT SINGH GAMBHIR (RESPONDENT NO.2 HEREIN)
(v) MRS. TAJINDER KAUR
SINCE PREDECEASED THROUGH HER LEGAL HEIRS:
(a) S. MOHANBIR SINGH,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 16 KUMAR KAURAV
(b) S. HARMEET SINGH,
All C/o. S. TARJEET SINGH,
5/8, WEA, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
.....APPELLANTS
(Through: Mr. H.L. Narula, Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar
Yadav, Advocates for P-2.)
Versus
1. M/S JAINSONS WESTEND PVT LTD
Having its Office at
5/7, W.E.A. Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005
2. RAKESH JAIN,
S/O SHRI T.C. JAIN
3. ATULYA KUMAR JAIN,
S/O SHRI RAKESH JAIN,
BOTH RESIDENTS OF
D-422, DEFENCE COLONY,
NEW DELHI-110024
......RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr.Jayant Mehta. Sr.Advocate with Mr.Vinod Kumar Sachdeva
and Mr.Abdul Vahid. Advocates.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 27.11.2024
Pronounced on: 14.01.2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
The captioned appeals revolve around a similar controversy and,
therefore, are being decided by this common order. For the sake of
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 17 KUMAR KAURAV
convenience, the facts are extracted from RSA No. 82/2022.
2. The appeal has arisen out of the impugned judgment dated 25.05.2022
and decree dated 26.05.2022 passed by the Court of learned Additional
District Judge-8, (Central District), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in RCA
No.14/2017, whereby, the suit has been decreed while setting aside the
judgment and decree dated 30.11.2016 passed by the Court of learned Civil
Judge-10, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Suit no.161/2005, dismissing the suit
of the respondent/plaintiff seeking declaration and cancellation of the sale
deed dated 10.06.2002 as null and void.
3. The contesting respondents i.e. Tarjit Singh and Dr. Jagjit Singh are
claiming through their predecessor-in-interest namely, Shanti Devi and S.
Sharam Singh, who were the owners of property bearing no.5/8, W.E.A.,
Karol Bagh, New Delhi (hereinafter referred as „suit property‟).
4. The facts of the case would further indicate that M/s Jainsons
Westend was a partnership firm that was a tenant on the suit property vide a
registered lease deed dated 31.05.1967. The property in question was a
leasehold property and the owners were S. Sharam Singh and Shanti Devi
each holding 50% shares in the property. S. Sharam Singh and Shanti Devi
had filed a civil suit bearing no. 831/1989 for recovery of rent and
possession of the tenanted premises against tenant partnership firm M/s
Jainsons Westend.
5. During the pendency of the civil suit, S. Sharam Singh died on
18.05.1994, accordingly, his legal heirs i.e. the contesting respondents
herein were brought on record. During the pendency of the said civil suit,
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 18 KUMAR KAURAV
parties entered into a compromise. As per the terms of the said compromise,
an Agreement to Sell dated 16.01.1995 was also entered into. The contesting
respondents agreed to sell the suit property to five companies namely, M/s.
Jainsons Westend Pvt. Ltd, M/s. Jainsons Collections Pvt. Ltd., M/s.
Jainsons Finance Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Saville Row Collections and M/s. Popular
Sales. The appellant/defendant herein agreed to purchase 1/5th of the suit
property for a consideration of Rs.1,75,000/- subject to terms and conditions
that the property will be first converted into freehold from leasehold and
then sale deeds shall be executed.
6. In pursuance of the Agreement to Sell, one unregistered general
power of attorney was also jointly executed by the owners in favour of
Rakesh Jain and Neena Jain. In view of the compromise, civil suit no.
831/1989 came to be disposed of vide order dated 21.04.1995 vide a
compromise decree. It appears that thereafter, a dispute further arose
between the parties and another suit came to be filed by the
appellant/defendant before this Court on 08.01.1998 seeking specific
performance of the aforesaid Agreement to Sell and Perpetual Injunction.
The said suit got transferred to the District Court after a change in pecuniary
jurisdiction and subsequently, registered as suit no. 253/2002, which was
eventually withdrawn by the appellant/defendant on 03.03.2003.
7. On 10.06.2002, Mr. Rakesh Jain appears to have executed a sale deed
with respect to 1/5th share of the suit property in favour of M/s. Jainsons
Westend Pvt. Ltd.
8. The respondent/plaintiff then filed a civil suit bearing suit no.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 19 KUMAR KAURAV
161/2005 on 30.05.2005 against the appellant/defendant seeking declaration
and cancellation of the sale deed dated 10.06.2002 as null and void. The said
civil suit came to be dismissed on 30.11.2016. However, on an appeal, the
first Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment decreed the civil suit in
favour of the respondent/plaintiff and hence, the appellant/ defendant has
preferred the instant appeal.
9. Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant/defendant submits that the impugned judgment and decree of
reversal is illegal and improper, inasmuch as, the civil suit filed by the
respondent/plaintiff itself was not maintainable in view of the express bar
enshrined in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred
as “SRA”). He argues that the respondent/plaintiff has filed the instant suit
for cancellation and declaration of the sale deed as null and void, without
claiming the relief of possession and confining the suit only to declaration.
According to him, the respondent/plaintiff is not in possession of the suit
property and thus, the civil suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is not
maintainable. To buttress his submission, he draws sustenance from the
recitals of the terms of the compromise as well as the Agreement to Sell. He
argued that the possession of the said property always remained with the
tenant i.e., M/s Jainsons Westend and the actual vacant and physical
possession was never handed back to the respondent/plaintiff.
10. Mr Mehta, further submits that the appellant/defendant has executed
the terms of compromise as entered between the parties and has acted upon
them, therefore, at a later stage, the respondent/plaintiff cannot object to the
sale deed validly executed in terms of the settlement agreement. He argued
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 20 KUMAR KAURAV
that as per the terms of the agreement, the appellant/defendant had paid a
sum of Rs 1,75,000/- and now at a later stage the respondent/plaintiff cannot
rescind the terms of the Agreement to Sell. So far as the contention of the
conversion from leasehold to freehold property is concerned, he argued that
as per the Agreement to Sell, it is the responsibility of the
respondent/plaintiff to convert the property to freehold and in view of
aforesaid, the appellant/defendant had duly paid the conversion charges.
Moreover, he further submits that as per Clause 13 of the Agreement to Sell,
if the respondent/plaintiff fails to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit
premises, the appellant/defendant shall be deemed to have become the
owner for all practical purposes. In view of aforenoted submissions, he
submits that the impugned judgment suffers from material perversity and the
appeal deserves to be admitted.
11. Mr. H.L. Narula, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff
vehemently opposes the aforenoted submissions. He submits that the
possession of the suit property was earlier with the tenant i.e. M/s Jainsons
Westend and pursuant to the compromise decree, the tenant had handed over
the vacant physical possession to the respondent/plaintiff and till date the
actual possession is with the respondent/plaintiff.
12. He further assails the contention of the appellant/defendant on the
ground that conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold was the
condition precedent for the execution of a sale deed. He argues that since in
the present case, admittedly the property was not converted to freehold,
therefore, any transfer in the change of ownership is not at all permissible.
On the force of said submissions, he submits that the instant appeal raises no
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 21 KUMAR KAURAV
substantial question of law and deserves to be rejected.
13. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the parties and have perused the record.
14. The entire thrust of the contentions canvassed before this Court rested
on the premise of the possession of the suit property. The principal legal
objection under Section 34 of the SRA is essentially based on the claim that
the respondent/plaintiff could not have claimed declaration without claiming
the consequential relief of possession. Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff
filed a suit simpliciter for cancellation and declaration of the sale deed dated
10.06.2002 as null and void.
15. The first Appellate Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial
Court and dealing with the question of possession has rendered the
following pertinent findings:-
“30. The Ld. Trial Court further held that the suit of the plaintiff seeking
declaration without seeking the ancillary relief of possession is not
maintainable. The plaintiff has filed the present case suit seeking
cancellation and declaration of sale deed dated 10.06.2022 as null and void.
The same was executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No.1.
Admittedly, the plaintiff is not the executant or signatory of the aforesaid sale
deed.
31. In the judgment of Suhrid Singh Vs. Randhir Singh & Ors; (2010) 12
SCC 112 it was held that if the person is executant of the document then he
has to seek the cancellation of the instrument but if the person is not the
executant of the instrument then he has to seek a declaration thereof.
Admittedly, the plaintiff is not the signatory or executant of the said sale
deed. Therefore, the plaintiff should not have sought the relief of cancellation
and his purpose would have been served by seeking the declaration only.
However, the fact that the plaintiff has sought the relief of cancellation also
does make any difference. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not executed any sale
deed in this case. The next question which arises for consideration is whetherSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 22 KUMAR KAURAV
the suit of the plaintiff seeking declaration is maintainable without seeking
the relief of possession of the suit property.
32. It is an admitted position between the parties that before the
execution of agreement to sell and the power of attorney a compromise had
taken place between the parties in the suit filed by predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiff. Vide legal notice Ex.PW1/8A dated 01.09.2003 of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff had asked the rent @ Rs.2,800/- per month. The said notice
was given under the provisions of Section 6-A read with Section 8 of DRC
Act. The said notice was given after the defendants had withdrawn their
suit for specific performance. The plaintiff had claimed the landlord-
tenant relationship after the withdrawal of the suit by the defendants. The
rate of rent claimed was below Rs.3,500/- per month. As per the provisions
of DRC Act when the rate of rent is less than Rs.3,500/- per month then the
tenant has the statutory protection and can only be evicted on the grounds
mentioned therein. In such case, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the plaintiff could not have sought the relief of possession in
this suit. The said fact was ignored by the Ld. Trial Court which resulted
into grave injustice.
33. The plaintiff had filed a petition under Section 14 (1) (a) of the DRC
Act. Vide order dated 31.08.2005 the Ld. ARC had refused to stay the
proceedings, Against the said order, the defendants approached the Hon’ble
High Court. Vide order dated 25.07.2006 the Hon’ble High Court had stayed
the said petition till the time there is a final decision of the respective claims
of the parties in the present suit. The plaintiff claimed that the landlord-
tenant relationship existed after the withdrawal of their suit by defendants
and therefore, he had filed a petition under Section 14 (i) (a) of DRC Act.
Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff seeking declaration simplicitor is
maintainable as the relief of possession is hit by Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. The plaintiff has sought the relief of declaration of sale deed dated
10.06.2002 to be null and void which affected his rights and title with
regard to the suit property. Hence, in my considered opinion the trial Court
did not appreciate the said fact correctly and came to an erroneous
conclusion.”
16. Thus, the first Appellate Court rendered a finding that the rent receipt
in the present matter amounted to Rs. 2800/month, which was below the
threshold of Rs. 3500/month as prescribed under the provisions of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as “RCA”). Based on the
aforementioned rationale, the first Appellate Court came to the conclusion
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 23 KUMAR KAURAV
that the respondent/plaintiff could not have claimed possession before the
Civil Court as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred as per Section
50 of the RCA. Put otherwise, the first Appellate Court was of the view that
the relief of possession could only have been claimed in terms of RCA on
the fulfilment of conditions stipulated therein.
17. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the rationale of the first Appellate
Court on the fulcrum of the legislative mandate behind Section 34 of the
SRA.
18. A bare perusal of Section 34 of the SRA clearly stipulates that while
praying for the relief for declaration, the consequential relief must be prayed
in the suit. The mere purpose of this Section is to avoid the multiplicity of
proceedings and also the loss of revenue of court fees. It prohibits the
splitting of relief and indicates that mere declaratory relief of title is not
sufficient and consequential relief of possession ought to be prayed in suit.
Having said that, it is relevant to note that an inquiry pertaining to the bar
under Section 34 of SRA is a more nuanced inquiry and is not a
straightforward one. The effect of the said provision is to be examined in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
19. It is quintessential to bear in mind that Section 34 of the SRA is a rule
of procedure which aims to curb the multiplicity of proceedings, in addition
to the other objectives mentioned above. This Court in the case of Promila
Bhagat v. Munni Lal Gupta1 while extensively dealing with the scope of
the underlying section has held that the procedural bar under Section 34 of
1
2024:DHC:9639.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 24 KUMAR KAURAV
the SRA cannot act as a hurdle in rendering substantial justice, especially
when a fraud appears to have been played upon the Court. The relevant
extracts of the said decision are as under:-
“92. A declaration sought on the basis of fraud is on a different footing as
compared to a general declaration of right. In a case of fraud upon the
Court, the Court becomes a stakeholder in the enquiry and it becomes
expedient in the interest of justice to examine the same. Furthermore, a
general declaration may not have a sweeping effect and consequential
rights would not automatically flow from such a declaration, unless prayed.
However, once fraud upon the Court is established, it takes within its sweep
every consequential action based on such fraud and it does not matter if a
certain consequence was envisaged or not. It happens by sheer operation of
law.
93. Although, the procedural bar under Section 34 of the SRA is not
attracted in an instant manner, it is nonetheless important to understand
that the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that what is under consideration
is a rule of procedure, which is manifested in Section 34 of the SRA. The
rule manifested in the said provision is meant to prevent multiplicity of
litigation and is intended to ensure that the suits instituted before the Courts
are complete in all respects and the prayers are such that the dispute
between the parties is brought to a quietus. It is also meant to ensure that
the concern of the State with respect to the payment of Court fee is duly
taken care of by preventing the parties from drafting their prayers in a
clandestine manner or claiming their rights in a piecemeal manner.
However, a rule of procedure is nevertheless a rule of procedure and it
cannot disentitle the Court from enquiring into a case of fraud upon the
Court. In Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala &Ors., the Supreme Court has
pertinently observed that no Court will allow itself to be used as an
instrument of fraud and no Court, by the application of the rules of evidence
or procedure can allow its eyes to be closed to the fact that it has been used
as an instrument of fraud. To permit so would offend against that principle
of substantial justice and would perpetuate an illegality on the strength of a
procedural bar. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and
Ors.28, the Supreme Court observed that even after a cause has attained
finality and has become law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if
it is discovered that the finding was based on fraud, the same would stand
vitiated.”
20. Irrespective of whether the consequential relief of possession was
mandated or not in the instant matter, it is unquestionable that the
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 25 KUMAR KAURAV
competency of the Court to grant such consequential relief is a sine qua non,
an essential pre-condition. The bar under Section 34 of the SRA would be
applicable when the Court is competent to grant the consequential relief and
the plaintiff has failed to include it despite the availability and necessity of
such relief. If by virtue of an operation of law, the relief was barred then the
party cannot be made to suffer for not praying such relief by the force of
Section 34 of the SRA, which is essentially a rule of procedure. No party
could be faulted for failing to do what was impermissible in the eyes of the
law.
21. Reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Rajender Bansal v. Bhuru2, wherein, while referring to the tussle
between the Rent Acts and the Civil Court’s jurisdiction, the Court held that
in order to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, there must be a specific
provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The
relevant extracts of the said decision read as under:-
“18. From the aforesaid discussion in Atma Ram Mittal [Atma Ram
Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284], Vineet Kumar [Vineet
Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC 352], Ram Saroop
Rai [Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati, (1980) 3 SCC 452], Ramesh
Chandra [Ramesh Chandra v. III Addl. District Judge, (1992) 1 SCC 751]
and Shri Kishan [Shri Kishan v. Manoj Kumar, (1998) 2 SCC 710] cases,
the apparent principles which can be culled out, forming the ratio
decidendi of those cases, are as under:
18.1. Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution
of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the date of filing of the suit
will continue to apply until the suit is disposed of or adjudicated.
18.2. If during the pendency of the suit, the Rent Act becomes applicable to
the premises in question, that would be of no consequence and it would not2
(2017) 4 SCC 202.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 26 KUMAR KAURAV
take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to dispose of a suit validly
instituted.
18.3. In order to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, there must be a
specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil
court in respect of those cases also which were validly instituted before
the date when protection of the Rent Act became available in respect of
the said area/premises/tenancy.
18.4. In case the aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of
the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted prior in
point of time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have
the consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent
Act becoming applicable to the said area/premises, unexecutable after the
application of these Rent Acts in respect of such premises. This would not
be in consonance with the legislative intent.”
22. Furthermore, as per Section 3(c) of the RCA, the concerned Act
would be applicable when, the rent of premises, whether residential or not,
was below the threshold of Rs. 3500/month. The said Section was subject to
challenge in the case of D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India3, and the Supreme
Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of the provision, held as
under:-
“In order to strike a balance between the interests of the landlords and also
the tenants and for giving a boost to house-building activity, the legislature
in its wisdom has decided to restrict the protection of the Rent Act only to
those premises for which rent is payable up to the sum of Rs 3500 per month
and has decided not to extend this statutory protection to the premises
constructed on or after the date of coming into operation of the Amending
Act for a period of ten years. This is a matter of legislative policy. The
legislature could have repealed the Rent Act altogether. It can also repeal it
step by step. It has decided to confine the statutory protection to the existing
tenancies whose monthly rent did not exceed Rs 3500.”
3
(1995) 1 SCC 104.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 27 KUMAR KAURAV
23. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted if the rent in
question falls below the threshold contemplated under the RCA. Admittedly,
in the present case, the rent receipts amount to Rs. 2800/month, thus, below
the threshold of Rs. 3500/month and in such a scenario, the RCA would be
applicable. Therefore, the jurisdictional bar imposed upon the Civil Court by
virtue of Section 50 of the RCA would be applicable in the present case. The
first Appellate Court correctly dealt with the argument canvassed before it
and held that in such a scenario, the bar under Section 34 of the SRA would
not be applicable as the Civil Court was not competent to deal with the
claim of possession by virtue of Section 50 of the RCA.
24. At this juncture, this Court has also perused the salient clauses of the
compromise decree and Agreement to Sell.
25. As per Clause 9 of the Compromise decree, the five companies as
noted hereinabove have purchased the premises. Furthermore, as per Clause
10(ii), by way of a compromise decree, M/s Jainsons Westend surrendered
its tenancy with respect to some portion of the property and has also retained
a certain portion of the property. The details of such portions are included in
Clause 10(ii)(a) to (f). Moreover, Clause 11 states that for the portion
retained by M/s Jainsons Westend, the respondent/plaintiff has no right or
entitlement over the said portion. Clause 16 further states that pursuant to
the said compromise, the parties shall withdraw the suit bearing no.
593/1993 and 1108/1993. For the sake of convenience, the relevant clauses
of the compromise decree read as under:-
“9. That the abovenamed Five Companies have purchased the premises
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 28 KUMAR KAURAV
as stated in paragraph 7 of the present petition of which M/s Jainsons
Westend is a tenant and are in actual physical possession of the same.
Moreover the different tenancies now in occupation of M/s JAISONS
WESTEND PVT. LTD. shall always remain with M/s Jaisons Westend
as tenants and no part thereof have been handed over to the
abovementioned five companies.
10. That in pursuance to the above said compromise and for the sake of
clarity all the parties mentioned herein above, do hereby state and
submit that they have arrived at the following settlement:-
ii) That this defendant has by way of compromise of this suit
and also in consideration of the plaintiffs having agreed to
have their present suit dismissed, surrendered their tenancy
rights in respect of some of the tenancy portion and handed
over actual, physical, vacant possession thereof to the
plaintiffs and have also taken certain portion of their
tenancies with new portions as per details and particulars
given hereinbelow:-
***
b) That the defendant M/s Jainsons Westend have also
surrendered and have handed over the actual physical vacant
possession of the portion of the hall on the first flow shown at
point B-1 and B-2 of annexure B along with the toilet on the
first flow shown at B-3 to the plaintiffs. Moreover the
defendant M/s Jainsons Westend have surrendered and have
actually handed over the actual vacant physical possession of
stair case leading from the ground floor and from first floor
to the second floor to the plaintiff. The remaining portion of
the hall on the first floor shall remain with the defendant
M/s Jainson Westend. Moreover, an additional portion on
the back side of the hall more specifically pointed as F-1 and
F-2 in the plan annexed as annexure A has been taken by the
defendant M/s Jainsons Westend. A details site plan is
annexed along with this petition whereby the premises now
retained by M/s Jainsons Westend and Additional Portion
handed over to Jainsons Westend is shown and is annexed as
Annexure C. However, the rent of the present tenancy in now
been reduced from Rs.2350/- to Rs.1100/- per month. The
said tenancy will hereinafter be referred as second tenancy
and which was earlier created in the month of August, 1967.
11. That as already stated hereinabove and as per annexure A-1 the
portion now retained by M/s Jainsons Westend in respect of different
tenancies has been sold by the plaintiffs to the above named five
different companies and as such the abovenamed five different
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 29 KUMAR KAURAV
companies and as such the abovenamed five different companies and co-
owner of the portion retained by M/s Jainsons Westend and as such the
plaintiffs have no title, right or interest whatsoever in respect of the
portion earmarked as red in the site plan attached as annexure A-1.
The entire rent of the above said five different tenancies of M/s Jains
Westend shall be paid by M/s Jainsons Westend to the five different
companies.
The plaintiff have already received the following amount in consideration
of the sale being made in favour of five different companies, as full and
final payment.
***
15. That the plaintiffs further agree that they shall not cause any
damage to the various portions at present under the tenancy of M/s
Jainsons Westend as and when they make any constructions, additions,
alterations or any structural change in their portions forming part of the
property bearing No.5/8, WEA Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh, New
Delhi.
16. That it is further agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that
both the parties shall withdrawn their respective suits i.e. Suit No.593 of
1993 titled as Jainsons Westend…Vs..Tarjeet Singh and others, pending
in the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi and similarly the plaintiff will also
withdrawn the suit for damages filed against the Jainsons Westend being
suit No.1108/1993 titled as Sharam Singh and another..Vs..Jainsons
Westend pending in the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi, New Delhi. Both
the parties further undertake to take all necessary steps i.e. filing of an
application under Order 23 Rule 3 or any other application connected
therewith for the withdrawal of the said suits and this shall also be a part
of the present compromise being entered between the plaintiff and the
defendant. It is clarified that the defendant M/s Jainsons Westend has
paid entire arrears of rent of the Plaintiff‟s w.e.f. 1.1.1993 to 31.12.1994
at the rate of Rs.6,500/- P.M. (Rupees six thousand five hundred only).
The said rent has been paid to the plaintiff‟s vide cheque No.009614
dated 15.01.1995, down as Andhra Bank, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The
plaintiff‟s acknowledge the receipt of the said amount and further state
that they have no further claim towards rent/damages in respect of suit
No.1108/1993 pending in the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi against
Jainsons Westend (Defendant) and the said suit has now become
infructuous and shall be withdrawn. Apart from the above Civil Revision
Petition No.593/1993 pending in the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi filed
by the plaintiff against the defendant shall be withdrawn.”
26. Pursuant to the said compromise decree, an Agreement to Sell was
executed between the parties. As per the terms of the Agreement to Sell, the
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 30 KUMAR KAURAV
respondent/plaintiff agreed to sell 1/5th of the undivided suit property to M/s
Jainsons Westend Pvt ltd, which has been retained by M/s Jainsons
Westened pursuant to the compromise decree for a consideration of Rs
1,75,000/-.
27. Clause 7 of the Agreement to Sell states that the 1/5 th undivided share
of the property was in the possession of the tenant i.e., M/s Jainsons
Westend. Furthermore, Clause (ii) states that the said transfer would be
applicable after the conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold.
Clause 6 further states that after the execution of the said agreement, the
vendor i.e., the respondent/plaintiff shall have no right over the said property
and the appellant/defendant shall be exclusive owners of the said property. It
further stipulates that the M/s Jainsons Westened would come under the
tenancy of the appellant/defendant and shall pay rent to the
appellant/defendant accordingly.
28. Clause 12 and 13 of the Agreement to Sell further state that the
respondent/plaintiff undertakes to immediately execute a sale deed in favor
of the appellant/defendant after the conversion of the suit property. Clause
13 then states that if the respondent/plaintiff fails to execute the sale deed
after conversion, then the appellant/defendant shall become the owner of the
property. The aforenoted Clauses of the Agreement to sell read as under:-
“WHEREAS by virtue of a compromise being entered between the vendors
and M/s Jainsons Westend, M/s Jainsons Westend is a tenant and shall
continued to be a tenant in respect of portion as earmarked in Red in the
the vendors have agreed to sell the earmarked portion in Red as Schedule
A of the present agreement. The entire portion now in possession of M/s
Jainsons Westend Comprises of various tenancies at different rates of rent.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 31 KUMAR KAURAV
And Whereas the vendors have agreed to sell the earmarked portion
marked in Red as in Schedule ‘A’ to the present agreement and which is
in occupation of M/s Jainsons Westend as Tenants and the purchasers
have agreed to purchase the same on the terms and conditions recorded
hereinbelow:-
***
7. Relying upon the aforesaid representations and assurances, the
vendee have agreed to purchase the portion ermarked as red in the site
plan attached as Schedule A i.e. 1/5th undivided share and now in
possession with M/s Jainsons Westend who are the tenant and are
enjoying the tenancy rights as distinct and separate tenancy for the agreed
consideration of an amount of RS.1,75,000/- on the terms and conditions
mutually agreed and which the parties are desirous of recording in the
manner hereinafter appearing.
(a) the vendor shall sell and the vendee shall purchase the 1/5th (One fifth)
undivided share of the portion earmarked in red in the site plan attached as
Schedule A in the premises being No.5/8, Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi, together with the rights and easements and appurtenances in
any right, relating and pertaining to the any said premises for the price of
Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees one lakh seventy five thousand only) to be paid by the
vendee to the vendors as follows:-
***
8. That the vendors have received the entire consideration and hence
forthafter the execution of this agreement to sell the vendors shall have no
right, title, interest in the portion sold to the Vendee (Schedule A) and the
vendees shall be exclusive owners of the premises. M/s Jainsons Westend
immediately after execution of this agreement shall be a direct tenant
under Vendees and all rental amount M/s Jainsons Westend shall be
directly paying to the venees.
***
12 The Vendors further undertake to immediately execute a sale Deed
in favour of Vendee with the portion sold after the above said premises are
converted from lease hold to free hold.
13. If the Vendor fail to execute a proper Sale Deed in respect of the
said premises in favour of Vendees immediately after the conversion, then
notwithstanding to any thing contrary hereinabove the vendees shall deem
to have been the owners for all practical purposes.
***
15. That the Vendors further undertake that after the execution of the
present agreement to sell, the vendor have no right, title or interest of any
kind over the portion 1/5th undivided which have been agreed to sell to the
vendee and that M/s Jainsons Westend who are tenant in respect of the
said portions shall become the direct tenants under the vendee and theSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 32 KUMAR KAURAV
vendors acknowledge and confirm the same. The remaining 4/5th and
have/has been sold to other four different companies in the ratio of 1/5th
each and present shall become co-owner along with other four companies
in respect of the premises earmarked in red in the site plan attached as
annexure A.”
29. It appears from the conjoint reading of the aforenoted clauses that the
possession of the property, pursuant to which the Agreement to Sell was
entered, remained with the tenant i.e., M/s Jainsons Westend. The
Compromise decree and Agreement to Sell only changed the ownership qua
the 1/5th undivided share of the property, but the tenant i.e., M/s Jainsons
Westend remained in the possession and its status of a tenant was not sought
to be altered.
30. Thus, it appears from a reading of the aforenoted clauses that the
possession of the suit premises was with the tenant and since, the said tenant
was not a party to the present proceedings, it becomes imminent to examine
whether, in such an atypical scenario, the respondent/plaintiff could even
claim the possession from the appellant/defendant. This examination shall
follow in the subsequent discussion.
31. At this juncture, it is appropriate to lend credence to the observations
of the Supreme Court in the case of Deo Kuer v. Sheoprasad Singh4,
wherein, it has been held that the consequential relief of possession is
necessitated against the defendants only and if the property is not in
possession of the defendants, then there is no requirement to pray for the
consequential relief of possession. The relevant extracts of the said decision
read as under:-
4
1965 SCC OnLine SC 282.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 33 KUMAR KAURAV
“5. The authorities clearly show that where the defendant is not in
possession and not in a position to deliver possession to the plaintiff it is not
necessary for the plaintiff in a suit for a declaration of title to property to
claim possession : see Sunder Singh — Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharam High
School, Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh-Mallah Singh Rajput
High School [(1957) LR 65 IA 106]. Now it is obvious that in the present
case, the respondents were not in possession after the attachment and were
not in a position to deliver possession to the appellants. The Magistrate was
in possession, for whomsoever, it does not matter, and he was not of course
a party to the suit. It is pertinent to observe that in Nawab Humayun
Begam v. Nawab Shah Mohammad Khan [AIR (1943) PC 94] it has been
held that the further relief contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the
Specific Relief Act is relief against the defendant only. We may add that
in K. Sundaresa Iyer v. Sarvajana Sowkiabil Virdhi Nidhi Ltd. [(1939) ILR
Mad 986] it was held that it was not necessary to ask for possession when
property was in custodia legis. There is no doubt that property under
attachment under Section 145 of the Code is in custodia legis. These cases
clearly establish that it was not necessary for the appellants to have asked
for possession.”
32. Thus, it is clear that the proviso to Section 34 of the SRA would be
applicable when the plaintiff could seek possession from the defendants i.e.
when the defendants are in possession. In the present case, it appears that
possession was with the tenant and not with the appellant/defendant and
therefore, on that score as well, Section 34 of the SRA would not be
applicable in the present case. Thus, there was no occasion for the
respondent/plaintiff to claim possession in the suit.
33. In a second appeal, the Court must be mindful of the exposition of law
under Section 100 of CPC, which clearly elucidates that the second appeal
can only be entertained if it raises a substantial question of law. Pertinently,
it is the settled exposition of law that as a Court of the second appeal, the
Court would not interfere in the impugned judgment on the ground of
erroneousness of the findings of fact, however gross or inexcusable the errorSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 34 KUMAR KAURAV
may seem to be.5 It is pertinent to point out that after the amendment in
1976, the scope of the second appeal under Section 100 CPC was further
curtailed and only in cases wherein substantial questions of law arise, the
second appeal is permissible. A second appeal under Section 100 CPC is
now confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question
must be a substantial one. A substantial question of law is one which carries
enough weight to turn the course of the issue between the parties to a suit
and which does not find any answer in the realm of settled law. The said
curtailment of the scope of a second appeal is a conscious curtailment by the
legislature for the refinement of the civil procedure and is meant to prevent
the re-agitation of factual issues before different forums.
34. In the case of Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil6, the
Supreme Court observed that where the findings of the fact by the lower
Appellate Court are based on evidence, the second Appellate Court cannot
ouster such findings and substitute them with its own finding on
reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was
possible. The Supreme Court further observed that it is the obligation of the
Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not
frustrate it by excluding the same.
35. As a second appeal is not the third trial on facts and the first Appellate
Court is the final arbiter of facts, this interference by the second Appellate
Court is rarity rather than regularity. In the case of Jai5
Ramratan Shukul v. Mussumat Nand, (1892) 19 Cal 249 (252) (PC).
6
(2004) 5 SCC 762.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 35 KUMAR KAURAV
Singh v. Shakuntala 7, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to
interfere even on questions of fact but it has to be done only in exceptional
circumstances. The Court observed as under :-
“6. … While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be totally prohibited
in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in the second appeal and that would
in our view be too broad a proposition and too rigid an interpretation of
law not worthy of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior
courts within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every
matter–it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that
the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible–it is a
rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded
that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only
be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.”
36. In P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan 8, the Supreme Court laid
down the exposition of law that interference in the second appeal is
permissible only when the findings are based on a misreading of evidence or
are so perverse that no person of ordinary prudence could take the said view.
Moreover, the Court must be conscious that intervention is permissible
provided the case involves a substantial question of law.
37. In the present case, the ground urged by the appellant/defendant as
regards the bar under Section 34 of SRA has been dealt by the first
Appellate Court in the correct perspective, as discussed above, and no
question of law emerges from the case set up by the appellant/defendant
before this Court. The issue raised finds an unequivocal answer from the law
already settled by the Supreme Court and the legislative intent clearly
discernible from the statutory provisions of SRA and RCA. No substantial
question of law, necessitating any fresh elucidation of law, has been raised
7
AIR 2002 SC 1428.
8
(2007) 5 SCC 669.
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 36 KUMAR KAURAV
before this Court. Therefore, on a careful consideration of the legal position
and circumstances specific to the case in hand, this Court is not inclined to
interfere with the findings of the first Appellate Court as the instant batch of
appeals raises no substantial question of law.
38. Accordingly, the appeals bearing no. RSA 82/2022, RSA 83/2022,
RSA 84/2022, RSA 85/2022 and RSA 86/2022 stand dismissed. In view of
aforesaid, the cross-appeals bearing no. RSA No. 10/2023, RSA No.
11/2023, RSA No. 12/2023, RSA No. 13/2023 and RSA No. 14/2023, also
stand disposed of.
39. All pending applications are also disposed of accordingly. No costs.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
JANUARY 14, 2025
Nc/am
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:17.01.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:42:13 37 KUMAR KAURAV
[ad_1]
Source link