Madhya Pradesh High Court
Imran Khan vs M.P.State Electriciy Board on 15 January, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 15th OF JANUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 19866 of 2017
IMRAN KHAN
Versus
M.P.STATE ELECTRICIY BOARD AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aniruddha Prasad Pandey - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Shraddha Tiwari - Pl for the State.
Shri Utkarsh Agrawal - Advocate for the respondent No.1.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been
filed seeking following reliefs:
“1. To quash the impugned order Ann/P/9 dated
07-12-2012
2012 and further may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to provide/grant compassionate
appointment of the petitioner in place of his late
father, as per policy dated 30/01/1997 as well as,
in the light of the judgments passed by this
Hon’ble Court & Supreme Court of India (Ann.P
(Ann.P–
10 & P-11)
11) in the interest of Justice.
2. Such other relief deemed fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case including costs of the
petition may also be awarded.”
awarded.
2. It is submitted
itted by learned counsel for petitioner that father of
petitioner had died in harness on 03.04.2003. Since, the peti
petitioner’s
application for grant of appointment on ccompassionate
ompassionate ground was not
being decided, therefore he filed W.P. No.18703/2012, which was
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disposed of vide order dated 05.11.2012 with a directio
direction
n to the respondents
to take a decision on the application. It is further submitted that thereafter,
vide impugned order dated 07.12.2012, the Executive Engineer, Madhya
Pradesh Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Ltd., Sagar took a
decision that it is not possible to give to appointment on compassionate
ground.
3. Challenging the order passed by the respondent No.2, it is
submitted by counsel for the petitioner that since
since, the father of the
petitioner had expired on 03.04.2003, therefore, the policy dated
30.01.1997 was applicable. However, it was also conceded by counsel for
the petitioner that vide order dated 01.09.2000, it was decided that owing
to poor financial condition of the M.P.E.B., no appointment on
compassionate ground shall be granted.
4.. It is submitted that thereafter, vide order dated 07.12.201
07.12.2012, a
compassionate appointment policy of 2013 was brought into existence. It
is also submitted that the case of the petitioner has been rejected primarily
on the ground that the policy for appointment on compa
compassionate
ssionate ground
was put on hold vide
ide order dated 01.09.2000. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot be granted appointment on compassionate ground.
5. It is further submitted that since the case of the petitioner is
covered by the policy dated 30.01.1997, therefore the petitioner should
have been granted appointment on compassionate ground. To buttress his
contentions, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon an order passed by
Coordinate Bench of this Court on 17.07.2007 in the case of Heeralal
Baria V/s M.P. State Electricity Board in W.P. No.1453/2006 as well as
order dated 07.07.2006 passed by High Court of Chhatisgarh in the case of
Krishna Kumar Bhaina and another V/s Chhatisgarh State Electricity
Board in W.P. No.3525/2004 as well as an order passed by Supreme
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Court in SLP Civil No.19197/2006 in the case of Chhatisgarh State
Electricity Board V/s Sanjay Yadav and Others .
6. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner.
7. The father of the petitioner had expired on 03.04.2003. The
Supreme Court in the ccase of Secretary to Govt. Deptt. Of Education
(Primary) and Others Vs. Bheemesh reported in 2021 SCC Online
1264 has held as under :
“12. But we do not consider it necessary to do
so. It is no doubt true that there are, as
contended by the learned senior Counsel for the
respondent, two lines of decisions rendered by
Benches of equal strength. But the apparent
conflict between those two lines of decisions, was
on account of the difference between an
amendment by which an existing benefit was
withdrawn or di diluted
luted and an amendment by
which the existing benefit was enhanced. The
interpretation adopted by this Court varied
depending upon the nature of the amendment.
This can be seen by presenting the decisions
referred to by the learned senior counsel for the
respondent
spondent in a tabular column as follows:
Citation Scheme in force Modified Decision of this
on the date of Scheme which Court
death of the came into force
Government after death
servant
State Bank of The Scheme of The 1996 Rejecting the
India v. Jaspal the year 1996, Scheme was claim of the
Kaur (2007) 9 which made the subsequently wife of the
SCC 571 [a two financial modified by deceased
member Bench] condition of the policy issued in employee, this
family as the 2005, which laid Court held that
main criterion, down few the application
was in force, on parameters for of the dependant
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the date of death determining made in the year
of the employee penury. One of 2000, after the
in the year 1999. the parameters death
eath of the
was to see if the employee in the
income of the year 1999,
family had been cannot be
reduced to less decided on the
than 60% of the basis of a
salary drawn by Scheme which
the employee at came into force
the time of in the year 2005.
death.
Therefore, the
wife of the
deceased
employee
claimed the
consideration of
the application
on the basis of
parameters laid
down in the
policy of the
year 2005.
State Bank of The employee But with effect This Court held
India v. Raj died on from 04.08.2005 that the
Kumar (2010) 1.10.2004 and a new Scheme application
11 SCC 661 [a the applications for payment of could be
two member for exgratia lump- considered only
Bench] compassionate
com sum was under the new
appointment introduced in the Scheme, as it
were made on place of the old contained a
6.06.2005 and Scheme. The specific
14.06.2005. On new Scheme provision
the date of death contained a relating to
and on the date provision to the pending
of the effect that all applications.
applications, a applications
Scheme known pending under
as the old Scheme
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compassionate will be dealt
appointment with only in
Scheme was in accordance with
force. the new
Scheme.
MGB Gramin The employee However, a new This Court took
Bank v. Chakra died on Scheme dated the view that the
warti 19.04.2006 and 12.06.2006 new Scheme
Singh (2014) 13 the application came into force alone would
SCC 583 [a two for appointment on 6.10.2006, apply as it
member Bench] made on providing only contained a
12.05.2006. A for ex gratia specific
scheme for payment instead provision which
appointment on of mandated all
compassionate compassionate pending
grounds was in appointment. applications to
force on that be considered
date. under the new
Scheme.
Canara The employee The 1993 This Court
Bank v. M. died on Scheme was dismissed the
Mahesh 10.10.1998 and substituted by a appeals filed by
Kumar (2015) 7 the application Scheme for the Bank on
SCC 412 [a two for appointment payment of ex account of two
member Bench] on gratia in the year important
importa
compassionate 2005. But by the distinguishing
grounds, was time the 2005 features,
made under the Scheme was namely, (i) that
Scheme of the issued, the the application
year 1993. It claimant had for appointment
was rejected on already on
30.06.1999. The approached the compassionate
1993 Scheme High Court of grounds was
was known as Kerala by way rejected in the
Dying
“Dying in of writ petition year 1999 and
Harness and succeeded the rejection
Scheme.”
Scheme before the order was set
learned Single aside by the
Judge vide a High Court in
Judgment dated the year 2003
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30.05.2003. The much before the
Judgment was compassionate
upheld by the appointment
Division Bench Scheme was
wa
in the year 2006 substituted by an
and the matter ex gratia
landed up before Scheme in year
this Court 2005;
thereafter. In and (ii) that in
other words, the the year 2014,
Scheme of the the original
year 2005 came scheme for
into force appointment on
: (i) after the compassionate
rejection of the grounds stood
application for revived, when
compassionate the civil appeals
appointment were decided.
under the old
scheme;
and (ii) after the
order of
rejection was set
aside by the
Single Judge of
the High Court.
Indian The employee A new Scheme In the light of
Bank v. Promila died on was brought into the decision
(2020) 2 SCC 15.01.2004 and force on in Canara
729 [a two the application 24.07.2004 after Bank v. M.
member Bench] for appointment the death of the Mahesh Kumar,Kumar
was made by his employee. this Court held
minor son on Under this that the case of
24.01.2004. On Scheme an ex the claimant
these dates, a gratia cannot be
circular bearing compensation examined in the
No. 56/79 dated was provided context of the
4.04.1979 which for, subject to subsequent
contained a certain Scheme and that
Scheme for conditions. After since the family
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appointment on the coming into had taken full
compassionate force of the new gratuity under
grounds was in Scheme, the the old scheme,
force. But
Bu the claimant was they were not
Scheme directed by the entitled to seek
provided for bank to submit a compassionate
appointment, fresh application appointment
only for those under the new even under the
who do not opt Scheme. The old Scheme.
cheme.
for payment of claimant did not
gratuity for the apply under the
full term of new Scheme, as
service of he was
employee who interested only
died in harness. in
compassionate
appointment and
not monetary
benefit.
N.C. Under the But by virtue of After taking
Santosh v. State existing Scheme an amendment note of a
of referable to Rule to the proviso to reference made
Karnataka (202 5 of the Rule 5, a minor in State Bank of
0) 7 SCC 617 (a Karnataka Civil dependant India v. Sheo
three Member Services should apply Shankar
Bench) (Appointment within one year Tewari to a
on from the date of larger bench, a
Compassionate death of the three member
Grounds) Rules, Government Bench of this
1999, a minor servant and must Court held
dependant of a have attained the in N.C.
deceased age of 18 years Santosh that the
Government on the date of norms
employee may making the prevailing on the
apply within one application. date of
year from the Applying the consideration of
date of attaining amended the application
majority. provisions, the should be the
appointment of basis for
persons already consideration
ideration of
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made on the claim for
compassionate compassionate
grounds, were appointment.
cancelled by the The Bench
appointing further held that
authority which the dependant of
led to the a government
challenge before employee, in the
this Court. absence of any
vested right
accruing on the
date of death of
the government
employee, can
only demand
consideration of
his application
appl
and hence he is
disentitled to
seek the
application of
the norms
prevailing on the
date of death of
the government
servant.
13. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, our
attention was also drawn to the decision of the
three member Bench in State off Madhya
Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas. But that case arose out
of a claim made by the dependant of a deceased
Government servant, who was originally
appointed on a work charged establishment and
who later claimed to have become a permanent
employee. The Court w went
ent into the distinction
between an employee with a permanent status
and an employee with a regular status. Despite
the claim of the dependant that his father had
become a permanent employee, this Court held
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in that case that as per the policy prevailing oon
n
the date of death, a work charged/contingency
fund employee was not entitled to
compassionate appointment. While holding so,
the Bench reiterated the opinion in Indian
Bank v. Promila.
14. The aforesaid decision in Amit
Shrivas (supra) was followed by a two member
Bench of this Court in the yet to be reported
decision in the State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi decided on
18.11.2021.
15. Let us now come to the reference pending
before the larger Bench. In Stateate Bank of
India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra), a two
member Bench of this Court noted the apparent
conflict between State Bank of India v. Raj
Kumar and MGB Gramin Bank on the one hand
and Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar on the
other hand and referred th thee matter for the
consideration of a larger Bench. The order of
reference to a larger Bench was actually dated
8.02.2019.
16. It was only after the aforesaid reference to a
larger Bench that this Court decided at least
four cases, respectively in (i) Indian
Bank v. Promila; (ii) N.C. Santhosh v. State of
Karnataka; (iii) State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas; and (iv) State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi. Out of
these four decisions, N.C. Santosh (supra) was
by a three member Bench, which actually took
note of the reference pending before the larger
Bench.
17. Keeping the above in mind, if we critically
analyse the way in which this Court has
proceeded to interpret the applicability of a new
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or modified Scheme that comes into force after
the death of the employee, we may notice an
interesting feature. In cases where the benefit
under the existing Scheme was taken away or
substituted with a lesser benefit, this Court
directed the application of the new Scheme. But
in cases where the benefits
benefits under an existing
Scheme were enlarged by a modified Scheme
after the death of the employee, this Court
applied only the Scheme that was in force on the
date of death of the employee. This is
fundamentally due to the fact that
compassionate appointment w wasas always
considered to be an exception to the normal
method of recruitment and perhaps looked down
upon with lesser compassion for the individual
and greater concern for the rule of law.
18. If compassionate appointment is one of the
conditions of servic
servicee and is made automatic
upon the death of an employee in harness
without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the
same would be treated as a vested right in law.
But it is not so. Appointment on compassionate
grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict
scrutiny
utiny of various parameters including the
financial position of the family, the economic
dependence of the family upon the deceased
employee and the avocation of the other
members of the family. Therefore, no one can
claim to have a vested right for appoin
appointment
tment on
compassionate grounds. This is why some of the
decisions which we have tabulated above
appear to have interpreted the applicability of
revised Schemes differently, leading to conflict
of opinion. Though there is a conflict as to
whether the Scheme in force on the date of
death of the employee would apply or the
Scheme in force on the date of consideration of
the application of appointment on
compassionate grounds would apply, there is
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certainly no conflict about the underlying
concern reflected in the above decisions.
Wherever the modified Schemes diluted the
existing benefits, this Court applied those
benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme
granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was
made applicable.
19. The important aspect about the conflict of
opinion is that it revolves around two
dates, namely, (i) date of death of the employee;
and (ii) date of consideration of the application
of the dependant. Out of these two dates, only
one, namely, the date of death alone is a fixed
factor that does not not change. The next date
namely the date of consideration of the claim, is
something that depends upon many variables
such as the date of filing of application, the date
of attaining of majority of the claimant and the
date on which the file is put up to ththee competent
authority. There is no principle of statutory
interpretation which permits a decision on the
applicability of a rule, to be based upon an
factor.. Let us take for
indeterminate or variable factor
instance
ance a hypothetical case where Government
servants die
die in harness on January 01, 2020.
Let us assume that the dependants of these 2
deceased Government servants make
applications for appointment on 2 different
dates say 29.05.2020 and 02.06.2020 and a
modified Scheme comes into force on June 01,
2020. If th
thee date of consideration of the claim is
taken to be the criteria for determining whether
the modified Scheme applies or not, it will lead
to two different results, one in respect of the
person who made the application before June 1,
2020 and another in res respect
pect of the person who
applied after June 01, 2020. In other words, if
two employees die on the same date and the
dependants of those employees apply on two
different dates, one before the modified Scheme
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comes into force and another thereafter, they
will come in for differential treatment if the date
of application and the date of consideration of
the same are taken to be the deciding factor. A
rule of interpretation which produces different
results, depending upon what the individuals
do or do not do, is inconceivable.. This is why,
the managements of a few banks, in the cases
tabulated above, have introduced a rule in the
modified scheme itself, which provides for all
pending applications to be decided under the
new/modified scheme. Therefore, we are of th thee
considered view that the interpretation as to the
applicability of a modified Scheme should
depend only upon a determinate and fixed
criteria such as the date of death and not an
indeterminate and variable factor.”
8. Thus, it is clear that policy, which was in vogue on the date of
death of employee would be a relevant policy. In the present case, the
father of the petitioner had died on 03.0
03.04.2003,
4.2003, therefore the said date is
relevant. The policy dated 30.01.1997 was put on ho
hold
ld vide order dated
01.09.2000. Therefore, after 01.09.2000, there was no policy for
appointment on compassionate ground and the new policy came into
existence in the month of December, 2014. Since on 03.04.2003, there was
no policy for appoin
appointment
ment on compassionate ground, therefore
theref the
respondents were right in holding that the petitioner is not entitled for
appointment on compassionate ground.
9. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that Coordinate Bench
of this Court in the case of Heeralal Baria (Supra) has directed
di
appointment on compassionate ground. However, in the case of Heeralal
Baria (Supra), his
is father had died on 13.09.1999 and admittedly
admittedly, on the
said date,, the policy dated 30.01.1997 was in force.. Similarly, the
petitioner has also relied upon the jud
judgement
gement passed by the High Court of
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Chhatisgarh, in the case of Krishna Kumar Bhaina (Supra). In the said
case, the employee had expired on 05.09.1997 i.e., the policy dated
30.01.1997 was in force.
force Therefore, both the cases are distinguishable on
their own peculiar facts. So far as the judgment
ment passed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Sanjay Yadav (Supra) is concerned, the petitione
petitioner has
not filed the copy of detailed order passed by High Court, there
therefore it is
not known as to whether the facts are similar or not.
10. Be that whatever it may be.
11.. In the light of the judg
judgment
ment passed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Bheemesh (Supra),
(Supra) it is made clear that the policy, which was in
force on the date of death of employee will be applicable
applicable.. Since,
S on
03.04.2003, the order dated 01.09.2000 was in force and the policy for
appointment on compassionate ground was on hold, therefore,
herefore, the
respondent did not commit any mistake by rejecting the application.
12. Furthermore,
hermore, 21 long y
years have passed. Appointment
Appo on
compassionate ground is a speedy remedy and cannot be used as aan
alternative mode for regular appointment. If a family has survived for a
considerable long time, then the basic purpose of appointment on
compassionate ground will auto
automatically get frustrated. Application for
appointment on compassionate ground was rejected vide order dated
07.12.2012, whereas this petition was filed on 16.11.2017 i.e., after 05
years of rejection of claim of petitioner. The Supreme Court in the case of
State of West Bengal and Others Etc., Vs. Debabrata Tiwari decided on
3rd March, 2023 in Civil Appeal Nos.8842
Nos.8842-8855 of 2022 has held as
under:-
“7.2. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court, the following principles emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate
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appointment makes a departure from the
general provisions providing for
appointment to a post by following a
particular procedure of recruitment.
Since such a provision enables
appointment being made without
following the said procedure, it is in the
naturee of an exception to the general
provisions and must be resorted to only
in order to achieve the stated objectives,
i.e., to enable the family of the deceased
to get over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate
grounds is not a sour
source of recruitment.
The reason for making such a benevolent
scheme by the State or the public sector
undertaking is to see that the dependants
of the deceased are not deprived of the
means of livelihood. It only enables the
family of the deceased to get oveover the
sudden financial crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a
vested right which can be exercised at
any time in future. Compassionate
employment cannot be claimed or offered
after a lapse of time and after the crisis is
over.
iv. That compassionate
compass appointment
should be provided immediately to
redeem the family in distress. It is
improper to keep such a case pending for
years.
v. In determining as to whether the family
is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects
must be borne in mind includi including the
income of the family, its liabilities, the
terminal benefits if any, received by the
family, the age, dependency and marital
status of its members, together with the
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income from any other source.
7.3. The object underlying a provision for grant of
compassionate employment is to enable the family
of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden
crisis due to the death of the bread-earner
bread earner which
has left the family in penury and without any means
of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian
consideration and
and having regard to the fact that
unless some source of livelihood is provided, the
family would not be in a position to make both ends
meet, a provision is made for giving gainful
appointment to one of the dependants of the
deceased who may be eligible for for such appointment.
Having regard to such an object, it would be of no
avail to grant compassionate appointment to the
dependants of the deceased employee, after the
crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-
bread-
winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is is also a
compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in
matters concerning compassionate appointment
because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme
of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long
lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of
the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for
seeking compassionate appointment would cease to
exist and thus lose its significance and this would be
a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the
authorities in determining as to whether a case for
the grant of compassionate appointment has been
made out for consideration.
7.4. As noted above, the sine qua non for
entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment
is that the family of the deceased employee would be
unable to make two ends meet without one of the
dependants of the deceased employee being
employed on compassionate grounds. The financial
condition of the family of the deceased, at the time
of the death of the deceased, is the primary
consideration that ought to guide the authorities’
authorities’
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decision in the matter.
7.5. Considering the second question referred to
above, in the first instance, regarding whether
applications for compassionate appointment could
be considered after a delay of several years, we are
of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of
prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant
in claiming compassionate appointment or the
authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of
immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial
circumstances of the family of the deceased, may
have changed, for the better, since the time of the
death of the government employee. In such
circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities
are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged
period of delay, the family of the deceased was able
to sustain themselves, most probably by availing
gainful employment from some other source.
Granting compassionate appointment in such a
case, as noted by this W.P.No.19868/2023 Court in
Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for
compassionate
mpassionate appointment as though it were a
matter of inheritance based on a line of succession
which is contrary to the Constitution. Since
compassionate appointment is not a vested right and
the same is relative to the financial condition and
hardship faced
ced by the dependents of the deceased
government employee as a consequence of his
death, a claim for compassionate appointment may
not be entertained after lapse of a considerable
period of time since the death of the government
employee.
8. Laches or undue
und delay, the blame-worthy
worthy conduct
of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in
England for obtaining discretionary relief which
disentitled him for grant of such relief was
explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper
Prosper Armstrong,
(1874) 3 PC 221 as under:
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“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation, in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute or limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such
cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval,
which might affect either party and cause a
balance of Justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as it relates
to the remedy.”
Whether the above doctrine of laches which
disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of
England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person
by the High Court in the exercise of its power under
Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for
consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court
in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M. R. Meher, President,
Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 1450.. In the
said case, it was regarded as a principle that
disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Co
Court
urt
in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article
226 of the Constitution.
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In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4
SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated
in earlier pronouncements in the following words:
“9. … the Hi
High Court in exercise of its
discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the Petitioner and
such delay is not satisfactorily explained,
the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated
resort to the extraordinary remedy because
it is likely to cau
cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It wwas pointed
out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third
third-party rights in the
meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in
deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.”
While we are mindful of the fact that there is no
period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ
petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide
Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryan
Haryana,a, (1997) 6 SCC 538;
NDMC vs. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 278.
9. Further, simply because the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ
Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant
authority in the year 2005
2005-2006,
2006, it cannot be said that
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they diligently perused the matter and had not slept
over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to
refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013)
12 SCC 179,, wherein the following observations were
made:
“19. From the aforesai
aforesaid authorities it is
clear as crystal that even if the court or
tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or
dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action cannot rise like a p phoenix.
Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time.”
(emphasis by us)
*******
10. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present
case, we hold that the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners,
upon submitting their applications in the year 20062006–
2005 did nothing further to pursue the matter, till the
year 2015 i.e., for a period of ten years.
Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities
of the Appellant
Appellant-State
State in dealing with their
applications, the Respondent
Respondent-Writ
Writ Petitioners delayed
approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the
nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the
State.
ate. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching
the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a
remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners. Such a delay would
disentitle the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners to the
discretionary
etionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Further, the order of the High Court
dated 17th March, 2015, whereby the writ petition filed
by some of the Respondents herein was disposed of
with a direction to the Director of Local Bodies,
Government nt of West Bengal to take a decision as to the
appointment of the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners,
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cannot be considered to have the effect of revival of the
cause of action.
11. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the
following observations of this Court in Malaya Nanda
2836,, as to the
Sethy vs. State of Orissa, AIR 2022 SC 2836
manner in which the authorities must consider and
decide applications for appointment on com
compassionate
passionate
grounds:
“9. Before parting with the present order, we
are constrained to observe that considering
the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds, i.e., a family of a
deceased employee may be placed in a
position of financial h hardship upon the
untimely death of the employee while in
service and the basis or policy is immediacy
in rendering of financial assistance to the
family of the deceased consequent upon his
untimely death, the authorities must consider
and decide such appli
applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds as
per the policy prevalent, at the earliest, but
not beyond a period of six months from the
date of submission of such completed
applications.
We are constrained to direct as above
as we have found that in several cases,
applications for appointment on
compassionate grounds are not attended in
time and are kept pending for years together.
As a result, the applicants in several cases
have to approach the concerned High Courts
seeking a writ of MandamuMandamus for the
consideration of their applications. Even after
such a direction is issued, frivolous or
vexatious reasons are given for rejecting the
applications. Once again, the applicants have
to challenge the order of rejection before the
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High Court which lleads to pendency of
litigation and passage of time, leaving the
family of the employee who died in harness in
the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further,
for reasons best known to the authorities and
on irrelevant considerations, applications
made for compassionate appointment are
rejected. After several years or are not
considered at all as in the instant case.
If the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds as envisaged under
the relevant policies or the rules have to be
achieved tthen it is just and necessary that
such applications are considered well in time
way. We have come across
and not in a tardy way
cases where for nearly two decades the
controversy regarding the application made
for compassionate appointment is not
resolved. Thi
This consequently leads to the
frustration of the very policy of granting
compassionate appointment on the death of
the employee while in service. We have,
therefore, directed that such applications
must be considered at an earliest point of
time. The conside
consideration must be fair,
reasonable and based on relevant
consideration. The application cannot be
rejected on the basis of frivolous and for
reasons extraneous to the facts of the case.
Then and then only the object and purpose of
appointment on compassionate grounds can
be achieved.”
(emphasis by us)
In the said case, the claim of the appellant
appellant–
applicant therein for compassionate appointment was
directed by this Court to be considered by the
competent authority. This Court noted that in the said
case, there was no lapse on the part of the appellant
appellant–
applicant therein in diligently pursuing the matter. The
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delay in considering the application of the appellant
therein was held to be solely attributable to the
authorities of the State, and no part of it wa wass
occasioned by the appellant
appellant-applicant.
applicant. Further, in the
said case, the appellant-applicant
appellant applicant was prejudiced not
only because of the prolonged delay in considering his
application but also by the fact that in the interim, the
policy of the State governing co compassionate
mpassionate
appointment had changed to his detriment. Therefore,
the facts of the said case were distinct from the facts
involved herein. In the present case, the conduct of the
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners cannot be said to be
blameless in that they did not
not pursue their matter with
sufficient diligence. However, the observations made in
the said case as to the manner in which applications
for compassionate appointment are to be considered
and disposed of are relevant to the present case.
As noted in ththee said case, the operation of a
policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is
founded on considerations of immediacy. A sense of
immediacy is called for not only in the manner in which
the applications are processed by the concerned
authorities but also iin
n the conduct of the applicant in
pursuing his case, before the authorities and if needed
before the Courts.
12. In the present case, the applications for
compassionate appointment were made by the
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners in the year 2005-2006.
2005 2006.
Admittedly, the first concrete step taken by the
Chairman of the Burdwan Municipality was in the year
2013, when the said authority forwarded a list of
candidates to be approved by the Director of Local
Bodies, Burdwan Municipality. The Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ
Petitioners knocked on the doors of the High Court of
Calcutta only in the year 2015, i.e., after a lapse of
nearly ten
en years from the date of making the
application for compassionate appointment. The
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners were not prudent enough
to approach the Courts sooner, claiming that no
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concrete step had been taken by the Appellant
Appellant-State
State in
furtherance of tthe
he application by seeking a Writ in the
nature of Mandamus.
13. The sense of immediacy in the matter of
compassionate appointment has been lost in the
present case. This is attributable to the authorities of
the Appellant-State
State as well as the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ
Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made
in 2005-2006,
2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail,
because admittedly, the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners
have been able to eke out a living even though they did
not successfully get appointed to the services of the
Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we
think that this is therefore not fit cases to direct that the
claim of the Respondents
Respondents-Writ
Writ Petitioners for
appointments on compassionate grounds, be
considered or entertained.”
13. In
n view of the fact that vide order dated 01.09.2000, the policy
for appointment on compassionate ground was put on hold and o
on the date
of death of father of the petitioner, there was no policy for appointment on
compassionate ground coupled with the fact that more than 22 years have
passed from the date of death of the father of the petitioner and the
rejection order has been challenged after 05 years, aaccordingly,
ccordingly, n
no case is
made out warranting interference.
14. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Shruti
APARNA Digitally signed by APARNA TIWARI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, ou=JABALPUR,
2.5.4.20=54c89e2792467ef9c0ee402cae8b0651738dbf770df314477
cd9e93a47cbfaf0, postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
TIWARI
serialNumber=37FD2B10CEB4A8AC1BEDA44A39E01F60FC0F75163
6583550F831F9BA97153B01, cn=APARNA TIWARI
Date: 2025.01.17 17:27:08 +05’30’