Madhya Pradesh High Court
Icici Lombardgeneral General … vs Kanhaiyalal on 21 January, 2025
Author: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
1 MA-88-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL
ON THE 21st OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 88 of 2025
ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS
Versus
KANHAIYALAL AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Narayan Sharma - Advocate for the appellant.
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ORDER
With the consent of learned counsel for the appellant, arguments are
heard finally.
This Miscellaneous Appeal at the instance of the appellant/Insurance
Company under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is directed
against the impugned award dated 05.09.2023 passed in Claim Case
No.14/2021 by Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rajendragram,
District Anuppur (M.P.).
2. Heard on I.A. No.759 of 2025 – an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for condonation of delay in presentation of the appeal.
3. The appeal is barred by 379 days i.e. almost one year & 14 days.
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Signed by: DINESH VERMA
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2 MA-88-2025
4. I have gone through the application for condonation of delay.
5. Learned counsel for appellant/Insurance Company has submitted that
the award was passed on 05.09.2023 and the appeal against the compensation
awarded by the Claims Tribunal in favour of claimants was required to be
filed within 90 days from the date of award; but same could not be filed in
due time as the claimant has impleaded Bharti AXA GIC as the insurer of the
alleged offending vehicle and during the pendency of the matter the Bharti
AXA GIC has merged with the appellant ICIC| Lombard GIC. It is further
submitted that post-merger the handing over of the pending litigation to the
legal department of the appellant took time and the passing of the impugned
award was not timely reported by the counsel representing the Bharti AXA
GIC before the Tribunal. After handing over of the pending litigation from
the Bharti AXA GIC to the legal department of the appellant was complete,
the Status of all the matters were taken and it was then gathered that the final
order has been passed in the matter. After getting the information of the
passing of the award by the Tribunal the copy of the order was sent to the
Head Office of the appellant at Mumbai from where the payment requests
and approval for filing appeal is taken. The receipt of the cheques for the
payment of the statutory deposit amount, the file was sent back to the
Regional Office at Bhopal for the appointment of an advocate and for the
filing of the appeal. In the process of taking approval and dispatch of files
and cheques and then receipt of statutory deposit, the filing of instant appeal
got delayed. The delay has occasioned due to the transition after the merger
of the Bharti AXA GIC with the appellant ICICI Lombard GIC and the the
filing of instant appeal got delayed by 379 days and the delay occasioned is
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Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
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3 MA-88-2025
neither willful nor deliberate and has occasioned due to attended
circumstances and is thus bona fide and liable to be condoned. Thus, it is
prayed that the delay caused in presentation the appeal may be condoned.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Co. at length
and perused the record.
7. Law with regard to scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by
Hon’ble the Apex Court and the various High Courts.
8. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.; AIR 1962 SC 361,
Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under:-
“7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant
to bear in mind two important considerations. The first
consideration is that expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of
the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties.
In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has
expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of
limitation to treat the decree as decree-holder by lapse of time
should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration
which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing
delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay
and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion
in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.”
9. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation,
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by LRs.
Vs. Executive Enginner, Jalgaon Medium Project and another; (2008) 17
SCC 448 has held as under:-
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4 MA-88-2025
“26. Basically, the laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, p. 266, Para 605,
the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (i) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove the
stale claim, and (iii) that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of
peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for
public order. This Court in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2
SCC 705] has observed: (SCC p. 712, para 18)
“18. The object of law of limitation is to prevent
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in
equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been
lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches.”
28. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110 :
AIR 1970 SC 898 : (1969) 2 SCR 824] this Court observed that
this principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation
are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury,
quickening diligence and preventing oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for
fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a
lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They
are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of
the sleepy.”
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Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
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5 MA-88-2025
10. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, Hon’ble the Apex Court in
the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Others; (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under:-
“19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking,
the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal
approach in considering the application for condonation of delay
on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in
Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] .
xxx … xxx..
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise
of the discretion by the courts in condoning delay, have been again
stated by this Court in Balwant Singh [(2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3
SCC (Civ) 537] , as follows: (SCC p. 696, paras 25-26)
“25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has
to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the
concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party
concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction
normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it
is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise
(sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a
given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the
delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will
be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of
the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result
of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be
done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice
can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent inSignature Not Verified
Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
5:09:05 PM
6 MA-88-2025implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair
to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued
to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.”
xxx… xxx..
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could
have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding
the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal
approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot
be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no
justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by
the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating
any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in
this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language
in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a
number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation
of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not
enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be
exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and
should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.”
11. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai; (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in
para 24 as under:-
“24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide
nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no
negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for theSignature Not Verified
Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
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7 MA-88-2025delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If,
on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found
to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to
condone the delay.”
12. Hon’ble the Apex Court in Chief Post Master General and Ors. Vs.
Living Media India Ltd. and Another; AIR 2012 SC 1506 has held that
unless reasonable and acceptable explanation of delay and sufficient cause is
shown, the application need not be accepted.
13. Hon’ble the Apex Court in University of Delhi Vs. Union of India
and Others; (2020) 13 SCC 745 has held that in the matter of condonation
of delay & laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of
the opposite party cannot be dealt with lightly. The condonation of delay is an
exception and should be used where lapse of time is not attributable to any
laches or negligence of the appellant.
14. In the case of State of M.P. and Others Vs. M/S Perfect Sales, Vineet
Market, Jayendraganj, Lashker, Gwalior; AIR 2015 MP 161, Bench at
Gwalior of this Court has held that the appellant slept over the matter for 296
days and did nothing to assail the judgment of the subordinate Court. It
shows careless attitude on the part of the appellant and there being no
sufficient cause shown, the delay cannot be condoned.
15. In the case in hand, the delay in presentation of the appeal is 379 days
i.e. almost one year & 14 days and no reasonable explanation with sufficient
cause has been given. The entire explanation given by the
appellants/Insurance Company depicts a casual approach, unlawful mind of
law of limitation despite being aware of position of law. That apart, when
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Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
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8 MA-88-2025
there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would
also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has
proceeded before filing an appeal.
16. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of law as regards
object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretionary power to be exercised
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court,
this Court is of the view that the delay of 379 days caused in presentation the
appeal by the appellant/Insurance Co. is hopelessly barred by limitation as
neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of
delay nor the same is found to be the satisfaction of this Court.
17. Accordingly, I.A. No.759 of 2025 – application under Section 5 of
Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.
Consequently, this Miscellaneous Appeal is also dismissed. No order as to
costs.
18. Record of the Claims Tribunal alongwith copy of this order be sent
down to the Court concerned through Principal District Judge, Anuppur
(MP).
(DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL)
JUDGE
DV
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: DINESH VERMA
Signing time: 23-01-2025
5:09:05 PM
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