Ranjan Kumar Sahoo vs The State Of Odisha on 24 January, 2025

Orissa High Court

Ranjan Kumar Sahoo vs The State Of Odisha on 24 January, 2025

              ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

                      C.R.P. No.3 of 2020

     In the matter of an Application under Section 115
             of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

                            ***

Ranjan Kumar Sahoo
Aged about 59 years
Son of Sri Santosh Kumar Sahoo
Of Dolabedi Corner,
Grand Road
Puri
Presently residing
At: Heragohiri Sahi
(Near Gopabandhu Bhawan)
P.O.: Puri – 752 001
P.S.: Kumbharpara
Town and District: Puri. … Petitioner

-VERSUS-

1. The State of Odisha
Represented by
The Collector, Puri
At/P.O./P.S.: Puri Town
District: Puri – 752 001.

2. Shri Jagannath Temple
Managing Committee
Represented by
The Administrator
At: Grand Road
P.O./P.S.: Puri Town,
District: Puri – 752 001 … Opposite parties.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 1 of 140

Counsel appeared for the parties:

For the Petitioner : M/s. Susanta Kumar Dash,
Ananga Kumar Otta,
Swetlana Das, Asutosh Sahoo,
Smruti Mohanty and
Prabin Das, Advocates

For the Opposite party : Mr. Satyabrata Mohanty,
No.1 Additional Government Advocate

For the Opposite party : M/s. Subrat Satpathy,
No.2 L.N. Rayatsingh, M.L. Mishra,
P.R. Behera and
Anand Chandra Swain,
Advocates

P R E S E N T:

HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

Date of Hearing : 03.01.2025 :: Date of Judgment : 24.01.2025

J UDGMENT

Invoking provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, challenge is laid in the afore-noted
civil revision petition to the Order dated 07.02.2020
passed by the learned District Judge, Puri, wherein
the delay of more than 25 years in filing the Appeal
under Section 96, registered as R.F.A. No.60 of 2019,
after dismissal of petition to restore the suit under
Order IX, Rule 13 in the year 2000, has been
condoned.

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Facts:

2. The opposite party No.2 herein, as appellant, preferred
appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (―CPC‖, for convenience), registered
as R.F.A. No.60 of 2019, before the learned District
Judge, Puri assailing the judgment and decree dated
21.06.1994 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Puri in Title Suit No.191 of 1992 (be called
―judgment of trial Court‖ hereinafter). The opposite
party No.2 had also filed petition under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of
more than 25 years in filing the said appeal.

2.1. In the affidavit of the Administrator of Shri Jagannath
Temple Managing Committee it has been affirmed that
he could come to know about the judgment being
passed on 21.06.1994 in TS No.191 of 1992 only on
10.09.2019, i.e., after 25 years. To support the said
astounding fact on affidavit, it has been stated at
paragraph 1(d) as follows:

“That the service of summons of the said TS No.191 of
1992 was not served personally on the then
Administrator of the Temple. The certified copy of order
sheet of CS No.191 of 1992 dated 11.04.1984 (sic.?)
reveals the SR of summons back against defendant on
personal service which appears not correct since all
these summons will be received by authorised clerk on
behalf of Administrator and he will put up the same

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before the Administrator, Puri further orders. This being
the practise of the Temple Administrator services of
notice personally on Administrator appeared to be
lawful and suspicious.”

2.2. While objecting to such manner of service of summons
being effected, the opposite party No.2-appellant
claimed to have come to know about the judgment of
trial Court on 10.09.2019 and inter alia contended in
the petition for condonation of delay as follows:

“Section 80 CPC notice is not served as per CPC on
Collector, Puri and Administrator of Sri Jagannath
Temple, Puri. The Order-sheet does not reveal leave is
taken by plaintiff of said suit under Section 80(2) of
CPC for urgency and leave has been granted to file suit
by not serving notice under Section 80 CPC on these
defendants.”

2.3. From the objection filed by the petitioner herein
(respondent No.1 in appeal) to the said petition of the
opposite party No.2, it is culled out that assailing the
ex parte judgment, the opposite party No.2-appellant
had filed a petition under Order IX, Rule 13 of C.P.C.
on 12.04.1996, which was registered as Miscellaneous
Case No.103 of 1996. Said petition got dismissed by
order dated 25.09.2000 for failure to take steps.
Further explanation at paragraph 4 of said objection
transpires that,

“That the allegation made in paragraph 1(b) of the
condonation petition is concerned it is submitted that
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 4 of 140
the averments are not correct. Notice under Section 80,
CPC has been served upon the defendants prior to filing
of this suit and in the present case in paragraph 18 of
the plaint of TS No. 191 of 1992 it is clearly pleaded
that notice under Section 80 CPC was sent to the
defendants on 28.01.1992 by registered post with AD
and the same was received by both the defendants on
29.01.1992 and the suit was filed on 23.06.1992, i.e.
long after expiry of the period of two months and
Section 80(1) clearly states that a statement regarding
service of 80 CPC notice shall be pleaded in the plaint,
which has been clearly pleaded in paragraph 18 of the
plaint. The plaint would not have been admitted without
verification of the notices under Section 80, CPC.
Therefore no fault can be found with the plaintiff of the
said suit. It is false to say that no notice was served
upon the defendants prior to two months of filing of the
suit. The office copy of both the notices along with the
original registration receipt and AD were filed along
with the plaint and only thereafter the plaint was
admitted and notices were issued to both the
defendants.”

2.4. Clarification as available at paragraph 6 of the
objection stands as follows:

“That so far the allegations made in 1(d) of the
condonation petition is concerned they are all false,
frivolous and specially denied. Order sheet of TS
No.191 of 1992 dated 02.02.1994, 21.03.1994 and
11.04.1994 clearly reflects that on 02.02.1994
summons were sent to the defendants on both the
ways. Order-sheet dated 21.03.1994 clearly reflects
that SR against defendant Nos.1 and 2 are back and
Order-sheet dated 11.04.1994 reflects that SR of
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 5 of 140
summons against the defendants were served on
personal service and they being Government officials
service of summons against them are accepted as
sufficient. Both of them were found absent on call and
no steps were taken, hence they were set ex parte. The
official acts are presumed to be correct and mere
allegations regarding non-service of summons is not
acceptable nor the presumption arising out of the Court
record can be ignored on such bald allegations In this
regard the order-sheet dated 29.04.1994 and
09.05.1994 may kindly be seen. Order-sheet dated
29.04.1994 reflects that the affidavit evidence filed by
the plaintiff after granting of permission under Order
19, Rule 1, CPC on 18.04.1994 was put up and the
matter was heard and the same was accepted and the
suit was posted to 11.05.1994 for ex parte judgment.
On 09.05.1994 the defendants filed a petition for time
to file W.S. which clearly shows that the present
Appellant was fully aware about the suit and they have
also appeared on 09.05.1994. In the said suit but their
appearance was ignored by the Court as because the
matter had already been posted for ex parte judgment
and there was no stage for appearance or to file any
W.S. once the hearing has been concluded and the
matter was posted for judgment. This is another
circumstance to show that the present Appellant was
fully aware about the suit and its proceeding.

It is to mention here that the present Appellant was
aware about the suit and its result as Misc Case No.
103 of 1996 was filed by the Appellant before the
Learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Puri against the present
Respondents and the said Misc. Case was filed on
12.04.1996 under Order IX, Rule 13 read with Section
151 CPC with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree

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dated 21.06.1994. The Miscellaneous Case was filed
after expiry of one year ten months from the date of ex
parte decree. The Order dated 02.01.1997 of
Miscellaneous Case No.103 of 1996 indicates that office
note was ready and the matter was posted to
24.02.1997 when the petitioner to take steps against
the opposite parties and for consideration of limitation
petition.

From 24.02.1997 twenty dates were adjourned, i.e.
upto 11.08.2000 for filling requisites for issuance of
summons to the opposite parties and for consideration
of limitation petition but the petitioner, i.e., Sri
Jagganath Temple did not take any steps for issuance
of notice against the opposite parties and ultimately the
matter was posted to 25.09.2000 on which date no
steps were taken from the side of the petitioner and
ultimately the Miscellaneous Case No.103 of 1996 was
dismissed.”

The impugned Order dated 07.02.2020 passed by the
learned District Judge, Puri:

3. The learned District Judge, Puri having considered the
petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
condoned the delay of more than 25 years and
admitted the appeal being RFA No.60 of 2019.

3.1. Taking note of Biranchi Narayan Kuanr Vrs. Khera
Rana, 2019 (II) CLR 688 (Ori), holding that despite
dismissal of petition under Order IX, Rule 13 of the
CPC for default, the appellant has a right to prefer

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appeal, the learned District Judge, Puri made the
following observation:

“Now it is to be seen whether the delay occurred in
present appeal can be excluded or condoned after 25
years and more.

Admittedly, originally the suit property belonged to Shri
Jagannath Mahaprabhu of Puri and the present
appellant is the Marfatdar of the temple as well as its
property represented through its Administrator,
admittedly the then Administrator of Managing
Committee though appeared in the suit did not contest
and allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte in favour of
the present respondent No.1. The matter does not end
there. Again after some years an application under
Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC was filed for setting aside
the said ex parte decree and the same was also
dismissed due to non-prosecution. In a decision
reported in 108 (2009) CLT 61 in the case of Lokesh
Patro and Anr. Vrs. Commissioner of Endowments,
Orissa & 6 Ors., our Hon‟ble High Court has been
pleased to observe as follows:

9. There can also.be no dispute to the settled legal
position that the deity is a juristic perpetual/
minor/and disable person and in respect of the
property belonging to the minor and a persons in
capable to cultivate the holdings by reasons of
physical disability or infirmity requires protection.

A deity is covered under both the classes. The
manager/trustee/pujari and ultimately the state
authorities are under obligation to protect the
interest of such a minor or physically disabled
persons. The deity cannot be divested of any title

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 8 of 140
or rights of immovable property in violation of
statutory provisions, The object is laudable and
based on public policy. In order to protect its
interest even a worshiper having no interest in the
property may approach the authority or Court. If
any person claim to have acquired any-kind of
right in the property belonging to the deity, the
transaction is required to be ignored being illegal
and the deity becomes entitled to recover the
possession as well as the right title/interest in the
property.

In another decision reported in 2012 (1) OJR (275)
in the case of Deben Sethi Vrs State of Orissa and
others our Hon‟ble High Court have been pleased
to observe as follows:

12. There can be no dispute to the settled legal
proposition that the land belonging to the deity
cannot be subject to alienationin violation of
statutory requirement. (see, Temple of Thakruji
Vrs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 Raj 85).

Therefore, right, title and interest over the
land/property‟ belonging to Lord Jagannath
always vests with the deity.

13. There can also be no dispute to the settled legal
proposition that the deity is a juristic perpetual
minor/and disabled person, and the property
belonging to the minor and a person incapable to
cultivate the holding by reason of physical
disability or infirmity requires protection. A deity is
covered under both the classes. The manager/
trustee/pujari and ultimately the State authorities
are under obligation to protect the interest of such
a minor or physically disabled person. The deity
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 9 of 140
cannot be divested of any title or rights of
immovable property in violation of the statutory
provisions. The object is laudable and based on
public policy. In order to project its „interest even a
worshiper having no interest in the property may
approach the authority or Court.

14. As a general proposition of law, if any person
claims to have acquired any kind of right in the
property belonging to the deity, the transaction is
required to be ignored being illegal and the deity
becomes entitled to recover the possession as well
as the right, title and interest in the property.

As discussed above the entire property of Shri
Jagannath Mahaprabhu bije at Puri was being
managed by the Managing Committee represented
through its Administrator. In other words, the
Managing Committee was the marfatdar of the
Temple and the property. Since Prabhu Jagannath
bije at Puri is a juristic perpetual minor and
disabled person and cannot protect properties of
its own and in that case the State Authorities and
the Managing Committee are under obligation to
protect the interest of such a minor or physically
disabled person. But in the suit filed by the
present Respondent No.1 the reasons best known
to the Temple Authority and the State Authorities
is as to how they allowed the present Respondent
No.1. to obtain a decree in his favour ex parte by
not contesting the suit. It otherwise suggestive of
the fact that the obligation of the State Authorities
and the Temple Authorities was not discharged
properly by its Administrator nor the interest of
Lord Jagannath was protected. It is pertinent to

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 10 of 140
mention here that after obtaining such decree the
present Respondent No.1 has never produced the
same before any authority as for the first time
when the demolition work was going on around
the Jagannath Temple, the said decree was
produced before the Collector-cum-District
Magistrate, Puri and claim was made. Therefore,
taking into consideration the aforesaid
circumstances, as discussed, this Court is of the
view that the properties of Prabhu Jagannath Bije
at Puri cannot be divested in such a manner by
not discharging the obligation by its marfatdars. In
the decision of Estate Officer Haryana Urban
Development Authority and Anr. Vrs Gopi Chand
Atreja (Supra) [(2019) 2 SCR 1000] the Hon‟ble
Apex Court have refused to condone the delay
because of the latches of some officials in
presenting the appeal in time, but the facts and
circumstances of the case is not applicable in the
present case. In as much as the present appeal
has been preferred challenging the judgment and
decree obtained as void and obtained by fraud.
Accordingly, the decision reported in 2017 (II) OLR
419 filed by the present Respondent No.1 is also
not found applicable in the present facts and
circumstances of the case. So in view of the
aforesaid discussion this Court is of the view that
length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation is the only criterion and when the
appellant has successfully explained its case for
filing the present appeal after delay of 25 years
and more, this Court allows the application filed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act constituently
and the delay is condoned and the appeal
admitted. Put up on 12.03.2020 for LCR.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 11 of 140

Hearing:

4. Pleadings, being completed and exchanged among the
counsel for respective parties, on their consent, the
Civil Revision Petition is taken up for hearing.

4.1. Heard Sri Susanta Kumar Dash, learned Advocate for
the petitioner, Sri Satyabrata Mohanty, learned
Additional Government Advocate for the opposite party
No.1 and Sri Subrat Satpathy, learned Advocate for
the opposite party No.2.

Contentions and arguments:

5. Sri Susanta Kumar Dash, learned Advocate put forth
that falsity of statement regarding the date of
knowledge of judgment of trial Court, i.e., 10.09.2019
as projected by the opposite party No.2 before the
appellate Court is apparent from record. Said date of
knowledge is a myth and far from truth. The appellate
Court has failed to appreciate the factual position and
thereby did not exercise his jurisdiction vested in him
justly while condoning the delay of more than 25 years
in filing appeal. Thus, this Court has the jurisdiction
to entertain this civil revision petition under Section
115 of the CPC.

5.1. Submitting that the factual aspect on merit of the
judgment of the learned trial Court vi-a-vis grounds of

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 12 of 140
appeal cannot be gone into at the stage of
consideration of petition for condonation of delay in
filing appeal in view of ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy
Vrs. The Special Duty Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286, he
has sought to apprise this Court that the opposite
parties, the Collector, Puri as well as the Shree
Jagannath Temple Managing Committee, Puri was
aware of the ex parte judgment and decree dated
21.06.1994 passed in TS No.191 of 1992, inasmuch as
a petition under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC bearing
Miscellaneous Case No.103 of 1996 filed on
12.04.1996 at the behest of the opposite party No.2
got dismissed after having availed opportunities on
02.01.1997 and thereafter for many occasions since
24.02.1997 till 11.08.2000 and 25.09.2000. The Shri
Jagannath Temple Managing Committee nor did the
Collector take any step to revive the miscellaneous
case or did they contemplate filing of appeal under
Section 96 of the CPC. Rather the opposite parties
chose to keep quiet for over 19 years since 2000.

Waking from deep slumber for more than 25 years
since the judgment of the trial Court has been passed
the appeal has been preferred in the year 2019. The
learned District Judge, Puri having misdirected
himself by weighing the merit of the judgment and
decree dated 21.06.1994 passed in TS No.191 of 1992,
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 13 of 140
illegally exercised his discretion while ignoring the
merit of the objection raised against the contents of
the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in
connection with condonation of delay in filing the
appeal.

5.2. The learned District Judge, Puri transgressed his
jurisdiction by considering that the deity is perpetual
minor and its properties were required to be protected.
The appellate Court failed to appreciate germane fact
that the State of Odisha was represented by the
Collector, Puri and the deities were represented by the
Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee, Puri.

5.3. The Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 has been
introduced by ceasing application of the provisions of
the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951
(Orissa Act 2 of 1952) to the said Temple for providing
better administration and governance of Shri
Jagannath Temple at Puri and its endowments.
Pursuant to said Act, Managing Committee has been
formed. Therefore, the contention of the opposite party
No.2 that the interest of the deities, being perpetual
minor, should be protected by hearing the appeal on
merit is illogical or irrational, as it is the responsibility
of the Managing Committee to see that the interest of
the Temple is protected.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 14 of 140

5.4. Having knowledge about the dismissal of petition
under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC in Miscellaneous
Case No.103 of 1996 for setting aside judgment and
decree dated 21.06.1994 in the year 2000, the learned
District Judge, Puri committed error of record by
condoning the delay in filing appeal against the self-
same judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Puri, being swayed away by the fact
pleaded by the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee as reflected in the petition for condonation
of delay that,

“*** it came to knowledge of the present Temple
Administration is on 10.09.2019 is about 25 (twenty
five) years. Within this 25 years there was no occasion
for the Temple Administrator to know about the ex parte
judgment passed in the above mentioned suit ***”

Strongly contending, Sri Susanta Kumar Dash,
learned Advocate would submit that the glaring factual
error led to the learned District Judge, Puri acting with
material irregularity having not considered the
objection filed on behalf of the petitioner (Annexure-2)
to the petition for condonation of delay.

5.5. Strenuous arguments were advanced by Sri Susanta
Kumar Dash, learned counsel to urge that the
approach of the District Judge by taking into
consideration the merit of the appeal without

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 15 of 140
considering the objection raised by the petitioner while
disposing of petition for condonation of delay of
around 25 years and odd is not only arbitrary but also
fanciful exercise of power vested in him. There has
been sheer non-application of mind and the discretion
as utilised by the learned District Judge, Puri in
favour of the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee is lacking conscientious application of
mind and the decision is tainted with whims.

6. While Sri Satyabrata Mohanty, learned Additional
Government Advocate for the opposite party No.1
supported the arguments of Sri Subrat Satpathy,
Advocate for the opposite party No.2, the latter made
valiant attempt to sustain the Order dated 07.02.2020
passed in connection with the petition under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963, filed by the Shri
Jagannath Temple Managing Committee showing the
date of knowledge of ex parte judgment and decree
dated 06.07.1994 passed in TS No.191 of 1992 by the
Civil Judge, Senior Division, Puri as ―10.09.2019‖, i.e.,
―when Ranjan Kumar Sahu gave an application to the
Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Puri on 09.09.2019
not to demolish the house standing on the suit land
and not to evict him from the suit property‖. It is,
therefore, submitted that such fact having come to the
knowledge on 10.09.2019, the Shri Jagannath Temple

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Managing Committee sprung into action by taking
steps to obtain certified copy of the ex parte judgment
of the learned trial Court and file appeal under Section
96 of the CPC. The appeal filed on 21.09.2019, being
registered as RFA No.60 of 2019, the learned District
Judge, Puri was justified by applying his judicious
discretion in favour of Shri Jagannath Temple
Managing Committee-opposite party No.2 and seemly
condoned the delay while considering that,

i. The interest of the deity, being perpetual minor,
is required to be protected at any cost;

ii. While so, the apparent jurisdictional error
committed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Puri while passing ex parte judgment and decree
on 21.06.1994 goes to the root of the matter
rendering the same void being invalid and
inoperative.

6.1. Amplifying further, Sri Subrat Satpathy, learned
Advocate for the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee-opposite party No.2 submitted that the
pertinent question of law touching the jurisdiction of
the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Puri that the
ex parte judgment and decree manifestly ―barred
under Section 39 of the Odisha Estates Abolition Act‖
and ―OEA Claim Case No.588 of 1974 was pending

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 17 of 140
before the OEA Collector, Puri‖. It is submitted that
ultimately the land (property in question) was settled
in favour of Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee-opposite party No.2 and rent has been
paid. The learned District Judge, Puri being apprised
of such pertinent and correct factual position coupled
with sound legal status of the judgement and decree,
no infirmity in application of his discretion in favour of
the opposite party No.2 could be imputed and the
order condoning the delay in filing appeal needs no
interference.

6.2. It is made clear by Sri Subrat Satpathy, learned
Advocate that no limitation would apply to question
the void and invalid judgment in appeal particularly
when the same is passed without jurisdiction and that
too during the pendency of OEA Claim Case before the
OEA Collector by the time judgment is passed by the
Civil Judge, Senior Division, Puri. Another significant
consideration which the learned Civil Judge failed to
keep in view is that in the year 1952, the Odisha
Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 or the Odisha
Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1952 was in vogue,
the provisions of which contemplated that Raja of Puri
could not have alienated the property of the Lord Shri
Jagannath without the approval of the Commissioner
of Endowment.

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6.3. There being justifiable reason for the learned District
Judge, Puri to condone the delay, inter alia on the
ground that the opposite party No.2 had two courses
open to question the ex parte judgment and decree
passed in TS No.191 of 1992. In view of Biranchi
Narayan Kuanr Vrs. Khetra Rana, 2019 (II) CLR 688,
being rendered following Bhanu Kumar Jain Vrs.
Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 = 2004 Supp.6 SCR
1104, that even after dismissal of petition under Order
IX, Rule 13, recourse to Section 96 read with Order
XLIII, Rule 1 of the CPC can be had.

6.4. It is, therefore, vehemently contested by Sri Subrat
Satpathy, learned Advocate for the opposite party No.2
that no jurisdictional error has been committed by the
learned District Judge, Puri in condoning the delay in
filing appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLIII of
the CPC considering the cause of action for preferring
said appeal, being RFA No.60 of 2019, arose on
10.09.2019, i.e., the date of knowledge about the
judgment and decree dated 21.06.1994 when the
petitioner herein posited not to demolish house
standing on the property in question and evict him
from the suit property.

Analysis with discussions:

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7. To appreciate the rival contentions and arguments, it
does require this Court to take note of reasons
ascribed by the opposite party No.2 in the petition
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for
condonation of delay in filing appeal under Section 96
of the CPC.

7.1. The grounds taken by the opposite party No.2 in the
application for condonation of delay in paragraphs 1(a)
to 1(e) are as follows:

―(a) That the final Hal R.O.R. is published in the name
of Sri Jagannath Temple before filing of T.S.
No.191 of 1992 to the knowledge of Respondent
still holds good, valid and effective till today and
appellant through its Administrator has been
paying rent to State. The rent of the year 2019 is
also paid.

(b) That no notice U/s.60 C.P.C. was served on the
Administrator prior to two months from filing of
T.S. No.191 of 1992. Administrator is a public
officer and entitled for a public notice since he is
sued. Even if Sec.80 C.P.C. notice was not served.

No personal notice was also sent by respondent
(Plaintiff of said suit).

(c) That after the judgment passed by learned lower
court directing to correct the Hal R.O.R. in order to
bring to the name of the plaintiff of said suit who
is respondent in this appeal, no step is taken as
yet to mutate the R.O.R. So the Court‟s order has

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 20 of 140
not yet been complied. Hal R.O.R. still stands in
name of the appellant.

(d) That the service of summon of the said T.S.
No.191/92 was not served personally on the then
Administrator of the Temple. The certified copy of
order sheet of C.S. No.191 of 1992 dated
11.04.1984 reveals the S.R. of summons back
against defendant on personal service which
appears not correct since all the summons will be
received by an authorised clerk on behalf of
Administrator and he will put up the same before
Administrator, Puri further orders. This being the
practice of the Temple Administrator service of
notice personally on Administrator appeared to be
lawful and suspicious.

(e) That entire judgment is void and since not acted
upon there is no occasion to know about the case
by Management of temple committee from time to
time.”

7.2. The Respondent No.1, the present petitioner, while
filing objection to the aforesaid application for
condonation of delay before the learned District Judge,
Puri in R.F.A. No.60 of 2019, in paragraphs 3 to 7
stated as follows:

―3. That the allegations made in Paragraph (a) of the
delay condonation petition is not admitted to be
correct. The Hal settlement R.O.R. was finally
published in the year 1989 in the name of Sri
Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije Srikhetra Marfat
Temple Managing Committee under
“Bebandabasta status” under Khata No.322 of
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 21 of 140
mouza: Chudanga Sahi, Unit No.18. The said
Khata consists of 19 (Nineteen plots) which
includes suit plot No.513, Area: Ac.0.034 dec.
recorded under Gharabari Status with possession
note in the name of Benga Dei, wife of Govinda
Chandra Sahoo since the year 1956 onwards.
This R.O.R. was filed in the lower Court in T.S.
No.191 of 1992.

Sri Jagannath Temple filed O.E.A. (C) No.704 of
1989 in the court of Tahasildar Puri for settlement
of fair and equitable rent in respect of the
following properties, which includes the suit plot
No.513.

Mouza: Chudanga Sahi, Khata no.322, Plot
no.286, 287, 288, 289, 323, 326, 325, 327, 328,
503, 504, 506, 509, 511, 512, 513, 549, 550,
505/686 Total 19 plots with a total area of
Ac.2.442 dec.

After the aforesaid O.E.A.(c) Case was admitted
notices and proclamations were invited from
General Public in the year 1990 as well as in the
year 1991 and the present Respondent no.1
namely Ranjan Kumar Sahoo filed an objection
under Sec-8 (A-4) of the O.E.A. Act and basing
upon the objection and after spot enquiry and
after following due procedure of law the learned
Tahasildar vide its order dated 09.04.1999
allowed the claim case IN PART i.e. out of 19 plots
only 18 plots was settled in the name of Sri
Jagannath Temple and so far as the suit plot is
concerned the claim was DISALLOWED. The said
order of the O.E.A. Collector is final and binding on
the Appellant/Petitioner as no Appeal nor any
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 22 of 140
revision was preferred challenging the rejection of
the claim application so far as the suit plot no.513
is concerned Section-39 of O.E.A. Act bars
contrary submission in count. On the other hand
basing upon the order of the O.E.A. Collector the
18 plots were separately mutated under sthitiban
Khata no.298/35 with a total area of Ac.2.408
dec. in place of Ac.2.442 dec. The suit plot
continued to remain in the original Khata no.322
and it is still in the said Khata and it is really
strange and surprising as to how only the suit plot
513 has been settled in O.E.A.(C) No.585/1974 in
the name of the temple under sthitiban status as
revealed from the document filed by the petitioner.

The recording itself is suspicious for the simple
reason when the suit khata contained 19 plots,
then how is it for one single plot a claim case was
filed in the year 1974 excluding 18 other plots,
then again how is it for all the 19 plots once again
O.E.A.(c) no.704/1989 was filed in the year 1989.
If at all the suit plot was settled in O.E.A.(c)
no.585/1974 then how is it the very same plot
was once again applied for settlement of fair and
equitable rent in the year 1989. Apart from that
temple has never filed any claim case from 1974
till 1988 as the matter was sub-judice before the
Hon‟ble High Court and before the Hon‟ble Apex
Court and it was only after Supreme Court‟s
decisions in the year 1988 all O.E.A. cases were
filed by Sri Jagannath Temple therefore the net
copy R.O.R. for Khata no.322 filed by Appellant
and the rent receipts of the year 2019 are not
genuine documents.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 23 of 140

4. That the allegations made in Paragraph 1(b) of the
condonation petition is concerned it is submitted
that the averments are not correct. Notice U/s.80
C.P.C. has been served upon the defendants prior
to filing of the suit and in the present case in Para-
18 of the plaint of T.S. No.191/1992, it is clearly
pleaded that Notice U/s.80 C.P.C. was sent to the
defendants on 28.01.1992 by registered post with
A.D. and the same was received by both the
defendants on 29.01.1992 and the suit was filed
on 23.06.1992 i.e. long after expiry of the period of
two months and Sec-80(1) clearly states that a
statement regarding service of 80 C.P.C. notice
shall be pleaded in the plaint, which has been
clearly pleaded in Para-18 of the plaint. The plaint
would not have been admitted without verification
of the notices U/s-80 C.P.C. Therefore no fault can
be found with the plaintiff of the said suit. It is
false to say that no notice was served upon the
defendants prior to two months of filing of the suit.
The office copy of both the notices along with the
original registration receipt and A.D. were filed
along with the plaint and only thereafter the plaint
was admitted and notices were issued to both the
defendants.

5. That the allegations made in 1(c) of the
condonation petition are not correct in its entirety.
It is correct to say no separate mutation case was
filed by the present Respondent no.1 but in view
of his objection filed in O.E.A. claim case
No.704/1989 before the Tahasildar Puri and his
prior objection having been allowed by the
Tahasildar after the judgment whereby the O.E.A.
claim so far as the suit plot is concerned it was

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 24 of 140
rejected and consequent upon the rejection
mutation the name of the present Respondent no.1
in respect of the suit plot is official duty of the
Tahasildar but it has not been done inadvertently
but it cannot be said that no steps were taken by
the Respondent no.1 in this regard. The plea of the
Appellant that the R.O.R. stands in its name is
also not correct for the simple reasons that once
the claim having been rejected HAL R.O.R. still
recorded in the name of the Appellant in sthitiban
status is without jurisdiction.

6. That so far the allegations made in 1(d) of the
condonation petition is concerned they are all
false, frivolous and specifically denied. Order
Sheet of T.S. No.191/1992 dated 02.02.1994,
21.03.1994 and 11.04.1994 clearly reflects that
on 02.02.1994 summons were set to the
defendants on both the ways. Order sheet dated
21.03.1994 clearly reflects that S.R. against
defendant no.1 and 2 are back and order sheet
dated 11.04.1994 reflects that S.R. of summons
against the defendants were served on personal
service and they being Government officials
service of summons against them are accepted as
sufficient. Both of them were found absent on call
and no steps were taken hence they were sent
exparte. The official acts are presumed to be
correct and mere allegations regarding none
service of summons is not acceptable nor the
presumption arising out of the Court record can be
ignored on such bald allegations. In this regard
the order sheet dated 29.04.1994 and 09.05.1994
may kindly be seen. Order sheet dated
29.04.1994 reflects that the affidavit evidence

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 25 of 140
filed by the plaintiff after granting of permission
under Order-19, Rule-1 C.P.C. on 18.04.1994 was
put up and the matter was heard and the same
was accepted and the suit was posted o
11.05.1994 for exparte judgment. On 09.05.1994
the defendants filed a petition for time to file W.S.,
which clearly shows that the present Appellant
was fully aware about the suit and they have also
appeared on 09.05.1994. In the said suit but their
appearance was ignored by the Court as because
the matter had already been posted for exparte
judgment and there was no stage for appearance
or to file any W.S. once the hearing has been
concluded and the matter was posted for
judgment. This is another circumstance to show
that the present Appellant was fully aware about
the suit and its proceeding.

It is to mention here that the present Appellant
was aware about the suit and its result as Misc.
Case No.103/1996 was filed by the Appellant
before the learned Subordinate Judge Puri against
the present Respondents and the said Misc. Case
was filed on 12.04.1996 under Order-9 Rule-13
read with Sec-151 C.P.C. with a prayer to set
aside the exparte decree dated 21.06.1994. The
misc. case was filed after expiry of one year ten
months from the date of exparte decree. The order
dated 02.01.1997 of Misc. Case No.103/1996
indicates that office note was ready and the
matter was posted to 24.02.1997 when the
petitioner to take steps against the opposite
parties and for consideration of limitation petition.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 26 of 140

From 24.02.1997 twenty dates were adjourned
i.e. up to 11.08.2000 for filing requisites for
issuance of summons to the opposite parties and
for consideration of limitation petition but the
petitioner i.e. Sri Jagannath temple did not take
any steps for issuance of notice against the
opposite parties and ultimately the matter was
posted to 25.09.2000 on which date no steps were
taken from the side of the petitioner and ultimately
the Misc. Case No.103 of 1996 was dismissed.

The present Appellant himself being the petitioner
and for its deliberate negligence in prosecuting its
case the Misc. case was dismissed and this fact
has been totally suppressed and not brought to
the notice of the Court either in the present Appeal
or in the delay condonation petition. This
deliberate suppression of vital fact amounts to
playing fraud upon the Court. The filing of an
application under Order-9, Rule-13 C.P.C. debars
filing of an Appeal supporting the earlier action.

It is totally false and misconceive to say that the
administrator never receives any Court notice but
it is only his office receives the same stands to no
reason at all and the order sheet of the Court
relating to a fact, which occurred in the year 1993-
1994 cannot be ignored on such statement. It be
mention here that Sri Jagannath Temple is a
Government organization having its full-fledged
office wherein there are Senior Administrative
Officers and there are number of officers the
District Collector is also a part of the Temple
Administration. The temple office itself constitutes
a separate legal department with well equipped,

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 27 of 140
having law officers, law assistant, Senior
Advocates, Law Clerks etc. and when a full-
fledged office is running with well equipped
machienries having fully acquainted with Court
matters.

7. That the allegations made in Paragraph 1(e) of the
petition are all false, frivolous and specifically
denied. It is false and misconceives to say that the
entire judgment is void and it has not been acted
upon for which the temple did not know about the
Original suit. The facts narrated beforehand
clearly depicts that the present Appellant was
fully aware about the judgment passed in the year
1994 and thereafter steps have been taken to set
aside the ex parte decree but they have became
unsuccessful due to their gross negligence and in
order to avoid their own acts they have taken a
false plea that they were not aware about the suit,
which cannot be accepted at all in view of the
facts narrated beforehand.”

7.3. What is transpired from the contents of petition for
condonation of delay and the objection raised by the
opponent is that the opposite party No.2 has
suppressed material fact by not disclosing about
dismissal of petition for setting aside the judgment of
the learned trial Court under Order IX, Rule 13 of the
CPC. Nothing is placed on record to show that for the
default of erstwhile Administrator(s) who allowed the
judgment and decree to remain intact till 2019, the
Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee had/has

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 28 of 140
taken action against him/them. There seems no
explanation, much less plausible explanation,
proffered by the opposite party Nos.1 and 2 as to why
after dismissal of petition under Order IX, Rule 13,
CPC way back in the year 2000 no step has been
taken.

7.4. The learned District Judge, Puri after hearing the
counsel for the respective parties vide Order dated
07.02.2020 allowed the application for condonation of
delay and admitted the appeal for hearing on merit.
The learned District Judge has discussed the merit of
the appeal itself by observing that admittedly the land
involved in the suit and the appeal, originally belonged
to Lord Jagannath under the Marfatdari of Gajapati
Maharaja Ramchandra Dev having a status of
intermediary with Amrutamonohi kisam. The claim of
the petitioner in the original suit was that the Gajapati
Maharaja leased out the property to Smt. Benga Dei,
the maternal grandmother of the plaintiff and salami
and rent was fixed at Rs.4,000/- and Rs.17.55 paise
respectively and after full payment of salami
possession of the suit property was delivered to her
and the Raja of Puri executed a document in favour of
the grandmother of the plaintiff. While in possession,
said Benga Dei executed a deed of gift in favour of the
present petitioner on 06.02.1980 and delivered

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 29 of 140
possession of the suit property to the plaintiff and
since then the plaintiff is in possession of the suit
property. During the settlement in the year 1962
preliminary record was prepared in the name of Benga
Dei. The name of Benga Dei was recorded in the
remarks column on misconceptions of law and the
Administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple filed a
petition before the Settlement Officer against the
plaintiff on 24.01.1986 vide Suo motu Appeal Case
No.4912 of 1988 which was dismissed on 08.03.1988
on contest. Taking advantage of the wrong recording of
the Hal Record-of-Right the local Revenue Authorities
did not receive rent since 1990 and thereafter the suit
was filed. Since the opposite party No.2 did not contest
the suit the same was decreed ex parte in favour of the
plaintiff/petitioner. Thereafter, Miscellaneous Case
under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC vide Misc. Case
No.103 of 1996 was filed, which came to be dismissed
for non-prosecution in 2000.

7.5. Notwithstanding such fact was taken into
consideration with further observation that ―the
reason best known to the Temple Authority and the
State Authorities‖ as to how they allowed the opposite
party No.1 to obtain a decree in his favour ex parte by
not contesting the suit and the State Authorities and
the Temple Authorities failed to discharge their

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 30 of 140
obligation, the learned District Judge, Puri jumped to
the conclusion that ―the present appeal has been
preferred challenging the judgment and decree
obtained as void and obtained by fraud‖. Careful
reading of the Order dated 07.02.2020 would reveal
that the learned District Judge, Puri has not dealt with
the objection dated 15.11.2019 filed by the petitioner
in proper perspective. The objections have not been
replied by learned District Judge and no material has
been discussed to hold that the judgment and decree
have been obtained by practising fraud. Entire Order
dated 07.02.2020 would show that the learned District
Judge was satisfied as to the lackadaisical manner of
the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee as
well as the Collector, Puri; yet he has held that
judgment of trial Court was obtained by practising
fraud (nothing is spelt out ―by whom?‖), which
warrants condonation of delay for admission of appeal
to be heard on merit.

7.6. Hence, this civil revision petition has been filed by the
petitioner challenging the aforesaid Order dated
07.02.2020.

Allegation as to element of “fraud”:

8. With respect to ―fraud‖, the following judgments are
noteworthy.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 31 of 140

8.1. Rattan Singh Vrs. Nirmal Gill, (2020) 12 SCR 422 =
2020 INSC 641:

“41. The requirement regarding shifting of burden onto
the defendants had been succinctly discussed in
Anil Rishi Vrs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558,
wherein this Court had held that for shifting the
burden of proof, it would require more than merely
pleading that the relationship is a fiduciary one
and it must be proved by producing tangible
evidence. The relevant extract of the said decision
is reproduced as thus:

„8. The initial burden of proof would be on the
plaintiff in view of Section 101 of the
Evidence Act, which reads as under:

„101. Burden of proof.–

Whoever desires any court to give
judgment as to any legal right or
liability dependent on the existence of
facts which he asserts, must prove that
those facts exist. When a person is
bound to prove the existence of any
fact, it is said that the burden of proof
lies on that person.‟

9. In terms of the said provision, the burden of
proving the fact rests on the party who
substantially asserts the affirmative issues
and not the party who denies it. The said
rule may not be universal in its application
and there may be an exception thereto. The
learned trial court and the High Court
proceeded on the basis that the defendant

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 32 of 140
was in a dominating position and there had
been a fiduciary relationship between the
parties. The appellant in his written
statement denied and disputed the said
averments made in the plaint.

10. Pleading is not evidence, far less proof.

Issues are raised on the basis of the
pleadings. The defendant-appellant having
not admitted or acknowledged the fiduciary
relationship between the parties,
indisputably, the relationship between the
parties itself would be an issue. The suit will
fail if both the parties do not adduce any
evidence, in view of Section 102 of the
Evidence Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of
proof would be on the party who asserts the
affirmative of the issue and it rests, after
evidence is gone into, upon the party against
whom, at the time the question arises,
judgment would be given, if no further
evidence were to be adduced by either side.

11. The fact that the defendant was in a
dominant position must, thus, be proved by
the plaintiff at the first instance.

***

14. But before such a finding is arrived at, the
averments as regards alleged fiduciary
relationship must be established before a
presumption of undue influence against a
person in position of active confidence is
drawn. The factum of active confidence
should also be established.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 33 of 140

15. Section 111 of the Evidence Act will apply
when the bona fides of a transaction is in
question but not when the real nature thereof
is in question. The words “active confidence”

indicate that the relationship between the
parties must be such that one is bound to
protect the interests of the other.

16. Thus, point for determination of binding
interests or which are the cases which come
within the rule of active confidence would
vary from case to case. If the plaintiff fails to
prove the existence of the fiduciary
relationship or the position of active
confidence held by the defendant-appellant,
the burden would lie on him as he had
alleged fraud. The trial court and the High
Court, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be
said to be correct in holding that without
anything further, the burden of proof would
be on the defendant.

***

72. The plaintiff asserted that she had attended
a family function in February, 2001 and in
the said function, while she was interacting
with one Rustam Singh, he disclosed that the
defendants have sold a portion of the joint
lands. Subsequently, she made enquiries in
that regard. As such, she had inspected the
jamabandis of the joint lands and thereupon
got knowledge about the existence of the
disputed documents. Immediately upon
discovery of the said documents, she filed
the suits. The suits are filed within 3 years
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 34 of 140
from the date of acquiring knowledge and
are thus within limitation.

73. To support her case, the plaintiff relied upon
the testimonies of DW3 and defendant No. 4,
wherein it had come on record that the
plaintiff, Nirmal Gill (respondent No. 1) and
Rustam Singh were present in the aforesaid
function. Nirmal Gill in her testimony as PW8
had deposed that there was a family
gathering in December, 2000 whereat the
plaintiff enquired from defendant Nos. 5 and
6 about the status of mutation, who informed
that the mutation could not be effected until
the encroachments on the lands at
Jalandhar and Premgarh are cleared.
Thereafter, in February 2001, there was
another family gathering wherein Rustam
Singh had passed on the said information to
the plaintiff in her presence.

74. The trial Court, while examining the issue of
limitation, had opined that when the
documents were proved to have been
executed by the plaintiff in 1990, it ought to
have been challenged within 3 years of its
execution. It was further observed that when
a specific plea is taken that the plaintiff
acquired knowledge about fraud recently in a
family function, she was obliged to examine
such person who disclosed the information
and the plaintiff failed to do so. Notably, the
date of the family function had been wrongly
mentioned by the trial Court as December,

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 35 of 140
2001. Paragraphs 94 and 98 of the trial
Court‟s judgment are reproduced below:

„94. I find merits in these arguments
advanced by Learned Defence Counsel
because when the plaintiff is taking a
specific plea that in some family
function in December, 2001 which she
as well as her daughter attended, this
thing came to their knowledge that the
power of attorney has been forged and
on the basis of that Harcharan Kaur
had executed the sale deeds of the
share of plaintiff, then in those
circumstances the plaintiff was
required to examine that person who
disclosed that information to the
plaintiff. But the plaintiff has not
examined any that person. ***

98. In my opinion, when the plaintiff is
specifically stating to have received the
information in some family function,
then she was required to examine that
person from whom she received the
information. But no such evidence is
coming forward. Moreover, when the
Court has come to the conclusion that
the disputed documents were executed
by Harcharan Kaur (Joginder Kaur [sic])
on dated 29.06.1990, 28.06.1990,
03.07.1990, then in those
circumstances, if any fraud etc. has
been played upon by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was required to file the suit

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 36 of 140
within the period of three years. So
apparently the suit filed by the plaintiff
is barred by limitation. Therefore, the
said issues stand decided in favour of
the defendants and against the
plaintiff.‟

75. The first appellate Court in its judgment
confirmed the findings of the trial Court that
the suits were barred by limitation. While
doing so, the first appellate Court had also
proceeded on the wrong premise that the
family function was held in December, 2001.
Finally, the first appellate Court held that
since the 1990 GPA had been proved to have
been executed by plaintiff, the question of
acquiring knowledge in the family function
loses significance.

76. In contrast, the High Court had noted that
the factum of the family function and
plaintiff‟s presence thereat was admitted by
defendant No. 4. The High Court then went
on to reverse the findings of the trial Court
and the first appellate Court whilst opining
the testimony of Rustam Singh cements the
case of the plaintiff and it was apparent that
the plaintiff had no reason to suspect her
brothers at an earlier point of time and she
was not even aware of the acts of the
defendants. The said facts came to light only
after the plaintiff conducted inquiries. The
relevant portion of the High Court‟s judgment
is set out hereunder:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 37 of 140

„*** Learned courts below have further erred
in holding that the suits are barred by
limitation. The plaintiff‟s case is that she
came to know about the fraud being
perpetuated by her own step brothers and
sister-in-law after she settled in Punjab,
subsequent to the retirement of her husband
and consequent increased frequency of her
interaction with her relatives. Marriage of her
paternal uncle‟s son (Taya‟s son) is admitted
by DW 6 Rattan Singh. It is further admitted
that the plaintiff was present at the said
wedding. Testimony of Rustam Singh
cements the case of the plaintiff.***‟

77. Before analysing the correctness of the
decisions arrived at, let us see the settled
legal position as to effect of fraud on
limitation as prescribed in Section 17 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. The said provision
reads as under:

„17. Effect of fraud or mistake.–

(1) Where, in the case of any suit or
application for which a period of
limitation is prescribed by this Act,–

(a) the suit or application is based
upon the fraud of the defendant or
respondent or his agent; or

(b) the knowledge of the right or title
on which a suit or application is
founded is concealed by the fraud
of any such person as aforesaid;

or
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 38 of 140

(c) the suit or application is for relief
from the consequences of a
mistake; or

(d) where any document necessary to
establish the right of the plaintiff
or applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him,

the period of limitation shall not begin
to run until the plaintiff or applicant has
discovered the fraud or the mistake or
could, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered it; or in the case of a
concealed document, until the plaintiff
or the applicant first had the means of
producing the concealed document or
compelling its production. ***‟

78. Therefore, for invoking Section 17 of the 1963
Act, two ingredients have to be pleaded and
duly proved. One is existence of a fraud and
the other is discovery of such fraud. In the
present case, since the plaintiff failed to
establish the existence of fraud, there is no
occasion for its discovery. Thus, the plaintiff
cannot be extended the benefit under the
said provision.

79. It must be noted that the trial Court was in
error to hold that the person who has
disclosed the information was not examined
by the plaintiff, when it had come on record
through the testimony of Kultar Singh (DW2),
that Rustam Singh expired before the suits
came up for trial. If so, the finding of the High

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 39 of 140
Court that the testimony of Rustam Singh
strengthened the case of plaintiff is ex-facie
erroneous and manifestly wrong. In as much
as, the said person was never examined
before the Court in these proceedings.
Further, the trial Court and the first appellate
Court had erroneously assumed the date of
function in December, 2001 in place of
February, 2001. However, that will have no
bearing on the finding on the factum of non-
existence of fraud. The concurring findings
recorded by the trial Court and the first
appellate Court– that the documents were
executed by the plaintiff– belies and
demolishes the case of the plaintiff, as to
having acquired knowledge of alleged fraud
in 2001. Therefore, the High Court committed
manifest error in reversing the concurrent
findings of the trial Court and the first
appellate Court in that regard.”

8.2. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) Vrs. M/s. Aafloat
Textiles (I) Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCR 490:

“9. „fraud‟ means an intention to deceive; whether it is
from any expectation of advantage to the party
himself or from the ill will towards the other is
immaterial. The expression „fraud‟ involves two
elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived.
Injury is something other than economic loss, that
is, deprivation of property, whether movable or
immovable or of money and it will include and any
harm whatever caused to any person in body,
mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a
non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 40 of 140
advantage to the deceiver, will almost always call
loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those
rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage
to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the
deceived, the second condition is satisfied. (See
Dr. Vimla Vrs. Delhi Administration, 1963 Supp.2
SCR 585 and Indian Bank Vrs. Satyam Febres
(India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550.

10. A „fraud‟ is an act of deliberate deception with the
design of securing something by taking unfair
advantage of another. It is a deception in order to
gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to
get an advantage. (See S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu
Vrs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1).

11. „Fraud‟ as is well known vitiates every solemn act.

*** Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud
is a conduct either by letter or words, which
includes the other person or authority to take a
definite determinative stand as a response to the
conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is
also well settled that misrepresentation itself
amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent
misrepresentation may also give reason to claim
relief against fraud. A fraudulent
misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in
leading a man into damage by willfully or
recklessly causing him to believe and act on
falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes
representations, which he knows to be false, and
injury ensues therefrom although the motive from
which the representations proceeded may not
have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always
viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 41 of 140
view to deprive the rights of the others in relation
to a property would render the transaction void ab
initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
Although in a given case a deception may not
amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all
equitable principles and any affair tainted with
fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine including res
judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh Vrs. Savitri
Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319.

12. *** Present day concept of fraud on statute has
veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise
of power. It may arise due to overstepping the
limits of power or defeating the provision of statute
by adopting subterfuge or the power may be
exercised for extraneous or irrelevant
considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or
administration law, as it is developing, is
assuming different shades. It arises from a
deception committed by disclosure of incorrect
facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke
exercise of power and procure an order from an
authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of
jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been
exercised. The misrepresentation must be in
relation to the conditions provided in a section on
existence or non-existence of which the power can
be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not
required by a statute to be disclosed may not
amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions
non-disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the
agreement. In a contract every person must look
for himself and ensures that he acquires the
information necessary to avoid bad bargain. In

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 42 of 140
public law the duty is not to deceive. (See Shrisht
Dhawan (Smt.) Vrs. M/s. Shaw Brothers, (1992) 1
SCC 534).

13. In that case it was observed as follows:

„Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilized system of
jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human
conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton‟s
sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to,
„wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him
into snares‟. It has been defined as an act of
trickery or deceit. In Webster‟s Third New
International Dictionary fraud in equity has been
defined as an act or omission to act or
concealment by which one person obtain an
advantage against conscience over another or
which equity or public policy forbids as being
prejudicial to another. In Black‟s Legal Dictionary,
fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of
truth for the purpose of inducing another in
reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing
belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false
representation of a matter of fact whether by
words or by conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed, which deceives and
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford
Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal
deception, use of false representation to gain
unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick.
According to Halsbury‟s Laws of England, a
representation is deemed to have been false, and

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 43 of 140
therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the
material date false in substance and in fact.
Section 17 of the Contract Act defines fraud as act
committed by a party to a contract with intent to
deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even
otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role
of representator about a fact which he knows to be
untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the
representee by making him believe it to be true.
The representation to become fraudulent must be
of the fact with knowledge that it was false. In a
leading English case Derry Vrs. Peek, (1886-90)
ALL ER Rep 1 = (1889) 14 A 337 (HL) what
constitutes fraud was described thus: (All ER p.
22 B-C)

„Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false
representation has been made

(i) knowingly, or

(ii) without belief in its truth, or

(iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or
false.‟

14. This aspect of the matter has been considered by
this Court in Roshan Deen Vrs. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1
SCC 100; Ram Preeti Yadav Vrs. U.P. Board of
High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8
SCC 311, Ram Chandra Singh Vrs. Savitri Devi,
(2003) 8 SCC 319 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vrs.
State of TN. and Another (2004) 3 SCC 1.

15. Suppression of a material document would also
amount to a fraud on the court. (See,
Gowrishankar Vrs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 44 of 140
Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 and S.P. Chengalvarava
Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1.

16. „Fraud‟ is a conduct either by letter or words,
which induces the other person or authority to
take a definite determinative stand as a response
to the conduct of the former either by words or
letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can
be evidence on fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti
Yadav Vrs. U.P. Board of High School and
Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311.

17. In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vrs. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB
702, Lord Denning observed at pages 712 & 713,

„No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can
be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by
fraud. Fraud unravels everything.‟

In the same judgment Lord Parker LJ observed
that fraud vitiates all transactions known to the
law of however high a degree of solemnity. (page

722)

18. These aspects were highlighted in the State of
Andhra Pradesh and Anr. Vrs. T. Suryachandra
Rao, 2005 (5) SCALE 621 = (2005) 6 SCC 149 and
Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar Vrs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 605).”

8.3. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vrs. Rajendra Singh,
(2000) 3 SCC 581 = AIR 2000 SC 1165:

“Fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim, which
has never lost its temper over all these centuries.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 45 of 140

8.4. District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social
Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram Vrs.
M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of
India Vrs. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 100; Vice-
Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vrs.
Girdharilal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325; State of
Maharashtra Vrs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar,
(2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd.
Vrs. Coal Tar Refining Company, (2007) 8 SCC 110 =
AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed Ibrahim Vrs. State
of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751:

Dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and
benefit to the persons who played fraud or made
misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court
should not perpetuate the fraud.

8.5. Harjas Rai Makhija Vrs. Pushparani Jain, (2017) 2 SCC
797:

“18. During the course of submissions, it was
contended on behalf of Makhija that it is a settled
proposition of law that a decree obtained by
playing fraud on the court is a nullity and that
such a decree could be challenged at any time in
any proceedings. Reliance was placed on A.V.
Papayya Sastry Vrs. State of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC

221. This proposition is certainly not in dispute.

19. The learned counsel also placed reliance on Union
of India Vrs. Ramesh Gandhi, (2012) 1 SCC 476
which reads as under:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 46 of 140

„27. If a judgment obtained by playing fraud on
the court is a nullity and is to be treated as
non est by every court, superior or inferior, it
would be strange logic to hear that an
enquiry into the question whether a judgment
was secured by playing fraud on the court
by not disclosing the necessary facts
relevant for the adjudication of the
controversy before the court is impermissible.
From the above judgments1, it is clear that
such an examination is permissible. Such a
principle is required to be applied with
greater emphasis in the realm of public law
jurisdiction as the mischief resulting from
such fraud has larger dimension affecting
the larger public interest.‟

20. We agree that when there is an allegation of fraud
by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts
or concealment of material facts, it must be
inquired into. It is only after evidence is led
coupled with intent to deceive that a conclusion of
fraud could be arrived at. A mere concealment or
non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald
allegation of fraud without proof and intent to
deceive would not render a decree obtained by a
party as fraudulent. To conclude in a blanket
manner that in every case where relevant facts
are not disclosed, the decree obtained would be
fraudulent, is stretching the principle to a
vanishing point.”

1 S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya
Sastry Vrs. State of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 47 of 140

8.6. In Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh Vrs. Watchand
Ramchand Kothari, AIR 1951 SC 16 = 1950 SCC 766,
the observation runs as follows:

“*** Rules of equity have no application where there are
definite statutory provisions specifying the grounds on
the basis of which alone the stoppage or suspension of
running of time can arise. While the Courts
necessarily are astute in checkmating or fighting
fraud, it should be equally borne in mind that
statutes of limitation are statutes of repose.”

8.7. Conspectus of the above decisions is that to constitute
―fraud‖ there must be intent to deceive. When an
allegation of fraud is made, it must be enquired into.
Enquiry would necessarily mean granting reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the parties committing fraud.
Evidence must be led and thereafter fraud must be
proved. No conclusion of fraud can be drawn on mere
allegation and by way of inference.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:

9. In consideration of petition for condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, discretion
is involved.

9.1. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, dealing with
―extension of prescribed period in certain cases‖
stands as follows:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 48 of 140

“Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be
admitted after the prescribed period, if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period.

Explanation.–

The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled
by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be
sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

9.2. It is reported in the decision of Privy Council in
Montreal Street Railway Company Vrs. Normandin,
(1917) AC 170 that:

“*** The question whether provisions in a statute are
directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in
this country, but it has been said that no general rule
can be laid down, and that in every case the object of
the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject
will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th Edn.,
page 596 and the following pages. When the provisions
of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty
and the case is such that to hold null and void acts
done in neglect of this duty would work serious general
inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no
control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the
same time would not promote the main object of the
Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such
provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them,

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 49 of 140
though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts
done.”

9.3. The aforesaid observation has also been followed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala
Vrs. ITO, (1961) 41 ITR 12 (SC) = AIR 1961 SC 200.

9.4. In Bhavnagar University Vrs. Palitana Sugar Mill P. Ltd.

AIR 2003 SC 511 it has been observed that:

“23. It is the basic principle of construction of statute
that the same should be read as a whole, then
chapter by chapter, section by section and words
by words. Recourse to construction or
interpretation of statute is necessary when there
is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein
and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give
effect to all parts of the statute and unless
absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be
rendered surplusage or redundant.”

9.5. In “Crawford on the Construction of Statutes” at page
516, it is stated that,

―The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or
directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and
not upon the language in which the intent is clothed.
The meaning and intention of the Legislature must
govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from
the phraseology of the provision, but also by
considering its nature, its design, and the consequences
which would follow from construing it the one way or
the other.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 50 of 140

9.6. The expression ―satisfies the Court‖ employed in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act has significance.
―Satisfaction‖ before completion of the proceedings
under the Act is a condition precedent for the exercise
of jurisdiction. It is the satisfaction of the Court in the
course of the proceedings regarding the delay in
approaching the Court with sufficient reason, which
constitutes the basis and foundation of the
proceedings for consideration of condonation of delay.
There must be something which shows from the record
itself that in the course of the proceedings the Court
was satisfied that there was sufficiency of reason for
not approaching the Court in stipulated period and,
therefore, it is a case in which the appeal deserves to
be admitted for hearing on merit. To be satisfied with a
state of things means to be honestly satisfied in one’s
own mind. Satisfaction is essentially a condition of the
mind. It means that there is a substantial ground for
the conclusion on the material available that the party
against whom it is sought to bring the proceedings has
obtained the judgment and decree by practising fraud
way back in 1994. The phrase ‗satisfied’ means, makes
up its mind; actual persuasion; a mind not troubled
by doubt or a mind which has reached a clear
conclusion.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 51 of 140

9.7. It is well-nigh settled that where the word ‗may’ shall
be read as ‗shall’ would depend upon the intention of
the Legislature and it is not to be taken that once the
word ‗may’ is used, it per se would be directory. In
other words, it is not merely the use of a particular
expression that would render a provision directory or
mandatory. It would have to be interpreted in the light
of the settled principles, and while ensuring that
intent of the provisions is not frustrated. Regard can
be had to Mohan Singh Vrs. International Airport
Authority of India, (1997) 9 SCC 132 as referred to in
Sarla Goel Vrs. Kishan Chand, (2009) 7 SCC 658,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while
dealing with the intention of the Legislature to use the
word ‗may’ or ‗shall’ observed in paragraph 17 as
follows:

“The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory
effect of the language depends upon the language
couched in the statute under consideration and its
object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in
the use of the word „shall‟ or „may‟ depends on
conferment of power. In the present context, „may‟ does
not always mean „may‟. May is a must for enabling
compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for
various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the
statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes duty to
exercise. Where the language of statute creates a duty,
the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of
the duty. In „Craise on Statute Law‟ (7th Edn.) it is

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 52 of 140
stated that the Court will, as a general rule presume
that the appropriate remedy by common law or
mandamus for action was intended to apply. General
rule of law is that where a general obligation is created
by statute and statutory remedy is provided for
violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope
and language of the statute and consideration of policy
at times may, however, create exception showing that
Legislature did not intend a remedy (generality) to be
exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The
language is the medium of expressing the intention and
the object that particular provision or the Act seeks the
achieve. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the
intention.

The word „shall‟ is not always decisive. Regard must be
had to the context, subject matter and object of the
statutory provision in question in determining whether
the same is mandatory or directory. No universal
principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to
whether a particular provision or enactment shall be
considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of
Court to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature
by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or
section or a phrase under Consideration. As stated
earlier, the question as to whether the statute is
mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the
Legislature and not always upon the language in which
the intent is couched. The meaning and intention of the
Legislature would govern design and purpose the Act
seeks to achieve. In „Sutherland Statutory Construction‟
(3rd Edn) Volume I at page 81 in paragraph 316, it is
stated that although the problem of mandatory and
directory legislation is a hazard to all Governmental
activity, it is peculiarly hazardous to administrative

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 53 of 140
agencies because the validity of their action depends
upon exercise of authority in accordance with their
charter of existence the statute. If the directions of the
statute are mandatory, then strict compliance with the
statutory terms is essential to the validity of
administrative action. But if the language of the statute
is directory only, the variation from its direction does
not invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if
the statutory direction is discretionary only, it may not
provide an adequate standard for legislative action and
the delegation. In „Crawford on the Construction of
Statutes‟ at page 516, it is stated that: The question as
to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends
upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the
language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning
and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these
are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of
the provision, but also by considering its nature, its
design, and the consequences which would follow from
construing it the one way or the other.”

9.8. The use of the word ‗may’ indicates that the power to
admit the appeal or application after the limitation
period has expired lies within the discretion of the
Court. It is not an automatic right, and the Court can
choose to condone or reject the delay depending on the
circumstances of the case. ‗May’ does not impose an
obligation on the Court to condone the delay. It gives
the Court flexibility to assess the sufficiency of the
cause for the delay on case-to-case basis.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 54 of 140

9.9. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 it has been succinctly stated:

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of
period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any
appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation
prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the
Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within such period. This section raises two
questions for consideration. First is, what is
sufficient cause; and the second, what is the
meaning of the clause „within such period‟?”

***

In construing Section 5·it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that
the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between
the parties. In other words, when the period of
limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has
obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat
the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right
which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time
should not be light, heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be-ignored is that if
sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion
is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the
appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred
on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion
in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by the
Madras High Court in Krishna Vrs. Chattappan, 1890
ILR 13 Mad 269:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 55 of 140

„Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect
of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in·which
judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised
upon principles which are well understood; the words
„sufficient cause‟ receiving a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence nor
inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
appellant.‟

Now, what do the words „within such period‟ denote? It
is possible that the expression „within such period‟ may
sometimes mean during such period. But the question
is: Does the context in. which the expression occurs in
Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the
Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute
prescribes different periods of limitation either for
appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that
normally means that liberty is given to the party
intending to make the appeal or to file an application to
act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would
not be reasonable to require a party to take the
necessary action on the very first day after the cause of
action accrues. In view of the period of limitation
prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time
and to file the appeal on any day during the said period
and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when
the delay has been made by the party in filing the
appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct
during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed.
In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even
irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence
of parties in construing the words of Section 5. The
context seems to suggest that „within such period‟
means within the period which ends with the last day
of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 56 of 140
falling under Section 5 what the party has to show is
why he did not file an appeal on the last day of
limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the
party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not
filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay
made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing
sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may
be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay
covered by the period between the last day prescribed
for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is
filed. To hold that the expression „within such period‟
means during such period would, in our opinion, be
repugnant in the context. We would accordingly hold
that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error
taking the view that the failure of the appellant to
account for its non-diligence during the whole of the
period of limitation prescribed for the appeal necessarily
disqualified it from praying for the condonation of
delay, even though the delay in question was only for
one day; and that too was caused by the party‟s
illness.

***

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled
to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of
right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition
precedent for the exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient
cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on
that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the
court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 57 of 140
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it
is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona
fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after
sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited
only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant.
It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of
bona fides or due diligence are always material and
relevant when the court is dealing with applications
made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing
with such applications the Court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly made
material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14
cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be
invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. ***”

9.10. The discretionary exercise of power amounts to
something that is not compulsory, but it is left to the
discretion of the person or authority involved, such as
a discretionary grant. It is opposite to ―mandatory‖.
Therefore, ―discretionary‖ is a term which involves an
alternative power, i.e., a power to do or refrain from
doing a certain thing. In other words, it would be
power of free decision or choice within certain legal
bounds.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 58 of 140

9.11. Necessity, thus, arises to state from K.K. Gopalan &
Co. Vrs. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), (2000)
118 STC 111 (Ker), that ‗discretion’ means use of
private and independent thought. When anything is
left to be done according to one’s discretion the law
intends it to be done with sound discretion and
according to law. Discretion is discerning between
right and wrong and one who has power to act at
discretion is bound by rule of reason. Discretion must
not be arbitrary. The very term itself stands
unsupported by circumstances imports the exercise of
judgment, wisdom and skill as contra-distinguished
from unthinking folly, heady violence or rash injustice.
When applied to a Court of Justice or Tribunal or
quasi-judicial body, it means sound discretion guided
by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humor; it
must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and
regular. Discretion must be exercised honestly and in
the spirit of the statute. It is the power given by a
statute to make choice among competing
considerations. It implies power to choose between
alternative courses of action. It is not unconfined and
vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.

9.12. In S.P. Road Link Vrs. State of Tripura, (2006) 144 STC
380 (Gau) reference has been made to Kumaon Mandal

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 59 of 140
Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC
182 to observe that ―discretion‖ means when it is said
that something is to be done within the discretion of
the authorities, that something is to be done according
to the rules of reason and justice, not according to
private opinion, according to law, and not humour. It
is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal
and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit,
to which an honest man competent to the discharge of
his office ought to confine himself.

9.13. The following observations made in Lanka
Venkateswarlu Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 3
SCR 217 are pertinent to be referred to:

“21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead)
by LRs Vrs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs., (2002)
Suppl.5 SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272, this Court
again emphasized that provisions contained in the
Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation
and culmination in an effective adjudication and
not to retard further progress of the proceedings.
The provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to
be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but
must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of
convenience in the administration of justice. It was
further observed that laws of procedure are meant
to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of
doing a substantial and real justice and not to
foreclose even adjudication on merits of
substantial rights of citizen under personal,
property and other laws. In the case of Mithailal
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 60 of 140
Dalsangar Singh Vrs. Annabai Devram Kini,
(2003) 10 SCC 691, this Court again reiterated
that inasmuch as abatement results in denial of
hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of
an abatement has to be construed strictly. On the
other hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement
and the dismissal consequent upon abatement
had to be considered liberally. It was further
observed as follows:

„The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented
approach dictated by the uppermost consideration
that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an
opportunity of having a lis determined on merits
unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate
inaction or something akin to misconduct,
disentitled himself from seeking the· indulgence of
the court.‟

22. The concepts of liberal approach and
reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the
Courts in condoning delay, have been again
stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh
(dead) Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 =
(2010) 8 SCC 685 as follows:

„25. We may state that even if the term „sufficient
cause‟ has to receive liberal construction, it
must squarely fall within the concept of
reasonable time and proper conduct of the
party concerned. The purpose of introducing
liberal construction normally is to introduce
the concept of „reasonableness‟ as it is
understood in its general connotation.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 61 of 140

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law
and has definite consequences on the right
and obligation of party to arise. These
principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Once a
valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of the failure of the other
party to explain the delay by showing
sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will
be unreasonable to take away that right on
the mere asking of the applicant, particularly
when the delay is directly a result of
negligence, default or inaction of that party.

Justice must be done to both parties equally.
Then alone the ends of justice can be
achieved. If a party has been thoroughly
negligent in implementing its rights and
remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive
the other party of a valuable right that has
accrued to it in law as a result of his acting
vigilantly.‟

***

24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the
High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our
opinion, such a course was not open to the High
Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by
the respondents in the application seeking
condonation of delay.

25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made
by the High Court about the delay being caused
by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the
Government pleaders. The displeasure of the
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 62 of 140
Court is patently apparent from the impugned
order ·itself. In the opening paragraph of the
impugned order the High Court has, rather
sarcastically, dubbed the Government pleaders as
without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is
clearly discernable from the observation that „This
is a classic case, how the learned Government
pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and
ability are discharging their function protecting the
interest of their clients.‟ Having said so, the High
Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of
duty by the concerned Government pleaders in not
pursuing the appeal before the High Court
diligently. The High Court has set out the different
stages at which the Government pleaders had
exhibited almost culpable negligence in
performance of their duties. The High Court found
the justification given by the Government pleaders
to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order,
it was recorded that in the normal course, the
applications would have been thrown out without
having a second thought in the matter. Having
recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the
High Court proceeds to condone the
unconscionable delay.

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or
rationale, which could have impelled the
High Court to condone the delay after
holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as „liberal approach‟, „justice
oriented approach‟, „substantial justice‟
cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation. Especially, in
cases where the Court concludes that there is no

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 63 of 140
justification for the delay. In our opinion, the
approach adopted by the High Court tends to
show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain
whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties.
We are rather pained to notice that in this case,
not being satisfied with the use of mere
intemperate language, the High Court resorted to
blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong
intemperate or extravagant language in a
judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by
this Court in a number of cases. Whilst
consideiing applications for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial
powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic
manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies;
prejudices or predilections cannot and should not
form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.”

9.14. May it is in general connotation the word ―discretion‖
means ‗prudence’, ‗individual choice or judgment’,
‗power of free decision’ and ‗freedom to act according
to one’s own judgment’, but in legal parlance, it is
confined to the exercise of freedom to act; squeezes
one’s individual choice. It prescribes direction to the
authority upon whom discretion is vested to act in
conformity with statutory provisions and rule of law. It
follows that the judgment of the delegatee of power,
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 64 of 140
who is vested with discretion, is his own application of
reasonable, conscience mind and thought unguided
and uncontrolled by opinion/judgment of others.
Discretion is the power delegated specially or implied
from the wordings of the statute is oft coupled with
responsibility and duty.

9.15. Conspectus of litany of decisions rendered by different
Courts indicates that ―discretion‖ means use of private
and independent thought. When anything is left to be
done according to one’s discretion the law intends it to
be done with sound discretion and according to law.
Discretion is discerning between right and wrong and
one who has power to act at discretion is bound by
rule of reason. Discretion must not be arbitrary. The
very term itself stands unsupported by circumstances
imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill as
contra-distinguished from unthinking folly, heady
violence or rash injustice. When applied to a Court of
Justice or Tribunal or quasi judicial body, it means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed
by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful but legal and regular. Discretion
must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the
statute. It is the power given by a statute to make
choice among competing considerations. It implies
power to choose between alternative courses of action.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 65 of 140

It is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing. It is to be, not
arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.
And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an
honest man competent to the discharge of his office
ought to confine himself. [See, Kumaon Mandal Vikas
Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182].

Showing sufficient cause:

10. The Courts through catena of decisions have
expounded the conceptual understanding of
―discretion‖ in exercise of power to condone the delay
in preferring appeal being ―satisfied‖ on the party
seeking to admit the appeal to be heard on merit
having shown ―sufficient cause‖.

10.1. In this regard, therefore, the interpretation of the
expression ―sufficient cause‖ as found in the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has
significant bearing on the question that is involved in
the instant case.

10.2. It needs to be discussed the connotation of ―good
cause‖ vis-à-vis ―sufficient cause‖. In Arjun Singh Vrs.
Mohindra Kumar, (1964) 5 SCR 946, these two terms
have been considered as follows:

“Before proceeding to deal with the arguments
addressed to us by Mr. Setalvad– learned counsel for
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 66 of 140
the appellant, it would be convenient to mention a point,
not seriously pressed before us, but which at earlier
stages was thought to have considerable significance
for the decision of this question viz., the difference
between the words „good cause‟ for non-appearance in
Order IX, Rule 7 and „sufficient cause‟ for the same
purpose in Order IX, Rule 13 as pointing to different
criteria of „goodness‟ or „sufficiency‟ for succeeding in
the two proceedings, and as therefore furnishing a
ground for the inapplicability of the rule of res judicata.
As this ground was not seriously mentioned before us,
we need not examine it in any detail, but we might
observe that we do not see any material difference
between the facts to be established for satisfying
the two tests of „good cause‟ and „sufficient
cause‟. We are unable to conceive of a „good
cause‟ which is not „sufficient‟ as affording an
explanation for non-appearance, nor conversely of
a „sufficient cause‟ which is not a good one and
we would add that either of these is not different
from „good and sufficient cause‟ which is used in
this context in other statutes. If, on the other hand,
there is any difference between the two it can only be
that the requirement of a „good cause‟ is complied with
on a lesser degree of proof than that of „sufficient cause‟
and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since
assuming the applicability of the principle of res
judicata to the decisions in the two proceedings, if the
court finds in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not
discharged, it must a fortiori bar the consideration of
the same matter in the later, where the standard of
proof of that matter is, if anything, higher.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 67 of 140

10.3. Observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3612 = 2024 INSC 932 is as follows:

“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation. In Majji
Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi, (2021) 9 SCR 476
= 2021 INSC 909, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect
the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by
statute. A reference was also made to the
decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare
Ram, (2023) 1 SCR 449 = 2023 INSC 90 wherein,
it was held as follows:

„13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj Vrs.

Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14
SCC 81 while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of
sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:

„15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means
an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 68 of 140
the court within limitation. In case
a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay.
No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within
the parameters laid down by this Court
in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the
legislature.‟

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any
mistake in dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant.”

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression
„sufficient cause‟ cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides is attributed to the party.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 69 of 140

10.4. The meaning of ‗sufficient’ is ‗adequate’ or ‗enough’,
inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose
intended. Therefore, word ‗sufficient’ embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude which when
the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose
intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case and duly examined from the view point of a
reasonable standard of a cautious man. ‗Sufficient
cause’ means that the party had not acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or the party cannot be alleged to have been ‗not
acting diligently’ or ‗remaining inactive’. However, the
facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. While deciding whether there is sufficient
cause or not, the Court must bear in mind the object
of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned
and that the technicalities of the law should not
prevent the Court from doing substantial justice and
doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of
the judgment impugned before it. ―Sufficient cause‖ is,
thus, the cause for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must
approach the Court with a reasonable defence.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 70 of 140

Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has
to exercise its discretion in the varied and special
circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a
straitjacket formula of universal application. [Refer:

Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 = (1962) 2 SCR 762; Lonard
Grampanchayat Vrs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222;
Surinder Singh Sibia Vrs. Vijay Kumar Sood, (1992) 1
SCC 70; Orinental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vrs.
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5
SCC 459; Parimal Vrs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545;
Sudarshan Sareen Vrs. National Small Industries
Corporation Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4412; State of
Bihar Vrs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94;
Madanlal Vrs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535; Davinder
Pal Sehgal Vrs. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., (2002)
3 SCC 156; Ram Nath Sao Vrs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002)
3 SCC 195, Kaushalya Devi Vrs. Prem Chand, (2005)
10 SCC 127, Srei International Finance Ltd. Vrs.

Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 95;
Reena Sadh Vrs. Aniana Enterprises, (2008) 12 SCC
589].

10.5. ―Sufficient cause‖ has to be construed as an elastic
expression for which no hard-and-fast guidelines can
be prescribed. The Courts have a wide discretion in
deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 71 of 140
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The
―sufficient cause‖ for non-appearance refers to the
date on which the absence was made a ground for
proceeding ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely
upon other circumstances anterior in time. If
―sufficient cause‖ is made out for non-appearance of
the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex
parte proceedings were initiated against him, he
cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which
had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In
a case where the defendant approaches the Court
immediately and within the statutory time specified,
the discretion is normally exercised in his favour,
provided the absence was not mala fide or intentional.
For the absence of a party in the case the other side
can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis
decided on merits. [Ref.: G.P. Srivastava Vrs. R.K.
Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54; A. Murugesan Vrs. Jamuna
Rani, (2019) 20 SCC 803]. The Court, in its discretion,
has to consider the ‗sufficient cause’ in the facts and
circumstances of every individual case. Although in
interpreting the words ‗sufficient cause’, the Court has
wide discretion but the same has to be exercised in the
particular facts of the case. See, Hira Sweets &
Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Hira Confectioners, 2021
SCC OnLine Del 1823.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 72 of 140

10.6. In Balwant Singh Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597
the ingredients of ―sufficient cause‖ for the purpose of
condonation of delay has been discussed as follows:

“7. *** However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion
is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an
application, after the expiry of the prescribed
period of limitation, if the appellant shows
„sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the application
within the prescribed time. The expression
„sufficient cause‟ commonly appears in the
provisions of Order XXII, Rule 9(2), CPC and
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus categorically
demonstrating that they are to be decided on
similar grounds. The decision of such an
application has to be guided by similar precepts.

***

8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of
Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 where there was delay
of 565 days in filing the first appeal by the State,
and the High Court had observed, „taking into
consideration the averments contained in the
affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone
the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition”.

While setting aside this order, this Court found
that the explanation rendered for condonation of
delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and
held as under:

„3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the
impugned order that the court has not
recorded any satisfaction that the
explanation for delay was either

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 73 of 140
reasonable or satisfactory, which is an
essential prerequisite to condonation of
delay.

4. That apart, we find that in the application
filed by the respondent seeking condonation
of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay
after 12.5.1995 is:

„*** at that time the Advocate General‟s office
was fed up with so many arbitration matters
(sic) equally important to this case were
pending for consideration as per the
directions of the Advocate General on
2.9.1995.‟

5. This can hardly be said to be a
reasonable, satisfactory or even a
proper explanation for seeking
condonation of delay. In the reply filed to
the application seeking condonation of delay
by the appellant in the High Court, it is
asserted that after the judgment and decree
was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge,
Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of
the appeal was examined by the District
Government Pleader, Special Law Officer,
Law Secretary and the Advocate General
and in accordance with their opinion, it was
decided that there was no scope for filing the
appeal but later on, despite the opinion
referred to above, the appeal was filed as
late as on 18.1.1996 without disclosing why
it was being filed. The High Court does not
appear to have examined the reply filed by
the appellant as reference to the same is
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 74 of 140
conspicuous by its absence from the order.

We are not satisfied that in the facts
and circumstances of this case, any
explanation, much less a reasonable or
satisfactory one had been offered by the
respondent-State for condonation of the
inordinate delay of 565 days.

6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribed and the courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. The discretion
exercised by the High Court was, thus,
neither proper nor judicious. The order
condoning the delay cannot be sustained.
This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the
impugned order is set aside. Consequently,
the application for condonation of delay filed
in the High Court would stand rejected and
the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand
dismissed as barred by time. No costs.‟

***

10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment
of Katari Suryanarayana Vrs. Koppisetti Subba
Rao, AIR 2009 SC 2907 again had an occasion to
construe the ambit, scope and application of the
expression „sufficient cause‟. The application for
setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal
heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that
case after a considerable delay. The explanation
rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in
filing the application for condonation of delay and
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 75 of 140
2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on
record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining
the application for condonation of delay, the Court,
while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy
Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC
321 in its para 9 held as under:

„11. The words „sufficient cause for not
making the application within the
period of limitation‟ should be
understood and applied in a reasonable,
pragmatic, practical and liberal
manner, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the type
of case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in
Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice, when the delay is not on
account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona
fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the
part of the appellant.‟

***

15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference
to the judgment of this Court in Perumon
Bhagvathy Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma,
(2008) 8 SCC 321. In this case, the Court, after
discussing a number of judgments of this Court as
well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the
principles which need to be kept in mind while
dealing with applications filed under the
provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an
application under Section 5, Limitation Act for
condonation of delay in filing the application for
bringing the legal representatives on record. In
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 76 of 140
paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as
under:

„(i) The words „sufficient cause for not making
the application within the period of limitation‟
should be understood and applied in a
reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal
manner, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the type of
case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section
5 of the Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice, when the delay is not on
account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona
tides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the
part of the appellant.

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of
delay, the courts are more liberal with
reference to applications for setting aside
abatement, than other cases. While the court
will have to keep in view that a valuable
right accrues to the legal representatives of
the deceased respondent when the appeal
abates, it will not punish an appellant with
foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended
lapses. The courts tend to set aside
abatement and decided the matter on merits.
The courts tend to set aside abatement and
decide the matter on merits, rather than
terminate the appeal on the ground of
abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay,
is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a
satisfactory explanation.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 77 of 140

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown
by a court depends on the nature of
application and facts and circumstances of
the case. For example, courts view delays in
making applications in a pending appeal
more leniently than delays in the institution
of an appeal. The courts view applications
relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently
than applications relating to litigant’s lapses.
The classic example is the difference in
approach of courts to applications for
condonation of delay in filing an appeal and
applications for condonation of delay in re-
filing the appeal after rectification of defects.

(v) Want of „diligence‟ or „inaction‟ can be
attributed to an appellant only when
something required to be done by him, is not
done. When nothing is required to be done,
courts do not expect the appellant to be
diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the
High Court and is not expected to be listed
for final hearing for a few years, an
appellant is not expected to visit the court or
his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the
position nor keep checking whether the
contesting respondent is alive. He merely
awaits the call or information from his
counsel about the listing of the appeal. ***

16. Above are the principles which should control the
exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court
under these provisions. The explained delay
should be clearly understood in
contradistinction to inordinate unexplained

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 78 of 140
delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients
which has to be considered by the Court. In
addition to this, the Court must also take
into account the conduct of the parties, bona
fide reasons for condonation of delay and
whether such delay could easily be avoided
by the applicant acting with normal care and
caution. The statutory provisions mandate that
applications for condonation of delay and
applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation for bringing the legal
representatives on record, should be rejected
unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation
of delay. The larger benches as well as
equi benches of this Court have consistently
followed these principles and have either allowed
or declined to condone the delay in filing such
applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law
that these applications cannot be allowed as
a matter of right and even in a routine
manner. An applicant must essentially
satisfy the above stated ingredients; then
alone the Court would be inclined to condone
the delay in the filing of such applications.”

10.7. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448,
it is observed as under:

“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as
“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat
of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some
kind of limitation is essential for public order. The
principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 79 of 140
sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires
that there should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private
justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening
diligence and preventing oppression. The object for
fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy
fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of
general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal
remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the
vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

10.8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India investigated if ―to
condone, or not to condone‖ four days’ delay, besides
examining as to ―whether or not to apply the same
standard in applying the ‗sufficient cause’ test to all
the litigants regardless of their personality‖ in
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107 = (1987) 2 SCR 387 and laid down
the following dicta:

“The Legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on „merits‟.
The expression „sufficient cause‟ employed by the
Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice– that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of Courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 80 of 140
Court. But the message does not appear to have
percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as
it is realized that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be decided
on merits after hearing the parties.

3. „Every day‟s delay must be explained‟ does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made.

Why not every hour‟s delay, every second‟s
delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence,
or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalize injustice on

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 81 of 140
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that
it was the „State‟ which was seeking condonation
and not a private party was altogether irrelevant.
The doctrine of equality before law demands that
all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even handed manner. There is
no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment
when the „State‟ is the applicant praying for
condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on
account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge
of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment
sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos,
delay on its part is less difficult to understand though
more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the community, does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression „sufficient cause‟.
So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in view to
do even handed justice on merits in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits.”

10.9. Discussing the scope and discretion of the Court in
condoning the substantial delay caused in filing
appeal by the State in G. Ramegowda Major Vrs.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 82 of 140

Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as follows:

“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there
is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be
ignored. If appeals brought by Government are
lost for such defaults, no person is
individually affected; but what, in the
ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective
and institutional decisions and do not share
the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same
for a private citizen as for Governmental-
authorities. Government, like any other
litigant must take responsibility for the acts
or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat
different complexion is imparted to the matter
where Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts
of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or
agents and where the officers were clearly at
cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
constitutes „sufficient cause‟ for purposes of
Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat
unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that
go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are
peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of
the Government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 83 of 140
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have „a little play at the joints‟.
Due recognition of these limitations on
Governmental functioning– of course, within a
reasonable limits–is necessary if the judicial
approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would,
perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of Governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision making
process. In the opinion of the High Court, the
conduct of the law-officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of these cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to Government.
It relied upon and trusted its law-officers. Lindley,
M.R., in the In re: National Bank of Wales Ltd., LR
1899 2 Ch. 629 @ 673 observed, though in a
different context:

„Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of
distrust. Men in responsible positions must be
trusted by those above them, as well as by those
below them, until there is reason to distrust them.‟

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite
sometime for the Government to realise that the
law-officers failed that trust.

18. While a private person can take instant
decision a „bureaucratic or democratic organ‟
it is said by a learned Judge „hesitates and
debates, consults and considers, speaks
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 84 of 140
through paper, moves horizontally and
vertically till at last it gravitates towards a
conclusion, unmindful of time and
impersonally.‟ ***”

10.10. In absence of showing deliberate delay as a
dilatory tactic, the manner of use of discretion in
favour of condonation of delay in filing appeal by the
State machinery with due regard to ‗sufficient cause’
has been enumerated in N. Balakrishnan Vrs. M.
Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123 in the following terms:

“8. The Appellant‟s conduct does not on the whole
warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible
litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not
very much far from what a litigant would broadly
do. Of course, it may be said that he should have
been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at
short intervals to check up the progress of the
litigation. But during these days when everybody
is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an
omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be
used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not
aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with
drastic consequences.

9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a
matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not say that such discretion
can be exercised only if the delay is within a
certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest
range may be uncondonable due to want of

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 85 of 140
acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases delay of very long range can be
condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the
explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive
exercise of discretion and normally the superior
court should not disturb such finding, much less in
reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of
discretion was on whole untenable grounds or
arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter
when the first Court refuses to condone the delay.
In such cases, the superior Court would be free to
consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and
it is open to such superior Court to come to its own
finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the
lower Court.

10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate
the dispute between the parties and to advance
substantial justice. Time limit fixed for
approaching the Court in different situations
is not because on the expiry of such time a
bad cause would transform into a good
cause.

11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the right of parties. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics,
but seek their remedy promptly. The object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation
fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is
precious and the wasted time would never revisit.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 86 of 140

During efflux of time newer causes would sprout
up necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span
must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period
for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law
of limitation is thus founded on public policy.
It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be putt to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that
every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time.

12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay
would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth
his cause. There is no presumption that delay in
approaching the Court is always deliberate. This
Court has held that the words „sufficient cause‟
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vrs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 = (1969) 1 SCR
1006 and State of West Bengal Vrs. The
Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC
749 = (1972) 1 SCC 366.

13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down
his plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 87 of 140
it is not put forth as part of a dilatory
strategy the Court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. But when there is
reasonable ground to think that the delay
was occasioned by the party deliberately to
gain time then the Court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While
condoning delay the Court should not forget the
opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind
that he is a looser and he too would have incurred
quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a
salutary guideline that when Courts condone
the delay due to laches on the part of the
applicant the Court shall compensate the
opposite party for his loss.”

10.11. While enunciating that pragmatism in justice
oriented approach is to be shown by the Court having
regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set up involved
in red-tapism within reasonable limits of time, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court propounded to hold officer
concerned personally responsible in the case of State
of Haryana Vrs. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and
the proposition of legal position stands thus:

“It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in
more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court–
be it by private party or the State– are barred by
limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal
approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat
sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is
equally common knowledge that litigants
including the State are accorded the same

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 88 of 140
treatment and the law is administered in an even-
handed manner. When the State is an applicant,
praying for condonation of delay, it is common
knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery
and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued
with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-
buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve,
but the State represents collective cause of the
community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by
officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on table for considerable time
causing delay– intentional or otherwise– is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the
process of their making decision is a common feature.
Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are
lost for such default no person is individually affected
but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public
interest. The expression „sufficient cause‟ should,
therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-
oriented approach rather than the technical detection of
sufficient cause for explaining every day‟s delay. The
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the Governmental conditions would be
cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic
approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should
decide the matters on merits unless the case is
hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to
determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private
litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of
sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level
should constitute legal cells to examine the cases
whether any legal principles are involved for decision
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 89 of 140
by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and
should authorise the officers take a decision or give
appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of
decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be
pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and
he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if
any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same
footing as an individual. The individual would always
be quick in taking the decision whether he would
pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application
since he is a person legally injured while State is an
impersonal machinery working through its officers or
servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be
held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been
explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the
delay.”

10.12. It is significant to notice the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case
of Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal
Representatives Vrs. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531
wherein while explaining the term ―sufficient cause‖,
the nature of approach of the Court and the
methodology in deciding the application for
condonation of delay have been discussed with
reference to earlier precedents. The said Court in the
mentioned reported case held as follows:

“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there
cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped
in to ensure that substantive rights of private
parties and the State are not defeated at the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 90 of 140
threshold simply due to technical considerations of
delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding,
we reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to Courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily
depend upon the sufficiency of the cause
shown and the degree of acceptability of the
explanation, the length of delay being
immaterial.

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being
shown or an acceptable explanation being
proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be
condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of
long periods can be condoned if the explanation is
satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the
Courts must distinguish between an
„explanation‟ and an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟
is designed to give someone all of the facts and
lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and allows the
person to point out that something that has
happened is not his fault, if it is really not his
fault. Care must however be taken to
distinguish an „explanation‟ from an
„excuse‟. Although people tend to see
„explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and
struggle to find out the difference between the two,
there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under
attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling
something as just an „excuse‟ would imply that the
explanation proffered is believed not to be true.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 91 of 140

Thus said, there is no formula that caters to
all situations and, therefore, each case for
condonation of delay based on existence or
absence of sufficient cause has to be decided
on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but
lament that it is only excuses, and not
explanations, that are more often accepted for
condonation of long delays to safeguard public
interest from those hidden forces whose sole
agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does
not reach the higher Courts for adjudication.

***

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated
21st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of
time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra),
Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra),
Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC
634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005)
3 SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the
said decisions do not hold the field now, having
been overruled by any subsequent decision.
Although there have been some decisions in the
recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654 is one such decision apart from
University of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13
SCC 745] which have not accepted Governmental
lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting
appeals within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of
discretion by the High Court has to be tested on
the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented
approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions
which have been referred to above.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 92 of 140

***

40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur
Vrs. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 … where
the same Bench of three Hon‟ble Judges of this
Court which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union
of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that
the impersonal nature of the State‟s functioning
should be given due regard, while ensuring that
individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of
collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read
as follows:

„7. But while concluding as above, it was
necessary for the Court to also be
conscious of the bureaucratic delay and
the slow pace in reaching a Government
decision and the routine way of deciding
whether the State should prefer an
appeal against a judgment adverse to it.
Even while observing that the law of
limitation would harshly affect the party, the
Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed
by the State, should not be condoned.

8. Regard should be had in similar such
circumstances to the impersonal nature of
the Government‟s functioning where
individual officers may fail to act
responsibly. This in turn, would result in
injustice to the institutional interest of the
State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost
for individual default, those who are at fault,
will not usually be individually affected.‟

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 93 of 140

41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival
contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision
to condone the delay on account of the first
respondent‟s inability to present the appeal within
time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not
suffer from any error warranting interference. As
the aforementioned judgments have shown,
such an exercise of discretion does, at times,
call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the Courts, where certain
leeway could be provided to the State. The
hidden forces that are at work in preventing
an appeal by the State being presented
within the prescribed period of limitation so
as not to allow a higher court to pronounce
upon the legality and validity of an order of
a lower court and thereby secure unholy
gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in
the working of the grand scheme of Governmental
functions have to be removed by taking a
pragmatic view on balancing of the competing
interests.”

10.13. In Pathupati Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. Vrs. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024
INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier
decisions, the principles for consideration of
condonation of delay have been expounded in the
following terms:

“6. The moot question before us is whether in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the High
Court was justified in refusing to condone the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 94 of 140
delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss
it as barred by limitation.

***

9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain
terms lays down that no suit, appeal or
application instituted, preferred or made after the
period prescribed shall be entertained rather
dismissed even though limitation has not been set
up as a defence subject to the exceptions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the
Limitation Act.

***

12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is
preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable
to be dismissed. The use of the word „shall‟ in the
aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is
mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of
the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to
even though no objection regarding limitation is
taken by the other side or referred to in the
pleadings. In other words, it casts an
obligation upon the Court to dismiss an
appeal which is presented beyond limitation.
This is the general law of limitation. The
exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are
concerned only with the exception contained
in Section 5 which empowers the Courts to
admit an appeal even if it is preferred after
the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant gives „sufficient cause‟ for not
preferring the appeal within the period

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 95 of 140
prescribed. In other words, the Courts are
conferred with discretionary powers to admit an
appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed
period provided the proposed appellant is able to
establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it within
time. The said power to condone the delay or
to admit the appeal preferred after the
expiry of time is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is shown based upon host of other factors
such as negligence, failure to exercise due
diligence etc.

13. It is very elementary and well understood that
Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in dealing with the applications for
condonation of the delay in filing appeals and
rather follow a pragmatic line to advance
substantial justice.

***

17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing „sufficient cause‟ in deciding
application under Section 5 of the Act, that
on the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive
right in favour of a decree-holder accrues
and this right ought not to be lightly
disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to
be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed
on such assumption creating new rights.

***

26. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 96 of 140
law laid down by this Court, it is evident
that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by
forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3
has to be construed in a strict sense whereas
Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice may
be kept in mind but the same cannot be used
to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion
to condone the delay if sufficient cause had
been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as,
where there is inordinate delay, negligence
and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others
are also entitled to the same benefit if the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 97 of 140
Court is not satisfied with the cause shown
for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions have
been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding
the statutory provision.”

10.14. In a recent case, being Union of India Vrs.

Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his Lr., (2024)
4 SCR 76 = 2024 INSC 262, certain observations are
made which are given as under with respect to a case
where there was inordinate delay in filing appeal:

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very
clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the Court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 98 of 140
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. ***

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the Court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should
be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction
for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the Court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The Court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 99 of 140
head of the respondent for indefinite period of time
to be determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.”

10.15. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha
Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782,
wherein the following principles are culled out:

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-

oriented, non-pedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation
of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.

(ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact
that these terms are basically elastic and are
to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact-situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should
not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on
the part of the counsel or litigant is to be
taken note of.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 100 of 140

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant
and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice
and cause public mischief because the courts
are required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsule the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few
days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is
attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants
strict approach whereas the second calls for
a liberal delineation.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of
liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 101 of 140
the other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion
which is founded on objective reasoning and
not on individual perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be
given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:

(a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern
and not in a half hazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts
are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that
adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.

(b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner
on the base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 102 of 140

(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for
achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that
is the ultimate institutional motto.

(d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and,
hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a non-challant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters.”

10.16. This Court in Radharaman Store Vrs. Odisha
Sales Tax Tribunal, 85 (1998) CLT 657 = (1998) 108
STC 284 (Ori) held that,

“It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in
more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in apex Court–
be it by private party or the State– are barred by
limitation and apex Court generally adopts liberal
approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat
sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merit. This
position was elaborately stated by the apex Court in
State of Haryana Vrs. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132
= (1996) 2 SCALE 820.

***

The factual backdrop and few relevant facts need to be
noted. It is an accepted position that the file was
endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for opinion on December 31,
1993, and he passed an order on March 30, 1994 for
filing of the second appeal. No cause has been indicated
as to why the Addl. S.R. took such a long time, and
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 103 of 140
what transpired during that period. In fact no
explanation whatsoever has been offered. Tribunal‟s
reasoning is that there was delay in decision-
making process and that was considered to be
sufficient cause. The conclusion does not stand to
reason. On the contrary, it shows non-application
of mind to the germane issue. Even though a
liberal approach has to be adopted, that does not
mean that any plea without any plausible or
acceptable basis, and not even having semblance
of rationality has to be accepted, and delay has to
be condoned. That shall be against the very spirit of
law. Prescription of time-limit for filing appeals would
become meaningless in such event. Merely because
State is involved, that does not mean that any lethargic
or supine inaction has to be condoned or ignored, and
even if no reason is indicated that would be
inconsequential. The subject-matter was not very
complex and rather the grounds of appeal filed appear
to be of very routine nature. As has been observed by
this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Koraput
Division Vrs. State of Odisha, (1976) 38 STC 538, delay
caused by the concerned officer in giving his
opinion, without any explanation whatsoever does
not constitute sufficient ground for condonation
of delay. In the aforesaid premises, the inevitable
conclusion is that the Tribunal has not applied its
judicial mind to the question whether delay was to be
condoned.”

10.17. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West
Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of
―sufficient cause‖ qua official business has been
perceived in the following manner:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 104 of 140

“There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient
cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice
oriented approach rather than the technical detection of
“sufficient cause” for explaining every day‟s delay.
However, it is equally well settled that the courts
albeit liberally considered the prayer for
condonation of delay but in some cases the court
may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the
Government is not accepted to keep watch
whether the contesting respondent further put the
matter in motion. The delay in official business
requires its pedantic approach from public justice
perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India Vrs.
Nripen Sarma, (2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237
the matter came up against the order passed by the
High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by
the appellant-Union of India. The High Court refused to
condone the delay on the ground that the appellant-
Union of India took their own sweet time to reach
the conclusion whether the judgment should be
appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its
anguish and distress with the way the State conducts
the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same
became operational and barred by limitation.”

10.18. In Mool Chandra Vrs. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC
4046 the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India is as follows:

“20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having
been granted to the appellant to pursue his
remedy in accordance with law, yet another O.A.
No. 2066 of 2020 along with an application for
condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay
was not condoned by the Tribunal on the ground
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 105 of 140
that it was filed more than one year after the
impugned order came to be passed. No litigant
stands to benefit in approaching the courts
belatedly. It is not the length of delay that
would be required to be considered while
examining the plea for condonation of delay,
it is the cause for delay which has been
propounded will have to be examined. If the
cause for delay would fall within the four
corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of
the length of delay same deserves to be
condoned. However, if the cause shown is
insufficient, irrespective of the period of
delay, same would not be condoned.

21. In this background when we turn our attention to
the facts on hand, it would emerge from the
records that appellant being aggrieved by the
dismissal of the O.A. No. 2066 of 2020 on the
ground of delay had approached the Delhi High
Court challenging the same. The High Court on the
ground of penalty imposed being a minor penalty,
refused to entertain the writ petition or in other
words confirmed the order impugned before the
Tribunal on merits. This Court in
Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara
Vrs. Labour Court, Bhilwara, (2009) 3 SCC
525 has taken a view that while deciding an
application for condonation of delay the High
Court ought not to have gone into the merits
of the case. It has been further held:

„5. While deciding an application for
condonation of delay, it is well settled that
the High Court ought not to have gone into

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 106 of 140
the merits of the case and would have only
seen whether sufficient cause had been
shown by the appellant for condoning the
delay in filing the appeal before it. We
ourselves have also examined the application
filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
before the High Court and, in our opinion, the
delay of 178 days has been properly
explained by the appellant. That being the
position, we set aside the impugned order of
the High Court. Consequently, the appeal
filed before the High Court is restored to its
original file. The High Court is requested to
decide the appeal on merit in accordance
with law after giving hearing to the parties
and after passing a reasoned order.‟

22. If negligence can be attributed to the appellant,
then necessarily the delay which has not been
condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the
High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if
no fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant
and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the
considered view that both the Tribunal and the
High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal
approach or justice oriented approach to condone
the delay. This Court in Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar Vrs. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC
48 has held:

“6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches
was also raised before the High Court and
on this score the High Court relying upon the
decision in N.L. Abhyankar Vrs. Union of
India, (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503 observed that it

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 107 of 140
is not an inflexible rule that whenever there
is delay, the Court must and necessarily
refuse to entertain the petition filed after a
period of three years or more which is the
normal period of limitation for filing a suit.

The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case,
(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503 stated that the question
is one of discretion to be followed in the facts
and circumstances of each case and further
stated:

„The real test for sound exercise of
discretion by the High Court in this
regard is not the physical running of
time as such but the test is whether by
reason of delay, there is such negligence
on the part of the petitioner so as to
infer that he has given up his claim or
where the petitioner has moved the writ
court, the rights of the third parties
have come into being which should not
be allowed to be disturbed unless there
is reasonable explanation for the delay.‟
***”

10.19. In the case of State of Odisha Vrs. Nirupama Das,
2024 SCC OnLine Ori 2461, this Court has held as
follows:

“9. It is however noted that these observations2 have
been further considered by the Supreme Court in
several cases including the case of the Pathapati
Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. & Others Vrs. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 =
2 Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 108 of 140

2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 wherein following was
observed:

„26. „***‟

10. Again in the case of Postmaster General Vrs.

Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, the
decision of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 = (1987) 2 SCR
387 was considered and it was held that the law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody. The
following observations of the Supreme Court are
noteworthy in this context:

„28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the Government bodies, their
agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 109 of 140
and there was bona fide effort, there is
no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-
tape in the process. The Government
departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform
their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for Government
departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.”

10.20. Thus, taking an overall view of the matter, this
Court finds that the proposed appeal is grossly delayed
and the explanation given, as narrated above, does not,
in the considered view of this Court, constitute sufficient
cause so as to be accepted. Though it has been argued
that valuable property of the State is involved yet as per
the settled position of law the merits of the case are not
to be gone into while considering the question of
limitation.”

10.21. In the case of Laxmi Gouda Vrs. The District
Collector, Ganjam, CMP No.1271 of 2022, decided on
22.10.2024 vide MANU/OR/1531/2024, this Court
held as follows:

“10. Thus, in the instant case, the Court should not
delve into the period of delay occurred in filing the
Appeal, but the explanation that has been offered
for such delay is material for consideration. As
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 110 of 140
discussed earlier, the so-called explanation for
condonation of delay are mere excuses and a
defensive plea has been taken by the Tahasildar,
Hinjili to save his skin by shifting the
responsibility to his predecessors without
explaining what the Government functionaries did
during all the aforesaid period to file the Appeal in
time. In view of the above, the case laws cited by
Mr. Dash, learned AGA, as stated above, are of no
assistance to him.

11. By efflux of time, a right has accrued in favour of
the Petitioners/Respondents by virtue of the
judgment and decree passed in CS No.95 of 2014.
The same cannot be taken away so lightly without
even discussing the objection raised by them
opposing condonation of delay as has been done
by learned Additional District Judge, Chatrapur.
Exclusion of period of COVID-19 is immaterial and
inconsequential for consideration of petition to
condone the delay in filing the Appeal, as the
statutory period for filing the appeal had expired
four years before the outbreak of COVID-19
pandemic.

12. No doubt, public interest plays a vital role while
considering the petition for condonation of delay,
but that does not take away the responsibility of
the party seeking for condonation of delay to
provide sufficient cause for the same. In the case
of Sumitra Das (supra) as well as in Chief
Postmaster General (supra), it has been held that
law shelters everyone under the same umbrella
and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
In the instant case, it appears that learned

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 111 of 140
Additional District Judge had categorically held
that there were latches on the part of the revenue
authorities in filing the Appeal in time. Having
observed so, learned Additional District Judge
could not have proceeded further to condone the
delay in filing the Appeal, as the finding of latches
on the part of the revenue authorities itself makes
it clear that no sufficient cause has been shown
by the Government functionaries for condonation
of delay.

13. The Government might suffer for refusal of the
prayer to condone the delay in filing the Appeal,
but that cannot be a ground to consider the
application in favour of the Government
functionaries who are at fault in not preferring the
Appeal in time. It is open to the Government to
take appropriate action and recover the loss,
if any, caused for the latches of their
Officers/staff, but that cannot be a ground to
drag the poor litigants/Petitioners to Court in
the garb of public interest.”

The action against the indolent:

11. Having thus discussed the gamut of ―sufficient cause‖
vis-à-vis ―good cause‖ with reference to the parameters
of consideration of germane grounds for condonation
of delay in preferring appeal, this Court feels expedient
to observe that in State of M.P. Vrs. Pradeep Kumar,
(2000) 7 SCC 372, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that if an appeal is time barred, the Court should
either return the memorandum of appeal to the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 112 of 140
appellant to submit it along with an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act or should provide a
chance to file application for condonation of delay. The
Court cannot, under such circumstances, dispose of
the appeal on merit. In S.V. Matha Prasad Vrs.

Lalchand Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722, it has been
clearly held that while dealing with an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court
cannot dispose of an appeal on merit and such a
course has been disapproved by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India. However, in O.P. Kathpalia Vrs.
Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744, it is held that if the
refusal to condone the delay results in grave
miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone
the delay.

11.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed the
Special Leave Petition being filed with delay in the case
of Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Hapur Pilkhuwa
Development Authority, Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Diary No.26127 of 2018, vide Order dated 27.08.2018
by observing thus:

“This petition for special to leave has been filed by the
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ghaziabad.

First of all this petition has been filed after a delay of
596 days. There is an inadequate and unconvincing
explanation given for the delay in filing the petition.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 113 of 140

***

As we have noted, there is an inadequate explanation
of delay of 596 days in filing the petition and a
misleading statement about pendency of a similar civil
appeal. Under the circumstances, we dismiss the
petition with costs of Rs.10 lacs to be paid to the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four
weeks from today. The amount be utilized for juvenile
justice issues.

List the matter for compliance after four weeks.”

11.2. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vrs. Gorkha Ram, Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 27426 of 2020, vide
Order dated 23.08.2021, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
made the following observation:

“The SLP has been filed with a delay of 636 days. On
our query as to what is the reason, learned counsel
seeks to contend it is because of COVID. The order was
passed on 05.12.2018 and thus, we asked the counsel
as to which year was the world affected by Covid 2019
or 2020 to which learned counsel‟s answer initially was
2019, possibly to cover the delay but realizing that it
was 2020, he states that the papers were not received
by him. To say the least, we are shocked at the
conduct of the petitioner-State and the manner of
conduct the litigation in such a sensitive matter.
There is not even a semblance of explanation for delay.
We however, would not like to dismiss the petition
on limitation because of the seriousness of the
issue involved. But that is no excuse why the
State should not be made accountable of such
inordinate delay and the persons responsible for

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 114 of 140
the same. We thus, condone the delay but subject to
imposition of costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with
the Supreme Court Group „C‟ (Non-Clerical) Employees
Welfare Association within four weeks with a direction
to hold the enquiry, fix responsibility and recover the
amount from the officers concerned. The certificate of
recovery should be filed before this Court within the
same period of time. The application for condonation of
delay is allowed in the aforesaid terms.”

11.3. In the case of Deputy Conservator of Forests Vrs.

Timblo Irmaos Ltd., (2021) 14 SCC 516, the following
observation has been made:

“1. The special leave petition has been filed after a
delay of 462 days. This is one more case which
we have categorised as “certificate cases”

filed before this Court to complete a mere
formality and save the skin of the officers
who have been throughout negligent in
defending a litigation!

***

5. We have dealt with the issue of the Government
authorities in approaching courts belatedly as if
the statute of limitation does not exist for them.
While referring to some reasons given for
insufficiencies, we observed that the parties
cannot keep on relying on judicial pronouncements
for a period of time when technology had not
advanced and a greater leeway was given to the
Government, [LAO Vrs. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107].
This situation no more prevails and this position
had been elucidated by the judgment of this Court

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 115 of 140
in Postmaster General Vrs. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563.

6. These aspects have been analysed by us recently
in State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654.
In the aforesaid judgment we have defined
“certificate cases” the objective of which is only to
put a quietus to the issue by recording that
nothing could be done because the highest Court
had dismissed the appeal. We have repeatedly
deprecated such practice and process. The irony
is that despite observations, no action was
ever taken against the officers who sit on the
file and do nothing.

7. The matter is further aggravated in the present
case and even the present petition is filed with a
delay of 462 days and once again the excuse is of
change of the counsel.

8. We have repeatedly deprecated such
attempts of the State Governments to
approach this Court only to complete a mere
formality. The learned counsel for the
petitioner strenuously contends that there is
valuable land involved. In our view, if it was
so, then the officers concerned responsible
for the manner in defending this petition
must be made to pay for it.

9. We are thus constrained to dismiss the petition as
barred by time and impose costs of Rs.15,000 on
the petitioner for wastage of judicial time. We put
it to the learned counsel that the costs would have
been much greater but for the fact that a young
counsel is appearing before us and we have given

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 116 of 140
considerable concession in the costs on that factor
alone.

10. The costs be recovered from the officers
responsible for the delay and costs be deposited
within a month with the Supreme Court
Employees‟ Welfare Fund. The certificate of
recovery be also filed within the same period of
time.”

11.4. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya
Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, made it
clear that,

“5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be
propounded that if there is some merit in the
case, the period of delay is to be given a go-
by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed
in any case. It is really a bar of limitation
which can even shut out good cases. This does
not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the
Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid
approach is being adopted in what we have
categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The
object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus
to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be
done because the highest Court has dismissed the
appeal. It is to complete this formality and
save the skin of officers who may be at
default that such a process is followed. We
have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated
such a practice and process. There seems to be no

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 117 of 140
improvement. The purpose of coming to this
Court is not to obtain such certificates and if
the Government suffers losses, it is time
when the officer concerned responsible for
the same bears the consequences. The irony
is that in none of the cases any action is
taken against the officers, who sit on the
files and do nothing. It is presumed that this
Court will condone the delay and even in making
submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to
address on merits without referring even to the
aspect of limitation as happened in this case till
we pointed out to the counsel that he must first
address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we
propose to do in all matters today, where there are
such inordinate delays that the Government or
State authorities coming before us must pay for
wastage of judicial time which has its own value.
Such costs can be recovered from the officers
responsible.”

11.5. In State of Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11
SCC 560 while declining to condone the delay of 783
days in preferring writ appeal before the Division
Bench of this Court against the Order of learned
Single Judge, the Supreme Court of India made the
following observations:

“1. The present SLPs have been filed after a delay of
1954 days in respect of the impugned order dated

12.03.2015 [Sunanda Mahakuda Vrs. State, WP
(C) No. 7021 of 2004, Order dated 12.03.2015

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 118 of 140
(Ori)] of the learned Single Judge and delay of 545
days qua the order [Deptt. of Water Resources Vrs.
Sunanda Mahakuda, Writ Appeal No. 147 of
2017, Order dated 19.04.2019 (Ori)] in writ
appeal. We may notice that the writ appeal itself
was preferred after a delay of 783 days and was
found not to have been properly explained. We
may add that the present special leave
petition is filed after contempt proceedings
were initiated on 13.05.2019, on dismissal of
the writ appeal. Now, it is our chance to
scrutinise a little more closely the aforesaid
conduct of the State Government.

***

4. There is no doubt that these are cases including
the present one where the Government machinery
has acted in an inefficient manner or it is a
deliberate endeavour. In either of the two
situations, this Court ought not to come to the
rescue of the petitioner. No doubt, some leeway is
given for Government inefficiency but with the
technological advancement now the judicial view
prevalent earlier when such facilities were not
available has been over taken by the elucidation
of the legal principles in the judgment of this Court
in Postmaster General Vrs. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563. We have discussed these
aspects in State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654 and thus, see no reason to repeat the
same again.

5. In the present case, the State Government has not
even taken the trouble of citing any reason or
excuse nor any dates given in respect of the period
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 119 of 140
for which condonation is sought. The objective of
such an exercise has also been elucidated by us in
the aforesaid judgment [State of M.P. Vrs.
Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 where we have
categorised such cases as “certificate cases”.

6. The object of such cases appears to be to obtain a
certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to
put a quietus to the issue and thus, say nothing
could done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is mere completion of
formality to give a quietus to the litigation and
save the skin of the officers who may be at fault
by not taking action in prescribed time. If the
State Government feels that they have
suffered losses, then it must fix
responsibility on officers concerned for their
inaction but that ironically never happens.

These matters are preferred on a
presumption as if this Court will condone the
delay in every case, if the State Government
is able to say something on merits.

7. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded,
we consider it appropriate to impose costs of
Rs.25,000 to be deposited with the Supreme Court
Advocates-on-Record Welfare Fund. The amount
be deposited in four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the officers responsible for
the delay in filing both the writ appeal and
the special leave petition and a certificate of
recovery be also filed in this Court within the
same period of time.”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 120 of 140

Taking note of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654 and State of Odisha Vrs. Sunanda
Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560, in the cases of State of
Gujarat Vrs. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 3517; State of U.P. Vrs. Sabha Narain,
(2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India Vrs. Central Tibetan
Schools Admin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 119; Union of
India Vrs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 9
SCC 263; Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs.
Shamshuddin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518 identical
view has been expressed by the Supreme Court of
India.

Conclusion:

12. Before going into the merits of the case, first of all, it
should be noted that in a case of this nature where
more than 25 years have been elapsed since the
judgment and decree being passed in the suit and
around 19 years have been passed in preferring appeal
in the year 2019 under Section 96 of the CPC since
dismissal of petition under Order IX, Rule 13 ibid. way
back in the year 2000, it is well settled that length of
delay would be material coupled with the reasons
stated thereof for condonation of delay. In other words,
for condonation of delay, the reasons ascribed must be
properly pleaded, convincing and acceptable and
explanation should be offered for condonation of the
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 121 of 140
delay. Unless proper explanation is offered, the Courts
could not exercise its discretion in proper perspective
to advance substantial justice. It is also settled that
when a Court has exercised its discretionary power to
condone the delay, the appellate Court, in exercise of
its discretion, should not ordinarily interfere with such
decision unless the discretion exercised is arbitrary
and overlooking the interest accrued to another party
to the dispute. The appellate Court should also see
whether the trial Court has taken into consideration
all the aspects of the matter, the advantage or
disadvantage that may be caused to the other side
while condoning the delay inasmuch as during the
interregnum, the other party could have asserted a
vested right. It deserves to be noted that when there is
inordinate delay in approaching the Court in appeal,
delay cannot be excused as a matter of judicial
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party.

12.1. If a litigant chooses to approach the Court long after
the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of
the law, he cannot say that no prejudice would be
caused to the other side by the delay being condoned.

The other side would have in all probability destroyed
the records thinking that the records would not be
relevant as there was no further proceeding in the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 122 of 140
matter. Hence to view a matter of condonation of delay
with a presupposition that no prejudice will be caused
by the condonation of delay to the other side in that
application will be fallacious. Each case has to be
decided on the facts and circumstances of the case.

12.2. In case of inordinate delay, length of delay is a relevant
factor to be taken into account while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. It is not
open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation
for instituting proceedings for which law has
prescribed period of limitation. Once a party loses his
right to have the matter considered on merits because
of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to
plead that substantial justice deserved to be preferred
as against technical considerations. The question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
Rules of limitation are based on principles of sound
public policy. A litigant cannot be allowed to have a
―Sword of Damocles‖ hanging over his head
indefinitely for a period to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the opponent.

13. With the perspective and the perception of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court now ventures to
examine whether the learned District Judge, Puri
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 123 of 140
while condoning the delay has exercised his
jurisdiction seemly by applying his conscientious
discretion.

14. The fact on record as emanating from the impugned
Order dated 07.02.2020 of the learned District Judge
depicts that he was considering the question whether
the delay occurred in filing appeal under Section 96 of
the CPC ―can be excluded or condoned after 25 years
and more‖.

14.1. The factual narration of said appellate Court revealed
that ex parte judgment and decree of the learned Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Puri, the subject matter of the
appeal, was rendered on 21.06.1994 in TS No.191 of
1992 and the petition for restoration of said title suit
under Order IX, Rule 13, being Miscellaneous Case
No.103 of 1996, got dismissed in the year 2000.
Nonetheless, after said dismissal there was
―inscrutable face of the sphinx‖ silence by the opposite
party No.2-Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee for nearly 19 years and more than 25 years
from the date of judgment and decree. The appeal was
filed in 2019.

14.2. Though objection was filed before the learned District
Judge, Puri in connection with aforesaid petition of the
Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee, the

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 124 of 140
same appears not to have been considered in proper
perspective, yet while condoning the delay of 25 years
and odd, the appeal was directed to be admitted for
hearing on merit. Notwithstanding making the
observation that ―the obligation of the State
Authorities and the Temple Authorities was not
discharged properly by its Administrator nor the
interest of Lord Jagannath was protected‖, and having
noticed the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Estate Officer Haryana Urban Development Authority
Vrs. Gopi Chand Atreja, (2019) 2 SCR 10003, learned
District Judge, Puri abruptly jumped to the conclusion
that ―Inasmuch as the present appeal has been
preferred challenging the judgment and decree
obtained as void and obtained by fraud‖ without any

3 The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are as follows:

“18. If, according to the appellants-HUDA, their lawyer did not take timely
steps, which resulted in causing delay in its filing/refiling, then, in our
view, it cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

19. In our view, it was equally the duty of the appellants (their legal
managers) to see that the appeal be filed in time. If the appellants
noticed that their lawyer was not taking interest in attending to the
brief in question, then they should have immediately engaged some
other lawyer to ensure that the appeal be filed in time by another
lawyer.

20. In our view, it is a clear case where the appellant-HUDA, i.e., their
officers, who were in-charge of the legal cell failed to discharge their
duty assigned to them promptly and with due diligence despite
availability of all facilities and infrastructure. In such circumstances,
the officers-in-charge of the case should be made answerable for the
lapse on their part and make good the loss suffered by the appellants-
HUDA.

21. A delay of 1942 days (4 years 6 months), in our view, is wholly
inordinate and the cause pleaded for its condonation is equally
unexplained by the appellants. In any case, the explanation given does
not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. It was, therefore, rightly not condoned by the High Court
and we concur with the finding of the High Court”

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 125 of 140

discussion as to the material particulars and without
being satisfied about the explanation with respect to
inordinate delay in filing appeal. It seems the learned
District Judge ignored to perceive that the Managing
Committee has suppressed to place the fact of
dismissal of petition under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC.

14.3. Having perused the petition under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, filed by the opposite party No.2
before the learned District Judge, Puri, it could be
ascertained that while admitting there was delay of
more than 25 years in preferring appeal, the reason for
the delay was given as:

“… Within this 25 years there was no occasion for the
Temple Administration to know about the ex parte
judgment passed in the above mentioned suit. …”

14.4. In the said petition there is no whisper about
dismissal of petition for restoration of suit filed under
Order IX, Rule 13, CPC in the year 2000. Such a fact
is narrated in the objection of the present petitioner.
Suppression of material fact by the opposite party
No.2 does liable for rejection of appeal itself. In this
regard it may be relevant to have regard to following
observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
the case of Smt. Badami Vrs. Bhali, (2012) 6 SCR 75:

“In the said case it was clearly stated that the courts of
law are meant for imparting justice between the parties
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 126 of 140
and one who comes to the court, must come with clean
hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood has
no right to approach the Court. A litigant who
approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the
documents executed by him which are relevant to the
litigation. If a vital document is withheld in order to gain
advantage on the other side he would be guilty of
playing fraud on court as well as on the opposite party.

***

In this regard we may profitably quote a statement by a
great thinker: “Fraud generally lights a candle for
justice to get a look at it; and rogue’s pen indites the
warrant for his own arrest.”

14.5. In Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. Vs.
Jagdeep Singh; AIR 2023 SC 2257, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:

“14. For filing the present frivolous appeal, in our
opinion, the Appellants deserve to be burdened
with heavy cost. This Court had deprecated the
conduct of the litigants in flooding this Court with
frivolous litigations, which are choking the dockets
as a result of which the matters, which require
consideration are delayed. Observations made in
Dynandeo Sabaji Naik and Ors. Vrs. Pradnya
Prakash Khadekar and Ors., (2017) 5 SCC 496
are extracted below:

‗13. This Court must view with disfavour any
attempt by a litigant to abuse the process.
The sanctity of the judicial process will be
seriously eroded if such attempts are not
dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 127 of 140
liberties with the truth or with the procedures
of the Court should be left in no doubt about
the consequences to follow. Others should
not venture along the same path in the hope
or on a misplaced expectation of judicial
leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and
even necessary, in order to ensure that in
litigation, as in the law which is practised in
our country, there is no premium on the truth.

14. Courts across the legal system-this Court not
being an exception– are choked with
litigation. Frivolous and groundless filings
constitute a serious menace to the
administration of justice. They consume time
and clog the infrastructure. Productive
resources which should be deployed in the
handling of genuine causes are dissipated in
attending to cases filed only to benefit from
delay, by prolonging dead issues and
pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can
have a vested interest in delay.

Unfortunately, as the present case
exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice
is misused by the unscrupulous to the
detriment of the legitimate. The present case
is an illustration of how a simple issue has
occupied the time of the courts and of how
successive applications have been filed to
prolong the inevitable. The person in whose
favour the balance of justice lies has in the
process been left in the lurch by repeated
attempts to revive a stale issue. This
tendency can be curbed only if courts across
the system adopt an institutional approach

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 128 of 140
which penalizes such behaviour. Liberal
access to justice does not mean access to
chaos and Indiscipline. A strong message
must be conveyed that courts of justice will
not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative
strategies designed to profit from the delays
of the law. Unless remedial action is taken
by all courts here and now our society will
breed a legal culture based on evasion
instead of abidance. It is the duty of every
court to firmly deal with such situations. The
imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary
instrument which has to be deployed to
weed out, as well as to prevent the filing of
frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts
can set apart time to resolve genuine causes
and answer the concerns of those who are in
need of justice. Imposition of real time costs
is also necessary to ensure that access to
courts is available to citizens with genuine
grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be
shut to legitimate causes simply by the
weight of undeserving cases which flood the
system. Such a situation cannot be allowed
to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a
matter of discretion but a duty and obligation
cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal
system is not exploited by those who use the
forms of the law to defeat or delay justice.

We commend all courts to deal with frivolous
filings in the same manner.”

14.6. In N. Mohan Vrs. R. Madhu, (2020) 20 SCC 302 (3-
Judge Bench) it is held as follows:

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 129 of 140

“15. The defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is
passed, has two options. First option is to file an
application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and
second option is to file an appeal under Section
96(2) CPC. The question to be considered is
whether the two options are to be exercised
simultaneously or can also be exercised
consecutively. An unscrupulous litigant may,
of course, firstly file an application under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC and carry the matter
up to the highest forum; thereafter may opt
to file appeal under Section 96(2) CPC
challenging the ex-parte decree. In that event,
considerable time would be lost for the plaintiff.
The question falling for consideration is that
whether the remedies provided as simultaneous
can be converted into consecutive remedies.

16. An appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory
right, the defendant cannot be deprived of the
statutory right merely on the ground that earlier,
the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC
was dismissed. Whether the defendant has
adopted dilatory tactics or where there is a lack of
bona fide in pursuing the remedy of appeal under
Section 96(2) of the Code, has to be considered
depending upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. In case the court is satisfied that the
defendant has adopted dilatory tactics or where
there is lack of bona fide, the court may decline to
condone the delay in filing the first appeal under
Section 96(2) CPC. But where the defendant has
been pursuing the remedy bona fide under Order
IX Rule 13 CPC, if the court refuses to condone the
delay in the time spent in pursuing the remedy

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 130 of 140
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the defendant would
be deprived of the statutory right of appeal.
Whether the defendant has adopted dilatory
tactics or where there is lack of bona fide in
pursuing the remedy of appeal under Section
96(2) of the Code after the dismissal of the
application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, is a
question of fact and the same has to be
considered depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.

17. When the defendant filed appeal under Section
96(2) CPC against an ex-parte decree and if the
said appeal has been dismissed, thereafter, the
defendant cannot file an application under Order
IX, Rule 13 CPC. This is because after the appeal
filed under Section 96(2) of the Code has been
dismissed, the original decree passed in the suit
merges with the decree of the appellate court.
Hence, after dismissal of the appeal filed under
Section 96(2) CPC, the appellant cannot fall back
upon the remedy under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC.”

14.7. The appellate Court while proceeding to hold that ―the
proceeding under Order IX, Rule 13 of CPC for default
was dismissed for non-prosecution still the appellant
(the opposite party No.2 herein) has a right to prefer
the present appeal‖, did not discuss the circumstances
which prevented the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing
Committee from approaching the Court since 2000.
This Court takes congnizance of the explanation
proffered by the learned counsel for the opposite party

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 131 of 140
No.2 by way of written note of argument filed on
18.12.2024, which is to the following effect:

“So far filing application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC
for setting aside the ex parte judgment vide
Miscellaneous Case No.103 of 1996 and not taking
steps in the said Miscellaneous Case resulting
dismissal was due to negligence of the respective staff
of the respective Department of Temple Administrator,
i.e., (Revenue) and by the time the fact came to the
knowledge of the Temple Administrator the respective
staff who were assigned with the Court work were
retired from service and died subsequently.”

14.8. This Court does not appreciate such a fact in absence
of any material being placed demonstrating whether
any step/action was contemplated to be taken or
taken by the opposite party No.2. Such a plea as
advanced by way of argument before this Court for the
first time is rejected.

14.9. Furthermore, this Court takes stern view on this point
inasmuch as there is no pleading contained in the
petition filed by the opposite party No.2 under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, with respect to dismissal
of Miscellaneous Case No.103 of 1996; nonetheless,
such a fact was for the first time surfaced on the
objection being filed by the petitioner before the
learned District Judge, Puri. Contents of paragraph 1
of the petition for condonation of delay in filing appeal
seems to be camouflaged one for the opposite party
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 132 of 140
No.2 has drafted the petition as if after judgment being
pronounced in TS No.191 of 1992 by the learned Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Puri on 21.06.1994, the
opposite party No.2 could come to know about such
judgment and decree on 10.09.2019. Having
suppressed the fact of dismissal of Miscellaneous Case
No.103 of 1996, for non-prosecution in the year 2000,
the conduct of the opposite party No.2 is tell-tale. The
merit of the appeal, if at all, could not have weighed
much for the purpose of consideration of petition for
condonation of delay in absence of sufficient cause
being shown for the inordinate delay.

14.10. At this juncture, it is apt to have reference to the
following observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar
Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 = 2024 INSC
932:

“7. There is one another aspect of the matter which
we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of
time, we have noticed that whenever there is a
plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance
of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to
be explained right from the time, the limitation
starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3
years or 4 years till the end of the same. For
example if the period of limitation is 90 days then
the party seeking condonation has to explain why
it was unable to institute the proceedings within

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 133 of 140
that period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to consider
what came in the way of the party that it was
unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th
day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until
the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But
when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must
establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before the limitation
expired it was not possible to file the appeal
within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute
such sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of
limitation which may further delay the filing of the
appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to
expire without the appeal being filed must be
traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh Vrs. State
of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 = AIR 1981 SC

733).”

14.11. This Court is satisfied that the learned District
Judge, Puri while condoning the delay vide Order
dated 07.02.2020 has failed to exercise his jurisdiction
appropriately. As has already been observed that the
objections raised by the petitioner against the contents
of the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 filed by the opposite party No.2-Shri Jagannath
Temple Managing Committee in RFA No.60 of 2019

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 134 of 140
have not been considered on facts in their right
earnest by the learned District Judge, Puri, this Court
having regard to above discussed legal approach set
forth by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, and
considering the aspect that the ex parte judgment and
decree are binding on the parties inter se having the
same effect as a regular judgment and decree, the
impugned Order dated 07.02.2020 condoning the
delay in filing appeal under Section 96 of the CPC
cannot be countenanced.

15. The learned District Judge, Puri in his Order dated
07.02.2020 has placed much emphasis on the
protection of properties of the deities, held to be
perpetual minor in view of Lokesh Patro Vrs.
Commissioner of Endowments, Odisha, 108 (2009) CLT

61. However, it has been observed in the said Order as
follows:

“*** In other words, the Managing Committee was the
marfatdar of the Temple and the property. Since Prabhu
Jagannath bije at Puri is a juristic perpetual minor and
disabled person and cannot protect properties of its
own and in that case the State Authorities and the
Managing Committee are under obligation to protect the
interest of such a minor or physically disabled person.
But in the suit filed by the present respondent No.1 the
reasons best known to the Temple Authority and the
State Authorities is as to how they allowed the present

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 135 of 140
respondent No.1 to obtain a decree in his favour ex
parte by not contesting the suit. ***”

15.1. It seems the learned appellate Court misconceived
such fact. The following provisions contained in the
Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955, are relevant for the
present purpose:

“4. Definitions.–

(1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context–

(a) “Committee” means the Shri Jagannath
Temple Managing Committee constituted
under this Act;

(d) “Record of Rights” means the Record of
Rights prepared under the Puri Shri
Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act (XIV
of 1952);

3. Delegation of powers to the Committee.–

The Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration)
Act, 1952 shall be deemed to be a part of this Act
and all or any the powers and the functions of the
State Government under the said Act shall be
exercisable by the Committee under this Act from
such date or dates as the State Government may
by notification direct.

5. Incorporation.–

Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the
time being in force or custom, usage or contract,
Sanad, deed or engagement, the administration
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 136 of 140
and the governance of the Temple and its
endowments shall vest in a Committee called the
Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee
constituted as such by the State Government, and
it shall have the rights and privileges in respect
thereof as provided in Section 33. It shall be a
body corporate, having perpetual succession
and a common seal, and may, be the said
name sue and be sued.

6. Constitution of the Committee.–

(1) The Committee constituted under Section 5 shall
consist of 18 members and shall be composed as
follows:

(a) the Raja of Puri who shall be the Chairman;

(b) an officer not below the rank of Additional Chief
Secretary, ex-officio member, who shall be the
Working Chairman;

(c) the Chief Administrator appointed under sub-

section (1) of section 19, ex-officio members, who
shall be the Secretary;

(d) the Collector of the District of Puri – ex officio
member;

(e) the Commissioner of Endowments appointed
under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments
Act, 1951 – ex officio member;

(f) the Additional Secretary, Law Department in-

charge of Shri Jagannath Temple Administration,
ex officio member;

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 137 of 140

(g) the Superintendent of Police, Puri- ex officio
member;

(h) the Superindending Archaeologist, Archaeological
Survey of India, Bhubaneswar Circle,
Bhubaneswar – ex officio member;

(i) one person to be nominated by the State
Government from among the persons entitled to sit
on the Muktimandap-member;

(j) Five persons to be nominated by the State
Government from among the sevaks of the Temple
members.

(k) one person representing the Maths and other
Institutions connected with the seva-puja or nitis
of the Temple or any Hindu religious/spiritual
organisation to be nominated by the State
Government member; and

(l) three persons (one of whom shall be Chartered
Accountant) from among the persons who do not
belong to any of the categories referred to in
clauses (j) and (k) – members:

Provided that the State Government shall nominate
persons for the categories referred to in clauses (i), (j)
and (k) out of a panel of names prepared by the Chief
Administrator for each such category which shall
consist of names twice the number of members required
to be nominated under the respective clauses.

(2) No person who does not profess the Hindu
religion, shall be eligible for membership.

(3) If the officers mentioned under clauses (b), (d), (e),

(f), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) do not profess the
C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 138 of 140
Hindu religion, and officer of the State/Central
Government of equivalent rank professing such
religion may be nominated by the State/Central
Government for the purpose.

(4) The appointment or nomination of the members
shall be notified in the Orissa Gazette.”

15.2. Such being position, it cannot be said that the minor’s
interest in the property was not protected in the suit
in view of unequivocal provisions contained in the Shri
Jagannath Temple Act, 19554. For the dereliction in
duty of the Managing Committee, a body corporate,
having perpetual succession and a common seal, and
in the said name it could sue and be sued, the
petitioner cannot be subject to rigmarole, that too the
Managing Committee has approached the Court after
lapse of more than 25 years. No suggestion even is
placed on record before the learned District Judge that
action was taken or contemplated to have been taken
against the erring officials/members of the Managing
Committee.

15.3. For the said reason also the Order dated 07.02.2020 of
the learned District Judge, Puri is held to be infirm
and untenable in the eye of law.

4 Vide Orissa Act No. 11 of 1955 (assented to by the President on 15th October,
1955)– an Act to provide for better administration and governance of Shri
Jagannath Temple at Puri and its endowments.

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 139 of 140

16. Under the above premises, the civil revision petition
succeeds and the Order dated 07.02.2020 condoning
inordinate delay in filing appeal under Section 96 of
the CPC in consideration of the petition under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, deserves to be set aside
as no plausible reason was ascribed which prevented
it to approach the Court within prescribed period and
suppressing the material fact. This Court does so.

17. Having thus set aside the impugned Order dated
07.02.2020, ex consequenti, the appeal preferred
under Section 96 of the CPC by the opposite party
No.2-Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee,
bearing RFA No.60 of 2019, before the learned District
Judge, Puri stands dismissed.

18. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed with
cost of Rs.25,000/- (rupees twenty five thousand only)
to be deposited by the opposite party No.2 within a
period of two weeks from today with the High Court
Bar Association Advocates’ Welfare Trust.

Signature Not (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
Verified JUDGE
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal
Assistant (Secretary-in-charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH
COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 24-Jan-2025 18:14:16

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 24th January, 2025//Aswini/MRS/Suchitra

C.R.P. No.3 of 2020 Page 140 of 140