Gauhati High Court
WP(C)/5993/2017 on 29 January, 2025
GAHC010142762017
2025:GAU-AS:967-DB
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
WP(C) NO.5993 OF 2017
Smt. R. Vanlalchami
D/ o- R. Laldanga (L),
R/ o- H.No.Y-2/ 8, Chhinga Veng, Aizawl
.......Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Mizoram, through the
Secretary to the Government of
Mizoram, Law & Judicial Department,
New Secretariat Complex, Aizawl.
2. The Gauhati High Court, through
the Registrar General, Gauhati High
Court, Guwahati- 781001.
3. The Registrar General, Gauhati
High Court, Guwahati - 781001.
4. The Registrar Vigilance cum in-
charge Recruitment Cell, Gauhati High
Court, Guwahati - 781001.
5. The Joint Registrar (Vigilance),
Gauhati High Court, Guwahati
6. Sh. Lalbiakzama,
Presently serving as Addl. District &
Sessions Judge, Kolasib, Mizoram.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 1 of 23
7. Dr. HTC Lalrinchhana,
Presently serving as Judge, Fast Track
Court, Siaha, Lunglei Judicial District,
Mizoram.
8. Sh. R. Vanlalena,
Presently serving as Addl. District &
Sessions Judge, Aizawl, Aizawl Judicial
District, Mizoram.
.......Respondents
-BEFORE-
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VIJAY BISHNOI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner : Mr. S. Dutta, Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr. S. Choudhury, learned
counsel, and Mr. R. Medhi, learned
counsel.
For the Respondents : Ms. P. Bhattacharya, Additional
Advocate General, Mizoram.
: Mr. T.J. Mahanta, Senior Advocate
& Standing Counsel, Gauhati High
Court.
Date of Hearing : 21.01.2025.
Date of Judgment : 29.01.2025.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(Kaushik Goswami, J)
Heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr. S. Choudhury and Mr. R. Medhi, learned
Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. T.J. Mahanta,
learned Senior Advocate and Standing Counsel, Gauhati
High Court appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 2 of 23
and Ms. P. Bhattacharya, learned Additional Advocate
General, Mizoram, appearing for the respondent No.1.
2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner is
assailing inter-alia the notification dated 06.09.2013,
whereby the Joint Registrar (Vigilance) Gauhati High Court
imposed the punishment of stoppage of 2(two) increments
with cumulative effect on the petitioner.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows: –
The petitioner is serving in the Mizoram Judicial
Service, Grade-I I and is presently holding the post of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Aizawl. I n the year 2012, when the
petitioner was holding the post of Senior Civil Judge cum
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lunglei, Mizoram, she was placed
under suspension vide notification dated 10.08.2012.
Thereafter an enquiry was held against the petitioner
wherein she was exonerated from all the charges,
however, the Gauhati High Court, i.e. the Disciplinary
Authority, having disagreed with the findings of the
Enquiry Officer, by order dated 06.09.2013, awarded the
said punishment. Aggrieved by the same, the present
petition has been filed.
4. Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner submits that the Enquiry Officer having
exonerated the petitioner of all the charges, the imposition
of the punishment vide the impugned order warrants
interference from this Court. He further submits that the
petitioner, while holding the post of Senior Civil Judge, was
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 3 of 23
also taking care of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate
and Judicial Officer-I in the District Court, and therefore,
being overloaded with work, there has been delay in
disposing of the cases reserved for orders and, therefore,
the charge of delay in disposing of cases by the petitioner
is not intentional and therefore the said charge is not
established. He further submits that as regards the charge
of passing judgment in Money Suit No. 40/ 2006 on the
basis of the draft judgment furnished by the counsel has
not been proved and the petitioner has also been
exonerated from the said charge by the Enquiry Officer,
and therefore, the finding of the Disciplinary Authority
holding the petitioner guilty of the said charge is totally
perverse. He further submits that the findings of the
Disciplinary Authority that the petitioner’s admission that
she had taken the copy of the plaint in a pen drive from
the plaintiff’s counsel cannot be the basis for awarding the
impugned penalty in as much as the same is not the
alleged charge in the memorandum of Charge-sheet.
5. Per contra, Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Senior
Advocate and Standing Counsel, Gauhati High Court, for
the respondents submits that there being sufficient
material available before the Disciplinary Authority which
clearly establishes that the petitioner had not maintained
integrity and conducted herself contrary to the dignity of
the office she holds, the impugned penalty order warrants
no interference from this Court.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 4 of 23
6. We have given our prudent consideration to the
argument made by the learned counsel appearing for the
contesting parties, perused the material available on record
and have also considered the case laws cited at the bar.
7. The issue arising for determination in this writ
petition is the legality and validity of the penalty order
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority against the
petitioner.
8. I t is well settled that the extent of judicial review
with regard to findings of Disciplinary Authority is limited
and it is not the sufficiency of evidence or the decision
itself but review of the decision making process only. The
Constitutional Court may interfere when the Disciplinary
Authority has acted in a manner inconsistent with the rules
of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules providing
the procedure of such enquiry, or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the Disciplinary Authority is either based
on no evidence or the same is against the principles of
Wednesbury reasonableness. However, if the findings of
the Disciplinary Authority are based on evidence, the Court
shall not reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own
finding. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of
the Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union
of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749. Paragraph 12 &
13 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder for
ready reference:-
” 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision isWrit petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 5 of 23
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of
misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held
by a competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence
Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority
accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have
ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with
the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so
as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary
inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted
to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of
India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion upon consideration evidence reached by
the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers fromWrit petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 6 of 23
patent error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
9. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, let us
now turn to the facts of the instant case. The charges
levelled against the petitioner are extracted hereunder:-
“ARTICLE NO. 1
That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, have
passed judgment in Money Suit No. 40/2006 (Rinpuli Vs.
State of Mizoram) and there are reasonable materials to
show that you have passed the judgment on the basis of
the draft judgment furnished by lawyer.
The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of
judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in
a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the
provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service
Rules, 2006 read with appendix ‘A’ of the said Rules and
Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
You, are therefore, charged accordingly.
ARTICLE NO. 2
That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl,
Mizoram had heard Title Suit 03/1987 (Shri
Lalthianghlima Vs State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 27-11-
2009 and the judgment was reserved which was shown
to have been delivered on 24-02-2011, i.e. after 1(one)
years 2(two) months and 27 (twenty seven) days. The
final order does not reflect that the parties were present.
The cause list dated 24-02-2011 also does not reflect that
the suit is posted for judgment on 24-02-2011. Such
inordinate delay in passing the judgment and that too
behind the back of the parties exhibits that the case was
not disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required
under the law.
The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of
judicial power and improper conduct, You, thus, acted in
a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the
provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service
Rules, 2006 read with appendix ‘A’ of the said Rules and
Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
You are therefore, charged accordingly.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 7 of 23
ARTICLE NO. 3
That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl,
Mizoram had heard Title Suit No. 2(A)/1996 (Shri
Thanthuana Vs. State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 08-03-
2010, and the judgment was reserved which was shown
to have been delivered on 24-02-2011 i.e. after 11(eleven)
months and 16 (Sixteen) days. The cause list dated 24 –
02-2011 also does not reflect that the said suit was
posted on 24-02-2011 for judgment.
Such inordinate delay in passing judgment and
that too behind the back of the parties and without
exhibiting fairness from the court of law, as required,
gives reasonable ground to believe that the case was not
disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required
under the law.
The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of
judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in
a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the
provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service
Rules, 2006 read with appendix ‘A’ of the said Rules and
Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964.
You, are therefore, charged accordingly.
ARTICLE NO.4
That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl,
Mizoram had heard Title Suit No. 24/1988 (Shri
Tinchawia Vs. State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 05-10- 2010
and the Judgment was reserved which was shown to
have been pronounced in the open court on 25-02-2011,
i.e. after more than 4 months 20 days from the date of
argument. The cause list dated 25-02-2011 also does not
reflect that the suit is posted for judgment on 25.02.2011.
Such delay in passing the judgment and that too
behind the back of the parties suggests that case was not
disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required
under the law.
The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of
judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in
a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the
provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial ServiceWrit petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 8 of 23
Rules, 2006 read with appendix ‘A’ of the said Rules and
Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
You, are therefore, charged accordingly.”
10. Thereafter, an enquiry was held by the
Disciplinary Authority by appointing an Enquiry Officer,
wherein the Enquiry Officer, after holding enquiry,
submitted his report on 30.04.2013 exonerating the
petitioner from all the charges. However, the Disciplinary
Authority upon careful consideration of the Enquiry Report,
decided not to accept the same and accordingly, issued
show-cause notice to the petitioner with a note of
disagreement on the Enquiry Report along with a
photocopy of the Enquiry Report. Against the aforesaid
show-cause notice, the petitioner filed representation on
10.06.2013. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering
the aforesaid representation and all the other materials,
awarded the punishment of stoppage of 2(two) increments
with cumulative effect on the petitioner.
11. I t appears that essentially the charges are, firstly
that the petitioner had passed judgment in Money Suit No.
40/ 2006 on the basis of the draft judgment furnished by
the counsel and secondly, in Title Suit No. 3/ 1987, Title
Suit No. 2(A)/ 1996 and Title Suit No. 24/ 1998, the
judgment was delivered after inordinate delay from the
date of reserving the same and, that too, in the absence of
the parties on dates when the cases were not listed in the
cause list for pronouncement of judgment.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 9 of 23
12. As regards the first charge of accepting the draft
judgment from the plaintiff’s counsel in the case in
question, it appears from the statement of the petitioner
before the Enquiry Officer that she has admitted that in
Money Suit No. 40/ 2006, she had requested the plaintiff’s
counsel to provide the soft copy of the plaint and that the
counsel accordingly provided the same in her pen drive.
The relevant portion of the statement of the petitioner
before the Enquiry Officer is extracted hereunder for ready
reference:-
“The charge that I had passed the judgment in Money
Suit no.40/2006 (Rinpuii Vs. State of Mizoram) on the
basis of the draft judgment furnished by lawyer is
completely false. I had drafted the judgment and order in
the Money Suit no.40/2006. Instead of typing the entire
plaint, I had requested the plaintiff’s counsel to provide
the soft copy of the plaint and he provided the same to
me in my pendrive. As the defendants did not submit the
written statement I could not take the same from the
Government Advocate. As I do not have any Personal
Assistant (PA) it was not possible for me to dictate the
judgment in the office. Further, at the relevant time I was
holding different posts and handling many cases and
also dealing with Police and excise papers, hence I could
not write the judgment in my office. Convenience sake I
had copied the plaint and pasted in the judgment and
order prepared by me. After it was ready, I gave the soft
copy to the peshkar and the same was printed out in the
office. I did not violate any of the provisions of Rule 30(A)
of Mizoram Judicial Service Rules, 2009 read with
Appendix ‘A’ and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Service
(Conduct) Rule, 1964.”
13. It is thus apparent that the petitioner has
admitted the factum of requesting for the soft copy of the
plaint from the plaintiff’s counsel which was also provided
and she had copied the plaint and pasted the same in the
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 10 of 23
judgment and order prepared by her. I t is further evident
from the aforesaid statement that after the argument was
closed the petitioner accepted the soft copy of the plaint in
her pen drive in the absence of the other side. I t further
appears that the concerned counsel of the plaintiff, who
was brought in as a defence witness, also admitted in his
statement that he had provided the soft copy of the plaint
as per the request of the petitioner. I t appears that though
the Enquiry Officer had exonerated the petitioner of the
aforesaid charge, however, the Disciplinary Authority was
of the opinion that such ex-parte communication by the
petitioner amounts to gross improper conduct and
unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and accordingly, disagreed
with the view of the Enquiry Officer.
14. Apt at this juncture to refer to the grounds of
disagreement of the Disciplinary Authority which is
extracted hereunder for ready reference:-
“Grounds for disagreement in respect of Article No. 1
It is provided in Rule 3(iv) of Appendix ‘A’, (Rule 30(A) to
the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules 2006, that –
‘A Judge shall not initiate, permit or consider ex-parte
communications made to the Judge concerning a pending or
impending proceedings, without the presence of the parties’.
Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
provides that –
‘(1) Every Government servant shall at all times,
(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(ii) maintain devotion to duty; and
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.’
Here in this case, it is an admitted position that
Advocate for the plaintiff, Shri Sam Joseph had furnishedWrit petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 11 of 23
soft copy and the hard copy of the plaint to the Charged
Officer in the Money Suit No. 40/2006, and the Charged
Officer had explained that for the sake of convenience she
had copied the plaint in pen drive and pasted it in the
judgment and order prepared by her. Though Shri Sam
Joseph, Advocate for the Plaintiff, denied furnishing draft
copy of the judgment to the Charged Officer in his evidence
and the Charged Officer also denied accepting any draft
judgment and consequently the Enquiry Officer held that
Article No. 1 of the charge not proved, yet, what eschewed
from consideration of the Enquiry Officer is that accepting
hard copy and soft copy in the plaint in pen drive, in
absence of the other party to the proceeding, is also not
permissible under the Rules. In the case in hand, there is
nothing on record to show that the other party to the said
proceeding was present during such communication made
by the lawyer for the Plaintiff. Permitting such ex-parte
communication by the Charged Officer amounts to gross
improper conduct and unbecoming of a judicial officer,
which ex-facie shows contravention of the aforesaid Rules.
Having assessed the materials on record objectively and
dispassionately, this Committee is unable to record
concurrence with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in
Article No.1.”
15. As regards the second charge pertaining to delay
in delivering judgments in the Title Suits in question, the
petitioner explained the reasons in her statement before
the Enquiry Officer which is extracted hereunder:-
“Regarding the charges that I heard the Title Suit
No.3/1987 (Shri Lalthianghlima Vs. State of Mizoram and
ors) on 27.11.2009 and the judgment was reserved
which was shown to have been delivered on 24.2.2011,
i.e. after 1(one) year 2(two) months and 27 days.
Likewise I heard the Title suit No. 2(A)/1996 (Shri
Thanthuama Vs. State of Mizoram and ors) on 8.3.2010
and the judgment was reserved which was show to have
been delivered on 24.2.2011, i.e. 11(eleven) months and
16 (sixteen) days. And that I heard the Title suit
No.24/1998 (Shri Tinchawia Vs. State of Mizoram and
ors) on 5.10.2010 and the judgment was reserved which
was shown to have been pronounced in the open court on
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 12 of 23
25.2.11, i.e. after more than 4 months and 20 days, I
would like to state that in the three cases after hearing
the arguments from the counsel for the plaintiff as well as
Government Advocate (Government Advocates includes
Additional Government Advocate/Assistant Government
Advocates), due to heavy load of work in the office it was
not possible for me to dictate my judgment myself in my
laptop/computer at home. When the judgments and
orders were ready in the above mentioned case, as per
the usual practice, I had informed the counsels for the
parties. I pronounced the judgment in all the three cases
in the presence of the counsel for the plaintiffs as well as
the Government Advocate or the AGA. I have not
pronounced the judgment and orders behind the back of
the parties. None of the parties ever complained to any
one that I had delivered the judgment behind the back of
the parties and none of witnesses produced by the
Reporting Officer prove that I had delivered the judgment
behind the back of the parties. In fact I will produce the
counsels who represented the parties in the above
mentioned cases and they can prove that I had acted
fairly in delivering the said judgments in the presence of
the counsels for both sides.
As regard not mentioned in the cause list, I would like to
state that the cause lists are prepared by the Peshkars.
As the case record was taken by me for preparing
judgment and Order, it was not possible for them to know
on the day they prepared the cause list. But I had
informed the counsels that the judgment was ready and
all the judgments were pronounced/delivered in the open
court in the presence of the counsels representing the
parties.”
16. Though the Enquiry Officer exonerated the
petitioner from the aforesaid charge of delay in
pronouncement of judgment after reserving the same, the
Disciplinary Authority, after taking note of Order XX Rule 1
of the Civil Procedure Code and the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar, reported
in (2001) 7 SCC 318, was unable to accept the version of
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 13 of 23
the petitioner that due to heavy workload she could not
pronounce judgments in time in the cases in question.
17. Apt at this juncture to refer to the grounds of
disagreement of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the
second charge which is extracted hereunder for ready
reference:-
“Grounds of disagreement in respect of Article Nos, 2, 3 and 4
Order XX Rule-1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that-
‘The court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment
in an open court, either at once, or as soon as may be practicable
and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the
court shall fix a date for that purpose, of which due notice shall be
given to the parties or their pleaders.’
Proviso to the Rule 1 provides that if judgment is
not pronounced at once, it shall be pronounced within 30
days from the date of hearing argument and if it is not
practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances of the case, it shall be
pronounced within 60 days of hearing argument after
giving due notice to the parties.
Pronouncement of judgment within the stipulated
period is emphasized in catena of decisions by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar,
(2001) 7 SCC 318, in paragraph 9 of the judgment it has
been held that-
‘The pronouncement of the judgment is a part of the justice
dispensation system; it has to be without delay. In a country like
ours where people consider the Judges only second to God, effort to
be made to strengthen that belief of the common people. Delay in
disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows,
sometimes genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the
confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come
when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature,
respect and regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the
fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary
cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of
the law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be
made to come up to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy,
untainted and unpolluted justice.’
It is also held that-
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 14 of 23
‘Unexplained long interval between conclusion of arguments
and delivery of judgment shakes the confidence of the people in the
judicial system and affects the rights of the parties under Article 21
of the constitution of India.’
Keeping the above legal position as well as the
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in mind, if the
finding of the Enquiry Officer in Article No. 2, 3 and 4 is
analyzed, then one would find that the reasons assigned
for exonerating the Charged Officer are unacceptable.
Without verifying the statement of pendency in the court
of the Charged Officer and the workload of the additional
posts held by the Charged Officer at the relevant point of
time, without specifying the actual number of cases
pending in her court, simply believing the version of the
Charged Officer and the witnesses that due to heavy
workload, she could not pronounce judgments in the Title
Suit No. 2(A). 1996 for 11 months and 16 days, and in
the Title Suit No. 3/1987 for 01 year 02 months and 27
days and in the Title Suit No. 24/1998 for 04 months 20
days, cannot be accepted. The inputs received from the
Registry do not show that the pendency position was
very high so as to brand it as heavy work load. Thus,
there is no foundation of the facts to support the view
taken by the Enquiry Officer. Rather lack of diligence on
the part of the Charged Officer is apparent on the face of
the record.
Besides, there is dearth of materials to show that
due notice was ever given to the parties about the dates
on which the judgment of the aforesaid cases are to be
pronounced, as mandated by Rule 1 of Order XX of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This fact is apparent from the
Cause List and the order sheet. This being the position,
the version of the defense witnesses, upon whom the
Enquiry Officer relied on, cannot be accepted and the
finding so recorded by the Enquiry Officer is without any
factual basis.
Rule 3(vii) of the Appendix-A (Rule 30(A) of the
Mizoram Judicial Service Rules 2006, provides that a
judge shall dispose of all judicial matters speedily,
effectively and fairly. The Charged Officer failed to
pronounce judgments in the aforementioned three cases
within the period prescribed in Rule-1 of Order XX of the
Civil Procedure Code, and she pronounced the judgments
several months later, in contravention of the mandate of
the Rule 1 of Order XX of the Civil Procedure Code. This
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 15 of 23
reflects violation of the aforesaid Rules by the Charged
Officer, which amounts to gross negligence and abuse of
judicial power and also improper conduct on the part of
the Charged Officer. The committee is therefore unable to
agree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and
accordingly this Disagreement Note is recorded.”
18. Apt to refer to Rule 30 of the Mizoram Judicial
Service Rules, 2006, (hereinafter referred to as “Rules,
2006”) which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:-
“30. Conduct: A Judicial Officer appointed under these
rules shall be required to maintain the absolute integrity
and conduct himself in conformity with the dignity of the
office he holds. He should follow the Code of Conduct as
provided in Appendix-A to these rules.
(A) Disqualification: (1) A Judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which the Judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including,
but not limited to instances where;
(a) The Judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding:
(b) The Judge served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or lawyer with whom the judge previously
practiced law, served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge has been a
material witness concerning it;
(c) The Judge knows that he or she, individually or a
fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse, parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge’s family
residing in the judge’s household, has an economic
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding or has any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) The judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person within
the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person;
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or
trustee of a party;
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 16 of 23
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
(2) The rules governing and regulating the conduct of
State Civil Service Officers shall, in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the rules in this chapter, shall apply to
the members of the service.
(B) Disciplinary Authority: (1) The members of the service
shall be under the disciplinary control of the High Court
and the disciplinary proceeding if and when necessity
arise may be drawn up against the member of the
Service in accordance with the provisions of the rules
followed by the Gauhati High Court. Notwithstanding
anything contained in this rule, penalty of dismissal or
removal from Service and reduction in rank in respect of
any member of the Service shall be imposed by the
Governor only on the recommendation of the High Court.
(2) No disciplinary proceeding shall be initiated against
any member of the service except by the High Court.”
19. A perusal of the aforesaid Rules, 2006 indicates
that a Judicial Officer is required to maintain absolute
integrity and conduct in conformity with dignity of the
office he/ she holds. I t is the further mandate of law that a
Judicial Officer should follow the code of conduct as
provided in Appendix-A to this Rules. Relevant portion of
the Appendix-A is extracted hereunder for ready
reference:-
“APPENDIX-A
(see rule 30)
(1). Should uphold the Integrity and Independence of
Judiciary –
An independent and honourable judiciary is
indispensable to administer justice in our society. A judge
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 17 of 23
should participate in establishing, maintaining and
enforcing and should personally observe high standards
of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved. A Judge shall always be
aware that the judicial system is for the benefit of the
litigant and the public, and not the judiciary. The
provisions of this chapter should be construed and
applied to further these objectives.
(2). Should avoid Impropriety-
(i) Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct by Judges. A Judge
must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety. A Judge must expect to be the subject of
constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.
(ii) A judge shall respect and observe the law. At
all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. Without regard to a person’s race, gender
or other protected personal characteristics, a judge
should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and
respect.
(iii) A Judge shall not allow family, social or other
relationships to influence his judicial conduct or
judgement. A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial
office to advance his private interests or those of others.
A Judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge. A judge shall not appear as a character
witness in a Court proceeding unless subpoenaed.
(iv) A judge shall not allow activity as a member of
an organization to cast doubt on the judge’s ability to
perform the function of the office in a manner consistent
with the code of judicial conduct and the laws of the
State. A judge shall not hold membership of an
organization protected personal characteristics. Nothing
in this paragraph should be interpreted to diminish a
judge’s right to free exercise of religion.
(3) Performance of duties impartially and diligently-
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 18 of 23
(i) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it. A Judge should be
unswayed by partisan interest, public clamour, or fear of
criticism.
(ii) A judge may require lawyers, court personnel, and
litigants to be appropriately attired for Court and should
maintain reasonable rules of conduct, order and decorum
in the Courtroom.
(iii) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in official capacity, and should require
similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, Court officials,
and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.
(iv) A judge shall not initiate, permit or consider ex-parte
communications made to the judge outside the presence
of the parties concerning a pending or impending
proceeding.
(v) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the
judge except those in which disqualification is required.
(vi) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, and shall not permit staff, Court officials and
others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do
so.
(vii) A judge shall dispose of all Judicial Matters
speedily, effectively and fairly.
(viii) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or
impending in any Court, make any public comment that
might reasonably be expected to effects its outcome or
impair its fairness or make any non-public comment that
might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.
The Judge shall require similar abstention on the part of
Court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and
control. This clause does not prohibit judges from making
public statements in the course of their official duties or
from explaining for public information the procedures of
the Court. This clause does not apply to proceedings in
which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
(ix) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising,
recording or taking photographs in or out of the courtroom
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 19 of 23
during session of court or recess between sessions except
as authorized by the High Court.
(x) (a) A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a
case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary
waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but the judge
should bear in mind that undue interference, impatience,
or participation in the examination of witness, or severe
attitude on the judge’s part toward witness, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual
circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of truth in
respect thereto.
(b) Conversation between the judge and counsel in
Court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies that apt to obscure the
merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to unjust
disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants or witness,
the judge should avoid a controversial manner or tone.
(c) A judge shall avoid interruptions of counsel in
their arguments except to clarify their positions, and
should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of
learning or premature judgment.
(xi) A judge shall adopt the usual and accepted methods
of doing justice; avoid the imposition of humiliating acts
or discipline, not authorized by law in sentencing and
endeavour to conform to a reasonable standard of
punishment and not seek popularity or publicity either by
exceptional severity or undue leniency.
(xii) A judge shall be punctual in attending court and do
judicial work during Court hours. He shall ensure
punctuality of the staff and Court officials.
(xiii) A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in
judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of
the administrative responsibilities of other judges and
Court officials.
(xiv) A judge should take or initiate appropriate
measures as admissible under law against a judge or
lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may become aware.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 20 of 23
(xv) A judge should not cause unnecessary expense by
making appointments. All appointments shall be based
upon merit.
(xvi) A judge should not approve compensation beyond
the fair value of services rendered.
(4) Extra Judicial and quasi-judicial activities-
……………….”
20. I t is evident from the above extracted Appendix-A
to the Rules, 2006 that it is imperative for a Judicial Officer
to uphold the integrity and independence of judiciary to
avoid impropriety and to perform the duties impartially and
diligently.
21. I n the present case, it appears that the petitioner
has accepted that she had entered into ex-parte
communication with the plaintiff’s counsel in the case in
question. The aforesaid ex-parte communication in relation
to a pending case is totally improper and undignified of a
Judicial Officer and such conduct totally shakes the public
confidence in the integrity and independence of the
judiciary. Therefore, such conduct of the petitioner is
irresponsible, improper and bias. Further, under Clause-3
(iv) of Appendix-A, it is mandatory for the petitioner as a
Judicial Officer not to initiate, permit or consider ex-parte
communications in the absence of the opposite party in a
pending proceeding. Since the Disciplinary Authority,
having taken note of the aforesaid evidence and the
provision of law has held that the first charge is made out
against the petitioner, we do not find any infirmity with the
said findings of the Disciplinary Authority.
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 21 of 23
22. As regards the second charge of inordinate delay
in pronouncing judgment after reserving the same, that too
in the Court when the same is not notified in the Cause List
for pronouncement of judgment, the petitioner in her
defence, in a very casual manner, has stated that due to
heavy workload she could not pronounce the judgments in
the cases in question within a reasonable time. Delay in
delivering judgment after reserving the same is a serious
issue in the context of the judicial scenario today. Such
casual explanation of the petitioner on the face of it does
not inspire confidence in the integrity, independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. On the contrary, inordinate
delays in delivering judgments after reserving the same is
not a desirable and proper conduct of a Judicial Officer and
it tarnishes the faith and confidence of the judiciary in the
eye of the public. I t is observed that the Disciplinary
Authority has already taken note of the evidence and
relevant provision of law in this regard. Accordingly, we do
not find any infirmity with the said findings of the
Disciplinary Authority.
23. I t further appears that the Disciplinary Authority
has observed the principles of natural justice before issuing
the impugned penalty order.
24. I n view of the above, we are of the considered
opinion that the impugned order dated 06.09.2013
whereby penalty of stoppage of 2(two) increments with
cumulative effect was imposed on the petitioner is valid. As
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 22 of 23
regards the penalty imposed is concerned, the same does
not appear to us to be disproportionate to the gravamen of
the charges. Hence, the writ petition fails.
25. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. No
order as to costs.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
Writ petition (civil) No.5993/2017 Page 23 of 23
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