Sri N Sanjay Ips vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 30 January, 2025

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Sri N Sanjay Ips vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 30 January, 2025

Author: K. Sreenivasa Reddy

Bench: K. Sreenivasa Reddy

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

          CRIMINAL PETITION No. 58 OF 2025

ORDER :

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short,

„BNSS‟), is filed by petitioner/A.1, seeking anticipatory

bail in connection with FIR No.05/RCO-CIU-ACB of

2024, dated 24.12.2024 registered by the ACB, CIU,

Andhra Pradesh for the offences punishable under

Sections 409, 420, 477A read with 120B of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (for short, „IPC‟) and 13 (1) (a) read

with 13 (2) and 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 as amended in 2018 (for short, „the PC Act‟).

2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, CIU,

ACB, Vijayawada prepared an occurrence report dated

24.12.2024, and based on the factual aspects mentioned

therein and on the orders of the Director General of ACB,

AP, Vijayawada dated 24.12.2024, the aforesaid crime

came to be registered against the petitioner herein and

others.

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3. The Chief Secretary to the Government of

Andhra Pradesh forwarded Memo No.2592927/SC.D/

A1/2024-3, dated 03.12.2024 of General Administration

(SC-D) Department to the Director General of ACB along

with detailed enquiry reports of the Vigilance and

Enforcement Department bearing No.62 (C.No.4828/

V&E/Sec.II/D1/2024), dated 18.10.2024 and No.63

(C.No.4828/V&E/Sec-II/D1/2024) dated 30.10.2024

submitted by the Director General, Vigilance &

Enforcement vide letters dated 18.10.2024 and

30.10.2024 respectively, to the Government, regarding

certain allegations against petitioner, who worked as the

Director General, A.P. State Disaster Response and Fire

Services and the Additional Director General, Crime

Investigation Department, with a request to conduct

enquiry into the allegations of misappropriation of funds

by him. Thereafter, the Director General, ACB addressed

a letter dated 12.12.2024 to the Chief Secretary to the

Government to accord permission under Section 17A of

the PC Act to conduct a regular enquiry/investigation
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into the allegations against him. Pursuant to the same,

the Government accorded permission Vide Memo

No.2592927/SC.D/A1/2024, dated 20.12.2024 of

General Administration (SC-D) Department according

permission as required under Section 17A of the PC Act.

4. Thereafter, on the instructions of the Director

General of ACB, vide Memo dated 24.12.2024, to register

a RCO case and to investigate into the allegations

against the petitioner and on perusal of the aforesaid

Vigilance reports, the Deputy Superintendent of Police,

CIU, ACB, Vijayawada registered the present case

against the petitioner herein and others.

5. Occurrence Report dated 24.12.2024 has

been enclosed along with the First Information Report.

In the Occurrence Report, the observations and findings

of the Vigilance and Enforcement Department in the

enquiry reports No.62 (C.No.4828/V&E/Sec.II/

D1/2024), dated 18.10.2024 and No.63 (C.No.4828/V&E

/ Sec-II/D1/2024) dated 30.10.2024, are mentioned.
4

6. The observations and findings in enquiry

report of the Vigilance and Enforcement Department

No.62 (C.No.4828/V&E/Sec.II/ D1/2024), dated

18.10.2024, as mentioned in the Occurrence Report, are

as under:

(a) The petitioner/A.1, during his tenure as the

Director General of A.P. State Disaster Response and

Fire Services(APSDRFS), manipulated tender processes

for awarding contract work of Development and

Maintenance of AGNI-NOC (Automated Governance &

NOC integration) Web Portal, Mobile App and supply of

hardware, to M/s. Sauthrika Technologies & Infra

Private Limited (Accused No.2), in violation of the

procedures in vogue and dishonestly and fraudulently

facilitated payment of Rs.59,93,000/- to the said firm on

22.02.2023 i.e. within one week after entering into

agreement on 15.02.2023, though there was no much

progress in the development of AGNI-NOC portal. It is

further alleged that on the same day i.e. on 22.02.2023,

A.2 firm claimed Rs.26,00,000/- more, towards 50%
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development of AGNI Portal and Mobile App, and the

Technical Committee constituted by successor of

petitioner/A.1 on 20.04.2023 for assessing progress of

work, evaluated that A.2 firm executed only 14% of the

work till such date, and thereby the petitioner/A.1 acted

in haste, abused his power, breached the trust reposed

in him as a Public Servant and his acts caused

misappropriation of Government funds.

(b) It is further alleged that petitioner/A.1, while

working as D.G. of APSDRFS, procured 10 laptops from

the said firm viz. Accused No.2, at an exorbitant price of

Rs.17,89,784/- i.e. Rs.1,78,978/- per each laptop,

without calling for any tenders through e-procurement,

without submitting bills, besides not obtaining any

competitive quotations from different vendors or firms in

violation of G.O.Ms.No.258, Finance (TFR) Department,

dated 20.09.2013 which envisages that materials/stores

costing more than Rs.1.00 lakh shall be procured

through e-platform only.

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(c) It is further alleged that the petitioner/A.1, while

working as the D.G., APSDRFS, had not properly

monitored progress of AGNI NOC Portal, leading to

delays and incomplete work, and by the time of

constitution of the Committee by his successor to

monitor the project, significant damage had already

caused due to lack of early oversight, and that no formal

reviews or assessments were conducted to evaluate the

progress of the work allowing Accused No.2 to submit

exaggerated progress reports without any checks or

balances. It is further alleged that while working as

such, petitioner/A.1 abused his position to expedite

release of funds to Accused No.2 without proper

authorization or verification of work progress, inspite of

concerns raised by some department officials about the

lack of progress and thereby he contravened financial

protocols which require verification of work before funds

can be disbursed.

7. The observations and findings in enquiry

report of the Vigilance and Enforcement Department
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No.63 (C.No.4828/V&E / Sec-II/D1/2024) dated

30.10.2024, as mentioned in the Occurrence Report, are

as under:

The petitioner/A.1, while working as Additional

Director General of CID in the year 2023, connived with

others and manipulated tender processes for awarding

contract work of conducting Awareness Meetings/

Workshops for SCs/STs on the SCs/STs (PoA) Act to

M/s. Kritvyap Technologies Private Limited (Accused

No.3) which was not existent and was not found in the

address i.e. Flat No.601, Lalithanjali Apartment,

Dwarakapuri Colony, Hyderabad, and though the said

firm was not at all involved in conducting the awareness

meetings/workshops for SCs/ STs, which were in realty

conducted by the officials of Regional CID offices,

petitioner/A.1 facilitated payment of Rs.1,19,03,600/- to

Accused No.3 dishonestly and fraudulently, causing

misappropriation of government funds. It is further

alleged that pre-qualification criterion for participating

bidders was not verified properly during the process and
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Accused No.2 was being operated at the address where

Accused No.3 company is ought to be operated and thus

the Accused Nos. 2 and 3 are one and the same. It is

further alleged that Awareness Programmes were shown

to be conducted on 27.01.2024, 28.01.2024 and

29.01.2024, even before entering of agreement with

Accused No.3 on 30.01.2024, and petitioner/A.1

sanctioned an amount of Rs.59,52,500/- and

Rs.59,51,100/- respectively towards SCs & STs

Awareness Workshops on the same date of the

agreement on 30.01.2024. It is further alleged that only

Rs.3,10,000/- was incurred against the agreement value

of Rs.1,19,03,600/- which indicates gross embezzlement

of government funds to a tune of Rs.1,15,93,600/-.

8. It is, therefore, alleged that the petitioner/A.1,

during his tenure as the Director General of APSDRFS,

actively connived with others in manipulating tender

processes for awarding contract work of Development

and Maintenance of AGNI-NOC (Automated Governance

& NOC integration) Web Portal, Mobile App and supply of
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hardware, to Accused No.2, in violation of the procedures

in vogue, leading to misappropriation of government

funds to a tune of Rs.59,93,000/-; that the

petitioner/A.1, while working as Additional Director

General, CID, awarded the contract of conducting

Awareness Meetings/ Workshops for SCs/STs on the

SCs/STs (PoA) Act to Accused No.3, which was non-

existent company, by showing undue favour to the firms

of his choice, leading to misappropriation of government

funds to a tune of Rs.1,15,93,600/-, and resorted to

corrupt and illegal means not adhering to the procedures

in vogue, and showed nonfeasance in initiating action

against Accused No.2 though they failed to show much

progress in development of AGNI-NOC portal and inspite

of facilitating payments to the said firm, causing

wrongful gain to others and loss to the government

exchequer, which tantamount to criminal misconduct,

criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and

criminal conspiracy, and in the capacity of being a public

servant, entrusted with public property and having
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domain over the same, committed breach of trust,

attracting the offences alleged.

9. Heard the learned senior counsel Sri

S.Sriram, appearing for Sri S.Dushyanth Reddy, learned

counsel for the petitioner, assisted by the learned

counsel Sri Sai Saran Chodisetty and the learned

Advocate General appearing for the respondent-State.

10. The learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the petitioner submitted that the present

complaint has been filed after lapse of one year and ten

months and there is absolutely no explanation

whatsoever for launching the prosecution with abnormal

delay; that the alleged payments were made in the month

of February, 2023 and the present prosecution has been

launched on 24.12.2024. The learned senior counsel

further submitted that except the offence punishable

under Section 409 IPC, the other offences alleged are

punishable with less than 7 years imprisonment. It is

his submission that the petitioner was the Head of the
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Department and was only a Supervising Authority, and

in order to award a work or to make payment, there is a

procedure contemplated, whereunder a file has to be

processed by different offices at different stages, and the

petitioner issued orders after having been satisfied that

the entire procedure contemplated is followed.

The learned senior counsel further submitted that

the work order was issued on 25.10.2023 in view of the

pressure from the Government to launch the APP, and

the successful bidder started working on it and made it

available to the general public immediately after entering

into the agreement; that amounts were paid to the

company concerned up to the stage where the work was

completed. He further submitted that AGNI App was

successfully developed and launched by the then Home

Minister and the Principal Secretary to Home

Department in the prestigious investors‟ summit, and in

connection with that, an Award was given by the Kerala

Government for this App. He submitted that on

29.05.2023, a show-cause notice was issued by the
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successor of the petitioner seeking explanation for the

delay and measures for expedition of the project, and

aggrieved by the same, A.2 approached this Court by

way of filing W.P.No.13793 of 2023, and by an Order

dated 21.06.2023, this Court directed the authority

concerned not to take any coercive steps and the said

interim order is still subsisting.

The learned senior counsel further submitted that a

Tender was called for, for supply of Laptops, and the

i-pods and surface laptops are now being utilized by the

Department. He further emphasized that awareness

camps for SCs/STs were successfully conducted and

after giving certificate for satisfactory by the officer

concerned, amounts were released therefor.

The learned senior counsel further submitted that

there is absolutely no accusation against the petitioner

attracting the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC.

It is his further submission that the petitioner was

suspended from service immediately when the former

opposition party came into power in June, 2024 and he
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was directed to attend the office of the Director General

of Police without assigning any work and without

payment of any salary, and as such, the question of the

petitioner tampering with the evidence or material would

not arise. He submits that the petitioner is an IPS officer

and entered into service in the year 1996 and he is a

cardiac patient diagnosed with coronary artery disease

(triple vessel disease) and underwent a coronary artery

bypass graft in July, 2023. Hence, he prays to consider

the request of the petitioner for anticipatory bail.

In support of his contention, the learned senior

counsel relied on the following decisions.

(i) in N.Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh,

CBI1, wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 45 to 48)

“Ingredients necessary to prove a charge under
Section 409IPC

45. Section 409IPC pertains to criminal breach of
trust by a public servant or a banker, in respect of
the property entrusted to him. The onus is on the
prosecution to prove that the accused, a public
servant or a banker was entrusted with the property

1
(2021) 18 SCC 70
14

which he is duly bound to account for and that he
has committed criminal breach of trust.
(See Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of
A.P. [Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P.,
(2012) 8 SCC 547 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 979 : (2012) 2
SCC (L&S) 638] )

46. The entrustment of public property and
dishonest misappropriation or use thereof in the
manner illustrated under Section 405 are a sine qua
non for making an offence punishable under Section
409IPC. The expression “criminal breach of trust” is
defined under Section 405IPC which provides, inter
alia, that whoever being in any manner entrusted
with property or with any dominion over a property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own
use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of
that property contrary to law, or in violation of any
law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to
be discharged, or contravenes any legal contract,
express or implied, etc. shall be held to have
committed criminal breach of trust. Hence, to
attract Section 405IPC, the following ingredients
must be satisfied:

46.1. Entrusting any person with property or with
any dominion over property.

46.2. That person has dishonestly misappropriated
or converted that property to his own use.
15

46.3. Or that person is dishonestly using or
disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any
other person so to do in violation of any direction of
law or a legal contract.

47. It ought to be noted that the crucial word used
in Section 405IPC is “dishonestly” and therefore, it
pre-supposes the existence of mens rea. In other
words, mere retention of property entrusted to a
person without any misappropriation cannot fall
within the ambit of criminal breach of trust. Unless
there is some actual use by the accused in violation
of law or contract, coupled with dishonest intention,
there is no criminal breach of trust. The second
significant expression is “misappropriates” which
means improperly setting apart for ones use and to
the exclusion of the owner.

48. No sooner are the two fundamental ingredients
of “criminal breach of trust” within the meaning of
Section 405IPC proved, and if such criminal breach
is caused by a public servant or a banker, merchant
or agent, the said offence of criminal breach of trust
is punishable under Section 409IPC, for which it is
essential to prove that:

(i) The accused must be a public servant or a
banker, merchant or agent;

(ii) He/She must have been entrusted, in such
capacity, with property; and
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(iii) He/She must have committed breach of trust in
respect of such property.”

(ii) in Common Cause, a registered society v. Union of

India & others2, wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 167

to 173)

“167. This brings us to the definition of the offence
of “Criminal Breach of Trust” as defined in Section
405 of the Penal Code, 1860 which, minus the
Explanation, provides as under:

“405. Criminal breach of trust.–Whoever, being in
any manner entrusted with property, or with any
dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the discharge
of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so
to do, commits „criminal breach of trust‟.”

168. A trust contemplated by Section 405 would
arise only when there is an entrustment of property
or dominion over property. There has, therefore, to
be a property belonging to someone which is
entrusted to the person accused of the offence

2
(1999) 6 SCC 667
17

under Section 405. The entrustment of property
creates a trust which is only an obligation annexed
to the ownership of the property and arises out of a
confidence reposed and accepted by the owner. This
is what has been laid in State of
Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal
[AIR 1968 SC 700 :

(1968) 2 SCR 408] . In Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada
[(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
415] the essential ingredients for establishing the
offence of criminal breach of trust, as defined in
Section 405, have been spelt out as follows: (SCC
pp. 406-07, para 13)
“(i) entrusting any person with property or with any
dominion over property; (ii) the person entrusted
dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his
own use that property; or dishonestly using or
disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any
other person so to do in violation of any direction of
law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to
be discharged, or of any legal contract made
touching the discharge of such trust.”

169. In this case, the earlier decision in Pratibha
Rani v. Suraj Kumar
[(1985) 2 SCC 370 : 1985 SCC
(Cri) 180] was affirmed. The case essentially related
to the entrustment of “Stridhan”, but nevertheless,
it is important in the sense that the ingredients of
the offence are set out and discussed.
In Chelloor
Mankkal Narayan Ittiravi Nambudiri v. State of
18

Travancore-Cochin [(1952) 2 SCC 392 : AIR 1953 SC
478 : 1954 Cri LJ 102] it was laid down that every
breach of trust in the absence of mens rea or
dishonest intention cannot legally justify a criminal
prosecution.

170. The expressions “entrusted with property” and
“with any dominion over property” used in Section
405 came to be considered by this Court
in CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC
591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045 : AIR 1996 SC 2452] and
the view earlier expressed was reiterated. It was held
that the expression “entrusted” has wide and
different implication in different contexts and the
expression “trust” has been used to denote various
kinds of relationships like trustee and beneficiary,
bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and
pledgee.

171. Mr K. Parasaran contended that “power to allot
petrol pumps”, and that too under discretionary
quota, cannot be treated as “property” within the
meaning of Section 405 of the Penal Code, 1860. It
is pointed out by him that the Minister merely
makes an order of allotment. Subsequently, the
Indian Oil Corporation or the Bharat Petroleum
Corporation enters into a dealership agreement with
that person and the business is regulated by the
agreement between the allottee and the Corporation
19

(Indian Oil Corporation or Bharat Petroleum
Corporation). It is also pointed out that in
pursuance of the agreement, the allottee invests
money, constructs the building and sets up the
petrol pump. Mere exercise of “power to allot”, it is
rightly contended, cannot, therefore, be treated as
“property” within the meaning of Section 405,
capable of being misutilised or misappropriated.

172. The word “property”, used in Section 409 IPC
means the property which can be entrusted or over
which dominion may be exercised. This Court
in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1962 SC 1821 :

(1963) 1 SCR 253] held that the word “property”,
used in Section 405 IPC, has to be interpreted in a
wider sense as it is not restricted by any
qualification under Section 405. It was held that
whether an offence defined in that section could be
said to have been committed would depend not on
the interpretation of the word “property” but on the
fact whether that particular kind of property could
be subject to the acts covered by that section. That
is to say, the word “property” would cover that kind
of property with respect to which the offence
contemplated in that section could be committed.

173. Having regard to the facts of the case
discussed above and the ingredients of the offence
constituting criminal breach of trust, as defined in
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Section 405, or the offence as set out in Section 409
IPC, we are of the opinion that there was no case
made out against the petitioner for any case being
registered against him on the basis of the judgment
passed by this Court nor was there any occasion to
direct an investigation by CBI in that case.”

11. On the other hand, the learned Advocate

General appearing on behalf of respondent/State, while

reiterating the averments mentioned in the counter,

vehemently contended that there is deception

entertained by the petitioner, right from the beginning in

awarding the contract to A.2 and A.3. According to him,

in order to award the contract to the co-accused, the

petitioner is alleged to have committed manipulations

with a view to favour A.2 and A.3. He further submitted

that the petitioner released funds in favour of A.2 prior

to entering into the agreement with the State. The

learned Advocate General further emphasized that the

agreement was entered with A.2 on 15.02.2023 and

sanction of huge amount of Rs.59,93,000/- on

22.02.2023 i.e. within a week from the date of the
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agreement, duly misrepresenting the department, is in

contravention of the agreed terms of the contract, and

the same has been done without verifying the progress of

work.

The learned Advocate General further emphasized

that a Tender for the works of the value over and above

Rs.50.00 lakhs, shall be published in one Telugu and

one English vernacular daily newspapers, but there were

no entries regarding the publishing of the Tender

Notifications in the newspapers and the same is in gross

violation of G.O.Ms.No.94, I & CAD (PW-COD)

Department, dated 01.07.2023. He further submitted

that A.3, despite being the successful bidder, failed to

conduct any awareness workshops for SCs/STs, and it is

the Regional CID officials of the respective regions, who

conducted 25 awareness workshops to SCs and STs with

active co-ordination of local Police, Revenue, MPDO,

Social Welfare Department officials, Colleges, SC/ST

leaders and Members of the District SC/ST Vigilance

monitoring committee in Government buildings, except
22

at one place i.e. Sneha Vinayaka Function Hall,

Kodumur, Kurnool district, and though A.3 has not

conducted any of the meetings, payment of

Rs.1,19,03,600/- was already sanctioned in favour of

A.3, purportedly for executing the work.

The learned Advocate General has also taken this

Court to the photographs to the effect that the

workshops were being organized by the APCID, but not

by A.3. The learned Advocate General submits that

though the works are not completed by A.3, certain

amounts were released on different dates. He submits

that this is not a case where anticipatory bail can be

granted, in view of the irregularities that have been

committed by the petitioner.

The learned Advocate General relied on the

following decisions.

(i) in P.Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement3,

wherein it is held thus: (paragraph 78)

3
(2019) 9 SCC 24
23

“78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an
extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly;
more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic
offences stand as a different class as they affect the
economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of
Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of
Enforcement
v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105
: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510] , it was held that in economic
offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory
bail.”

(ii) in Jaya Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar &

another,4 wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 13 and 22)

“13. There is no substantial difference between
Sections 438 and 439 CrPC so far as appreciation of
the case as to whether or not a bail is to be granted,
is concerned. However, neither anticipatory bail nor
regular bail can be granted as a matter of rule. The
anticipatory bail being an extraordinary privilege
should be granted only in exceptional cases. The
judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to
be properly exercised after proper application of
mind to decide whether it is a fit case for grant of
anticipatory bail.

22. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we
are of the considered opinion that it was not a fit
case for grant of anticipatory bail. The High Court
4
(2012) 4 SCC 379
24

ought to have exercised its extraordinary
jurisdiction following the parameters laid down by
this Court in the abovereferred to judicial
pronouncements, considering the nature and gravity
of the offence and as the FIR had been lodged
spontaneously, its veracity is reliable. The High
Court has very lightly brushed aside the fact that
the FIR had been lodged spontaneously and further
did not record any reason as to how the prerequisite
conditions incorporated in the statutory provision
itself stood fulfilled. Nor did the court consider as to
whether custodial interrogation was required. The
court may not exercise its discretion in derogation of
established principles of law, rather it has to be in
strict adherence to them. Discretion has to be
guided by law, duly governed by rule and cannot be
arbitrary, fanciful or vague. The court must not
yield to spasmodic sentiment to unregulated
benevolence. The order dehors the grounds provided
in Section 438 CrPC itself suffers from non-
application of mind and therefore, cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law.”

(iii) In State, rep. by the CBI v. Anil Sharma5,

wherein it is held thus: (paragraph 6)

“6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that
custodial interrogation is qualitatively more
5
(1997) 7 SCC 187
25

elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who
is well ensconced with a favourable order under
Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective
interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous
advantage in disinterring many useful informations
and also materials which would have been
concealed. Success in such interrogation would
elude if the suspected person knows that he is well
protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order
during the time he is interrogated. Very often
interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a
mere ritual. The argument that the custodial
interrogation is fraught with the danger of the
person being subjected to third-degree methods
need not be countenanced, for, such an argument
can be advanced by all accused in all criminal
cases. The Court has to presume that responsible
police officers would conduct themselves in a
responsible manner and that those entrusted with
the task of disinterring offences would not conduct
themselves as offenders.”

(iv) in Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureal of

Investigation6, wherein it is held thus (paragraphs 23 to

26)

6
(2013) 7 SCC 466
26

“23. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the
country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-
collar crimes, which has affected the fibre of the
country’s economic structure. Incontrovertibly,
economic offences have serious repercussions on
the development of the country as a whole. In State
of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [(1987) 2
SCC 364 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 364] this Court, while
considering a request of the prosecution for
adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as
under: (SCC p. 371, para 5)
“5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the
economic offenders who ruin the economy of the
State are not brought to book. A murder may be
committed in the heat of moment upon passions
being aroused. An economic offence is committed
with cool calculation and deliberate design with an
eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence
to the community. A disregard for the interest of the
community can be manifested only at the cost of
forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the
system to administer justice in an even-handed
manner without fear of criticism from the quarters
which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye
unmindful of the damage done to the national
economy and national interest.”

24. While granting bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of
27

evidence in support thereof, the severity of the
punishment which conviction will entail, the
character of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of
securing the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the
public/State and other similar considerations. It
has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of
granting bail, the legislature has used the words
“reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the
grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether
there is a genuine case against the accused and that
the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected,
at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and
need to be visited with a different approach in the
matter of bail. The economic offence having deep-
rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of
public funds needs to be viewed seriously and
considered as a grave offence affecting the economy
of the country as a whole and thereby posing
serious threat to the financial health of the country.
28

26. Taking note of all these aspects, without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the case
and also with regard to the claim of CBI and the
defence, we are of the opinion that the appellant
cannot be released at this stage, however, we direct
CBI to complete the investigation and file charge-
sheet(s) as early as possible preferably within a
period of four months from today. Thereafter, the
appellant is free to renew his prayer for bail before
the trial court and if any such petition is filed, the
trial court is free to consider the prayer for bail
independently on its own merits without being
influenced by dismissal of the present appeal.”

12. Heard and perused the record.

13. A perusal of the record goes to show that the

Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh

forwarded Memo No.2592927/SC.D/ A1/2024-3, dated

03.12.2024 issued by the General Administration (SC-D)

Department to the Director General of ACB along with

detailed enquiry reports of the Vigilance and

Enforcement Department bearing No.62 (C.No.4828/

V&E/Sec.II/D1/2024), dated 18.10.2024 and No.63

(C.No.4828/V&E/Sec-II/D1/2024) dated 30.10.2024
29

submitted by the Director General, Vigilance &

Enforcement vide letters dated 18.10.2024 and

30.10.2024 respectively, to the Government regarding

certain allegations against petitioner, who worked as the

Director General, A.P. State Disaster Response and Fire

Services and the Additional Director General, Crime

Investigation Department, with a request to conduct

enquiry into the allegations of misappropriation of funds

by him. Thereafter, pursuant to letter dated 12.12.2024

addressed by the Director General, ACB to the Chief

Secretary to the Government, the Government accorded

permission Vide Memo No.2592927/SC.D/A1/2024,

dated 20.12.2024 of General Administration (SC-D)

Department according permission as required under

Section 17A of the PC Act.

14. Thereafter, on the instructions of the Director

General of ACB, vide Memo dated 24.12.2024, to register

a RCO case and to investigate into the allegations

against the petitioner, the Deputy Superintendent of
30

Police, CIU, ACB, Vijayawada, on a perusal of the reports

submitted by the Vigilance and Enforcement

Department, prepared an occurrence report dated

24.12.2024, and based on the factual aspects mentioned

therein and on the orders of the Director General of ACB,

AP, Vijayawada dated 24.12.2024, the aforesaid crime

came to be registered against the petitioner herein and

others.

15. The accusation as against the petitioner is

that he is alleged to have actively connived with others in

manipulating tender processes for awarding the contract

work of Development and Maintenance of AGNI-NOC

(Automated governance & NOC Integration) Web portal,

Mobile App and supply of hardware to A.2 in violation of

the procedure in vogue leading to misappropriation of

Government funds to a tune of about Rs.59,93,000/-

and the contract of conducting awareness meetings/

workshops for SCs/STs on the SC/ST PoA Act to A.3 by

showing undue favour to the firms of his choice. It is
31

further alleged that A.3 is a non-existent company

leading to misappropriation of Government funds to a

tune of about Rs.1,53,93,600/-, resorting to corrupt and

illegal means not adhering to the procedures in vogue,

nonfeasance in initiating action against A.2, though they

failed to show much of progress in the development of

AGNI-NOC portal.

16. A perusal of the material placed on record

goes to show that when a Tender Notification vide RC

No.3776/Planning/2015/NOC, dated 06.01.2023 was

issued for Development and Maintenance of AGNI-NOC

Web portal for a period of five years and mobile app and

supply of hardware for APSDRFS, A.2 and others are

said to have participated in the tender process and A.2

was declared as successful bidder for an amount of

Rs.2,29,61,000/-. The price bid was opened on

25.01.2023 and the Committee constituted for Tender

Finalization was met on 25.01.2023, and the tender was

accepted on negotiations. Thereafter, the said fact was
32

informed to the successful bidder with a request to enter

into agreement within a period of 7 days. The allegation

is that the petitioner, in violation of the procedures in

vogue and dishonestly and fraudulently facilitated

payment of Rs.59,93,000/- to the said firm on

22.02.2023 i.e. within one week after entering into

agreement on 15.02.2023, though there was no much

progress in the development of AGNI-NOC portal.

17. It is pertinent to mention here that the

petitioner worked as the Director General of APSDRFS,

and he, being the Head of the Institution, a Supervising

Authority, is said to have accepted the entire process as

suggested by the officers concerned. A plain reading of

the material on record with regard to the disbursement

of amounts, it is alleged that there appear to be some

procedural violations. Merely because there are certain

procedural violations, the petitioner cannot be made

liable therefor. In connection with the said averment,

the petitioner followed the procedure as contemplated.
33

Merely because the amounts have been released in

favour of companies for the works completed by them, it

would not come within the purview of the offence

punishable under Section 409 IPC.

18. In respect of another Tender Notification

No.9707/D1/CID/2024, dated 11.01.2024, it was issued

for conducting awareness programmes for SCs/STs,

which include providing refreshments/venues/VC halls

and workshop material. A.3 is said to have declared as

lowest bidder, and after complying with all the

formalities, A.3 was declared as the successful bidder

vide proceedings dated 19.01.2024 for a sum of

Rs.59,52,500/- and Rs.59,51,100/- respectively towards

SCs awareness workshops and STs awareness

workshops. In connection with that, an agreement was

entered into, for carrying out the workshops.

19. It is alleged that Awareness Programmes were

shown to be conducted on 27.01.2024, 28.01.2024 and

29.01.2024, even before entering of agreement with A.3
34

on 30.01.2024, and petitioner sanctioned an amount of

Rs.59,52,500/- and Rs.59,51,100/- respectively towards

SCs & STs Awareness Workshops on the same date of

the agreement on 30.01.2024, and that only

Rs.3,10,000/- was incurred against the agreement value

of Rs.1,19,03,600/- which indicates gross embezzlement

of government funds to a tune of Rs.1,15,93,600/-. The

learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner

submitted that though the agreement was entered into at

a belated stage, it is agreed upon that the work would

commence from the date of the Purchase Order.

According to the learned senior counsel, work

commenced much earlier and the awareness camps for

SCs and STs were successfully conducted, and the

officer concerned has also given certificate of

satisfactory. As far as the Awareness workshops are

concerned, the same were managed by the Regional

Officers in the cadre of Superintendent or Additional

Superintendent of Police, and basing on their feed back

and on the recommendation of all the concerned, the
35

amounts were paid under the said Head. It is also

relevant to mention here that the petitioner is not a

Drawing and Disbursing Officer. It is submitted that

the Drawing and Disbursing Officer certified that the

work performed by the companies are found to be

satisfactory and thereafter the amounts were released.

20. It is further alleged that the petitioner/A.1,

while working as the Director General of APSDRFS,

violated G.O.Ms.No.258, Finance (TFR) Department,

dated 20.09.2013 with a mala fide intention and in

connivance with A.2 in procuring 10 Nos. laptops at an

exorbitant price of Rs.17,89,784/- i.e. Rs.1,78,978/- per

each laptop, without calling for tenders. It is further

alleged that the petitioner failed to discharge his

legitimate duties deliberately in sanctioning the

abovesaid amount. A perusal of the material on record

goes to show that the sanction of Rs.17,89,784/- to

procure 10 Nos. laptops was ratified by the Welfare

Committee of A.P. Fire Services (Petroleum Retail
36

Outlets), Krishna District in its meeting dated

10.02.2023. It goes to show that the said laptops were

supplied by A.2 for rate 5% less than the market value.

It is not the case of prosecution that the laptops were not

at all procured. But, it is the averment in the First

Information Report that the same has not been done

through tender process. It is not the case of the

prosecution that laptops are not being used by the

Department and the same are not in working conditions.

Being the Head of the Institution, the petitioner is said to

have taken a collective decision along with other senior

officials to procure the laptops at a rate less than 5% of

the market price. It appears that the said laptops are

necessary for effective development of the said

application by the superior officers of the Fire

Department and several other subordinates, since the

same were launched formally. It is the submission of

the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner

that various price quotations and queries in terms of

quick delivery were taken from different vendors by the
37

Department and as A.2 company quoted less price than

the price quoted by other vendors, the work of supplying

the said laptops was entrusted by the Department to A.2

company. On a perusal of the entire material on

record, this Court is of the opinion that there are certain

procedural violations in respect of monies that have been

released in favour of the companies by verifying the

progress of work done by the companies. It is for those

officers concerned to look into the aspects and submit a

report to the Head of the Institution. The Head of the

Institution, being the Supervisory Authority, would not

in any way go into each and every aspect in detail in

order to release funds in favour of the companies.

21. Section 409 IPC deals with the criminal

breach of trust by a public servant or a banker in respect

of the property entrusted to him. Under Section 405

IPC, whoever, being in any manner, entrusted with

property, or with any dominion over property,

dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use
38

that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that

property in violation of any direction of law prescribing

the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of

any legal contract, express or implied, which he has

made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully

suffers any person so to do, commits „criminal breach of

trust‟. In order to constitute the aforesaid offence, there

must be an entrustment of property or dominion over the

property, and the said person entrusted has to

dishonestly misappropriate or convert it to his own use.

The onus is on the prosecution to prove that the

accused, being a public servant or a banker, was

entrusted with the property which he is duty bound to

account for, and that he committed criminal breach of

trust.

22. Going by the averments contained in the First

Information Report, there is absolutely no doubt that the

petitioner is a public servant. In Common Cause’s case

(2 supra), a discussion has cropped up with regard to
39

„entrustment of property‟ and „with any dominion over

property‟, used in Section 405 IPC, which came to be

considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in CBI v. Duncans

Agro Industries Limited {(1996) 5 SCC 591}, wherein it is

held that the expression „entrusted‟ has wide and

different implication in different contexts and the express

„trust‟ has been used to denote various kinds of

relationships like trustee and beneficiary, bailor and

bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledgee, and it

was held that mere exercise of „power to allot‟ cannot be

treated as „property‟ within the meaning of Section 405

IPC, capable of being mis-utilized or misappropriated.

23. In the case on hand too, the work has been

allotted to A.2 and A.3 after following due procedure

contemplated as per Rules. Merely because certain

procedural violations alleged have taken place with

regard to disbursement of amounts in favour of the

companies, prima facie, would not in any way come

within the purview of Section 409 IPC. In view of the
40

aforesaid judgment, it can be inferred that mere power to

allot the work to other companies, would not in any way

come within the purview of entrustment of property.

24. Apart from the same, it is also essential that

the property which has been entrusted must have been

misappropriated and the same has been converted for

personal use. In the case on hand, there is absolutely no

material to show that the property or any monies has

been misappropriated and the same has been converted

for the personal use of the petitioner. In the absence of

the said ingredients, there is any amount of ambiguity

whether the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC

would attract or not.

25. The learned Advocate General, by placing

reliance on the decision in State, rep. by the CBI v. Anil

Sharma (5 supra), strenuously contended that in order to

prove that the funds have been misappropriated and the

same were converted for the personal use of the

petitioner, custodial interrogation is essential, and that
41

custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-

oriented than questioning a suspect who is well

ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438

CrPC. He further emphasized that in a case of this

nature, effective interrogation of the suspected person is

of tremendous advantage in disinterring useful

information and also materials which would have been

concealed.

26. In the case on hand, the petitioner is an IPS

officer, entered into service in the year 1996. He has

been suspended from service in June, 2024. Entire

material that is borne out of record, has been seized by

the Vigilance and Enforcement Department and the

same has been furnished to ACB officials. The petitioner

is under suspension since June, 2024 and question of

tampering with the evidence by him would not arise at

all. When the entire material pertaining to the alleged

transactions has been seized, question of custodial

interrogation to elicit more information, would not arise.
42

It is pertinent to mention here that if the petitioner is

arrested and if the prosecution is not able to prove the

accusation of misappropriation and funds that were

converted for his personal use, as alleged, reputation of

the petitioner will be mollified.

27. The Hon‟ble Apex Court, in Siddharam

Satlingappa Mhetre case reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694,

laid down certain factors and parameters to be

considered while considering an application for

anticipatory bail, which read as under :

“112. The following factors and parameters can be
taken into consideration while dealing with the
anticipatory bail:

(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation and the
exact role of the accused must be properly
comprehended before arrest is made;

(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the
fact as to whether the accused has previously
undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in
respect of any cognizable offence;

(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from
justice;

43

(iv) the possibility of the accused’s likelihood to
repeat similar or [the] other offences;

(v) where the accusations have been made only with
the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by
arresting him or her;

(vi) impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly
in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large
number of people;

(vii) the courts must evaluate the entire available
material against the accused very carefully. The
court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of
the accused in the case. The cases in which the
accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34
and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 the court should
consider with even greater care and caution because
overimplication in the cases is a matter of common
knowledge and concern;

(viii) while considering the prayer for grant of
anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck
between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be
caused to the free, fair and full investigation and
there should be prevention of harassment,
humiliation and unjustified detention of the
accused;

(ix) the court to consider reasonable apprehension of
tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat
to the complainant;

44

(x) frivolity in prosecution should always be
considered and it is only the element of genuineness
that shall have to be considered in the matter of
grant of bail and in the event of there being some
doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in
the normal course of events, the accused is entitled
to an order of bail.

113. Arrest should be the last option and it should
be restricted to those exceptional cases where
arresting the accused is imperative in the facts and
circumstances of that case. The court must carefully
examine the entire available record and particularly
the allegations which have been directly attributed
to the accused and these allegations are
corroborated by other material and circumstances
on record.”

28. This Court is of the view that the petitioner,

being an IPS officer, worked in the capacities as the

Director General, A.P. State Disaster Response and Fire

Services and the Additional Director General, Crime

Investigation Department, question of he fleeing away is

remote. There is absolutely no flight risk. He has got

fixed abode. He is aged about 57 years. The material

filed along with the petition shows that petitioner is a
45

cardiac patient, diagnosed with coronary artery disease,

specifically triple vessel disease, and he underwent a

coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) in July, 2023, and

considering the severity, he requires continuous follow

up with his physician to monitor his recovery and overall

health. Considering the aforesaid facts and

circumstances of the case, this Court feels that the

request of the petitioner for anticipatory bail can be

considered, however, on certain conditions.

29. Accordingly, in the event of his arrest in the

aforesaid crime, the petitioner shall be released on bail

on his executing a personal bond for a sum of

Rs.25,000/- with two sureties for the like sum to the

satisfaction of the arresting officials. The petitioner shall

co-operate with the investigating agency and attend

before it as and when required. The petitioner shall not,

directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or

promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the
46

case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to

the Court or to any police officer.

30. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed.

Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in the

Criminal Petition shall stand closed.

___________________________________
JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY
30.01.2025
DRK
47

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 58 OF 2025

30.1.2025
DRK

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