Ashok Kumar Sharma Aged About 64 Years vs The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd on 23 January, 2025

Date:

Jharkhand High Court

Ashok Kumar Sharma Aged About 64 Years vs The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd on 23 January, 2025

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                   Second Appeal 125 of 2024

      1. Ashok Kumar Sharma aged about 64 years,
      2. Kailash Sharma, aged about 61 years
         Both sons of late Dwarika Prasad Sharma, resident of D-road, Sonari,
         P.O. and P.S. Sonari, Town Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum
                                     ......................Appellants


                         ... Versus....

      1. The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., a Joint Stock Company, Incorporated
      under the Indian Companies Act, having its registered office at Homy Mody
      Street, Fort, P.0. and P.S. Fort, District Mumbai and it work's at Jamshedpur,
      Pargana Dhalbhum, P.O. and P.S. Dalbhum, District East Singhbhum.


      2. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) represented by Deputy Commissioner,
      Singhbhum East at Jamshedpur, P.O. and P.S. Sakchi, District East
      Singhbhum, Jharkhand.

      3. Ram Das Yadav son of Paras Yadav.

      4. Dinesh Yadav son of Narayan Yadav.

      Both are residents of Gwala Basti, Sonari, P.O. and P.S. Sonari, Town
      Jamshedpur, District, East Singhbhum, Jharkhand......    Respondents

      CORAM:      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

For the Appellants                : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate
For the Respondents               :
                 ..........

05/Dated: 23/01/2025
Heard learned counsel for the appellants.

2. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment of

affirmation dated 27.05.2024 and the decree following thereupon drawn up on

06.06.2024 by learned Principal District Judge, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in

Civil Appeal No. 56 of 2009 whereby said appeal filed by the original defendant

no.1 has been dismissed upholding and confirming the judgment dated

14.10.2009 and decree dated 06.11.2009 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-V at

Jamshedpur in Title Suit No. 123 of 1987 and also against the judgment dated

14.10.2009 and the decree dated 06.11.2009 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-V

at Jamshedpur in Title Suit No. 123 of 1987 whereby the said suit filed by the

1
respondent no.1 herein, was decreed on contest with cost against the original

defendant no.1 was ordered.

3. The case of the plaintiff/ Principal respondent No. 1 in short is that

the land in R.S. Plot no. 401 and 416 alongwith other lands were acquired before

the Revisional Survey Settlement, 1937 by the then Provincial Government under

the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. During the R.S. settlement of 1937 the

lands in R.S. Plot no, 401 accordingly came to be recorded in the name and

possession of the plaintiff i.e. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (TISCO) in R.S.

Khata as its khas vacant land. During 1937 Survey the R.S. Plot no. 416 along

with other plots happened to be recorded in the name of Late Makar Majhi in R.S.

Khata no. 30 as tenant under the plaintiff. The plaintiff again regained possession

of the aforesaid land in R.S. Plot No. 416 alongwith plot no. 417 in Rent

Execution Case No. 436 of 1939-40 in execution of Certificate of Sale by the Rent

Suit Dy, Collector Jamshedpur. The plaintiff has regained possession of all the

other lands of R.S. Khata no. 30 by virtue of registered Deed of Surrender dated

11/03/1943. The plaintiff has been in possession of the aforesaid plots by leasing

out to different persons and by constructing roads, sewer lines, electric lines and

portions of the same have been continuing in vacant possession of the plaintiff

awaiting further development. Under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act,

1950 as amended from time to time, the aforesaid lands in R.S.Plot Nos.401 and

416 along with other lands vested in the State of Bihar, the Proforma Defendant/

Principal Respondent no.-2 absolutely and free from all encumbrances with effect

from 1.1.1956. Further case of the plaintiff is that by virtue of registered Lease

dated 1.8.85 executed by Proforma Defendant/ Principal Respondent no.-2 in

favour of the plaintiff, the aforesaid lands being held by the plaintiff as Lessee

under the Proforma Defendant/Principal Respondent no.-2, the absolute owner

thereof and before the expiry of deed of lease dated 01-08-1985 the plaintiff has

exercised its option for renewal of lease for the further period of 30 years with
2
effect from 01-01- 1996 in terms of clause (XI) of the deed of lease vide its letter

dated 03- 08-1995 addressed to the Deputy Commissioner East-Singhbhum

Jamshedpur and even after expiry of aforesaid lease deed dated 01-08- 1985 the

plaintiff company has been regularly paying rent to the state of Bihar, and in terms

of the aforesaid lease, the state of Bihar has also been accepting the rent

deposited by the plaintiff company in respect of the lease land including suit land.

During the pending survey settlement, Which commenced in 1970, portions of

lands in R.S .Plot No.401 have Come to be demarcated as new Plot No. 982 and

portions of land in R/S. Plot Nos.401 and 416 have come to be demarcated as new

Plot Nos.983, 984, 985. An attempt to grab portions of khas vacant lands in

possession of the plaintiff, the Principal Defendant No.1 lodged a station diary with

Sonari Police with all false allegations and in collusion with them got Misc. Case

No.517 of 1979 started against the plaintiff and Principal Defendant Nos. 2 & 3,

U/s 144/145 Cr.P.C making false claim over new Plot Nos.982 & 983 forming part

of R.S.Plot Nos. 401 and 416 in which Principal Defendant Nos.2 & 3 also appeared

and filed written statement making false allegations but left contest in the said

proceeding. The plaintiff was in khas vacant possession of the aforesaid lands in

R.S. Plot Nos. 401 and 416 by laying its sewer lines which are still existing and

exercising their acts of possession. The aforesaid proceeding U/S 145 Cr.P.c was in

respect of new Plot Nos.982 and 983 and was disposed off by Md. Sahabuddin,

Executive Magistrate, Jamshedpur who failed to appreciate the facts and law

involved and by his judgment dt.25.9.81 declared Principal Defendant No.1 in

possession of the lands in new Plot Nos.982 and 983, Against that order plaintiff

filed Criminal Revision No. 203 of 1981 and taking advantage of the aforesaid

erroneous order of Md. Sahabuddin, Executive Magistrate, Jamshedpur, during the

pendency of the aforesaid revision, the Principal Defendant No.1 unlawfully

encroached upon the land fully described in Schedule “A” of the plaint in

December, 1981 by hurriedly making kutcha temporary shed thereon, The cause of
3
action for the suit arose against the Principal Defendants on and from 25.9.81 and

December, 1981 and on subsequent dates at Jamshedpur within the jurisdiction of

this court. Thus, this case has been filed by the plaintiff for (1) a decree declaring

right and title of the plaintiff and proforma defendant, the State of Bihar over the

lands in Schedule “A” and “B” of the plaint, (ii) a decree for recovery of possession

of the lands in Schedule “A” of the plaint, (iii) for confirmation of possession over

the lands in Schedule “B” of the plaint in favour of the plaintiff and Proforma

Defendant, State of Bihar and also (iv) for a decree for permanent injunction

restraining the Principal Defendants from interfering with possession of the plaintiff

over the lands in Schedule “B” and making any further constructions on the land in

Schedule “A” and in the alternative for a decree for recovery of possession in their

favour of the lands in Schedule “B” if the court finds that they have been

dispossessed at any time before disposal of the suit and (v) for cost of the suit

with interest till realization and for any other relief to which they entitled.

4. The case of the defendant no. 1/appellants is that the defendant no.

1 Dwarika Prasad Sharma has challenged the maintainability of the suit. He has

stated that the suit is barred by provision of Limitation. It is also barred by the

principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence. So far as the possession of the

predecessors-in-interest of the answering defendant was openly and adversely to

the knowledge of the plaintiff and State of Bihar and at no point of time they ever

interfered with or disturbed the peaceful possession and occupation either of the

answering defendant or his predecessors-in-interest and as such they at present

cannot say that the defendant has not acquired a valid title in respect of the land

in question. The suit is barred under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and also

under Articles 65 and 66 of the Limitation Act. The suit is bad for mis-joinder of

necessary party and the State of Bihar should be the plaintiff with the TISCO Ltd.

The sanction from the State of Bihar has not been obtained by the plaintiff before

initiation of this proceeding. The suit is not maintainable under provisions of
4
section 52 of the Transfer of property Act the and Section 3-A of the Bihar Land

Reforms Act and Sections 46 and 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. The suit

is bad and not maintainable under Order 7 Rule 3 C.P.C. as the entire

measurement and the description of the land has been kept vague purposely by

the plaintiff Para 1 is denied by the defendant and as a matter of fact the land in

question was never acquired by the then provincial government under the Land

Acquisition Act. The plaintiff was never conveyed with any title and possession of

the land under any provisions of law or in fact at all. As a matter of fact previously

the disputed land in the survey of 1908 was recorded in Khata No.43, Plot No.187

in the name of Raja Satrughna Deo Dhabal Deo and said Raja Satrughna Deo

Dhabal Dey by a registered kewala transferred it to Kali Narayan Babu and such

the land was recorded in the name of Kali Narayan Babu in the survey of 1908.

After acquisition of the entire land in Khata No.43 said Kali Babu started enjoying

the suit land by cultivating paddy crops thereupon. The statements made at para 2

of the plaint are denied and this statement itself shows that the process in

Execution Case No.629 of 1938-39 and Execution Case No.436 of 1939-40 are only

a paper transaction which is absolutely irrelevant in deciding the factum of title

and possession in respect of the suit land. All the proceedings in the rent suit and

the Execution Cases are absolutely against the provisions of law and without

complying the necessary and mandatory provisions of the Bihar Land forms Act

and as such bad in law and in fact. The company never came In possession of the

land as claimed in the Execution Case No.439 of 1939-40 in the year 1939-40. The

predecessors-in-interest of the defendant No.1 were all along in possession which

fact will be found in the subsequent paras of the written statement. It is true to

say that in 1937 the land in R.S. Plot No.416 along with other plots were recorded

in the name of Makar Manjhi in R.S. Khata No.30. But it is false to say that his

name was recorded as a tenant under the plaintiff. The khata No.30 of R.S. Plot

independent and as such Makar Manjhi independently and without having any
5
concern with the plaintiff was in occupation of the land in question through the

said Kali Naryan Babu who acquired the land from the then Raja of the Zamindary.

Makar Manjhi expired just after the year 1937 and his legal heirs and successors

came in possession of the same and were in peaceful possession and occupation

of the land in question and as such the allegations of the plaintiff that said Makar

Manjhi was a tenant under the plaintiff is absolutely false and concocted

statement. It is also false to say that plaintiff had taken possession of the land in

R.S.No.416 along with R.S. Plot No.417 by being put in possession in Rent

Execution Case No.436 of 1939-40 in Execution of Certificate of Sale by the Rent

Deputy Collector, Jamshedpur and whereby the plaintiff had taken possession of all

the lands of R.S.Khata No.30 by virtue of the registered deed of surrender dated

11.3.46. All the proceedings in the Rent Execution case and the issuance of the

Certificate of Sale and the Deed of Surrender alleged or otherwise or of any date

are mere paper transaction and not binding against the right and title of the

defendant as the same are against the provisions of the Specific law of the land.

That the statements appearing at paras 3 and 4 of the plaint are disputed and

denied by the answering defendant and the same are false. If the plaintiff claims

that the land was vacant and as such recorded in his khas land awaiting further

development it has lost all title and interest in the land as soon as the defendant

proves his possession long before such vesting of such land in the State of Bihar

and even inspite of the coming into force of the Land Reforms Act, 1950 the

predecessors-in-interest continuing peaceful possession of lands along with others

even after coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The provisions

of Bihar Land Reforms Act., 1950 did never affect the right of the predecessors-in-

interest of the answering defendant in respect of the land situated at R.S. Plot

Nos. 401 and 416 and in other plots in their possession and occupation. No lease

referred to in para 5 of the plaint dated 1.8.1985 or any other date had been

executed by the proforma defendant, the State of Bihar, in favour of the plaintiff.
6
The State of Bihar, proforma defendant, has no right Whatsoever to execute any

lease in respect of the suit land which was never the land of the State of Bihar or

in possession of the State. The lease executed, if any, in favour of the plaintiff by

the State is against the provisions of law and absolutely inoperative in law and

voidable at the instance of the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest. If in

case the plaintiff’s intermediary right had vested with the State, the raiyati right

cannot be extinguished or liable to be settled. The right of a raiyat who has

perfected his title by virtue of his long undisturbed possession and has been in

continuous possession of the land either as agriculturist or as a homestead land

the said right and his undisturbed possession cannot ve with the intermediary by

subsequent transfer after vesting of the land in the State of Bihar or otherwise.

The statements and allegations appearing at paras 6 and 7 of the plaint are

disputed and denied by the answering defendant as being false. The defendant

were in peaceful possession and occupation of the suit lands since the time of

Makar Manjhi and his remaining survivors, the defendant has acquired a right,

title, interest and disturbed possession against all including the State of Bihar and

the plaintiff. That the proceeding under section 144 and 145 Cr.P.C. was on the

basis of a true affairs of the fact and accordingly decided in favour of answering

defendant. The allegations and statements appearing in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the

plaint are false. That the land in question was never in khas possession of the

plaintiff. The land was never possessed by the plaintiff company at any point of

time and the question of its using as sewer line or otherwise does not arise at all.

As a matter of fact after the death of Makar Manjhi in the Year 1937 his survivors

came in occupation and possession of the suit land and subsequently one of his

liner Durjo Mahato came in possession of the same and as such the name of Durjo

Mahato was recorded in the survey record-of-rights of 1971 with a note of

possession since more than 30 years in respect of the said land under Khata

No.292, plot Nos. 982 and 983 being the part and parcel of R.S. Plot No 401 and
7

416. The answering defendant has purchased the 15 decimal of land in plot no.

401 and 6- ½ decimal of land in plot no. 416 from Durjo Mahato and his other

family members by virtue of two separate sale deeds dated 15.2.1978 and

26.5.1978 executed by the heirs of Durjo Mahato thereafter he is rightful in use

and occupation of the suit land. The statements and allegations appearing at para

12, 13 and 14 are disputed and denied by the answering defendant is being false.

As the answering defendant and his predecessors-in-interest are/were in peaceful

possession of the land, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief of any injunction or

any equitable relief as claimed.

By filing additional W.S, defendant no.1 has stated that the State of

Bihar having apparent title in respect of the suit property and any claim against

the defendant, unless the State of Bihar takes any step regarding eviction of the

defendant, the plaintiff has no right to evict the defendant having no ownership

and title in respect of the suit property. In the present/recent survey settlement

the suit property has been recorded in the name of the defendant Dwarka Prasad

Sharma with his possession in the Khata of ‘Anebad Bihar Sarkar’ and in such view

of the fact the plaintiff has lost all its right to evict the defendant as the possession

of the defendant is found more than 12 years adversely and openly against the

State of Bihar and the present plaintiff. If it is assumed that by virtue of any option

exercised by the plaintiff for renewal of the lease in its favour the right of

ownership which is an essential condition for eviction of a trespasser or the holder

of the property is not maintainable unless any nature or right or ownership is

proved by the plaintiff in its favour as provided under the law for a decree for

eviction of a trespasser. The surrender deed in favour of the plaintiff alleged to

have been executed on 11.3.1943 by Renge Majhi, Gore Majhi, Dumka Majhi and

Chhoto Majhi. The heirs of late Makar Majhi is hit under the provisions of Section

46 and 71- A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act and by virtue of the said surrender

deed the plaintiff cannot acquire any right in its favour. The deed of surrender
8
dated 11.03.1943 is forged and fabricated document by the Company for its

wrongful gain and it never acted upon nor the same can be used as a shield in

proof of title by the Company against the defendant.

5. Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellants submits that

the learned trial court as well the appellate court have erred in facts as well as in

law in deciding the said suit which was instituted by the Tata Iron and Steel

Company Limited for declaration of right, title and interest of the schedule

property of the plaint. He submits that the law points are involved whether the

learned courts have erred in not considering the locus of the plaintiff (Tata Iron

and Steel Company Limited) to seek for a decree, declaring its right and title over

the suit land, though the case of the plaintiff is that the suit land held by the

plaintiff as lessee. He submits that second law point is involved whether a fixed

term lease holder can seek a relief for declaration of its right and title over the

lease hold land. He submits that third law point is involved that in absence of

State as co-plaintiff suit was not maintainable. He refers to section 31 of the

Specific Relief Act and submits that in view of that suit was not maintainable. He

submits that registered sale deed has not been challenged by any one and so far

as declaration of title of the plaintiff along with co-defendant-State is not

permissible in law. He further refers to Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act and

section 68 of the Registration Act. He submits that section 6 of Specific Relief Act

has not been properly dealt with by the learned court and the suit is barred under

section 6 of Specific Relief Act. He submits that both the courts have erred on

these law points in view of that this second appeal may kindly be admitted on the

substantial question of law.

6. The Title Suit No. 123 of 1997 was instituted by plaintiff-TISCO

Limited for a decree declaring right, title of the plaintiff and proforma defendant

i.e. State of Bihar over the suit land mentioned in schedule A and B of the plaint.

Further prayer was made for a decree for recovery of possession of land
9
mentioned in schedule-A and for confirmation of possession of the lands in

schedule-B of the plaint and for permanent injunction restraining the principal

defendants Dwarika Prasad Sharma, Ramesh Yadav, Dinannath Yadav and

Ramesh Yadav from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit

mentioned in schedule -B and further for restraining the principal defendants from

making any construction over the suit land and in alternative a decree for recovery

of the possession of the lands mentioned in schedule B of the plaint if the principal

defendants dispossesses the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The cost of

the suit was also prayed.

7. The said title suit was decided by the learned Sub-Judge-Vth,

Jamshedpur by judgment dated 14.10.2009. The learned trial court has framed

sixteen issues to decide the suit.

8. Issue No. VII was with regard to suit land being acquired by the

provincial government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and title to and

possession of which was conferred upon the plaintiff under the provisions of the

said Act or not. Issue No. VIII was whether is it correct to say that plaintiff

regained possession of R.S. Plot No. 416 and R.S. Plot No. 417 by being put in

possession over the same in Rent Execution Case No. 436 of 39-40 in execution of

certificate of sale by the rent suit by Dy. Collector, Jamshedpur. Issue No. IX was

as to whether the R.S. Plot No. 401 was recovered in R.S. Khata No. 77 in the

name of the plaintiff in the Revisional Survey Settlement of 1937 and Issue No. X

was whether it is correct to say that the plaintiff regained possession of all other

lands of R.S. Khata No. 30 by virtue of registered deed of surrender dated

11.03.43.

9. Since all these issues were interlinked, the learned trial court has

taken up those issues simultaneously.

10. After hearing both sides, the learned court has found that both the

parties have admitted the fact that R.S. Plot No. 416 was under the rayait of Makar
10
Majhi. The dispute is that as per the plaintiff Makar Manjhi was rayait of the

plaintiff. The defendants contended that Makar Manjhi was not rayait of plaintiff

rather Makar Manjhi was independent rayait without having any concern with the

person and accordingly, Makar Majhi has acquired the land as rayait from Kali

Narayan Babu and Kali Narayan Babu had acquired the land from the then landlord

Raja Satrughan Dawal Deo. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that suit

lands were acquired by the plaintiff from the Provincial Govt. as per the provision

of Land Acquisition Act after getting possession plaintiff has given some lands to

different rayait including Makar Majhi and also performed several development

works over the land acquired by the Provincial Government. The plaintiff has filed

certified copy of the Khewat which have been marked in this case as Ext, 8,9 and

9/A. Exhibit 8 is with regard to Khewat of Sonari village Thana No. 1156 area

986.68 acres which has been prepared in the name of Tala Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.

who is plaintiff and in the remarks column mention has been made that above

area of the land has been given to the Tisco Plaintiff. As per the agreement dated

8.7.09, 9.7.18 and 18.10.1919 that land was acquired by the government and its

representative by the deed of conveyance on 19.1.1912 and 23.8.1929. Ext.9

was with regard to Khata No. 77 including plot no. 401 wherein the column that

TISCO name has been mentioned as tenure holder cum Khewat holder. Ext. 9 A

was also with regard to land of Khata No. 30 plot no. 416 which was also under

the tenancy of TISCO and plot no. 416 has been given to Makar Majhi, son of

Khepa Majhi as rayait. In those exhibits the learned court has also found that the

rent and fixation of the rent has also been mentioned. In view of that the learned

court has come to the finding that Khata No. 30 and 77 has been settled by the

TISCO and to different persons including Makar Majhi. Ext.6 which is certified

copy of order for supply to certified purchaser of land at sale in execution with

respect to rent Execution Case No. 629/38-39 wherein it was found that plot no.

416, 417 area 1.33 acres has been given to the TISCO on auction purchaser from
11
the Ranga Majhi and others that was made after identification of the identifier

Girish Chandra after demarcating the plots with the help of Bomboo and after

executing the writ of D.P. the plaintiff has returned the writ to the court

concerned. Exhibit VII was document of possession of Makar Majhi who has

taken into rent suit no. 1391/35-36 and after decree plaintiff filed Execution Case

No. 629/38-39 and the land which was in possession of Makar Manjhi was

auctioned on 20th January 1939 and right, title and interest of Makar Majhi was

taken back by the plaintiff TISCO by paying Rs. 74/- and sale was also confirmed

by the rent suit Deputy Collector, Dhalbhum. Exhibit X and XI were deed of

surrender and sketch map respectively, regarding plot no. 401 and 416 and in the

light of that the plaintiff has taken back the possession of land of Khata No. 30

altogether 24 plots total area 1.69 acres on 11.3.1943 excluding land of plot no.

416 and 417 of Khata No. 30 as that land plot area 1.33 acres were already sold

In Rent Execution Case No. 629/38-39. From the deed of surrender the learned

court has found that land of 1.19 acres has been given back by the rayaits on

payment of consideration amount of Rs. 146/- which was paid in cash by the

landlord Tisco to the tenant as compensation and thereafter land was surrendered

by the tenant and all the interest of the tenant. All these documents have been

marked exhibit without objection except sketch map that has come in the

judgment of the learned trial court and that was the position before abolition of

Zamindari and before enforcement of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 and after

enforcement of Bihar Land Reforms Act according to TISCO who is plaintiff suit

land including other lands has been given on lease through registered deed of

sale by the state of Bihar free from all incumbrances w.e.f. 1.1.56 and that deed

was executed on 01.8.85 with retrospective effect with condition that lease deed

can be renewed on the application of plaintiff and subsequently the plaintiff has

acquired the land by way of lease holder as mentioned above. The certified copy

of the lease deed was marked as Exhibit-1 wherein the Khata No. 77 plot No. 401
12
and land of Khata No. 30 plot no. 416 and other plots of land measuring area

4008.35 acres has been settled in favour of the TISCO on payment of annual rent.

Exhibit 2 was the document of the Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum. This

is the letter dated 13th May, 1997 acknowledging the request letter of plan for

renewal of the above land obtained through lease of deed.

11. Exhibit 3 was the certified copy of letter of the Deputy Commissioner

sent to the G.M., Town services of TISCO to the effect that the challen has been

passed with condition with respect to the renewal of the land as per the terms and

conditions fixed by the State Government. Exhibit 4 was the document before the

learned court which was certified copy of letter issued by the Dy, Collector Tata

Zamindari, Jamshedpur to G.M. State Services, Jamshedpur which was the

Challans filed by the TISCO with respect to annual rent and cess. Exhibit 5, 5 B

and 5 C were the certified copy of challan in favour of the TISCO Ltd. whereby

rent was deposited. In these background the learned trial court has found that

the plaintiff-TISCO is in possession and plaintiff has got right, title.

12. The claim was made by the defendant that Kali Narayan Babu

has given the suit land and other lands to the Makar Majhi under rayaiti system

but the learned court has found that defendant has not produced any

documentary evidence in support of the above averment and in cross-examination

para 28 he has admitted that he has not seen the paper with respect to the fact

that land in question was initially in the name of Raja Satrughan Dawal Deo and

further for the fact that subsequently the land was given to the Kali Narayan Babu

as gift in lieu of ‘Babuani’. The defendant has also admitted that he has not seen

the Khatian of Survey conducted in the year 1908 in view of that no document

was produced by the defendant in support of said averment before the learned

court. The claim was made by the defendant on the basis of sale deed, executed

in his favour by the wife of Durjo Mahato, Phool Mani Mahatain and daughters

of Durjo Mahato regarding land measuring 0.6 acres and 0.15 acres. Exhibit B was
13
filed by the defendant which was passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in

Objection Case No. 587/06-87 regarding suit land and other lands and order of the

Assistant Settlement Officer in which it was said that New Survey plot No. 82-83

has been shown as Anabad Bihar Sarkar and further TISCO was shown as lease

holder from the date of 1.1.56 and only possession and construction of the

defendant has been mentioned over plot no. 983. Thus, from the own document

of the defendant the possession of the plaintiff has been proved.

13. The learned court has found that the persons who have transferred

the land by registered sale deed are not legal person and it was not legally

executed and even rent receipt after registration was not produced before the

learned court.

14. In view of all these discussions the learned trial court has found that

plaintiff is in possession and all these issues have been decided in favour of the

plaintiff. The other issues have been further decided by judgment dated

14.10.2009 and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff-TISCO.

15. The said judgment of the learned trial court was challenged by the

appellant-defendant in Civil Appeal No. 56 of 2009 and by judgment dated

27.05.2024 the learned appellate court has dismissed the appeal affirming the

judgment of the learned trial court.

16. In para 11 of the judgment the learned appellate court has further

framed five points to decide the appeal. The point no. II was with regard to

perfect right, title and interest and point no. III was perfect right, title of the

defendant and both these points were taken up together by the learned appellate

court. The learned appellate court has further elaborately dealt with all the

documents as well as witnesses. The learned appellate court has found

considering the materials available on record as well as the arguments that

plaintiff-Tata Steel has acquired the land before the Revisional Survey Settlement

1937 by the then Provincial Government under the provision of the Land
14
Acquisition Act and the title and possession of the same was conveyed to the

plaintiff under the provision of the said Act and accordingly, the suit land was

recorded in the name and possession of the plaintiff in R.S. Khata No. 77 as its

Khas vacant land in R.S. Settlement of 1937. It was an admitted case of the

plaintiff that in settlement of 1937, R.S. Plot No. 416 along with other plots has

been recorded in the name of Makar Majhi in R.S. Khata No. 30 as tenant under

the plaintiff and the possession of the same was regained by him Rent Execution

Case No. 436 of 1939-40 in Execution of Certificate of Sale by the Rent Suit

Deputy Collector, Jamshedpur and by the registered deed of surrender dated

11.03.1943 executed by Ranga Majhi. From the Exhibit-A which is lease deed

dated 01.08.1985 executed between the government of State of Bihar through

Deputy Collector, Singhbhum and Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited having its

registered office at Bombay wherein the mention of Khata No. 77 and 30

respectively with respect to plot no 401 and 416 which are the suit land as per

Schedule A and B of the plaint in view of that the learned appellate court has

come to the finding that the said land was leased out to TISCO and after abolition

of jamindari the government of Bihar (now Jharkhand) has amended the Land

Reforms Act, 1982 and with regard to some disputes the company has filed a writ

application before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the validity of the said

Act and during pendency of the same the agreement was made between the

parties and due to said reason the company has withdrawn the said writ

application and entered in this agreement with the government with certain terms

and conditions of the lease by the government in favour of the company with

respect to the suit land and other lands. The suit land including other lands were

leased out by the government in favour of the company for 40 years with effect

from 01.01.1956 with an option to the company for renewal of the same for a

period of 30 years on payment of rent to the government.

17. Exhibits 8, 9 and 9/A were further considered by the learned appellate
15
court which were khewat and khatian respectively which belongs to suit lands.

Exhibit 8 further suggests that the suit land was acquired by the government and

the same was conveyed by the Deed of Conveyance dated 19.01.1923 and

23.09.1929 in favour of Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd.. Exhibit 9 was the Survey

Records of Rights i.e khatian the suit land i.e plot no. 401 under khata no. 77

which is shown as Ánabad’ and the name of landlord is mentioned as Tata Iron

and Steel Company Ltd. All these facts have been further considered by the

learned appellate court and the suit was decided in favour fo the plaintiff.

18. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines lease. Section 107

of the Transfer of Property Act provides the manner in which a lease of an

immovable property is required to be made. The said section reads as follows:

“107. Leases how made.– A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for

any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a

registered instrument.

All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered

instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.

Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such

instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument

shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee:

Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the

Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from

year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any

class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral

agreement without delivery of possession.”

19. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act inter alia, provides that in

absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable

property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, shall be deemed to be lease

from year to year and that a lease of an immovable property for any other purpose
16
shall be deemed to be lease from month to month. Further the said section

prescribes the procedure for making of a lease between the parties mentioned

therein. It classifies the classes of lease in two categories. Mainly, ( i) a lease of

immovable property from year to year, or for a term exceeding a year, or lease

reserving a yearly rent, to be made by a registered document; and ( ii) all other

leases other than the above, to be made by registered instrument, or the said

lease to be made by an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.

20. Now coming to section 68 of the registration act, It is well settled that

even the Registrar, in exercise of power under Section 68 of the Registration Act,

cannot direct the Sub-Registrar not to register a document present to him for

registration if the document complies all the statutory requirements and

formalities. It is equally well settled that the Registrar cannot refuse to register a

document of the ground of under valuation nor can he inquire about the

correctness of the valuation given in the instrument.

21. So far limitation is concerned, learned appellate court has further

decided the point nos. I, IV and V simultaneously and has observed that it has

come in findings that the suit land was encroached by the defendants in the year

1978-79 which was found established by virtue of claim made by the defendant

through sale deed no. 1152 dated 4.7.46 and thus it is the admitted case of the

parties that a proceedings under section 144 and 145 Cr.P.C. was initiated in the

year, 1979 and the same proceeding was pending by filing a criminal revision on

subsequent dates and further it was admitted case of the plaintiff that proceeding

under section 83 of C.N.T. Act was also initiated through the case number being

Objection Case No. 587 of 1986-87 vide exhibit B and C and there was continuous

litigation till the filing of the suit by the defendant and in light of that the learned

appellate court found that the suit was well within time and that was answered

against the appellants/defendants.

22. In view of above findings of the learned courts, the Court finds
17
that there is no perversity in the judgments of the learned trial court as well as

learned appellate court. There is concurrent findings of two courts and the

defendants/appellants failed to prove their right, title and interest. Even if

proper appreciation of evidence is there perversity is completely unsustainable

however what has been discussed hereinabove the evidences have been rightly

appreciated by both the courts. There is no perversity.

23. The rational of section 100 C.P.C. is that if in reaching it’s the High

Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100 of C.P.C, it would

inevitably introduce in such decision an element of disconcerting unpredictability

as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Naresh and others

Vs. Hemant and others” (2020) 18 SCC 802.

24. In view of the above discussions the Court finds that what has

been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to admission of

the second appeal is not made out.

25. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis there is no

perversity in the judgment of both the courts and in absence of perversity, sitting

under section 100 of the C.P.C., the High Court is not required to admit this second

appeal in absence of any substantial question of law and accordingly, this second

appeal is dismissed. Pending, I.A., if any, stands disposed of.

( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)

Satyarthi/A.F.R.

18



Source link

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

Share post:

Subscribe

spot_imgspot_img

Popular

More like this
Related