Himachal Pradesh High Court
____________________________________________________________ vs Amar Singh on 21 April, 2025
( 2025:HHC:11450 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AT SHIMLA
LPA No.183 of 2025
Decided on: 21.04.2025
____________________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh and others
…Appellants
Versus
Amar Singh
…Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge
1Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the appellants: Mr. Rakesh Dhaulta, Additional
Advocate General.
For Respondent : Notice not issued
Per Ranjan Sharma, Judge
State of Himachal Pradesh, has come up
before this Court in Letters Patent Appeal, assailing
the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge in
Amar Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh &
others, CWP No.9090 of 2022, decided on 14.05.2024,
{herein, the Impugned judgement} whereby, the writ
petition filed by the Respondent herein-Writ petitioner
Amar Singh was allowed with directions to appellants
herein to initiate the acquisition proceedings of land
used for the construction of road, within a period of
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
-2- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
six weeks.
FACTUAL MATRIX IN WRIT PETITION IN
CWP No. 9090 OF 2022:
2 Respondent-writ petitioner, Amar Singh, filed
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, praying for a direction to the State Authorities-
Appellants herein to initiate acquisition proceedings
qua the land as described in writ petition under the
Land Acquisition Act and with second prayer to
allow exchange of 4 Marlas of government owned in
Khasra No 111 in lieu of 6 Marlas of his land in
Khasra No. 124, which was utilized for construction
of road during the year 1984-1985 from Hamirpur
to Sarkaghat via Bhukkar Bajoura, Tanamorh, Kalahu
[Amroh to Chandruhi as per reply].
In this background, the writ petition was
filed by respondent-Amar Singh herein.
STAND OF STATE IN WRIT PROCEEDINGS:
3. Appellants-State Authorities had filed a
reply to the writ petition stating that the petitioner
has neither any legal nor fundamental right. So far
as the construction of link road from Amroh to
Chandruhi, it was stated in Reply-Affidavit that road
-3- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
was constructed in the years 1984-1985, over Khasra
No. 124, situated in Mohal Tan-Amroh from Kilometers
0/000 to Kilometers 4/225 by the State Authorities-
Appellants herein. It was averred in the reply that
the land owners including writ petitioner-respondent
herein did not raise any objection at the time of
construction of road. It was pleaded that petitioner
had never raised any demand for compensation for
utilized land. It was averred that the road was
constructed as per their own demand and the villagers
have utilized aforesaid land. So far as the claim
of petitioner for exchanging his 6 Marlas of utilized
land in Khasra No 124 with 4 Marlas of government
land in exchange in Khasra No.111, the reply stated
that the petitioner was an encroacher on Government
land in Khasra No. 111 and Government land cannot
be exchanged in lieu of private land.
With aforesaid averments, the prayer was
made for dismissing the writ petition.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT DATED 14.5.2024:
4. The writ petition, CWP No. 9090 of 2022,
titled as Amar Singh versus State of Himachal
-4- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Pradesh and others was decided by Learned Single
Judge on 14.05.2024. So far as the claim of the
petitioner for compensation is concerned, Learned
Single Judge directed the appellants/respondents to
initiate acquisition proceedings for the land utilized
for the construction of road, within six weeks, after
negativating the contention of the State Authorities-
Appellants herein regarding delay and laches. So
far as second claim of the petitioner, for awarding
or giving him alternative piece of Government land
in Khara No.111, measuring 4 Marlas in lieu of
his 6 Marlas of land in Khasra No.124 utilized by
the State Authorities for construction of road, the
plea was not accepted by Learned Single Judge with
specific finding recorded in Para-4 of the judgment
that there was no policy which permits the exchange
of Government land in lieu of private land utilized
for construction of road by the State Authorities. In
this background, the writ petition was allowed only
to the limited extent of directing the State Authorities
-Appellants herein to initiate acquisition proceedings
for having utilized the land of the Respondent herein
-5- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
for construction of road in question.
PROCEEDINGS IN INSTANT LPA:
5. The judgment passed by the Learned Single
Judge on 14.05.2024 has been assailed in Letters
Patent Appeal by the State Authorities along with an
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, seeking
condonation of delay of 225 days in filing the
accompanying appeal. Vide even date, the delay was
condoned and CMP (M) No.268 of 2025 was allowed
by this Court.
However, in view of the nature of the
controversy involved, the instant appeal, LPA No 183
of 2025 was finally heard by this Court, at this stage
itself.
CONTENTIONS BY STATE AUTHORITIES IN
INSTANT APPEAL:
6. First contention of Learned State Counsel
for the appellants is that the impugned judgment dated
14.05.2024, passed by Learned Single Judge is contrary
to the facts of law and is erroneous judgment.
The above contention of the appellants is
misconceived for the reason that impugned judgment
dated 14.05.2024 has been passed by the Learned
-6- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Single Judge after discussing the factual matrix
and the contentions raised and the legal mandate
as applicable in the instant case. Thus, the contention
of Learned State Counsel is misconceived and devoid
of any merit.
7. Second contention of Learned State Counsel
is that the road was constructed during the years
1984-1985 and the writ petitioner-respondent had
offered the land for construction of road and had
neither raised by objection for construction of road
nor demanded any compensation at the relevant time.
It is contended that respondent-writ petitioner had
consented for construction of road and therefore, the
impugned judgment directing initiation of acquisition
proceedings for having utilized the land of the
Respondent writ petitioner for construction of road
is erroneous.
The above plea set up by Learned State
Counsel is without any merit, for the reason, that
the plea of consent cannot be presumed unless
some evidence of consent either in the form of
letter, writing or signatures or representation is placed
-7- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
on record. Plea of oral consent or no objection at
the time of construction cannot be used as a tool
to deprive the writ petitioner-respondent of his
legitimate entitlements i.e. compensation and when,
no such consent based on documentary evidence was
placed on record by the State Authorities, before the
writ court and even in LPA and thus the plea of
consent stands negativated.
7(i). Plea as set-up in the instant appeal by
the State Authorities denying claim for compensation
by asserting that the land was utilized on the basis
of oral consent of land owner-petitioner stands negated
by the Full Bench of this Court, in Shankar Dass
alias Shankru versus State of Himachal Pradesh
and others in CWP No. 1966 of 2010-C decided on
2.3.2013 [2013 SCC OnLine HP 681], mandating that
that the oral consent cannot be presumed until some
evidence of consent either in form of letter, writing
or signatures on a representation for construction of
road was placed on record by the State Authorities
therefore, in these circumstances, plea of oral consent
is not tenable, in the following terms:
-8- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
51. On the question of consent, I am of
the considered view that after the judgement in
Nokhia’s case, quoted hereinabove, the State should
not have constructed roads without taking
consent in writing from the land owners. If the
State did so, it did at its own peril. his Court had
issued clear cut directions which have held the field
since 1984 that the State should ensure that
roads are constructed only after the land owners
give informed consent.
52. Oral consent cannot be presumed
in the case of poor persons or those living
in rural or remote areas. In cases where parties
are rich and educated and they do not
approach this Court within a reasonable period, then
the Writ Court may direct them to approach the Civil
Court. But in cases where people are poor and
uneducated, it would invariably be better to take a
more liberal view.
53. The State also cannot plead consent
or implied consent only on the basis that
the road had been constructed. There must be
some better evidence in this regard. If some
evidence of consent, either in the form of letter,
writing or signatures on a representation for
construction of road, is placed before this
Court, then this Court may not exercise its
writ jurisdiction and direct the party to approach
the Civil Court. But if the only sort of
consent pleaded is the implied consent due
to construction of road, then this Court may
entertain the writ petition.
7(ii). Similar plea of divesting a land private
owner of his lands and in utilizing it for the
construction of road without paying compensation by
taking the “plea of consent of land owner(s)” was
repelled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Raj Kumar versus State of Himachal Pradesh
-9- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
and others, SLP (C) No. 2373 of 2014 [arising
from LPA No 285 of 2012], decided on 29.10.2015,
in the following terms:
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Anil
Nag, learned counsel for the appellant argued
that the High Court was in error in declining
to intervene and grant relief prayed for by
the appellant. It was submitted that the case
of the appellant was no different from that of
Kanwar Singh in whose case the High Court had
not only issued a Mandamus for acquisition
of the land utilised for the very same purpose
but order so passed had been complied with
by the State by not only initiating the proceedings
but even determining and paying compensation
lawfully due and payable to them. In the case
of the appellant also the State had on its own
initiated proceedings for acquisition of land
but the said proceedings were allowed to lapse
ostensibly because the road in question had
subsequently been taken over under the
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna which
did not provide for payment of compensation
to the land owners whose lands were utilised
for such projects. It was urged that the utilisation
of the land for construction of the road was
not in dispute before the High Court as was
evident from the counter affidavit filed to the
writ petition. There was therefore no question
of directing the appellant to approach the Civil
Court for adjudication of any disputed question
of fact. It was also submitted that the transfer
of the road to the Pradhan Mantri Sadak
Yojna for maintenance etc. was no reason
why the owners whose land had been utilised
should have been denied the payment
of compensation otherwise due to them. It was
urged that the State had never claimed that
the erstwhile owner of the land and the
predecessor in interest of the appellant herein
had made any formal or informal donation of
the land in favour of the State to facilitate
the construction of the road. In the absence of
even an assertion that the road was
constructed on the invitation of the erstwhile
– 10 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
owner, the High Court was in error in declining
to grant relief to the appellant who had
lost his valuable land and thereby the
source of livelihood. The remedy in a civil
court was neither speedy nor efficacious. It
was urged that the appellant would be satisfied
in case the actual extent of land utilised
by the State out of his ownership is verified
by the Collector and compensation determined
in Kanwar Singh’s case under Award No. 10
of 2008 directed to be paid to the appellant
depending upon the classification of the
land that has been utilised by the State Government.
It is urged that the appellant would keeping
in view the intervening delay give up his
right to claim compensation for the user of the
land without acquisition and payment of statutory
interest recoverable on the said amount. This
would according to the learned counsel not only
serve the ends of justice but also prevent any
further litigation in the matter. It was submitted
that this Court could in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case and with a view to
giving a quietus to the entire controversy make
a suitable order that would meet the ends of
justice.
There is in our opinion considerable
merit in the submission made by Mr. Nag.
It is true that the appellant had approached
the High Court rather belatedly inasmuch
the land had been utilised sometime in
the year 1985-86 while the writ petition
was filed by the appellant in the year 2009.
At the same time it is clear from the
pleadings in the case at hand that the user
of the land owned by the appellant is
not denied by the State in the counter affidavit
filed before the High Court or that filed
before us. It is also evident from the averments
made in the counter affidavit that the State
has not sought any donation in its favour
either by the appellant or his predecessor in
interest during whose life time the road in
question was constructed. All that is stated
in the counter affidavit is that the erstwhile
owner of the land “might have donated” the
land to the State Government. In the absence
– 11 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
of any specific assertion regarding any such
donation or documentary evidence to support
the same, we are not inclined to accept the
ipsit dixit suggesting any such donation. If
that be so as it indeed is, we fail to appreciate
why the State should have given up the land
acquisition proceedings initiated by it in relation to
the land of the appellant herein. The fact that
the State Government had initiated such
proceedings is not in dispute nor is it disputed
that the same were allowed to lapse just because
the road had in the meantime been taken
under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna.
It is also not in dispute that for the very
same road the land owned by Kanwar Singh
another owner had not only been notified
for acquisition but duly paid for in terms
of Award No. 10 of 2008.
7(iii). Plea of the State Authorities that the land
was utilized on the basis of the oral consent given
by land-owner(s) was negated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Vidya Devi versus State of
Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569,
which reads as under:
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not
have been forcibly dispossessed of her property
without any legal sanction and without
following due process of law and depriving
her payment of just compensation, being a
fundamental right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the
appellant or her predecessors had “orally”
consented to the acquisition is completely
baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting
the appellant of her property by the
State.
- 12 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
7(iv). In Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022)
7 SCC 508, {i.e. CA No 2773 of 2022}, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that in absence of any
material on record, the plea of verbal consent or
the fact that the land owner did not raise any
objection cannot be used to deny compensation, in
the following terms:
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the
State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to
be rejected. The State has merely averred to
the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the
lack of objection, but has not placed any
material on record to substantiate this plea.
Further, the State was unable to produce any
evidence indicating that the land of the appellants
had been taken over or acquired in the manner
known to law, or that they had ever paid any
compensation. It is pertinent to note that this
was the State’s position, and subsequent findings
of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other
writ proceedings.
22. This court is also not moved by the
State’s contention that since the property
is not adjoining to that of the appellants,
it disentitles them from claiming benefit on
the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining
(which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed
by the appellants), it is clear that the subject
land was acquired for the same reason-construction
of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and
much like the claimants before the reference court,
these appellants too were illegally dispossessed
without following due process of law, thus
resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting
the High Court’s intervention under Article 226
– 13 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent
to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants
were entitled to compensation in terms of
law. The need for written consent in matters
of land acquisition proceedings, has been
noted in fact, by the full court decision of
the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself,
which is relied upon in the impugned judgment.
7(v). The judgment in the case of Sukh Dutt
Ratra (supra) was again taken in Review Petition
(Civil) Diary No. 7253 of 2023 titled as The State
of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Sukh Dutt
Ratra, resulting in dismissal of review petition on
03.08.2023 in the following terms:
Review Petition (Civil) Diary No 7253 /2023
“Delay condoned.
Instant petition has been filed by the petitioners for
review of order dated 6.4.2022 passed by
this Court in CA No 2773 of 2022.
Having carefully perused the petition for
review and the papers connected therewith,
we do not find any reason for reconsideration
of the above mentioned order.
The Review petition is accordingly dismissed.”
Thus, taking into account the material
on record in the writ proceedings and even in
instant Letters Patent Appeal, this Court is of
the considered view, that the State Authorities have
not placed any material on record to substantiate
– 14 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
the plea of verbal consent by writ petitioner(s)-
private land owner and in absence of any proof
of “consent on the basis of cogent and concrete
evidence-material” the action of the State Authorities
in depriving the landowner-writ petitioner of his land(s)
and in divesting a land owner of the right to get
compensation for his lands but in utilizing such land
for the construction of road, being without sanction
of law does not stands the test of judicial scrutiny.
In absence of any material, contention of Learned
State Counsel is misconceived on facts and also
in view of the mandate of law in the case of
Shankar Dass, Raj Kumar, Vidya Devi and Sukh
Dutt Ratra (supra).
Thus, once the Appellants-State Authorities
have not placed on record any material to substantiate
the plea of consent or willingness by writ petitioner
-respondent at the time for construction of said road
then, the aforesaid plea without being supported by
any material on record cannot be used to deprive
the petitioner of legal entitlement for compensation,
admissible to him.
– 15 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
8. Third contention of Learned State Counsel
is that claim for compensation was hit by principle
of delay and laches.
The above contention of Learned State
Counsel is devoid of any merit, for the reason, that
after construction of road in question and awaiting
initiation of land acquisition proceedings, which was
an act to performed by the State Authorities under
the Land Acquisition Statutes so as to enable the
release of compensation, the writ petitioner-respondent
had moved an application to revenue authorities on
15.01.2004, Annexure P-5, on the plea that once
the State Authorities have utilized 6 Marlas of his
land situated in Khasra No.124 for construction of
road in question then, the writ petitioner-respondent
may be given Government land in exchange in Khasra
No.111. The application dated 15.01.2004, Annexure
P-5, was forwarded by Assistant Collector, 1st Grade,
Bhoranj to District Collector Hamirpur on 07.01.2005,
which is borne out from report of Assistant Collector,
1st Grade, Bhoranj dated 18.2.2005 Annexure P-3
with the writ file. Material on record with the writ
– 16 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
file reveals that even the Sub-Divisional Officer
[Civil], Bhoranj has sent a communication to the
Collector Hamirpur, Annexure P-6, for considering his
case for exchange of land as per report of the
revenue staff. Ultimately, on 30.05.2022, Annexure P-9,
District Revenue Officer on behalf of the Collector
Hamirpur rejected the case of petitioner for exchange
of private land utilized for construction of road with
other Government land. Thus, once the case of
petitioner was rejected on 30.05.2022, Annexure P-9,
denying benefit of exchange of land, awaiting the
initiation of acquisition proceedings by State and
therefore, the writ petition filed after passing of
rejection orders on 02.12.2022, on facts, does not
suffer any delay and laches.
The plea of delay and laches as put-forth
by Learned State Counsel needs to be examined
from another angle also. Once it is an admitted case
of the State Authorities-Appellants that they had
utilized 6 Marlas of land situated in Khasra No
124 in Mohal Tan-Amroh, Tehsil Bhoranj, District
Hamirpur and further admitted in the communication
– 17 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
dated 24.08.2021, Annexure P-4, that the road,
Amroh-Chandruhi was constructed by State and
after construction of road, this road has been marked
as Gair Mumkin Sadak as per Jamabandi for the
years 2017-2018, therefore, in these circumstances
once the land of the writ petitioner stood utilized
then, deprivation of compensation cannot be defeated
by invoking the defense of delay and laches or
limitation when, the deprivation of compensation relates
to a continuing cause of action and denial of
compensation, certainly shocks the conscious of this
Court as the writ petitioner-respondent has been
deprived of his legal entitlement by the State Authorities
-Appellants.
8(i). Repelling the contention of delay and laches
or limitation the Hon’ble Supreme Court mandated
that the defence of delay and laches or limitation
will not apply, if the case relates to a continuing
cause of action or if circumstances shocks the
conscious of the Court while exercising constitutional
jurisdiction so as to do substantial justice in Vidya
Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and
– 18 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, in the following terms:
12.12. The contention advanced by the State
of delay and laches of the appellant in moving
the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay
and laches cannot be raised in a case
of a continuing cause of action, of if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of
the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of
judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and
circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights and the remedy
claimed and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed
for the courts to exercise their constitutional
jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice
is so compelling, a constitutional court would
exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote
justice, and not defeat it.
8(ii). Negativating the contention of delay and
laches in case a person was forcibly dispossessed
of private property without following due process
of law and by mandating that there cannot be a
limitation for doing justice the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7
SCC 508 after following the mandate in the case
of Vidya Devi (supra), in the following terms:
“16. Given the important protection extended
to an individual vis-a-vis their private
property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and
now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and
the high threshold the State must meet while
– 19 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
acquiring land, the question remains- can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and
laches, evade its legal responsibility towards
those from whom private property has been
expropriated? In these facts and circumstances,
we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and
warranting intervention on the grounds of equity
and fairness.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. This court is also not moved by the
State’s contention that since the property
is not adjoining to that of the appellants,
it disentitles them from claiming benefit
on the ground of parity. Despite it not being
adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit
filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject
land was acquired for the same reason-construction
of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much
like the claimants before the reference court, these
appellants too were illegally dispossessed without
following due process of law, thus resulting
in violation of Article 31 and warranting the
High Court’s intervention under Article 226
jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent
to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants
were entitled to compensation in terms of law.
The need for written consent in matters of land
acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact,
by the full court decision of the High Court in
Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon
in the impugned judgment.
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession
of a person of their private property without
following due process of law, was violative of
both their human right, and constitutional right
under Article 300-A, this court allowed the
appeal. We find that the approach taken by
this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely
applicable to the nearly identical facts before
us in the present case.
8(iii). A coordinate Division Bench of this Court
based on the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi, Vidya
– 20 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) had outlined
in LPA No. 54 of 2017, In re: State of Himachal
Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar and
other connected matters decided on 27.3.2024 that
the objection regarding limitation or delay and laches
cannot be permitted to come in the way so as render
do substantial justice when, the action of forcible
deprivation of private land owner from his property
was without sanction of law resulting in expropriation
of property by the State, resulting in a continuing
cause of action and/or such act shocks the judicial
conscience in the following terms:
10. It is now trite law that in dealing
with constitutional rights in the exercise
of writ jurisdiction, one can no longer
apply mutatis mutandis, the time frame
stipulated in limitation law as if they were
attracted. The issue has been dealt with time
and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
particularly in the context of land acquisition.
11. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through
Power-of-Attorney Holder versus Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation and others
(2013) 1 SCC 353 (“Tukaram”), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional
right to property could not be defeated on
technical grounds citing delay. Though, in the
case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar
(1995) 4 SCC 683 (“Digambar”) the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had denied relief to farmers
on the ground of delay, but delay was not
simply declared to be an absolute bar on filing
of a writ petition.
– 21 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
12. It cannot be disputed that while deciding
Tukaram’s case (supra), Digambar‘s case
(supra) had not been noticed, but the same
was later noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in a fairly recent case of Sukh Dutt
Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh
and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 (“Sukh Dutt Ratra”)
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt
with a number of its judgments to emphasis that
there can be no “limitation” to do justice if
it is clear that the right to property has
been intruded into without due process of
law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repelled
the citation of delay and laches in enforcement
of the constitutional right to property in land.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, as observed above,
has considered the case of Digambar.
13. Thus, the law as stands today is that
the State cannot, on the ground of delay
and laches, evade its responsibility towards
those from whom private property has been
expropriated. In any case, what principles a
Court must apply while assessing whether a
writ petition is so hopelessly barred by delays
and laches that a remedy is not worthy of
consideration, is well articulated in Maharashtra
SRTC versus Balwant Regular Motor Service
AIR 1969 SC 329 and these principles stand
extracted and endorsed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra‘s case (supra) wherein
it was held as under:
“16. Given the important protection
extended to an individual vis-a-vis their
private property (embodied earlier in Article
31, and now as a constitutional right
in Article 300-A), and the high threshold
the State must meet while acquiring land,
the question remains-can the State, merely
on the ground of delay and laches, evade
its legal responsibility towards those from
whom private property has been
expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion
to be unacceptable, and warranting
intervention on the grounds of equity and
fairness.
– 22 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent
that the State’s actions, or lack thereof,
have in fact compounded the injustice
meted out to the appellants and compelled
them to approach this court, albeit belatedly.
The initiation of acquisition proceedings
initially in the 1990s occurred only at the
behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued
to only extend the benefit of the court’s
directions to those who specifically
approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from
this action of initiating acquisition
proceedings selectively, only in respect
to the lands of those writ petitioners who
had approached the court in earlier
proceedings, and not other land owners,
pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007
(in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC
Online HP 220) and 20.12.2013 (in Onkar
Singhvs. State, CWP No. 1356/2010)
respectively. In this manner, at every
stage, the State sought to shirk its
responsibility of acquiring land required
for public use in the manner prescribed
by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents
on delay and laches which conclude
either way-as contended by both sides
in the present dispute-however, the specific
factual matrix compels this court to weigh
in favour of the appellant-land owners.
The State cannot shield itself behind the
ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’
to doing justice. This court in a much
earlier case-Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service (1969) 1 SCR 808, held:
“11……Now the doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary
or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give
a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent
– 23 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation
in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material.
But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would
be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting
to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of
the acts done during the interval,
which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
14. By now, it is well settled that right
to property though no longer a fundamental right
and is otherwise a zealous possession of which
one cannot be divested save and except by
the authority of law as is enjoined by Article
300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous
inaction or apathy of the State and its
instrumentalities, in securing just compensation
would amount to dereliction of a constitutional
duty justifying issuance of writ of mandamus
for appropriate remedial directions.
8(iv). The judgment in Upender Kumar’s case
(supra) was taken by State Authorities in SLP (C)
No. 49057 of 2024, titled as The State of Himachal
Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar wherein,
after cautioning the State Authorities with exemplary
– 24 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
costs, the SLP was dismissed on 22.11.2024, in
the following terms:
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s).
49057/2024
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and
order dated 27-03-2024 in LPA No. 54/2017 passed
by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at
Shimla]THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH &
ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UPENDER KUMAR
Respondent(s)
1. Delay condoned.
2. We have come across several matters
wherein the State of Himachal Pradesh has
challenged the orders passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh,
thereby directing the compensation to be
paid to the respondent(s).
3. The writ petitioner(s) has approached
the High Court with a grievance that though
the possession of their lands were taken for
road construction, they did not receive
compensation.
4. By the impugned judgment and order,
the High Court has held that the State cannot take
possession of citizen land without paying the
compensation.
5. Although the right to property is no
longer considered a fundamental right, it is still a
constitutional right. The State cannot be
permitted to acquire citizen land without paying
appropriate compensation.
6. In these circumstances, it would have been
justified in dismissing the special leave petition(s)
with exemplary cost. However, we refrain from
doing so now and simply dismiss these special leave
petitions.
8(v). While dealing with a claim by landlord
– 25 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
for compensation, who was non suited on the
ground of delay and laches, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
allowed the compensation by negating the plea of
delay and laches, so as to rectify injustice and
moreso when, the right of an individual to vindicate
and protect private property could not be brushed
aside by invoking delay and laches in Urban
Improvement Trust versus Vidhya Devi and others,
Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024 decided on 13.12.2024
in the following terms:
45. Having heard the learned counsels appearing
for the parties and having gone through the
materials on record, the following questions fall
for our consideration:
(i) Whether the High Court committed
any error in taking the view that the
respondents herein should be non-suited
on the ground of delay and laches?
46. As regards the appellant’s challenge
to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing
of the writ petitions by the respondents,
we are of the view that the same needs to be
considered in the facts and circumstances of the
case. While it is true that the courts have
consistently held that undue delay in approaching
the court can be a ground for refusing relief,
the courts have also recognized that in
exceptional cases, where the impugned action
is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights,
the delay must be condoned.
47. It is pertinent for us to consider the
judgment of this Court in Vidya Devi v. State
of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 2 SCC
569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as
– 26 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
follows:
12.13. In a case where the demand for
justice is so compelling, a constitutional
court would exercise its jurisdiction with
a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.,
(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
[Emphasis supplied]
48. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated
by this Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of
Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 7 SCC 508
wherein the court opined that there cannot
be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice….”.
50. This Court in its decision in Ramchandra
Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, reported
in (1974) 1 SCC 317 held that:
“10. … There was a delay of more than
ten or twelve years in filing the petition since
the accrual of the cause of complaint, and
this delay, contended the respondents,
was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners
to any relief in a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution. We do not think
this contention should prevail with
us. In the first place, it must be remembered
that the rule which says that the Court
may not inquire into belated and stale
claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of
practice based on sound and proper
exercise of discretion, and there is no
inviolable rule that whenever there is
delay, the Court must necessarily refuse
to entertain the petition. Each case
must depend on its own facts. The question,
as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J.,
in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi
[(1969) 1 SCC 110] “is one of discretion
for this Court to follow from case to case.
There is no lower limit and there is no
upper limit…. It will all depend on what
the breach of the fundamental right and
the remedy claimed are and how the delay
arose”. …[ SCC para 11] …”
(Emphasis supplied)
– 27 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently
held that the right to property is enshrined in
the Constitution and requires that procedural
safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and
non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in
cases of acquisition by the State. Therefore,
the delay in approaching the court, while a
significant factor, cannot override the necessity
to address illegalities and protect right to
property enshrined in Article 300A. The court
must balance the need for finality in legal
proceedings with the need to rectify injustice.
The right of an individual to vindicate and
protect private property cannot be brushed
away merely on the grounds of delay and
laches.
{Emphasis Ours}
Based on the factual matrix and the
legal mandate as discussed hereinabove, this Court is
of the considered view that once the State Authorities
have curtailed the constitutional right of the writ
petitioner i.e. by forcibly depriving him of his property
without sanction of law and in depriving such land
owner of the compensation by utilizing the land of
writ petitioner, even though for a public purpose i.e.
construction of road. This action of State Authorities
has certainly resulted in civil consequences, by depriving
the land owner-writ petitioner of his right to reap
the benefits accruing from his land resulting in
recurring loss and this action has shocked the
conscience of this Court. In these circumstances,
– 28 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
the plea of delay and laches cannot be permitted
to be raised by the State so as to safeguard
the rights of writ petitioner so as to rectify injustice
and to enable the writ petitioner to get compensation
for his land, from which he was forcibly and illegally
dispossessed in the teeth of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A
of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, in facts of
this case, the plea of delay and laches needs to
be brushed aside so as to rectify injustice and to
render substantial justice to the writ petitioner.
Accordingly, the contention of Learned State Counsel
based on delay and laches does not stand the test
of judicial scrutiny and the same is rejected.
9. Fourth contention of Learned State Counsel
is that the judgment in the case of State of
Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683
has not been considered by the Learned Single Judge
is misconceived when, the Learned Single Judge had
referred to the judgment in the case of Sukh Dutt
Ratra (supra), wherein, the judgment in Digambar’s
case (supra) as discussed in the case of Vidya Devi
(supra) was relied upon and based on the aforesaid
– 29 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
judgment(s), the plea of delay and laches was negated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, the contention
of Learned State Counsel does not stand test of
judicial scrutiny and is accordingly turned down.
10. Fifth contention of Learned State Counsel
is that the judgment in case of Rajiv versus State
of Himachal Pradesh has not been considered by
the Learned Single Judge.
The above contention is contrary to the
records, when no such judgment was made part
of reply affidavit before the writ Court and even,
in instant appeal, no such judgment has been
referred and relied upon during the hearing today.
Even on a query by this Court, Learned State
Counsel was unable to point out the aforesaid judgment,
as quoted in grounds of appeal today.
11. Last contention of Learned State Counsel is
that the writ petitioner-respondent did not raise
the claim for compensation and, therefore, plea for
compensation could not have been acceded to by
the Learned Single Judge while passing the impugned
judgment dated 14.05.2024.
– 30 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
The above plea of Learned State Counsel
is misconceived and devoid of any merit for the
reason that writ petitioner-respondent could not have
been deprived of his property, saved by authority of
law, in view of the mandate of Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India. Merely by an executive fiat
and without there being any specific legal authority
or sanctity of law, made by competent legislature,
the action of State Authorities in depriving the
writ petitioner-respondent of his property and that
too in an unlawful and unfair manner and without
any sanctity of law cannot be a ground for denying
compensation to the writ petitioner, for having
utilized his 6 Marlas of land for construction of
road, situated in Khasra No 124, is admitted by the
State Authorities, by reflecting this constructed road,
on the land of writ petitioner as Gair Mumkin
Sadak, in the revenue records i.e. Jamabandi for
years 2017-2018, which is borne out from the writ
records, Annexure P-1.
12. Based on the principle of eminent domain
at relevant time, Article 30(1-A) and provisos to
– 31 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution of India recognized
the right to property and the right of a person to
acquire, hold and dispose of property was conferred
the status of a fundamental right. However, keeping
in view the directive principles of state policy, the
right of property which was a fundamental right,
after the enactment of the 44th amendment in 1978,
introducing Article 300-A in the Constitution of India
mandating that “no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law” was recognized as
a “constitutional right”.
12(i). Consequent upon being recognized as a
constitutional right, a question arose as to whether
a person can be deprived of his property, save
by authority of law under Article 300-A, merely
by an executive fiat but without any specific
legal authority or without sanctity of law made
by a competent legislature was answered by the
Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in K. T. Plantation Private Limited and another vs
State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 01 mandating
that the deprivation of property under Article 300-A
– 32 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
must be for a public purpose and the same cannot
be by an executive fiat but such deprivation can
take place only by operation of law, which has to
be lawful, fair and which does not undermine the
rule of law, failing which any such law shall be
subject to judicial review, in the following terms:
168. Article 300-A proclaims that no person
can be deprived of his property save by
authority of law, meaning thereby that a
person cannot be deprived of his property
merely by an executive fiat, without any
specific legal authority or without the support
of law made by a competent legislature. The
expression ‘Property’ in Art. 300-A confined not
to land alone, it includes intangibles like
copyrights and other intellectual property and
embraces every possible interest recognised
by law.
169. This Court in State of W. B. & Others
v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd &
Another (2002) 4 SCC 134, while examining the
provisions of the West Bengal Great Eastern
Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980,
held in the context of Article 300-A that the
State or executive offices cannot interfere with
the right of others unless they can point out
the specific provisions of law which authorizes
their rights.
170. Article 300-A, therefore, protects private
property against executive action. But the
question that looms large is as to what extent
their rights will be protected when they are
sought to be illegally deprived of their properties
on the strength of a legislation. Further, it was
also argued that the twin requirements of ‘public
purpose’ and ‘compensation’ in case of deprivation
of property are inherent and essential elements
or ingredients, or “inseparable concomitants” of
the power of eminent domain and, therefore, of
– 33 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
entry 42, List III, as well and, hence, would
apply when the validity of a statute is in question.
171. On the other hand, it was the contention
of the State that since the Constitution consciously
omitted Article 19 (1) (f), Articles 31(1) and 31(2),
the intention of the Parliament was to do away
the doctrine of eminent domain which highlights
the principles of public purpose and compensation.
172. Seervai in his celebrated book
‘Constitutional Law of India’ (Edn. IV), spent
a whole Chapter XIV on the 44th Amendment, while
dealing with Article 300A. In paragraph 15.2
(pages 1157-1158) the author opined that
confiscation of property of innocent people for
the benefit of private persons is a kind of
confiscation unknown to our law and whatever
meaning the word “acquisition” may have does
not cover “confiscation” for, to confiscate means
“to appropriate to the public treasury (by way
of penalty)”. Consequently, the law taking private
property for a public purpose without compensation
would fall outside Entry 42 List III and cannot
be supported by another Entry in List III.
173. Requirements of a public purpose and
the payment of compensation according to
the learned author be read into Entry 42
List III. Further the learned author has also
opined that the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2)
could have repercussions on other fundamental
rights or other provisions which are to be regarded
as part of the basic structure and also stated
that notwithstanding the repeal of Article 31(2),
the word “compensation” or the concept thereof
is still retained in Article 30 (1A) and in the
second proviso to Article 31A (1) meaning thereby,
that payment of compensation is a condition
of legislative power in Entry 42 List III.
174. Learned senior counsel Shri T.R. Andhyarujina,
also referred to the opinion expressed by another
learned author Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in his
article “Right to Property after 44th Amendment –
Better Protected than Ever Before” (reported
in AIR 1980 J pg. 49-52). Learned author expressed
the opinion and the right of the individual to
receive compensation when his property is
acquired or requisitioned by the State, continues
– 34 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
to be available in the form of an implied
condition of the power of the State to legislate on
“acquisition or requisition of property” while
all the exceptions and limitations set up against
and around it in Article 31, 31A and 31B
have disappeared. Learned author opined that
Article 300-A will require obviously, that the law
must be a valid law and no law of acquisition or
requisitioning can be valid unless the acquisition
or requisition is for a public purpose, unless
there is provision in law for paying compensation,
will continue to have a meaning given to it, by
Bela Banerjee’s case (supra).
175. Learned author, Shri S.B. Sathe, in
his article “Right to Property after the 44th
Amendment” (AIR 1980 Journal 97), to some extent,
endorsed the view of Prof. Tripathi and opined
that the 44th amendment has increased the
scope of judicial review in respect of right to
property. Learned author has stated although
Article 300A says that no one shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law, there
is no reason to expect that this provision
would protect private property only against
executive action. Learned author also expresses
the wish that Article 21 may provide viable
check upon Article 300A.
176. Durga Das Basu in his book “Shorter
Constitution of India”, 13th Edition, dealt
with Article 300A in Chapter IV wherein the
learned author expressed some reservation
about the views expressed by Seervai, as well as
Prof. Tripathi Learned author expressed the view,
that after the 44th amendment Act there is no
express provision in the Constitution outside
the two cases specified under Article 30(1A)
and the second proviso to 31(1A) requiring the
State to pay compensation to an expropriated
owner. Learned author also expressed the opinion
that no reliance could be placed on the legislative
Entry 42 of List III so as to claim compensation
on the touchstone of fundamental rights since
the entry in a legislative list does not confer
any legislative power but only enumerates fields of
legislation.
177. Learned counsel on the either side,
– 35 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
apart from other contentions, highlighted the
above views expressed by the learned authors
to urge their respective contentions.
178. Principles of eminent domain, as
such, is not seen incorporated in Article
300-A, as we see, in Article 30(1A), as well as
in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) though we
can infer those principles in Article 300A.
Provision for payment of compensation has been
specifically incorporated in Article 30(1A) as
well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) for
achieving specific objectives. Constitution’s 44th
Amendment Act, 1978 while omitting Article 31
brought in a substantive provision Clause (1A)
to Article 30. Resultantly, though no individual
or even educational institution belonging to majority
community shall have any fundamental right
to compensation in case of compulsory acquisition
of his property by the State, an educational
institution belonging to a minority community
shall have such fundamental right to claim
compensation in case State enacts a law providing
for compulsory acquisition of any property
of an educational institution established and
administered by a minority community. Further,
the second proviso to Article 31 A (1)
prohibits the Legislature from making a
law which does not contain a provision
for payment of compensation at a rate not
less than the market value which follows that
a law which does not contain such provision
shall be invalid and the acquisition proceedings
would be rendered void.
179. Looking at the history of the
various constitutional amendments, judicial
pronouncements and the statement of objects and
reasons contained in the 44th Amendment Bill
which led to the 44th Amendment Act we have
no doubt that the intention of the Parliament
was to do away with the fundamental right to
acquire, hold and dispose of the property.
But the question is whether the principles of
eminent domain are completely obliterated when
a person is deprived of his property by the
authority of law under Article 300 A of the
Constitution.
- 36 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Public purpose
180. Deprivation of property within the
meaning of Art. 300-A, generally speaking, must
take place for public purpose or public interest.
The concept of eminent domain which
applies when a person is deprived of his property
postulates that the purpose must be primarily
public and not primarily of private interest and
merely incidentally beneficial to the public.
Any law, which deprives a person of his private
property for private interest, will be unlawful
and unfair and undermines the rule of law
and can be subjected to judicial review. But
the question as to whether the purpose is
primarily public or private, has to be decided by
the legislature, which of course should be made
known.
12(ii). Another question arose before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Plantation (supra)
as to whether a person who is deprived of property
for public purpose is entitled to get compensation has
to be justified by the State on judicially justifiable
standards depending upon the law formulated by
a State, which has to be just, fair and reasonable.
In case, State enactment provides for acquiring a
private property for public purpose for no compensation
or nil compensation then, the Court in exercise of
judicial review will test such a law, as mandated in
the following terms:
183. Payment of compensation amount
is a constitutional requirement under Article
30(1A) and under the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1),
– 37 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
unlike Article 300A. After the 44th Amendment
Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay
compensation to a person who is deprived of
his property primarily depends upon the terms
of the statute and the legislative policy. Article
300-A, however, does not prohibit the payment of
just compensation when a person is deprived
of his property, but the question is whether
a person is entitled to get compensation,
as a matter of right, in the absence of any
stipulation in the statute, depriving him of
his property.
189. Requirement of public purpose, for
deprivation of a person of his property under
Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no
compensation or nil compensation or its
illusiveness has to be justified by the state on
judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed
to achieve greater social justice, may call for
lesser compensation and such a limitation by
itself will not make legislation invalid or
unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words,
the right to claim compensation or the
obligation to pay, though not expressly included
in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that
Article and it is for the State to justify its
stand on justifiable grounds which may depend
upon the legislative policy, object and purpose
of the statute and host of other factors.
190. Article 300A would be equally violated
if the provisions of law authorizing deprivation
of property have not been complied with. While
enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed
Article 31(1) [the “Rule of law” doctrine] and
not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of
Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the
State to put restrictions on the right to
property by law. That law has to be reasonable.
It must comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. The limitation or restriction
should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is
beyond what is required in public interest.
The limitation or restriction must not be
disproportionate to the situation or excessive.
191. The legislation providing for deprivation
of property under Article 300A must be “just,
– 38 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
fair and reasonable” as understood in terms of
Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus in
each case, courts will have to examine the
scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose
as also the question whether payment of nil
compensation or nominal compensation would
make the impugned law unjust, unfair or
unreasonable in terms of other provisions of
the Constitution as indicated above.
192. At this stage, we may clarify that there
is a difference between “no” compensation and
“nil” compensation. A law seeking to acquire
private property for public purpose cannot
say that “no compensation shall be paid”.
However, there could be a law awarding “nil”
compensation in cases where the State undertakes
to discharge the liabilities charged on the
property under acquisition and onus is on the
government to establish validity of such law.
In the latter case, the court in exercise of judicial
review will test such a law keeping in mind the
above parameters.
198. Article 300 A, unlike Articles 31A(1) and 31C,
has not made the legislation depriving a person of
his property immune from challenge on the
ground of violation of Article 14 or Article
21 of the Constitution of India, but let us
first examine whether Article 21 as such is
available to challenge a statute providing
for no or illusory compensation and, hence,
expropriatory.
12(iii). Reference in the case of K. T. Plantation
(supra) was answered by the Supreme Court mandating
that public purpose is a pre-condition for depriving
a person from his property under Article 300-A and
right to claim compensation is also inbuilt under
that Article and when a person is deprived of his
property the State has to justify such deprivation on
– 39 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
the basis of the statute or legislative policy and its
object and purpose and other related factors.
12(iv). The judgment in K. T. Plantation‘s case
was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Association of Vasanth Apartments’ Owners versus
V. Gopinath and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
137, Civil Appeal No. 1890-91 of 2010, decided
on 13.02.2023 that illegal deprivation is attracted
where a person is deprived of his property, in case
of “no compensation” in the following terms:
118. The Court also reiterated the distinction
between ‘no compensation’ and ‘Nil compensation’,
as laid down in K.T. Plantations (supra). The
Court proceeded to find that it was a case
of ‘no compensation’ at all, and therefore,
it attracted the vice of illegal deprivation
of property and gave relief on the said basis.
This is after finding that the property in question
was a productive asset.
144. An acquisition is a compulsory vesting
of the property of a person with the state. It is
traceable undoubtedly to the power of eminent
domain assured to every sovereign. It can
undoubtedly be exercised only for securing
public interest as contrasted with promotion
of private interest (See K.T. Plantation (supra).
145. K.T. Plantations (supra) was a case
which involved the validity of a law which provided
for compulsory acquisition under the State
enactment. The understanding of this Court
in K.T. Plantations (supra) was that a person
cannot be deprived of his property merely
by executive fiat without any specific legal
authority or without support of law made
– 40 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
by a competent Legislature. We must notice
here that law for the scope of Article 300A has
been explained by this Court in Bishambhar
Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others as follows:
“41. There still remains the question whether
the seizure of wheat amounts to deprivation
of property without the authority of
law. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. The State
Government cannot while taking recourse
to the executive power of the State
under Article 162, deprive a person of his
property. Such power can be exercised
only by authority of law and not by
a mere executive fiat or order. Article
162, as is clear from the opening words,
is subject to other provisions of the
Constitution. It is, therefore, necessarily
subject to Article 300-A. The word “law”
in the context of Article 300-A must
mean an Act of Parliament or of a State
legislature, a rule, or a statutory order,
having the force of law, that is positive
or State made law. The decisions in
Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [AIR 1954 SC
415: (1955) 1 SCR 408 : 1954 SCJ 600 : 1954
Cri LJ 1029] and Bishan Das v. State
of Punjab [AIR 1961 SC 1570 : (1962) 2
SCR 69 : (1963) 1 SCJ 405] are an
authority for the proposition that an illegal
seizure amounts to deprivation of property
without the authority of law…..”.
146. What this Court in K. T. Plantations
(supra) meant was to distinguish ‘law’ as a
legislative measure as distinct from mere
Executive fiat.
12(v). Right for compensation in case the property
of a private owner is utilized by the State has
been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
– 41 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Ultra-tech Cement Limited versus Mast Ram
and others, (2025) 1 SCC 798, Civil Appeal No.
10662 of 2024 decided on 20.09.2024 in the following
terms:
52. Acquisition of land for public purpose
is undertaken under the power of eminent domain
of the government much against the wishes
of the owners of the land which gets acquired.
When such a power is exercised, it is coupled
with a bounden duty and obligation on the
part of the government body to ensure that
the owners whose lands get acquired are paid
compensation /awarded amount as declared
by the statutory award at the earliest.
12(vi). Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in JT
2025 (1) SC 41 titled as Bernard Francis Joseph
Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and
Others, decided on 02.01.2025, has outlined that
where a statute requires an act to be done in a
particular manner, the act has to be done in that
manner alone. While reinforcing that the right of
property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has
reiterated that deprivation of property without any
authority amounts to violation of human rights in
a welfare State. It has further been stated that it
is the bounden duty / obligation of the State Authority
– 42 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
to ensure that individuals whose lands have been
utilized are paid compensation along with admissible
benefits. Deprivation of compensation and benefits
amounts to denying the legitimate dues to the land
owners as in this case. The relevant portion of this
judgment reads as under:
“33. It can thus be seen that this Court in the
aforesaid case observed that it is settled law
that where a statute requires a particular act
to be done in a particular manner, the act
has to be done in that manner alone. It can
further be seen that this Court held that the
acquisition notification therein failed to meet the
statutory mandate and that it was vague. It
was further held that the least that was required
was that the acquisition notification therein
should have let the person whose land was sought
to be acquired know what he was going to
lose. It was, therefore, held that the acquisition
notification was not in accordance with law.
42. Right to Property ceased to be a Fundamental
Right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continues
to be a human right in a welfare State, and
a constitutional right under Article 300-A of
the Constitution.
43. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except
in accordance with the procedure established
by law.
46. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement
Ltd. (supra), this Court further observed that
acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken
under the power of eminent domain of the
government much against the wishes of the
owners of the land which gets acquired It
was therefore, observed that when such a
power is exercised, it is coupled with a
bounden duty and obligation on the part of
the government body to ensure that the
owners whose lands get acquire are paid
– 43 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
compensation/awarded amount as declared
by the statutory award at the earliest.
48. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants
herein have been deprived of their legitimate
dues for almost 22 years ago. It can also
not be controverted that money is what
money buys. The value of money is based on
the idea that money can be invested to earn
a return, and that the purchasing power of
money decreases over time due to inflation.
What the appellants herein could have bought
with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in
2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance
that the determination of the award and
disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition
of land should be made with promptitude.
49. We find that in the present case, the appellants
were required to knock at the doors of the
courts on number of occasions during the
period of last twenty-two years. The appellants
have been deprived of their property without
paying any compensation for the same in the
said period of last twenty-two years. As already
discussed hereinabove, the appellants had
purchased the plots in question for construction
of residential houses. Not only have they not
been able to construct, but they have also not
been even paid any compensation for the same.
As discussed hereinabove though Right to
Property is no more a fundamental right, in
view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India, it is a constitutional right.
A person cannot be deprived of his property
without him being paid adequate compensation
in accordance with law for the same.”
The intent and object of Article 300-A
having been outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in K.T. Plantation, V. Gopinath, Ultra-tech Cement
Limited and in Bernard Francis (supra), this Court
on the basis of existing material on record is of
the considered view, that the appellant-State Authorities
– 44 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
have not pointed out any law enacted by State
Legislature empowers the State to divest a person
of his land without paying compensation. In absence
of any statute having been enacted by State [which
has not placed before this Court], the action of
the State Authorities in divesting the Writ petitioner-
Amar Singh of his private property and by utilizing
his land(s) for construction of Amroh to Panchruhi
road is an act unbecoming of a model state and
the same is deprecated.
In these circumstances, the State Authorities
cannot by way of an executive fiat divest the writ
petitioner-Amar Singh of his private land(s), without
his consent and without paying compensation and
by utilizing such land for construction of road
in question, and such expropriation of property,
by the State, without sanction of law visits a
landowner with civil consequences, depriving him
of the right to use his own property and action
confers a continuing cause to a landowner to claim
compensation. Even the whimsical and anarchical
manner of depriving the landowner-writ petitioner
– 45 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
of property and right of compensation shocks the
conscience of this Court. Accordingly, the judgment
passed by Learned Single Judge after noticing the
material on record and the factual and the legal
aspects-herein, does not require any interference in
instant appeal.
13. While dealing with a similar claim for
compensation for having utilized the land of a
land owner, a Coordinate Division Bench of this
Court has negativated the claim of State Authorities-
Appellants and has mandated that compensation for
land utilized deserves to be given to the land owners
in terms of the judgment passed by Learned Single
Judge in respective cases in LPA No 154 of 2024
titled as State of HP & ors. Versus Sohan Lal
and LPA No 303 of 2024, titled as State of Himachal
Pradesh & ors. Versus Vishal Kumar & ors, reads
as under:-
LPA No.154 of 2024
“3 We have heard learned Additional Advocate
General and have also gone through the
judgment passed on 3rd August, 2023 in CWP
No. 3679 of 2022.
4 These grounds have been considered
and dealt with by learned Single Judge in the
– 46 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
light of judgments passed by the Supreme
Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Umed
Ram Sharma (1986)2 SCC 468; State of
Maharashtra vs.Digambar (1995)4 SCC 683;
Vidya Devi vs. State of HP and others (2020) 2
SCC 569; Hari Krishana Mandir Trust vs.
State of Maharashtra & others (2020) 9 SCC
356; Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7
SCC 508; Civil Appeal No. 1278 of 2023 titled
State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Rajiv and another,
decided on 24.2.2023 as well as judgments
passed by this High Court on 18.7.2023 in CWP
No. 8647 of 2022 titled as Ramanand and
others vs. State of HP and others; dated
27.7.2023 passed in CWP No 5928 of 2022
titled Vir Sain vs. State of HP and others and
in Shankar Dass vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh, CWP No. 1966 of 2010 decided
on 2.3.2013, has allowed the petition.
5 In similar matters, identical appeals have
been dismissed by the Division Bench of this
Court passed in LPA No. 40 of 2024 titled
State of HP vs. Ramesh Kumar decided on
27th February, 2024; LPA No. 24 of 2019
titled as State of HP vs. Baldev Singh and
others decided on 27th March, 2024; LPA No.
144 of 2024 titled State of HP vs. Karam
Singh decided on 27th May, 2024; and LPA No.
151 of 2024 titled State of HP vs. Prem Nath
decided on 12th June, 2024, by referring
the judgment of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.
10492 of 2023, titled Dharnidhar Mishre (D)
and another vs. State of Bihar and others,
and Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024, titled
Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Anr. vs. Bimal
Kumar Shah and others.
6 Learned Additional Advocate General is
not able to point out any ground indicating
that present case is not squarely covered
by aforesaid verdicts of the Court.
7 In aforesaid facts and circumstances,
we do not find any illegality, irregularity or
any other perversity in the impugned judgment.
Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being
devoid of merits.
- 47 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) 8 We consider it fit to record that State is
preferring the appeals despite dismissal of their
similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct
is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy
adopted by the State of HP which is causing
wasting the time and energy of the State as
well as the Court. It may invite imposing cost
but taking lenient view, no cost is being
imposed.
9 Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with
direction that consequential action, in terms
of judgment dated 03.08.2023 passed in CWP
No. 3679 of 2022 be taken within four
weeks.
Appeal stands disposed of along with
all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.”
LPA No.154 of 2024
“3. It is undisputed that land of the petitioner
was utilized by the State for construction of
road namely “Pangan to Shangcher” through
the Public Works Department in the years
1992-93 and petitioner had approached the
Court seeking direction to the respondents to
pay compensation for the land utilized for
construction of aforesaid road.
5. It is also pertinent to record here that vide
judgment dated 27.05.2024, passed in LPA No
.144 of 2024 and judgment dated 27.02.2024
passed in LPA No.40 of 2024, similar appeals
preferred by the respondents-State were dismissed
by the Division Benches of this Court by
referring judgment of this High Court in LPA
No. 24 of 2019, titled as State of H.P. & Ors.
vs. Baldev Singh & Ors. as well as judgment
of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.10492
of 2023, Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another
vs. State of Bihar and others and in Civil
Appeal No. 6466 of 2024, Kolkata Municipal
Corporation & Anr. vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and
others.
6. Learned Additional Advocate General is
not able to point out any ground indicating
that present case is not squarely covered
by aforesaid verdicts of the Court.
– 48 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
7. In aforesaid facts and circumstances,
we do not find any illegality, irregularity or any
other perversity in the impugned judgment.
Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being
devoid of merits.
8. We considered it fit to record here that
State is preferring appeals despite dismissal of
their similar appeals in identical matters.
Such conduct is not in consonance with the
Litigation Policy adopted by the State of
Himachal Pradesh, which is causing wastage
of time and energy of the State as well as
the Court. It may invite imposing cost, but
taking lenient view no cost is being imposed.
9. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with
direction that consequential action, in terms
of judgment dated 08.08.2023, passed in CWP
No.2929 of 2021 along with connected matter,
be taken within four weeks from today. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.”
14. Challenge to the impugned judgment dated
14.05.2024 must fail, in view of the fact that
writ petitioner-respondent had filed LPA No.228 of
2024, assailing the impugned judgment and this
LPA was decided on 29.08.2024 laying challenge
to the impugned judgment, disallowing the claim
for exchange the land owned by the writ petitioner-
respondent which was utilized for construction of
land in Khasra No.124 with Government land in
Khasra No.111 as the plea for exchange without
there being any policy for exchange was not tenable.
- 49 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) However, the findings recorded by Learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024,
entitled writ petitioner-respondent for compensation
for that land which was utilized by the State
Authorities-Appellants for the construction of road
in terms of Para-3 of the aforesaid judgment, which
reads as under:-
“3. The learned Single Judge had considered
the said notification and expressed a view
that the said notification is not applicable. He
also held that as per the said notification, the
land, if any, allotted under the Himachal Pradesh
Nautor Land Rules, 1968, can be exchanged,
but certainly by applying the aforesaid notification,
no order can be issued to the respondents
to accede to the request made by the appellant
for exchange of his private land with that
of Government land. The learned Single Judge
held that since there is no dispute that the
land comprised in Khasra no.124, measuring
06 Marlas was utilized by the respondents
for construction of a road, the appellant is
only entitled to compensation under the law
relating to Land Acquisition for that land, but
he cannot claim Government land in exchange
in lieu of the land used for construction
of road in question.”
Thus, once the findings of Learned Single
Judge recorded in the impugned judgment dated
14.05.2024 have been affirmed in LPA No. 228 of
2024, titled as Amar Singh Versus State of Himachal
Pradesh and others, qua the entitlement for
– 50 – ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
compensation, for having utilized his land and these
findings have attained finality then, instant appeal,
challenging the judgment in instant proceedings is
not permissible.
15. A similar issue raising the identical
contentions stands decided by this Court in LPA
No.68 of 2025, tilted as State of Himachal Pradesh
and others vs Charan Dass, decided on 01.03.2005,
in the following terms:-
“14. Based on the factual matrix and the
mandate of law as discussed hereinabove, this
Court does not find any merit in the contentions
advanced by the Learned State Counsel, in
the instant appeal which are just a reiteration
of the pleas taken by the appellate-State
Authorities before the Writ Court. Accordingly,
the contentions of Learned State Counsel
for appellants, are without merit and the same
are accordingly turned down.
16. Before parting with this case, this Court
observe that State Authorities have been filing
appeals notwithstanding the fact that benefit
of acquisition and/or compensation for utilization
of lands of landowner(s) by the State Authorities
in identical cases stands implemented. Yet,
filing of instant appeal reveals a sorry state of
affairs, for which this Court would have imposed
exemplary costs. However, without observing
further and by refraining ourselves, this Court
hopes and trust that State Authorities shall
follow its litigation policy in letter and
spirit hereinafter, failing which we shall be
constrained to levy exemplary costs which
shall be liable to be paid by the officer concerned.
In aforesaid terms, the letters patent
appeal is dismissed in limine and pending
- 51 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of accordingly."
16. No other points are pressed.
17. In view of above discussion and for the
reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant Letters
Patent Appeal, is devoid of any merit and is dismissed
in the following terms:-
(i) The impugned judgment passed by
Learned Single Judge in CWP No. 9090
of 2024, titled as Amar Singh vs State
of Himachal Pradesh & others, decided
on 14.05.2024 is upheld;
(ii) State Authorities-Appellants are directed
to initiate the acquisition proceedings for
awarding compensation for having utilized
the land(s) of the writ petitioner-respondent
herein [Amar Singh]; with directions to
complete the entire process expeditiously ;
(iii) No order as to costs.
In aforesaid terms, the instant appeal is
dismissed in limine and all pending application(s), if any,
shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(G.S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma)
Chief Justice Judge
April 21, 2025
[Bhardwaj]
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