Kale Sanskruti Madhukar*
Source: Wikimedia Commons
This article critiques the Supreme Court’s split verdict in Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, where a tribal-Christian was denied burial of his father in his native village. It examines Justice Sharma’s restrictive reading of burial rights and Justice Nagarathna’s failure to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Highlighting the backdrop of caste, religion, and conversion, it argues that the Court failed to address systemic discrimination.
Recently, in the case of Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Supreme Court of India (‘SC’) denied a Christian Man the right to bury his Father in his native village, because the villagers were discomforted with the same.
Initially, Ramesh Baghel approached the Chhattisgarh High Court (‘HC’), where the right of burial was denied, citing the ‘public order’ issue. Challenging this decision, he moved to the SC, which delivered a split verdict. Justice B.V. Nagarathna (‘Justice Nagarathna’) acknowledged the state’s indifference and granted his alternative request, i.e., permission to bury his father on private land. However, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma (‘Justice Sharma’) dissented with Justice Nagarathna’s directions and held that neither the Gram Panchayat Rules nor the Fundamental Right under Article 25 of the Constitution gives a right to choose a ‘place’ of burial.
Therefore, to avoid further delay, Justice Nagarathna, ultimately, allowed Justice Sharma’s primary holding to prevail, and the SC issued a common operational order directing the Appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian cemetery at Karkapal, some 20-25 kilometres away.
This article argues that the judgment flew high on promise but nosedived on delivery. And, to substantiate the critique, it is structured as follows: Part I lays out the factual backdrop of the case, Part II examines the arguments advanced by both sides, Part III delivers a critical analysis of Justice Sharma’s ruling, Part IV is a critique of Justice Nagarathna’s failure to refer the case to a larger bench, with Part V conclusively reflecting on the overall (missed) impact of judgment.
Part I: Facts of the Case
Ramesh Baghel (‘the appellant’), a Christian from Chhindawada, Tehsil Darbha, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh, sought to bury his father, Subhash Baghel, a pastor, in the village graveyard. His family, belonging to the Mahra caste, has lived in the village for generations and owns agricultural land. However, the villagers, led by the Sarpanch’s Husband, raised objections, barring the burial, even on the family’s private land.
As tensions escalated, 30-35 police personnel arrived but, inversely, threatened the appellant with legal action if Christian rites were performed. Thus, the family shifted the body to the Jagdalpur District Hospital mortuary and sought State intervention. On receiving no response, the appellant petitioned the Chhattisgarh HC to allow the burial at his native village.
The HC rejected the petition, citing the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, and Rules 3, 4, and 5 of the Chhattisgarh Gram Panchayat (Regulating Places for Disposal of Dead Bodies, Carcasses, and Other Offensive Matter) Rules, 1999 (‘1999 Rules’). It cited Palani v. District Collector, 2014, and Mathew v. State of Kerala, 2022, which bar burials on private land without proper licensing. The HC held that since there was no separate Christian burial ground in Chhindawada, but one existed in Karkapal, 20-25 km away, the Appellant could use that facility. To prevent ‘unrest and disharmony,’ the HC, thus, declined to direct the burial in the native village and disposed of the petition.
Therefore, the Appeal before the SC.
Part II: Arguments before the SC
Before the SC, the State of Chhattisgarh relied on a Gram Panchayat certificate to assert that no Christian burial ground existed in Chhindwada. It stated on affidavit that the population of Chhindwada is 6450, with 6000 tribals and 450 Mahras, of which 350 are Hindu Mahras and 100 Christian Mahras. The village graveyard has designated areas for tribals and Hindus, and past burials of the appellant’s Hindu grandfather and Mahra aunt followed community rituals, and not Christian rites. Another affidavit argued that permitting past Christian burials in the tribal graveyard did not constitute a waiver of tribal rights. An additional affidavit stated that a 2.15-acre Christian burial ground exists in Karkapal, serving Christians from Chhindwada, Munga, Tirathgarh, and Darbha villages, and a 2013 demarcation report confirms its use.
The State alternatively argued that since a Christian burial ground exists in Karkapal, 20-25 km from Chhindwada, there should be no objection to the appellant performing his father’s last rites there. The government also offered to ‘provide an ambulance’ for a respectful burial at the designated site.
On the other hand, the appellant argued that Chhindwada’s graveyard, with Gram Panchayat’s oral approval, had separate areas for Tribals and other communities. It was contended that within the Mahra community graveyard, a designated section exists for Christians and that his grandfather (2007), two relatives (2013, killed by Naxalites), and aunt (2015) were all buried there. Thus, the same right was sought for his father.
To counter the State’s claim, the appellant filed two additional affidavits. It claimed that Khasra No. 725/136 in Chhindwada has been used as a graveyard by all communities, supporting this with photographs, GPS coordinates, and affidavits from villagers confirming past Christian burials. Another affidavit refuted the State’s argument that Christians used the Karkapal graveyard, asserting that no Christian from Chhindwada, or nearby villages, had ever taken a deceased family member outside the village for burial.
The Appellant, alternatively, sought permission to bury his father on his private agricultural land to settle the matter. Lastly, it was argued that, if at all, the appellant desired to bury his father at the Karkapal graveyard, as suggested by the respondents, he would not have turned to the courts, to begin with.
Part III: A Critique of Justice Sharma’s Judgment
Justice Sharma dissented from the directions given by Justice Nagarathna and thus authored a separate, split verdict. However, his insistence on upholding the HC’s order, despite the clear constitutional stakes, not only eroded the appellant’s right to equal treatment but also reduced a fundamental rights dispute to a matter of administrative compliance.
To substantiate the same, Justice Sharma’s judgment is critiqued on four grounds.
a) Mischaracterization of the Core Issue
Justice Sharma started the analysis by framing the issue:
‘Whether the fundamental right to conduct last rites as per one’s specific religion or custom would extend to include the ‘place’ where such ceremonies are scheduled to take place; and thus, in the context of the present lis the right to choose the place of burial in a blanket & unilateral manner?’
However, it must be noted that his framing may not fully capture the essence of the Appellant’s grievance. Justice Sharma’s concern about setting a precedent for unilateral burial requests is understandable, as the SC must guard against opening the floodgates to arbitrary claims. However, the concern is misplaced, as the present case hinges not on personal preference but on systemic exclusion, and the remedy sought was one already available to others.
In Chhindwada, the majority communities enjoy ready access to burial sites within the village, while the Christian minority is expected to travel over 20-25 kilometres to exercise the same right. This disparity constitutes an ‘unreasonable classification’ without intelligible differentia, making it an issue of unequal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Thus, by mischaracterizing the appellant’s claim as a unilateral demand and overlooking its constitutional dimension, Justice Sharma undermined the Constitution’s promise of substantive equality.
b) The Court’s Oversight of the Gram Panchayat’s Failure
Responding to Justice Nagarathna’s direction, Justice Sharma relied on the 1999 Rules to assert a two-pronged argument.
He observed that ‘the Rules reveal that graves cannot be arbitrarily constructed, and must be established in designated areas identified by the Gram Panchayat. The rationale behind the same is extremely logical, the designation of an identified area serves a salutary purpose of ensuring a systemized procedure of conducting last rites whilst paying due deference to the surrounding sensitivities, and encompasses a public-health angle.’
It must be noted that the second prong of this reasoning is conditional upon the fulfillment of the first, namely, the actual identification and allocation of designated burial areas by the Gram Panchayat. In the present case, no such designated burial ground was allotted to the Christian community within the village of Chhindwada by the Panchayat, despite being under a duty to do so. Therefore, the invocation of the Rules to deny burial on private land collapses under its own logic, as the precondition for their application – state-provided burial space – remains unfulfilled.
This very duty of the local governments to ensure accessibility of burial grounds, without discrimination, was highlighted by the Rajasthan HC in the case of Ramchandra Machwal v. State of Rajasthan. It observed that:
‘The use of public land or public facilities cannot be subject to discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The refusal for any caste to use the same only on the ground that the Societies of other Castes are maintaining it, is discriminatory and violative of Article 14, 15 & 17.’
Similarly, in T. Balasubramanian v. Commissioner, the Madras HC held that, ‘even though the Corporation Act makes it obligatory for the Corporation to provide public cremation grounds, it does not mean that it should be vivisected based on community or caste.’
The constitutional inconsistency, in this case, does not lie in the 1999 Rules, but in the State’s omission to implement these rules. Rule 3 requires that burial grounds be designated by the Gram Panchayat, mandating the Panchayat to act. However, Justice Sharma interpreted that the mere existence of burial grounds sufficed to discharge the Panchayat’s statutory duty, but failed to recognize that Rule 3 is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, the duty to designate burial grounds cannot be discharged selectively, but must reflect the principle of substantive equality. Therefore, the failure to designate a burial ground for the Christian minority in Chhindwada amounts to a dereliction of both statutory and constitutional duty of the Gram Panchayat. However, by turning a blind eye to this omission, Justice Sharma read the law like a manual but missed the fine print of justice.
Further, Justice Sharma noted that ‘the earmarking of designated areas for every community in every village is an evolutionary process that is not perfect and slow-moving, however, it seeks to delicately handle aspects of human life, and beyond which must receive adequate judicial attention.’ However, this reasoning overlooks the Gram Panchayat’s affirmative duty to provide a burial ground for all its residents. The fact that only 100 Christian citizens reside in the village does not make their burial rights any less significant than those of the majority. But, by accepting the State’s reasoning, the SC has, inadvertently, sent a message that the minority communities must simply wait, possibly forever, for the State to recognize their most basic dignities in death.
Therefore, ultimately, Justice Sharma held that there is no need to exercise equitable jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to overcome the prohibition encapsulated under Rule 8 of the 1999 Rules, and to permit the Appellant to bury the remains of his father on his private land.
c) Overlooking systemic exclusion
Justice Sharma didn’t adequately address several factual observations, such as: i) no material was produced before the SC to show that Christians from Chhindwada have ever been buried at Karkapal, ii) no government order or notification designated Karkapal as the official burial ground for Christians from Chhindwada, iii) no record suggested that the Chhindwada Gram Panchayat has prescribed Karkapal for this purpose, iv) no evidence was produced to establish that the village graveyard in Chhindwada is exclusively reserved for the Hindu community, nor was any proof presented to indicate the existence of such a custom.
This non-consideration becomes especially troubling when viewed against the backdrop of escalating hostility faced by the Mahra Christian community in Chhindwada. The State’s affidavit itself acknowledges that tensions between the Mahra Christian community and the local population in Chhindwada have escalated to an extent that every Christian funeral necessitates police intervention.
This is further substantiated by an The Indian Express’ report: In one instance, a dispute arose over the burial of a Christian woman, Pachami Bais, and the standoff only ended when the family agreed to bury her without a cross on her tombstone. Similarly, in October 2023, Eshwar Nag, a Christian native of Chhindwada, passed away in Sukma’s Tongapal village. His cousin, Jaldev Andhkury, a 42-year-old pastor, buried the body there, triggering a heated conflict with villagers. The situation escalated to the point where Andhkury and six of his family members were arrested. ‘We were in jail for four days. I still don’t know the charges against me. But the villagers have approached the HC to get my brother’s body exhumed,’ he told The Indian Express. Bastar Police confirmed the arrests but claimed they were ‘preventive custody.’
Furthermore, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties’ report indicates that Chhattisgarh has become a focal point of targeted social exclusion against tribal and Dalit Christian converts. According to the United Christian Forum, Chhattisgarh ranks second in anti-Christian incidents. Nationwide, reported attacks rose from 127 in 2014 to 834 in 2024, with 165 cases in Chhattisgarh alone.
These incidents and reports make it clear that the denial of burial rights is not an isolated administrative issue but a systemic attempt to exclude and oppress a vulnerable minority, which Justice Sharma has failed to consider.
Additionally, the judgment noted that the State will provide ambulance services to transport the Pastor’s body to the Karkapal graveyard. It failed to recognize that burial is not just a logistical act, but a cultural, emotional, and religious practice tied to one’s dignity.
In P. Rathinam v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Madras HC held that:
‘It is no doubt true that in a particular village, there may be some apprehension of the law and order situation. However, it will be the duty of all public officials concerned to ensure that no member of any particular community is forced to go to a different place for the cremation of a dead body. Anything contrary, either directly or indirectly, would be against the sentiments expressed in Article 17 of the Constitution.’
Admittedly, Article 17’s text and history focus on caste-based ostracism. However, in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, Justice Chandrachud emphasized that Article 17 forbids ‘untouchability in any form,’ including social exclusion grounded in notions of purity and pollution; thereby extending its reach beyond caste contexts. The Chhindwada villagers’ and the Gram Panchayat’s refusal to allow Christian burials, backed by police intimidation and arrests, exhibits precisely the ‘ideology of exclusion’ that Article 17 proscribes. Thus, the forced denial of burial space must have been treated as an Article 17 violation.
However, in the present case, let alone Article 17 violation, Justice Sharma did not even find it important enough to upbraid the Police Officers and the State machinery for harassing the appellant, rather than assisting him.
d) Avoiding Public Disorder by Enabling Discrimination?
Justice Sharma further observed that the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion under Article 25 is expressly subject to ‘public order.’ He also noted that Clause (2) of Article 25 empowers the State to regulate certain activities associated with religious practices. However, Justice Sharma failed to consider the gist of the SC’s ruling inGulam Abbas v. State of U.P., where it was held that ‘burial rights cannot be interfered with on the ground that it offends the sentiments of another community.’
Lastly, Justice Sharma observed that:
‘This Court is conscious of the responsibility on its shoulders and would loathe being swayed by sweeping and illusionary claims of a potential “public order” eruption, however, in the present case, it cannot be said that the Respondent State have propped up the “public order” argument as a ruse. The maintenance of “public order” is paramount and in the larger interest of the society.’
However, this observation raises several questions, such as did the State produce evidence that allowing one burial in the village graveyard would lead to violence. Has the State taken steps to mediate and prevent tensions instead of resorting to outright exclusion? And, arguendo, even if there were an imminent threat to public order, then too, why did Justice Sharma not find it important enough to direct the state to take measures so that such a situation doesn’t arise again, in the near future?
Part IV: A Critique of Justice Nagarathna’s Judgement
On the contrary, Justice Nagarathna criticised the State of Chhattisgarh and the village panchayat for their actions. Describing their conduct as ‘unfortunate, discriminatory, and unconstitutional,’ she held it violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution. She condemned the affidavit submitted by the Additional Superintendent of Police opposing the burial, observing that it ‘betrayed the sublime principle of secularism.’ Reaffirming the State’s duty to uphold fraternity, she held that the Gram Panchayat’s attitude and inaction amounted to an abdication of responsibility in the face of manifest discrimination.
Invoking Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala – ‘Our tradition teaches tolerance, our Constitution teaches tolerance, let us not dilute it,’ – Justice Nagarathna allowed burial on the family’s private agricultural land, clarifying that this would not set a precedent for future claims. She also directed the State to ensure police protection during the funeral. Lastly, she mandated that dedicated burial grounds for Christians be earmarked across all districts within two months.
Till this point, it was clear that the case had resulted in a split verdict, a scenario that, by established judicial practice, shall be referred to a larger Bench for resolution. However, in the present dispute, the matter was not escalated to a larger Bench. Instead, Justice Nagarathna ultimately allowed Justice Sharma’s primary holding to prevail, and the SC issued a common operational order directing the Appellant to bury his father at Karkapal, some 20-25 kilometres away. Thus, essentially, rendering him remediless.
This failure to refer the matter to a larger Bench is innately problematic for two principal reasons:
- Delay as an inadequate justification
A split verdict by a Division Bench of the SC indicates the absence of a majority opinion, rendering it devoid of any binding ratio decidendi. In such cases, as held in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, the matter must be placed before the Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’) for appropriate directions. Thus, following judicial discipline and the principle of judicial hierarchy, the CJI refers the matter to a larger bench to settle the law. However, in the present case, this established practice was not followed. Justice Nagarathna justified this deviation solely on humanitarian grounds, citing the need to avoid further delay and ease the Appellant’s suffering, as his father’s body had remained in a mortuary for nearly three weeks.
On the surface, the rationale seems understandable. A study conducted by the Supreme Court Observer of 12 split verdicts reveals that a significant period often elapses before a larger bench adjudicates such matters. On average, it takes two years from the date of the split verdict for the case to be finally decided. Of the 12 cases examined, four remain pending, the oldest dating back to 2019, another from 2021, and three from 2022. The remaining seven were eventually resolved by three-judge benches.
However, it must also be noted that while delays are common after split verdicts, the SC has, in sensitive cases, responded with remarkable urgency. A prominent example is Yakub Memon’s mercy plea against his death sentence. A day before his scheduled execution, a Bench comprising Justices Anil R. Dave and Kurian Joseph delivered a split verdict, Justice Joseph favoured staying the execution to examine procedural irregularities, while Justice Dave declined to stay the sentence. The very next day, the issue was heard by a three-judge bench, which ultimately upheld the death sentence.
Similarly, in a recent case involving a woman’s plea to terminate her pregnancy beyond the 24-week statutory limit, Justices Nagarathna and Hima Kohli initially permitted the termination on October 9, 2023. However, a medical report submitted the following day indicated a high likelihood of foetal survival, prompting the Centre to file an application seeking recall of the order. While Justice Nagarathna reaffirmed her original stance, Justice Kohli withdrew support for the termination on October 11. The matter was subsequently referred to a three-judge bench, which, on October 16, denied the Appellant permission to terminate the pregnancy.
These examples cast serious doubt on Justice Nagarathna’s justification in the present matter. This reasoning reflects a lack of judicial effort in grappling with the gravity of the case. As argued by the Appellant, if the present case were at all about delay, then the Appellant, in the very first place, would not have invested substantial efforts in seeking the Court’s intervention. The matter, very clearly, transcended the individual; it spoke to broader questions of minority rights, dignity in death, and protection from state excess.
These developments also highlight the urgent need for the SC to establish a mechanism for immediate constitution of a larger bench in cases involving split verdicts on sensitive matters.
- Substantial questions of law & reference to a larger bench
The present case also raises significant constitutional concerns regarding the failure to refer substantial questions of law to a larger Bench, as mandated by Article 145(3) of the Constitution. This Article requires that cases involving substantial questions of constitutional interpretation be heard by a Bench of not less than five Judges.
There exists no constitutional or procedural bar preventing a two-Judge Bench from referring a case to a Constitution Bench. On the contrary, both the SC Rules and established judicial precedents support such referrals, particularly in cases involving judicial deadlock. Importantly, a larger Bench does not act in appeal over a smaller one but serves to clarify conflicting positions and ensure legal consistency. This principle was affirmed in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, where Chief Justice R.S. Pathak, presiding over a five-Judge Bench, upheld the legitimacy of such referrals. He recommended that Indian courts, wherever feasible, constitute Benches of at least three Judges to reduce conflicts and enhance doctrinal stability.
In the present case, certain potential questions of law arose that met the threshold of ‘substantial questions of law’ under Article 145(3) of the Constitution, such as
- Whether the right to religious freedom under Article 25 includes the right to choose a burial place according to one’s faith, and to what extent this right can be curtailed under the ground of ‘public order’?
- Whether the failure of the Gram Panchayat to allocate land to a religious minority for the burial of their dead in the village burial ground amounts to discriminatory state action, in violation of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution?
- Whether social opposition to burial on State land can justify the denial of such a burial, and whether this denial infringes the right to dignity in death under Article 21?
A split verdict without a referral to a larger Bench also results in a denial of effective hearing. It violates the principles of access to justice and effective remedy, both of which are central to constitutional morality and the Directive Principle in Article 39A
Part IV: Conclusion
To leave a body unburied for months pending a larger bench ruling would have definitely compounded the constitutional injury. However, Article 142 empowers the SC to craft both an immediate and a durable solution. Thus, the SC could have granted interim burial on private land, limited strictly to the facts of the case, while simultaneously referring the matter to a larger Bench. This would have given the appellant his required dignity today, and the nation, binding constitutional clarity tomorrow. However, granting none, the SC conspicuously avoided confronting issues dealing with systemic inequities.
The intersection of caste, religion, and conversion reveals the vulnerability of tribal Christians. These individuals often find themselves caught between their tribal ancestry and their adopted Christian faith. Conversion frequently becomes a pretext for excluding them from ancestral lands and communal spaces. The SC missed an opportunity to reaffirm that conversion cannot be a basis for discrimination, and dignity in death is not contingent on religious conformity.
The case highlights how local governance bodies, driven by political pressures, often enforce communal divides instead of protecting rights. The SC failed to issue clear guidelines for Panchayats on fair burial ground allocation and to outline consequences for failing to uphold constitutional obligations in such disputes.
This judgment raises a critical concern: If the judiciary does not act as a counterweight to state indifference, who will? By refusing to intervene meaningfully, the judgment made it easier for majoritarian forces to override minority rights in the future. Most importantly, the SC failed to clarify, ‘What exactly are burial rights tied to: Residence, Religion, or basic human dignity?’
*Kale Sanskruti Madhukar is a III Year B.S.W. LL.B (Hons.) Student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar