Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
A Viswanatha Raju vs The Deputy Director Of Enforcement on 28 March, 2025
Author: Ninala Jayasurya
Bench: Ninala Jayasurya
NJS, J & JS, J
CMSA_10_2024
APHC010292602024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3494]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL N
No:: 10 OF 2024
Between:
A Viswanatha Raju (dead) ...APPELLANT
AND
The Deputy Director Of Enforcement ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. Mr.Y SREENIVASA REDDY
Mr. C.V.NARASIMHAM
NARASIMHAMCounsel for the Respondent:
1. Mr.JOSYULA
JOSYULA BHASKARA RAO
RAO,Standing
tanding Counsel for Enforcement Directorate
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CMSA_10_2024The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ninala Jayasurya)
The present Appeal has been preferred against the order of the
Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA at New Delhi, dated 13.05.2024
passed in FPA-PMLA-221/HYD/2011. Vide said order, the Appellate
Tribunal dismissed the Miscellaneous Application i.e., MP-PMLA-
12749/HYD/2023 (Misc.), seeking to bring on record the Legal
Representative of the deceased appellant, as also the appeal.
2. Heard Mr. C.V.Narasimham, learned counsel for the appellant and
Mr.Josyula Bhaskar Rao, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The brief narrative of the case for better appreciation and
adjudication of questions of law may be stated thus:
4. One Mr.A.Viswanatha Raju filed the above said appeal i.e., FPA-
PMLA-221/HYD/2011 under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act (for short “the PMLA”) against the orders passed by the
Adjudicating Authority in OC No.38/2009, dated 14.01.2010. The genesis
for the complaint was a letter dated 07.01.2009 addressed by Mr.
B.Ramalinga Raju to the shareholders of M/s SCSL (Satyam Computer
Services Limited) intimating that books of accounts of M/s.SCSL were
falsified and the financial figures were inflated and the FIR registered on
09.01.2009 on a complaint by one of the investors against Mr.Ramalinga
Raju and other promoters of M/s.SCSL under Section 120B r/w Section
406, 420, 467, 471 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was
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subsequently taken over by the CBI. Since the commission of offence
under Section 467 of IPC is a scheduled offence under the PMLA, the
Enforcement Directorate registered a case by filing ECIR dated
23.01.2009. Based on the charge sheet filed by the CBI dated
07.04.2009 and further investigations, having come to a conclusion that
the offences of money laundering within the meaning of Section 3 of
PMLA was committed, the Deputy Director of Enforcement Directorate,
Hyderabad Zone Unit / the respondent issued a Provisional Attachment
Order PAO No.1/2009, dated 18.08.2009, provisionally attaching the
various properties of M/s SCSL and its Directors, including the properties
of the appellant in the above mentioned appeal i.e., Mr.Vishwanatha Raju.
5. Subsequently, the respondent filed a complaint vide OC
No.38/2009 before Adjudicating Authority as required under Section 5 (5)
of the PMLA and the said authority issued notices to the defendants
therein. Mr. A. Viswantha Raju, who was arrayed as defendant No.100 in
the complaint, submitted his objections along with others. Thereafter, the
Adjudicating Authority vide orders dated 14.01.2010 confirmed the order
of Provisional Attachment and directed that the attachment of the
properties shall: (a) continue during the pendency of the proceedings
relating to the schedule offences before the Trial Court; and (b) become
final after the guilt of the persons is proved in the Trial Court and order of
such Trial become final.
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6. Aggrieved by the orders of the Adjudicating Authority
Mr.A.Viswanatha Raju filed the above mentioned appeal raising various
grounds. During the pendency of the appeal, he died on 23.08.2014
leaving behind his legal heir one Smt. Bh.Varalakshmi Kumari, daughter.
Seeking to record her as Legal Representative of deceased-appellant in
the appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA, she
filed a miscellaneous application and the same was dismissed vide
impugned order. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal also dismissed the
Appeal as abated in view of the death of the appellant in the said Appeal.
Aggrieved by the said order, Smt. Varalakshmi Kumari, filed the present
appeal.
7. Mr. Narasimham, learned Senior Counsel made submissions, inter
alia, that the late Mr.A. Viswanatha Raju, who was Director in one of the
Satyam Group of Companies purchased agricultural property of an extent
of Ac.53-00 cents, for a valuable sale consideration out of the savings and
funds received from M/s MAYTAS Pvt. Ltd., and the same was attached
by the Enforcement authorities and the Adjudicating Authority confirmed
the same without considering the objections of the said Viswanatha Raju.
He submits that assailing the said order of the Adjudicating Authority an
appeal vide FPA-PMLA-221/HYD/2011 was filed raising various factual
and legal contentions and during the pendency of the said appeal
Mr.Viswanatha Raju died on 23.08.2014. He submits that the appeal was
filed in the year 2010 and on receipt of intimation about its hearing in the
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year 2023 received from the counsel representing Mr.Viswanatha Raju,
his daughter filed an application No.MP-PMLA-12749/HYD/2023 (Misc.)
to record her as legal representative of the deceased-appellant before the
Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal, but the same was dismissed vide Order dated
13.05.2024 and the Tribunal also dismissed the Appeal on the premise
that the same is abated. In elaboration, he submits that the Appellate
Tribunal rejected the LR application on the ground that the same was filed
beyond the normal period of limitation of 90 days as prescribed under
Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Order XXII of the Code of
Civil Procedure (for short ‘C.P.C.’), and such an application beyond the
reasonable period of 90 days may be filed, but it should be supported with
an application for condonation of delay by explaining the reasons, but no
such application was filed in the instant case. He submits that the order
under challenge is misconceived, violative of principles of natural justice
and not sustainable. Referring to the provisions of the PMLA and the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, he seeks to set aside
the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
8. The arguments of the learned counsel may be summarized as
follows:
a) Section 72 of the PMLA enables the continuation of the appeal,
even if the original appellant dies during the pendency of the
appeal.
b) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in dismissing the appeal as
abated when the legal representative of the deceased-appellant
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CMSA_10_2024had filed an application to come on record so as to continue the
proceedings.
c) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in dismissing the LR application
by referring to Limitation Act without appreciating that the said Act
does not apply to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial
authorities and Tribunals, but only to the Courts in terms of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act.
d) Application of the provisions of C.P.C., i.e., Order 22 of C.P.C., by
the Appellate Tribunal in the light of Section 35 (1) of the PMLA
providing specifically that the Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the
procedure laid down by the C.P.C., is wholly unsustainable.
e) No separate procedure with regard to filing of LR application under
PMLA is prescribed nor were any rules framed, in the absence of
which, dismissal of LR application on the premise that the same is
barred by limitation is not tenable.
f) When PMLA does not prescribe limitation, resort cannot be made
to the Limitation Act.
g) The impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice as
the Appellate Tribunal did not give opportunity for filing a petition to
condone the delay in making application for bringing the LR on
record, assuming that the time limit under the Limitation Act is
applicable.
h) When the special statute does not contain a provision for limitation,
a broader and liberal approach shall be adopted while dealing with
the applications filed by the Legal Representatives of the deceased
parties.
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i) An appeal is statutory right and cannot be denied on technical
grounds, more particularly when the right to property proposed to
be denied.
j) The Appellate Tribunal went wrong in not noting that the property of
the applicant’s father was not confiscated, but only attached and
that on the death of the appellant, the property attached has to be
released.
9. The learned counsel also referred to the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ganesan Rep. by its Power Agent G. Rukmani
Ganesan v. Commissioner, Tamilnadu Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments Board and Others1; M.P. Steel Corporation v
Commissioner of Central Excise2; Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v.
Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others3; L.S.
Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd.,4 Commissioner
of Sales Tax, UP, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur5; U.
Subadramma v State of Andhra Pradesh6; Indus Ind Media and
Communication Ltd., Vs Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate
Tribunal and another7 etc., and seeks to set aside the order under
appeals by answering the questions of Law in favour of the appellant.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent made
submissions to sustain the order of the Appellate Tribunal. He submits
1
(2019) 7 SCC 108
2
(2015) 7 SCC 58
3
(2008) 7 SCC 169
4
(2004) 11 SCC 456
5
(1975) 4 SCC 22
6
2016 (7) TMI 1514 = AIR 2016 SC 3095 = AIR 2016 SC (Crl.) 1214
7
2012 SCC OnLine Bom 799-Bombay High Court
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that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is well considered, contains cogent
reasons and warrants no interference by this Court. He submits that the
present appeal is filed only with a view to drag on the proceedings.
Referring to the averments made in the counter affidavit, he submits that
though Section 72 of the PMLA does not specify the time limit within
which an application for bringing the legal representatives should be filed
before the Tribunal, the other provisions of the Act i.e., Section 35
enables the Appellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure including, by
following the provisions of C.P.C., or the Limitation Act. He submits that
the Appellate Tribunal had not committed any wrong as sought to be
projected, as the provisions of the C.P.C., and Limitation Act are taken as
guiding factors. He submits that the application to bring the legal
representative on record should have been filed within 90 days, that in the
present case, no explanation was offered for the delay and no petition
was filed setting out sufficient reasons seeking condonation of delay in
filing the LR petition. Therefore, the learned Appellate Tribunal was right
in passing the impugned order, he adds.
11. Referring to Section 26(3) of the Act, the learned counsel for the
respondent contends that the time limit for preferring the Appeal is also
applicable to miscellaneous applications. He also submits that as the
order under challenge was passed after hearing the counsel, the
contention that the same is violative of principles of natural justice merits
no appreciation. While relying on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
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Court of India in Puran Singh and others v. State of Punjab and
others8; Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K.
Suresh Reddy and others9; Surendra Kumar v. Union of India10 and
United Bank of India v. Golam Hossian Halder11 etc., he seeks to
dismiss the appeal.
12. On a consideration of the submissions made, the following
questions of law arise for adjudication –
A) Whether the impugned order by which the Hon’ble
Tribunal dismissed the LR petition, and the appeal on the
ground of delay in filing the LR petition is legal and
correct in the absence of any specific limitation
prescribed under Section 72 of PMLA?
B) Whether the Hon’ble Tribunal erred in applying the
provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to the
proceedings under the PMLA when Section 35 of the
PMLA clearly stipulates that the provisions of CPC are
not applicable to it, in the absence of any regulations?
C) Whether the impugned order of the Hon’ble Tribunal was
passed in violation of principles of natural justice and
dismissal of the LR petition and the appeal as abated
without giving proper opportunity to the appellant to
defend her case, is sustainable?
8
(1996) 2 SCC 205
9
AIR 2003 SC 3592
10
2023 Law suit (All) 1291
11
1997 Lawsuit(Cal) 163
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13. For determination of the questions of Law with reference to the rival
contentions, the relevant provisions of the PMLA, may be referred to. As
per Section 2 (a) – “Adjudicating Authority” means an Adjudicating
Authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 6 and; as per
Section 2 (b) “Appellate Tribunal” means the Appellate Tribunal [referred
to in] Section 25; Section 6 deals with Adjudicating Authorities,
composition, powers etc., Chapter XI of the PMLA deals with the
Appellate Tribunal and the provisions relating to the same.
14. Sections 25, 26, 35 and 42 of PMLA, which are relevant in the
present context, are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
25 : Appellate Tribunal: The Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sub-
section (1) of Section 12 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange
Manipulators (forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 shall be the Appellate
Tribunal for hearing appeals against the orders of the Adjudicating
Authority and the other authorities under this Act.
26 : Appeal to Appellate Tribunal: 1) Save as otherwise provided in
sub-section (3), the Director or any person aggrieved by an order made
by the Adjudicating Authority under this Act, may prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Any 2(reporting entity) aggrieved by any order of the Director made
under sub-section (2) of Section 13, may prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal.
(3) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of
the order made by the Adjudicating Authority or Director is received and it
shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be
prescribed:
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CMSA_10_2024Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity of
being heard, entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of
forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
it within that period.
35. Procedure and powers of Appellate Tribunal:-
(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down
by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by
the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this
Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own
procedure.
(2) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its
functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 ) while trying a suit,
in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence an affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any public record or document or copy
of such record or document from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte;
(h) setting aside any order or dismissal of any representation for default
or any order passed by it ex parte; and
(i) any other matter, which may be, prescribed by the Central
Government.
(3) An order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be
executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court and, for
this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil
court.
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(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), the Appellate
Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local
jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a
decree made by that court.
(5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be
judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to
be a civil court for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1874).
42. Appeal to High Court:-
Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal
may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of
communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him
on any question of law or fact arising out of such order.
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said
period, allow it to be filed within a period not exceeding sixty days.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means-
(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party
ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for
gain; and
(ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High
Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case
where there are more than one respondent, any of the
respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or
personally works for gain.
15. In the present case, as noted earlier, Mr.A.Viswanatha Raju filed an
appeal against the orders of the Adjudicating Authority before the
Appellate Tribunal and the same was entertained, but during the
pendency of the appeal, he died. In view of the same, his legal heir
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Smt.Varalakshmi Kumari, filed an application for bringing her on record as
legal representative of the deceased-appellant, inter alia stating that she
is having the rights and interest in the issue pending adjudication before
the Appellate Tribunal.
16. In the order under challenge, the Appellate Tribunal opined that
“Section 72 of the Act of 2002 does not provide limitation and this Tribunal
is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil
Procedure where order 22 provides for substitution of deceased with legal
heirs and if it is read with Article120 of Limitation Act, it provides limitation
of three months from the date of death. The application in these Appeal
have been preferred beyond the period of 90 days.”
17. Stating that the question for its consideration would be about the
application of C.P.C., and observing inter alia that it is not bound by the
procedure under Code of Civil Procedure, but that does not mean that the
provisions of C.P.C., cannot be applied to guide itself to take an
appropriate measure to the requirements, and that Article 120 of the
Limitation Act provides three (3) months period for filing an application,
the learned Appellate Tribunal opined that it is appropriate to apply the
said period of limitation, as otherwise the Tribunal is clothed with power to
regulate its own procedure. It also observed that the reason for the
application of Article 120 of the Limitation Act is to keep the proceedings
alive in the hands of one who can pursue, otherwise it would be in the
hands of a dead person, who cannot pursue the litigation and therefore,
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the substitution of the deceased is to be made within a reasonable time.
It expressed the view to the effect that application for substitution of
deceased after reasonable period of three months can be filed, but it is to
be supported by an application for condonation of delay, after explaining
the reasons, but no application was filed for condonation of the delay in
the case before it. It also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Shri Puran Singh v. State of Punjab12. The Appellate Tribunal
while dismissing the said application also dismissed the Appeal as
abated. However, this Court is not inclined to subscribe to the view taken
by the Appellate Tribunal.
18. Article 120 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
Art.No. Description of Application Period of Time from which
limitation period beings to run
120. Under the Code of Civil Ninety days The date of death of
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), to the plaintiff,
have the legal representative of appellant, defendant
a deceased plaintiff or appellant or respondent as
or of a deceased defendant or the case may be.
respondent, made a party.
19. Further, the Order 22 of C.P.C., deals with death, marriage and
insolvency of parties and Order 22, Rule 2 contemplates the procedure
where one of the several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue
survives. The said provisions which are the basis for the orders under
challenge cannot be made applicable to the PMLA, which is a special
enactment. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure had limited application to
12
(1996) 2 SCC 205
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the Appellate Tribunal in respect of the matters as set out in Section 35,
extracted above. From a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear that
the Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the
Code of Civil Procedure, but it should be guided by the principles of
natural justice and it shall have the powers to regulate its own procedure.
When the provision i.e., Section 35 contemplates the application of Code
of Civil Procedure to the extent indicated therein and that the Appellate
Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil
Procedure, provisions of Order 22 C.P.C., though there is no absolute bar,
in the opinion of this Court cannot be pressed into service, in the absence
of any regulations / rules formulating the procedure or making it
applicable to the matters before the Appellate Tribunal, more particularly
in view of the Section 72 of the Act, which enables continuation of
proceedings in the event of death or insolvency. The said section reads
as follows:
72. Continuation of proceedings in the event of death or
insolvency:- 1) Where –
a) any property of a person has been attached under Section 8 and no
appeal against the order attaching such property has been preferred; or
b) any appeal has been preferred to the Appellate Tribunal, and-
(i) in a case referred to in clause (a), such person dies or is
adjudicated an insolvent before preferring an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal; or
(ii) in a case referred to in clause (b), such person dies or is
adjudicated an insolvent during the pendency of the appeal,
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CMSA_10_2024Then, it shall be lawful for the legal representatives of such person
or the official assignee or the official receiver, as the case may be,
prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal or as the case may be,
to continue the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, in place of
such person and the provisions of Section 26 shall, so far as may
be, apply, or continue to apply, to such appeal.
(2) where –
(a) after passing of a decision or order by the Appellate Tribunal, no
appeal has been preferred to the High Court under Section 42; or
(b) any such appeal has been preferred to the High Court, then –
(i) in a case referred to in clause (a), the person entitled to file the appeal
dies or is adjudicated an insolvent before preferring an appeal to the
High Court, or
(ii) in a case referred to in clause (b), the person who had filed the appeal
dies or its adjudicated an insolvent during the pendency of the appeal
before the High Court,
then, it shall be lawful for the legal representatives of such person, or the
official assignee or the official receiver, as the case may be, to prefer an
appeal to the High Court or to continue the appeal before the High Court
in place of such person and the provision of Section 42 shall, so far as
may be, apply, or continue to apply, to such appeal.
(3) The powers of the official assignee or the official receiver under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be exercised by him subject to the
provisions of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or
the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), as the case may be.
20. A close reading of the above provision of law, to the mind of this
Court, is indicative of the intention of the legislature of continuation of
proceedings in the event of death or insolvency and it shall be lawful for
the legal representative of an appellant, who dies during the pendency of
an appeal to continue the same before the Appellate Tribunal in the place
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of the deceased – appellant. No time limit was prescribed for making of an
application for continuation of proceedings / appeal by the legal
representatives of the appellant.
21. At this juncture, it may be appropriate to refer to the contention
advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that as Section 26
stipulates 45 days time for preferring appeal against the order made by
the Adjudicating Authority, the same shall be applicable in case of L.R.,
applications. The said contention is far-fetched. The provisions
specifically dealing with filing of appeal cannot be extended to L.R.,
applications, thereby introducing something, which is not contemplated by
the Legislature.
22. Insofar as the applicability of the Limitation Act is concerned, in
Ganesan’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
dealing with an appeal arising under the provisions of the Tamilnadu
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (for short ‘the
Act’). In the said case, the Commissioner of Endowments passed an
order condoning the delay of 266 days in filing the appeal. Challenging
the same, a writ petition was filed before the High Court of Madras. The
learned Single Judge, dismissed the writ petition holding that in appeal
proceedings before the Commissioner, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
fully applicable and there is sufficient cause and the delay was rightly
condoned by the Commissioner. Against the orders of the learned Single
Judge, a Writ Appeal was preferred and a Division Bench, after referring
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to the provisions of the Act held that it does not exclude the applicability of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
23. In the appeal carried against the said decision, referring to the
earlier legal precedents including M.P.Steel Corporation‘s case, wherein
it was inter alia opined that the Limitation Act applies only to Courts and
not to the Tribunals etc; the Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the
questions formulated by it at Para Nos.60.1 and 60.2 as follows:
60.1 The applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is with
regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application when to be filed in a court.
60.2 Section 29 (2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing
of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and
tribunals provided in a special or local law. The Commissioner while
hearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is not entitled
to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Section 5
shall not be attracted by strength of Section 29 (2) of the Act.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal by
concluding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the
scheme of the 1959 Act.
25. In M.P.Steel Corporation‘s case, the appellant before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was challenging the order of Customs, Excise & Service
Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The Commissioner of Customs
(Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay stating that the
same was filed beyond the period of 60 days + 30 days provided for in
Section 128 of the Customs Act. On Appeal, CESTAT dismissed the
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appeal stating that the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) had no
power to condone the delay beyond the period specified in Section 128 of
the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court inter alia examined the point as to
whether the Limitation Act applies to only Courts and not to Tribunals with
reference to a series of decisions, wherein it was laid down that the
Limitation Act applies only to Courts and does not apply to quasi judicial
bodies.
26. Referring to the decisions in Parson Tools & Plants and
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Para
No.32 opined as follows:
“32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan( reported in (1995) 5 SCC
5) does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169). In
the later case, this Court has unequivocally held that Parson Tools
(reported in 1975 SCC (Tax) 185) is an authority for the proposition
that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or
tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan (reported in (1995) 5 SCC
5) is in conflict with the judgment in Consolidated Enggl. Enterprises
case, it is no longer good law.”
27. After thorough analysis of the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
set aside the order of CESTAT and remanded the same for consideration
on merits.
28. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises case, a Three-Judge
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a matter arising
under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, vis-à-vis,
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the provisions of the Limitation Act, J.M.Panchal, J, speaking for himself
and Bala Krishnan, C.J., while observing that on review of the provisions
of the Act of 1996, no provision was found which excludes applicability of
the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application
submitted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and that on the contrary
Section 43 makes the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to Arbitration
proceedings held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator. In a
separate, but concurring judgment, Raveendran, J., at Para No.44 held as
follows:
“44. It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the
Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in
courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial
authority. Consequently Section 3 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act will
not apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the
Limitation Act will not apply to appeals or applications before the
tribunals, unless expressly provided.”
29. In L.S.Synthetics Ltd., case referred to supra, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the provisions of the Special
Courts (Trial of offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992.
A Three Member Bench inter alia held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is
applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all applications,
despite the fact that the words “other proceedings” were added in the long
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CMSA_10_2024
title of the Act in 1963, and that the provisions of the said Act are not
applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as a
quasi judicial Tribunal or even an executive authority. At Para No.41 the
Apex Court held that “a statute of limitation bars a remedy and not a right.
Although a remedy is barred, a defence can be raised. In construing a
special statute providing for limitation, consideration of plea of hardship is
irrelevant. A special statute providing for special or no period of limitation
must receive a liberal and broader construction and not a rigid or a narrow
one. The intent and purport of Parliament enacting the said Act
furthermore must be given its full effect.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have
no application in relation to the proceedings under the Special Court (Trial
of offences relating to the Transactions in Securities) Act.
30. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it clear that when the
specific Act does not prescribe limitation, the provisions of the Limitation
Act cannot be made applicable. As noted earlier, no regulations were
framed providing for time limit in respect of applications for continuation of
the proceedings under Section 72 by the legal representative on the death
of the appellant. In the absence of the same, the Tribunal artificially
brought in the 90 days time limit which is not tenable and its order
rejecting the application on the premise that it was filed beyond the period
of 90 days time is erroneous.
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31. Further, PMLA is a complete Code itself and Section 72 of the Act
enables continuation of the appeal by the legal representative/s of the
deceased – appellant, without imposing any conditions. A plain reading of
Section 72 of the Act, makes it clear that it shall be lawful for the legal
representative of a deceased- appellant to continue the appeal before the
appellant Tribunal. A right to continue the appeal has been statutorily
provided under Section 72 (1) (b) of the Act, and deprivation of the same
on the ground of Limitation or for want of petition to condone the delay is
not just. The order under challenge, in the considered opinion of this Court
is contrary to the statutory provisions and the same is not sustainable. In
the light of the conclusions, the order of the appellate Tribunal in
dismissing the L.R., Petition is not correct and Question No.1 is answered
accordingly.
32. The order of the Tribunal pressing into service the provisions of
C.P.C., i.e., Order 22 and thereby dismissing the appeal as abated is also
not tenable. Even if the appeal is abated, the right conferred under
statute viz., Section 72 cannot be taken away on the ground that no
formal application to condone the delay was filed. As noted earlier,
Section 35 provides for limited application of the provisions of the C.P.C.,
and no regulations have been framed formulating the procedure /
applicability of provisions of C.P.C., under Order 22 etc., If the Appellate
Tribunal’s order dismissing the appeal as abated is to be accepted, the
same would render Section 72 (1)(b)(ii) of the Act otiose. The very fact
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that continuation of appeal or filing of an appeal before the Appellate
Tribunal in terms of Section 72(1) and continuation of appeal or filing of
appeal before the High Court under Section 72 (2) would indicate that the
proceedings under the Act can be continued even after the death of a
party / appellant and that the death would not automatically result in
termination of the proceedings.
33. Further, in the present case, the legal heir of the deceased /
appellant filed the application to record her as legal representative while
the appeal is pending. The Appellate Tribunal, in such circumstances, in
the considered opinion of this Court should have allowed the same and
decided the matter on merits taking a liberal view rather than rejecting it
on technicalities.
34. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to impress this
Court by relying on the decisions in 1) Puran Singh & Others v. State of
Punjab & Others13, 2) Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie
Sangham v. K.Suresh Reddy & Others14 and 3) United Bank of India v.
Golam Hossian Halder15, but the same are not of much aid, in view of
the conclusions arrived at by this Court with reference to the statutory
provisions and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed
supra.
13
(1996) 2 SCC 205
14
AIR 2003 SCC 3592
15
1997 LawSuit(Cal) 163
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35. Though the order under challenge indicates that the Appellate
Tribunal had heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the legal
representative of the deceased – appellant, in consonance with the
principles of natural justice, as the same is not sustainable for the
conclusions arrived at supra, the same is liable to be set aside. Questions
of Law 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
36. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed in
MP-PMLA-12749/HYD/2023(Misc.) in FPA-PMLA-221/HYD/2011 dated
13.05.2024 is set aside. The application filed by the legal representative
of the deceased appellant before the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA
at New Delhi stands allowed and the matter is remanded for passing
orders in the appeal on merits, by affording opportunity of hearing to the
legal representative of the deceased appellant and the respondent, in
accordance with Law. No order as to costs.
Consequently, the Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall
also stand dismissed.
____________________
NINALA JAYASURYA, J
____________________
SUMATHI JAGADAM, J
SSV/BLV
Dt. 28. 03.2025
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26
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CMSA_10_2024
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM
C.M.S.A.No: 10 of 2024
Date: 03.2025
SSV/BLV
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