Jharkhand High Court
Aamir Sohail vs (A) Sarwari Begum on 28 March, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
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2025:JHHC:10166
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
C.M.P. 937 of 2023
----
1. Aamir Sohail, aged about 52 years,
2. Md. Shadab Hussain, aged about 50 years,
3. Buland Akhtar, aged about 47 years,
4. Md. Fakhre Alam, aged about 45 years,
5. Shahrukh Quraishi, aged about 43 years,
All sons of Late Salimuddin Quraishi, Resident of H. No. 239, Jama Masjid
Chowk, Butcher Toli, P.O.-Hazaribag, P.S.-Sadar, Dist.-Hazaribag. (Amir Sohail
is presently residing at Royal Regency, Flat No. 104, Samanpura, Raja Bazar,
Indrapuri, P.O. & P.S.-Patna, Dist.-Patna, Bihar)
6. Shagufta Yasmin, aged about 55 years, Wife of Md. Rayuf Quraishi, Resident
of H. No. 42, Behind LIC Office, Mahamaya Road, Mayapur. Abmikapur, P.O.
P.S. and Dist.-Surguja. Chhattisgarh.
7. Zeba Tabassum, aged about 35 years, Wife of Md. Sarfaraz Quraishi, Resident
of Madarsa, Gali, Samanpura, Raja Bazar, P.O., P.S. and Dist.-Patna, Bihar.
8. Nagma Anjum, aged about 29 years, Resident of H. No. 239, Jama Masjid
Chowk, Butcher Toli, P.O.-Hazaribag, Hazaribag. P.S.-Sadar, Dist.-Hazaribag.
No. 1F. to 1H. all daughters of Late Salimuddin Quraishi
9. Sultana Khatoon, aged about 73 years, Wife of Salimuddin Quraishi, Resident
of H.No.239, Jama Masjid Chowk, Butcher Toli, PO-Hazaribg, P.S. Sadar, Dist.
Hazaribag. .... .... Petitioners
-- Versus --
1(a) Sarwari Begum,W/o late Md.Syed, D/o Saibu Nisha R/o Z3/238 18/A
Bagdi Para Road, Metiabruz, Kolkata, W.B.
1(c) Nagma Khatoon, w/o Md. Nasim, D/o Saibu Nisha,R/oG53, Bangla
Basti Garden Rach Rolad, Kolkata,W.B.
1(d) Ahmad Raza
1(e) Md Shamim Raza
1(f) Nasim Raza
1(g) Naushad Raza
All sons of late Saibu Nisha and Ali Raja., R/o 32 Bari Alam
Mistry Lane,PO and PS Filkhana, Dist.Howrah,W.B.
2(a) Tamanna Almas, W/o Hanan Quraishi, r/O Mahamaya Road,
Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh.
2(b) Md. Sajid Quraishi
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2© Md.Reyaz Quraishi
Both sons of late Sajida Khatoon and late Illiyas Quraishi, R/o
Sultanganj, Mewa Saw Lane, Sultanganj, Patna, Bihar.
2(d) Razia Khatoon, W/o Md. Laddan Quraishi, R/o Bela Toli, Dargah
Road, Patna, Bihar.
2(e) Tabassum Perween, W/o Md. Aslam Quraishi, R/o Chandolia Madrasa
Gali, Patna City, Patna, Bihar
2(f) Tanweer Almas, W/o Md. Rayes Ahmad, R/o Butcher Toli Chowk,
Sadar, PO- Hazaribag, PS Sadar, Distt. Hazaribag.
. .... Opp. Parties
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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
—
For the Petitioners :- Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, Advocate
For the Resp. Nos.2 & 3 :- Mr. Pratyush Shounikya, Advocate
—-
07/28.03.2025 The instant CMP has been filed for restoration of S.A. No.
183 of 2013 to its original file which has stood dismissed on 17.9.2019
on account of non-compliance of peremptory order dated 17.9.2019
passed by this Court.
2. Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners submits that this court granted two weeks time for removing
the remaining defects in S.A. No. 183 of 2013, however, it was not
removed within time and, therefore, S.A. No. 183 of 2013 has been
dismissed. He further submits that earlier another counsel was appearing
in this case who has not informed the petitioners as such the petitioners
could not know about the defects and, subsequently, he has been
engaged for filing the present CMP for restoration of SA No. 183 of
2013. Therefore, the present CMP may kindly be allowed and delay of
651 days may kindly be condoned.
3. The learned counsel further submits that IA No. 11689 of 2023
has been filed for condonation of delay of 651 days and same ground
has been taken in the said interlocutory application for condoning the
delay. He submits that SA No. 183 of 2013 may be restored to its
original file. The learned counsel has relied upon a case of Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 paragraph 21
which reads as under:
“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not
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2025:JHHC:10166supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose
regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so
that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it
may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants
strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of
liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.”
Relying on above judgment he submits that liberal and pragmatic,
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justice-oriented approach is required to be taken by the court.
4. On the same line he further relied in the case of N. Balakrishnan
v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 at paragraph no.9
which is an under:
“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act
does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if
the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no
matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be
uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation
whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long
range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as
sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion
e and normally the superior court should not disturb
such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless
the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different
matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay.
In such cases, the superior court would be free to
consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is
open to such superior court to come to its own finding
even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower
court.”
Relying on the above judgment he submits that length of delay is not
material and explanation is required to be considered.
5. He further relied in an order of a coordinate Bench in CMP No.
127 of 2017 dated 24.3.2022 and submits that considering the fault of the
lawyer the delay was condoned and the matter has been restored and on
the above grounds he submits that the present CMP may be allowed and
Second Appeal may kindly be restored.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed
the prayer and submits that the present matter is arising out of partition
suit which was instituted in the year 1998 and the petitioners and the
respondents are sisters and brothers respectively and the judgment of the
learned trial court was also affirmed by the first appellate court and,
thereafter, the second appeal was filed. He submits that since the Second
Appeal was filed in the year 2013, however, the defects have not been
removed and considering that aspect of the matter this court has passed
the preemptory order on 17.9.2019 in-spite of that defects have not been
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removed. He submits that the Second Appeal was dismissed in the light
of the peremptory order in the year 2019 itself the CMP for restoration
was filed on 9.8.2023. He submits that the facts of the present case are
otherwise in view of that the judgments relied by the learned counsel for
the petitioners will not apply. He relied in the case of Union of India and
another vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in
2024 INSC 262 and he refers to paragraph nos. 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33 and
35 which are reproduced hereinbelow:
“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court long after the
lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his
decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed
a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has
lost his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead
that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes
a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
hot merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
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2025:JHHC:10166policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v.
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5
SCC 459, this Court rejected the application for
condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an application
to set aside an exparte decree on the ground that the
explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to
be not satisfied.
30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media
India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while
dismissing the application for condonation of delay of
427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that
condonation of delay is not an exception and it should
not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government
departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the
department has reasonable and acceptable reason for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need
to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be
accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29
respectively, this Court dealt with the scope of ‘sufficient
cause’ and held as follows:
“25. We have already extracted the reasons as
mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by
Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail
Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to
note that in the said affidavit, the Department
has itself mentioned and is aware of the date
of the judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster
v. Living Media India Ltd. (2009) 8 AD 201
(Del)) as 11-9-2009. Even according to the
deponent, their counsel had applied for the
certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-
1-2010 and the same was received by the
Department on the very same day. There is no
explanation for not applying for the certified
copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009
or at least within a reasonable time. The fact
remains that the certified copy was applied for
only on 8-1-2010 Le. after a period of nearly
four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to
file better affidavit by placing adequate
material, neither the Department nor the
person-in-charge has filed any explanation for
not applying the certified copy within the
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prescribed period. The other dates mentioned
in the affidavit which we have already
extracted, clearly show that there was delay at
every stage and except mentioning the dates of
receipt of the file and the decision taken, there
is no explanation as to why such delay had
occasioned. Though it was stated by the
Department that the delay was due to
unavoidable circumstances and genuine
difficulties, the fact remains that from day one
the Department or the person/persons
concerned have not evinced diligence in
prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking
appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the
Department LUGS possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In
the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot
be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The
law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is
no need to accept the usual explanation that
the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The
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government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this
Court made the following observations:
21. From the aforesaid authorities the
principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be liberal. pragmatic,
Justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should
be understood in their proper spirit.
philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic
and are to be applied in proper perspective to
the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (ш) Substantial Justice being paramount
and pivotal the technical considerations
should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross
negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not affect
public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant
so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has
to encapsulate the conception of
reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration
or few days. for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it
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may not be attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the second
calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude
of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken
into consideration. It is SO as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect
of both parties and the said principle cannot
be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud. misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should
be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective
reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an
entity representing a collective cause should
be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add
some more guidelines taking note of the
present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of
delay should be drafted with careful concern
and not in a haphazard manner harbouring
the notion that the courts are required to
condone delay on the bedrock of the principle
that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal
to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of
delay should not be dealt with in a routine
manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be
laid down regard being had to the concept of
judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for
achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that is
the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
10
2025:JHHC:10166nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that
delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital
test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”
7. Relying on the above judgments learned counsel appearing for the
respondents submits that in the facts and circumstances the present case
is similar to that case in view of that the present CMP may be dismissed.
He further relied in the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this
Court in Commercial Appeal No. 08 of 2023 which was decided vide
judgment dated 19.7.2024. He refers to paragraph nos. 48,49,50,51,55,62
and 64 which read as under:
“48. The provision of C.P.C. since contains a provision that the
period of limitation is to be counted in case of liberty having been
granted to approach the court and the period of limitation will be
counted from the date of judgment/decree. Otherwise, keeping into
consideration the very object and intent of Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 in the present facts of the case, the object of the said Act
will be redundant which is mainly for the expeditious disposal of
the commercial disputes. If such thing will be allowed to be
carried out, then the party concerned will be indulged in such
practice which will ultimately lead to lingering of the commercial
disputes and will ultimately frustrate the very object and intent of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
49. Therefore, the aforesaid object has been taken into
consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court also in the case of
Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers
and Contractors Private Limited (Supra) as per the paragraphs
which have been referred hereinabove wherein also the object of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has been taken into
consideration based upon that the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid
down the proposition that although the Section 5 of the Limitation
Act has limited applicability under the statutory provision as
contained in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but conferring
discretionary power to the delay of a very shorter period
depending upon the sufficient cause as also if there is no negligent
approach of the party concerned.
50. The negligent approach has been taken into consideration
and the due negligence said to be the sufficient cause for
condoning the delay is the two parameters of the purpose of
condoning the delay has per the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water
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2025:JHHC:10166Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v.
Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited
(Supra).
51. Sufficient cause has also been interpreted by Hon’ble Apex
Court in the judgment referred hereinabove and if the spirit of the
judgments will be taken into consideration in the context of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, it would be evident that for the
purpose of expeditious disposal, it is the bounden duty of the
concerned court that in the rarest of rare case the principle is to
be made applicable in view of the judgment rendered in the case of
Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers
and Contractors Private Limited (Supra), as such, the conduct of
the party concerned is to be taken into consideration so as to
reach to the conclusion as to whether the conduct of the parties is
in negligent manner or any due diligence is there or not.
55. Further, the period of delay is also of 356 days, the Hon’ble
Apex Court, in the Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (Supra) has refused to
condone the delay of 75 days, 131 days and 200 days.
62. The law is settled that the things are to be done strictly in
accordance with the statutory provision and there cannot be
interpretation beyond the statutory provision. Reference in this
regard may be taken from the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors.,
AIR (1964) SC 358 (para-25), Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar
Council of Kerala and Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 422 (para-31,32),
Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala
& Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 633 (para-27), State of Jharkhand & Ors.
vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 368 (para-26) and Zuari
Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Direction ESIC Hyderabad & Ors.,
(2015) 7 SCC 690 (para-14,26).
64. This Court, taking into consideration the aforesaid reasons, is
of the view that the instant interlocutory application is not fit to be
allowed due to the absence of the sufficient explanation as also in
view of the discussion made by referring the provision of Rule
XXIII Rule 2 C.P.C. and the principle laid down by Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water
Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v.
Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited
(Supra).”
8. Relying on the above judgments he submits that the law is well
settled and required to be strictly followed in accordance with the statutory
provision that has been held herein in view of that this CMP may be
dismissed.
9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties, the court has gone through the materials available on records and
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finds that admittedly the second appeal was filed in the year 2013 and the
same was allowed to be defective for years together and finally the matter
was listed before the Bench on 17.9.2019 and on that day also nobody
appeared on behalf of the appellant in view of that the peremptory order
was passed. In-spite of that the defects have not been removed and,
therefore, the second appeal was dismissed in the light of the peremptory
order and further this CMP has been filed on 09.08.2023 after considerable
delay of 651 days. Thus, it appears that purpose of filing the second appeal
only to show that the case is pending for long. This Court is in agreement
of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that liberal and
pragmatic approach are required to be taken by the courts in deciding the
limitation matter, however, at the same time the court is required to see the
conduct and right accrue to the other parties. This court is in agreement of
the judgments relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners,
however, it is well settled that the judgments are applicable in the facts and
circumstance of each of the cases.
10. In light of the above discussions it requires to refer herein that
the law of limitation is enshrined in legal maxim “interest reibublicae ut sit
finis litium” (it is for the public good that there should be an ends of
litigation). Therefore, it is well settled that Rules of limitation are not meant
to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held
in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar &
Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351. The
privy council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd.
v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the
writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been
said that
[“A law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if
the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced
even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the
judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time
allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce
exceptions not recognized by law].”
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11. While considering the similar issue the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of “Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013)
12 SCC 649 on which much reliance have been made by the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner in paragraph nos. 21.5(v), 21.7(vii),
21.9 (ix) and 22.4(d) which are at cost of repetition again reproduced
herein:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot
be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of
liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can
be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed,
of course, within legal parameters.”
12. In view of the above it is settled proposition of law that a litigant
does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time due to inaction on
its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of
bona fide and gross inaction and negligence of the vital factors it should be
taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of
delay.
13. Admittedly in the case in hand in-spite of filing of the Second Appeal
in the year 2013 it was allowed to be defective for years together and in
view of that peremptory order was passed, in spite of that the defects have
not been removed and further this CMP has been filed after delay of 651
days which suggests that only to delay the matter the petitioners who
contested the suit and first appeal had adopted the such approach.
14. Sufficient cause was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in
(1962)2 SCR 762 wherein it has been held that merely because sufficient
fault has been made out in the facts of the given case there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned and paragraph no.12 of the said judgment
stipulates as under:
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2025:JHHC:10166
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The
proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has
to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at
this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall
for consideration, but the scope of the enquiry when exercising
the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would
naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard
as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party
was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides
or due diligence are always material and relevant when the
court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court
is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions
of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and relevant by the
provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which
fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding
that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the
appellant because apart from the general criticism made
against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of
limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed,
as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant’s application for
condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant’s
duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period
prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.”
15. The meaning of “sufficient cause” has been considered in the case
of “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC
81 wherein paragraphs 9 to 15 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient is “adequate” or “enough inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices-12-to accomplish
the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in
a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
15
2025:JHHC:10166standard of a cautious man in this context, sufficient cause”
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant
must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient
cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose (See Manindra Land and Building
Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 1336). Mata
Din v A. Narayanan ((1969) 2 SCC 770: AIR 1970 SC 1953),
Parimal v Veena ((2011) 3 SCC 545: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1:
AIR 2011 SC 1150) and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbal ((2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3SCC
(CV) 24: AIR 2012 SC 1629))
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mahindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is
a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists
it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal ((2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR
2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao ((2002) 3
SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201])
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
16
2025:JHHC:10166perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28,p. 266.
” 605. Policy of the Limitation Acts-The courts have expressed
at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3)
that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them
with reasonable diligence. An unlimited limitation would lead
to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence
or laches. (See Popet and Ratcha Property v SBI Staff Assn
(2005)-14-SCC 510), Rajender Singh Santa Singh ((1973) 2
SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundik Jalam Patil Jaigaon
Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907)
14. In P Ramachandra Rao State of Karnataka ((2002) 4 SCC
578: 2002 SCC (CH) 830: AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held
that judicially engrafting principles of Imitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of love laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay R.S. Navak
(1992) SCC 225 1992 SCC (01) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances
of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
16. In view of the above judgments the sufficient cause is required to be
considered by the court considering the entire aspects of the matter. What
has been discussed hereinabove the court finds that only to delay the matter
such approach has been adopted by the petitioners herein that too in a case
of partition wherein both the sides have been allowed certain shares in the
property and they are sisters and brothers respectively.
17
2025:JHHC:10166
17. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to
secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale in this regard reference may be made to Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts-The courts have expressed
at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3)
that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them
with reasonable diligence.”
18. In view of the above discussions, it is evident that sufficient cause
means that the parties should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bonafide on his part in view of the facts and circumstances of
the case or it cannot be alleged that the parties has not acted deliberately or
remained inactive, however, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion
for the reason that whenever the court exercise discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was
prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as
has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manindra
Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee &Ors.,
AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin V. A. Narayanan, (1969)2 SCC 770,
Parimal V. Veena @Bharti, (2011)3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012)5 SCC 157.
19. In the aforesaid judgments the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
the “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts or a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible in deciding the
condonation in any matter.
18
2025:JHHC:10166
20. In the case of “Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project, (2008)14 SCC 448 it was observed that the laws of
limitation are founded on public policy. Statute of limitation are sometimes
described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty some kind of limitation is
essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that
there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitations are
means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening
diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the
purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond
in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the
vigilant and not of the sleepy.
21. In the light of the above facts, reasons and analysis this court has
come to a conclusion that only to delay the matter such approach has been
taken by the petitioners as such there is no merit in this CMP.
22. Accordingly, the present CMP stands dismissed.
23. Pending petition(s) is/are disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Dated 28.03.2025
JHC/ KNR/ AFR
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