Delhi High Court
Abhijit Mishra vs Wipro Limited on 14 July, 2025
Author: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Bench: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
$-
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
+ CS(OS) 31/2021
ABHIJIT MISHRA
S/O (LATE) MR. OM PRAKASH MISHRA,
R/O 7 PRIYA ENCLAVE,
DELHI 110092
...PLAINTIFF
.
(Through: Mr. Abhijit Mishra, plaintiff in person.)
Versus
WIPRO LIMITED
THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
480-481, PHASE III, UDYOG VIHAR,
GURUGRAM, HARYANA - 122016.
....DEFENDANT
(Through: Mr. Mandeep Singh Vinaik, Ms.Ragini Vinaik and Mr.
Gaikhuanlung, Advs.)
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% Reserved on: 26.05.2025
Pronounced on: 14.07.2025
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JUDGMENT
The plaintiff has filed the present suit, claiming damages amounting to
Rs. 2,10,00,000/- for alleged defamation by his employer, asserting that the
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imputations made in the termination letter are contrary to the employment
contract and have caused serious injury to the plaintiff‟s reputation and
goodwill.
2. The following prayers have been made by the plaintiff in the
plaint: –
“A. Kindly grant a decree in favor of the Plaintiff and hold the
Defendant i.e. Wipro Limited guilty of tort of defamation and injuria
sine damnum.
B. Kindly direct the Defendant i.e. Wipro Limited to issue a new
discharge letter expunging the negative remarks about the Plaintiff
along with the sincere letter of apology for the cause of defamation
and loss of reputation.
C. Kindly be pleased for the grant of Rs. 2,10,00,000 (Indian
National Rupees Two Crore and Ten lacs Only) as a damage to the
plaintiff caused by the tortuous conduct of the defendant and
violation of Right to Dignity as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India citing the legal Doctrine of Injuria Sine
Damnum.”
Factual Matrix
3. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant i.e., Wipro Limited,
as a Principal Consultant from 14.03.2018 until 05.06.2020. His
employment was governed by a contract (hereinafter referred to as the
„employment contract‟) and Clause 10 thereof expressly provided that
the employment could be terminated without any reason, by either party
upon serving the requisite notice period, i.e., one month during the
probationary period and two months after confirmation.
4. On 05.06.2020, the defendant, through its authorized
representative Mr. Srinath Sridharan, issued a termination/relieving
letter. The letter attributes the conduct of the plaintiff as “malicious” and
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further claims that his actions had resulted in an irreparable breakdown
in the employer-employee relationship.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid allegedly defamatory remarks
contained in the termination letter, the plaintiff has instituted the present
suit seeking the issuance of a fresh termination letter expunging the
observations impugning the plaintiff‟s character and professional
integrity.
6. Upon receipt of the summons, the defendant entered appearance
and filed a written statement, categorically denying the averments made
by the plaintiff. The defendant has sought to justify the issuance of the
termination letter as being in strict conformity with the procedure
stipulated under the employment contract. According to the defendant,
the remarks impugned by the plaintiff are merely reflective of the
plaintiff‟s conduct during the tenure of his employment and were
necessitated by the circumstances culminating in his termination.
Submissions
7. The plaintiff in person avers that the impugned termination letter
is replete with defamatory and derogatory assertions that are
unsubstantiated and, in effect, serve to malign his character. It is
contended by him that such vague and baseless allegations flagrantly
contravene Clause 10 of the employment contract between the parties.
8. He further contends that the allegations contained in the
impugned termination letter, including the usage of words like
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“malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust,” are baseless and have
been made in a manner that is both defamatory and vexatious.
9. Moreover, it is contended by the plaintiff in person that he had
duly exercised his right by making an appeal and representation against
the impugned termination letter. Despite the aforesaid, according to the
plaintiff, the defendant denied him an opportunity to defend himself
against the spurious claims in the impugned termination letter. It is
further contended that the absence of any material evidence to
corroborate the alleged misconduct reinforces the position that the
termination was arbitrary and capricious, amounting to an abuse of the
contractual prerogative.
10. Moreover, it is averred by the plaintiff that the adverse remarks
contained in the impugned termination letter have had a deleterious
impact on his professional reputation, rendering him unable to secure
any alternative employment. It is further submitted by him that the
defendant‟s actions amount to a violation of his fundamental right to life
with dignity as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India
(hereinafter referred to as the „Constitution‟) and constitute a breach of
contractual obligations.
11. According to the plaintiff, the termination of the plaintiff by the
defendant, executed under the guise of contractual provisions, was
marred by defamatory assertions that lack any basis. It is also contended
that the defendant‟s conduct is indicative of a deliberate disregard for
the principles of natural justice and contractual fairness, thereby
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entitling him to seek a redressal for the injuries caused to his reputation
and livelihood.
12. He places reliance on the decision of this Court in SP Sharma v.
IFCI Ltd.1, Himanshu Bhatt v. Indian Railway Catering and Tourism
Corporation 2 , Shobhna Bhartia v. State of NCT of Delhi 3 , and the
decision of the Court of England and Wales in Drummond -Jackson v.
British Medical Association4.
13. Per Contra, Mr. Mandeep Singh Vinaik, learned counsel
appearing for the defendant, contends that the plaint does not disclose
any cause of action and must be dismissed on this ground alone. In
addition, it is also contended that the plaintiff has failed to establish any
instance of offending statements being broadcast or transmitted to
members of the public or any person other than the plaintiff himself.
14. Learned counsel further submits that the plaintiff was employed
with the defendant as a Principal Consultant, which is a senior, creative,
and managerial position that demanded highly creative and original
work. However, the plaintiff, according to learned counsel, instead of
focusing on his professional duties and honoring his commitment to the
employer, was more invested in his self-styled identity as a “Crusader
for Social Change”, engaging in activities unrelated to his work.
Learned counsel avers that the plaintiff himself admitted to his inability
1
2015 SCC OnLine Del 11311
2
2015 SCC OnLine Del 12393
3
2007 SCC OnLine Del 1301
4
1970 1 (WLR) 688
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to discharge his professional duties in an email to Mr. Ajay Nahar, with
a copy marked to his Reporting Manager, Mr. Shri Dhar. In this
communication, according to the learned counsel, the plaintiff
acknowledged that he felt he did not fit in with his job or team and
requested a transfer.
15. Learned counsel, therefore, contends that when given an
opportunity to improve his performance, the plaintiff chose to issue
communications to the senior management of the defendant, in utter
insubordination. Mr. Vinayak further submits that the negative attitude
of the plaintiff resulted in him being placed on a Performance
Improvement Plan ( hereinafter referred to as „PIP‟) by the defendant.
Instead of taking this opportunity to improve his performance, according
to the learned counsel, the plaintiff began a campaign of complaints,
writing numerous grievances to various individuals and agencies.
16. Further, learned counsel for the defendants contends that the
behaviour of the plaintiff demonstrated his lack of interest in improving
his professional performance, which ultimately led to the termination of
his employment.
17. Learned counsel further argues that the communications issued by
the defendant to the plaintiff were personal and justified. He also avers
that no public communications were ever published or transmitted by
the defendant, as admitted by the plaintiff. Furthermore, it is stated by
Mr. Vinayak that the termination of the services of the plaintiff was duly
communicated to him in accordance with the employment contract, and
two months’ notice pay was credited to his account.
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18. Furthermore, it is also averred by the learned counsel for the
defendant that the employment was entirely contractual, and the
defendant had the right to terminate the services of the plaintiff due to
his unsuitability for the job. Additionally, learned counsel submits that
the plaintiff was responsible for his termination due to his lack of
professional focus and commitment.
19. Mr. Vinayak, therefore, contends that the statement in the
impugned termination letter was a factual account of the conduct of the
plaintiff and there has been no loss to the reputation and livelihood of
the plaintiff, as he is currently working as an Advocate practicing in
various Courts at Delhi, including the Supreme Court and this Court.
20. Learned counsel places reliance on the decisions in S.T.P. Singh
v. Tarsem Singh and Ors5, Queen Empress v. Taki Husain6, Khima
Nand and Another v. Emperor through Prem Singh7, Kundanmal S/c
Mulchand v. Emperor 8 , Lachhman v. Pyarchand 9 , Sardar Amar
Singh v. K. S. Badalia10, Challa Subbarayadu v. Darbha Ramakrishna
Rao11, P.R. Ramakrishnan v. SubbarammaSastrigal and Anr12, S.S.
Sanyal and Another v. K.V.R. Nair and Ors13, Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v.
5
2018 SCC OnLine Del 9978
6
1884 ILR 7 ALL 205
7
1936 SCC OnLine All 307
8
AIR 1943 Sind 196
9
1959 SCC OnLine Raj 18
10
1964 SCC OnLine Pat 186
11
1967 SCC OnLine AP 137
12
1986 SCC OnLine Ker 309
13
1987 Crl. L.J. 2074
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State of Andhra Pradesh 14 , and Smt. Dr. Nagarathinam v. M.
Kalirajan15.
21. I have heard the plaintiff in person, learned counsel appearing for
the defendant, and have perused the record.
22. Vide order dated 26.07.2022, the following issues were framed:-
“1. Whether the service (employment) of the plaintiff was wrongly
terminated by the defendant in violation of the Employment Contract?
OPP
2. Whether the statement in the impugned termination letter, as issued
by the defendant has resulted in the defamation of the plaintiff? OPP
3. In the event, issue No.l being decided in favour of the plaintiff
whether the defendant ‘s action of termination of the plaintiff’s
services has caused damage to the plaintiff? OPP
4. Relief”
23. The Court also takes note of the fact that parties have examined
the following witnesses:-
a. Mr. Abhijit Mishra as Plaintiff Witness No. 1 (PW-1)
b. Mr. Raja Jassal as Plaintiff Witness No. 2 (PW-2)
c. Mr. Mansatkar Singh as Defendant Witness No.1 (DW-1)
24. It is also seen that the defendant has not placed on record any document.
The joint document schedule has listed the following documents:-
Particulars of the Document Exhibited
as
The true copy of the Plaintiff's ID Card Ex P-1
and employee letters
14
1997) 7 SCC 431
15
2001 SCC OnLine Mad 355
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The true copy of the termination letter Ex P-2
vide letter ref. no. WC/T/20004452/40
Dated 05.06.2020
The true copy of the employment Ex P-3
contract of the plaintiff
The true copy of the appeal against the Ex P-4
termination letter from the plaintiff
The true copy of the legal notice of the Ex P-5
plaintiff
25. Further, the plaintiff has also exhibited the following documents
during the evidence:-
Ex. PW-2/1 – True copy of the Aadhaar Card of the Deponent(PW-2);
Ex. PW-2/2 – True copy of employment document with Oracle India Pvt.
Ltd.;
Ex. PW-2/3 – True copy of relieving letter issued by Defendant (Wipro
Ltd.);
Ex. DW-1/P1 – Archived Annual Appraisal for 2018-2019 of the Plaintiff;
Ex. DW-1/P2 – Wipro Leaders‟ Qualities Survey 2018-19, Leader Report
for Abhijit Mishra;
Ex. DW-1/P3 – Performance appraisal (Q3 2019-20) from „my Career
portal‟;
Ex. DW-1/P4 – Email dated 09.04. 2020 from Navonil Rahut to Plaintiff;
Ex. DW-1/P5 – Certified copy of a document titled “PIP INITIATION”
from MyCareerPortal
Ex. DW-1/P6 – Email dated 26.03.2020 from Plaintiff to Shri Dhar & Ajay
Nahar;
Ex. DW-1/P7 – Certified copy of Plaintiff‟s RTI Application and Reply
from Supreme Court of India;
Ex. DW-1/P8 – Certified copy of High Court of Delhi (PIL) Rules, 2010;
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Ex. DW-1/P9 – Email dated 04.01.2019 from Aditya Vikram to Tarun
Kumar (with trail);
Ex. DW-1/P10 – Performance Improvement Plan Policy of Wipro Ltd.;
Ex. DW-1/P11 – Email & Letter dated 21.04.2020 from Plaintiff to
Executive Chairman (Rishad Premji);
Ex. DW-1/P12 – Email & Letter dated 21.04.2020 from Plaintiff to CEO
(Abidali Neemuchwala);
Ex. DW-1/P13 – Email & Letter dated 21.04.2020 from Plaintiff to CHRO
(Saurabh Govil);
Ex. DW-1/P14 – Legal Notice dated 28.05.2020 sent by Plaintiff‟s counsel
to Wipro management;
Ex. DW-1/P15 – Email dated 03.06.2020 from Plaintiff to Srinath Sridharan
(HR);
Ex. DW-1/P16 – Email communication dated 27.05.2020 between Plaintiff
and Shri Dhar;
Ex. DW-1/P17 – Ombuds Policy of Wipro Ltd. (Version 5.5, Dec 2019);
Ex. DW-1/P18 – Email dated 11.04.2020 from Plaintiff to Wipro‟s
Ombudsman;
Ex. DW-1/P19 – Annual Board‟s Report dated 9.06.2021 (FY ending March
31, 2021) by Executive Chairman.
Ex. DW-1/P20 – Cross-examination dated 1.03.2024 of Mr. Mansatkar
Singh in CS no. 7 of 2021
Ex. DW-1/P21 (Colly) – Acknowledgements of Plaintiff‟s Income Tax
Returns (AYs 2018-2024)
26. Apart from the aforesaid, the plaintiff has also placed reliance
upon the following documents:-
‘Mark A’ – Copy of letter dated 04.09.2020 issued by Kridhavan Agro Pvt.
Ltd.
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‘Mark B’ – Copy of letter dated 12.12.2020 issued by Depavani Metals Pvt.
Ltd.
Issue-wise analysis
27. At the threshold, it is pertinent to observe that issue No. 3 is
contingent upon the determination of issue No. 1. Accordingly, for the
sake of brevity, both issues shall be considered and decided conjointly.
Issue no.1- Whether the service (employment) of the plaintiff was wrongly
terminated by the defendant in violation of the Employment Contract? OPP
Issue No.3 – In the event, issue No.l being decided in favour of the plaintiff
whether defendant’s action of termination of the plaintiff’s services has
caused damage to the plaintiff? OPP
28. At the outset, it is noted that the factum of employment of the
plaintiff with the defendant is undisputed. The plaintiff was employed
under an employment contract dated 14.03.2018. Clause 10 of the said
contract, titled “Notice Period”, states that either party may terminate
the employment without assigning any reasons by giving one month‟s
notice during the probationary period, and two months‟ notice post
confirmation.
29. It further provides that the employer/defendant reserves the right
to pay or recover salary in lieu of the notice period and may, at its
discretion, relieve the employee from such date as it deems fit, even
before the expiry of the notice period. The relevant portion of the
employment contract reads as follows:
“10.NOTICEPERIOD
This contract of employment is terminable, without reasons, by either
party giving one month notice during probationary period and two
months’ notice on confirmation. Wipro reserves the right to pay orSignature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
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recover salary in lieu of notice period. Further, the Company may at
its discretion relieve you from such date as it may deem fit even prior
to the expiry of the notice period.”
30. Furthermore, it is also seen that the impugned termination letter,
exhibited as Ex P-2, issued by the defendant explicitly invokes Clause
10 of the appointment letter to give effect to the termination and states
as follows:
“This is to bring to your attention Clause 10 of your appointment letter
dated March 14, 2018. The clause provides that the employment
contract is terminable, without reasons, by either party giving one
month notice during probationary period and two months’ notice on
confirmation. Wipro reserves the right to pay or recover salary in lieu
of notice period. Further, the Company may at its discretion relieve
you from such date as it may deem fit even prior to the expiry of the
notice period.
We are hereby exercising our rights under this clause and terminating
your employment contract with immediate effect.”
“We were compelled to take this difficult decision on account of a
complete loss of trust and confidence between us due to your actions
and malicious conduct in the past weeks. We believe that an effective
and fruitful employer-employee relationship between Wipro and you is
no longer possible, as we have lost trust in your ability to perform your
duties without prejudice, serve our clients effectively, or work with our
employees as a team.”
31. A thorough scrutiny is necessary to determine if the impugned
termination letter breaches the employment contract.
32. A meticulous perusal of Clause 10 of the employment contract
unequivocally permits the termination of the contractual engagement by
either party. It also states that during the probationary period, the
employment may be terminated upon issuance of one month‟s notice;
whereas post-confirmation, the requirement escalates to a notice period
of two months. The said clause further accords the employer the
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discretion to either compensate the employee in lieu of the stipulated
notice period or recover the commensurate sum thereof from the
employee. Additionally, the employer is vested with the unilateral
authority to dispense with the services of the employee even prior to the
expiry of the prescribed notice period.
33. At this juncture, it is pertinent to first examine whether the clause
of such tenor would render the contract in the present case determinable
in nature. Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter
referred to as „SRA‟), specifies agreements which are “in their nature
determinable”. A determinable contract is, by definition, one that
confers upon either party an unfettered right to terminate the contractual
arrangement unilaterally, whether at will or upon service of notice,
without the presence or requirement of any breach or default.
34. Clause 10, under the consideration herein, squarely fits within the
aforementioned legal construct, as it empowers the employer to bring
the employment relationship to a cessation solely upon notice or,
alternatively, upon payment of salary in lieu thereof, with the additional
prerogative of curtailing the notice period unilaterally. Effectively, the
termination clause does not presuppose the existence of any reason or
breach, or violation of the employment agreement for the invocation of
the termination clause, thereby reflecting the essential character of a
determinable contract. However, for the completion of reasoning, it may
be noted that mere presence of a pre-condition of termination does not
ipso facto alter the determinable nature of the contract.
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35. Recently, this Court in Gaurav Rajgaria v Maruti Suzuki India
Limited 16 held that a contract which, by its nature or explicit terms,
allows termination by either party, whether with or without assigning
reasons, is considered to be determinable. The Court held that such a
determinable contract is not specifically enforceable under Section 14(d)
of the SRA. The Court held that even if the termination is effected
pursuant to a “for cause” clause, the very presence of a termination
mechanism within the contract renders it determinable in law. The Court
held that, in such cases, the only remedy available to the aggrieved party
is monetary compensation, typically confined to the contractual notice
period, and not the equitable relief of specific performance or
injunction.
36. Relying upon the decisions in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v.
Amritsar Gas Service17, Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v. Stroh Brewery
Co.18, and Beoworld Pvt. Ltd. v. Bang & Olufsen Expansion 19, the
Court reaffirmed that private commercial agreements are presumed to be
terminable unless explicitly rendered irrevocable. Even where the
agreement permits termination only upon the occurrence of certain
events, it remains determinable in the eyes of the law from the point of
view of specific enforcement.
37. Therefore, Clause 10 of the employment contract unequivocally
renders the nature of the contract to be determinable.
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38. The Court shall now discuss the approach to be adopted while
considering a claim of the ousted employee for compensation/damages
on account of alleged wrongful termination. In doing so, it is necessary
to take a brief detour to underscore that in determinable employment
contracts, the relief of specific performance or reinstatement against the
will of the employer is not available.
39. In the Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v.
Lakshmi Narain20, the Supreme Court clarified the contours of specific
enforceability of contracts of personal service. While reiterating that
ordinarily such contracts are not specifically enforceable, the Court
carved out three narrow exceptions: (i) where a public servant is
dismissed in contravention of Article 311; (ii) where a worker seeks
reinstatement under Industrial Law; and (iii) where dismissal
contravenes a statutory obligation imposed on a statutory body. It was
unequivocally held that in the absence of these conditions, specific
performance would not be granted. The Court reasoned that enforcing
such contracts would, in effect, compel the continuation of a personal
and confidential relationship, which is fundamentally antithetical to the
principle of voluntariness underpinning the contract law. The relevant
extract of the aforementioned decision reads as under:-
“15. This brings us to the next point for consideration as to whether
or not the plaintiff/respondent’s case fell within the exceptions laid
down by this Court to the general rule that the contract of personal
service is not specifically enforceable. In this connection, as early as
1964, in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra [AIR 1964 SC 168020
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:(1964) 3 SCR 55, 59 : (1964) 1 LLJ 1] this Court observed as
follows:
“Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an
employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer
wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well recognised
exceptions. It is open to the courts in an appropriate case to declare
that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention
of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing
the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it
does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law,
jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the
employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is
recognised. The courts are also invested with the power to declare
invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has
acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if
by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something
which it does not desire to do.”
To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Executive
Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra
Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : (1970) 2 SCR 250, 265] , where it
was observed as follows : [SCC p. 850, para 23]
“From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above, the position
in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service
will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognised
exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in
appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been
dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2)
Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under industrial law by Labour
or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in
breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute.”
16. In Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai this Court also
observed as follows : [SCC p. 193, para 3]
“It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported
termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract
of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special
circumstances because of the principle that courts do not ordinarily
grant specific performance of service. This is so, even in cases where
the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of
statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed
and the employer would in such cases be contractual i.e. as between
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a master and servant, and the termination of that relationship would
not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment has not
been validly determined.“To the same effect is the decision of this
Court in Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra [(1970) 3 SCC 677 :
(1970) 2 LLJ 54, 55] where this Court observed as follows : [SCC p.
678, para 3]”The law as settled by this Court is that no declaration
to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted.
The well recognised exceptions to this rule are (1) where a public
servant has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article
311; (2) where reinstatement is sought of a dismissed worker under
the industrial law by labour or Industrial Tribunals; (3) where a
statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation
imposed by statute;”
17. In the Sirsi Municipality case the matter was exhaustively
reviewed and Ray, J. (as he then was) observed as follows : [SCC p.
413 : SCC (L&S) p. 210, paras 15-17]”The cases of dismissal of a
servant fall under three broad heads, purely by contract of
employment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced by a
suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of
employment is not capable of specific performance similarly breach
of contract of employment is not capable of founding a declaratory
judgment of subsistence of employment. A declaration of unlawful
termination and restoration to service in such a case of contract of
employment would be indirectly an instance of specific performance
of contract for personal service. Such a declaration is not permissible
under the law of Specific Relief Act. The second type of cases of
master and servant arises under Industrial Law. Under that branch of
law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated. This is
a special provision under Industrial Law. This relief is a departure
from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract Act and the
Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of a
servant.
The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to
the servant in the employment of the State or of other public or local
authorities or bodies created under statute.”
18. On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is,
therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily
be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a
declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after
having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service
against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is
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subject to three well recognised exceptions — (i) where a public
servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the
provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a
worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the
Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or
violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.”
40. In J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir21, the Supreme Court
followed the ratio of Vaish Degree College. The Court held that where
an employment contract is terminable by notice, and the employer has
acted in breach of such contractual terms, the only available relief is
damages, not reinstatement or continuation of service. Importantly, the
Court also emphasized that Section 14(d) of the SRA acts as a statutory
bar to specific enforcement of such determinable contracts.
41. A similar position has been taken by the Supreme Court in Binny
Ltd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan, 22 wherein, while making the categorical
distinction between public employment and private contractual
relationships, it was held that the principles of administrative law and
public law, including the doctrine of natural justice, do not extend to
private employment contracts.
42. This Court in L.M. Khosla v. Thai Airways International Public
Co. Ltd. 23 , relying on the decisions in S.S. Shetty, Vaish Degree
College, and Binny, summarised the applicable legal principles holding
inter alia that- (i) employment contracts of a private nature do not
attract public law remedies; (ii) where a contract provides for
21
(1979) 4 SCC 160
22
(2005) 6 SCC 657
23
2012 SCC OnLine Del 4019
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termination by notice, only monetary compensation limited to the notice
period is recoverable in law; and (iii) under Section 14 of SRA,
determinable contracts are statutorily exempted from specific
performance.
43. Likewise, in Satya Narain Garg v. DCM Ltd. 24 and in GE
Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. v. Tarun Bhargava25,
this Court reiterated that in cases involving private employment, the
scope of judicial review is limited, and the remedies are governed solely
by contract law principles. It was affirmed that the rights of the
employees are confined to what is stipulated in the contract, and even if
termination is wrongful, Courts will not grant reinstatement unless it
falls within the exceptions recognised by the Supreme Court in Vaish
Degree College.
44. In Pawan Kumar Dalmia v. Tata Finance ltd.,26 the Court once
again applied this settled line of reasoning to hold that in a private
employment dispute, the employee could not seek a declaration that the
termination was void or seek reinstatement. The Court emphasised that
the employment being purely contractual and terminable by notice, the
appropriate remedy, if any, was damages in terms of the notice period,
thereby reinforcing the limited enforceability of determinable personal
service contracts.
24 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5205 25 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1684 26 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1508 Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:16.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 15:18:52 KUMAR KAURAV 19
45. More importantly, in S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd. 27 , the
Supreme Court held that, where a master wrongfully dismisses a
servant, the servant is entitled only to such damages as would
compensate for the loss of income during the notice period or until
alternative suitable employment is secured, whichever is earlier. Where
the employment contract provides for termination by notice, the
quantum of damages is ordinarily restricted to the wages payable during
that notice period. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision further
clarified that compensation cannot be awarded for emotional distress,
injury to reputation, or the added difficulty in obtaining new
employment resulting from the dismissal. A wrongfully dismissed
employee is under a duty to mitigate damages by making reasonable
efforts to secure other employment, and any suitable offer received may
be taken into account in assessing the final amount of compensation.
Paragraph no. 12 of the judgment specifically reinforces this principle,
and the same reads as under:
“12. The position as it obtains in the ordinary law of master and
servant is quite clear. The master who wrongfully dismisses his servant
is bound to pay him such damages as will compensate him for the
wrong that he has sustained. “They are to be assessed by reference to
the amount earned in the service wrongfully terminated and the time
likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he is
fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon,.
e.g., a month’s notice, the damages will ordinarily be a month’s wages
…. No compensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to
the servant’s feelings by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in
respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those
circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use
diligence to seek another employment, and the fact that he has been27
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offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing the
damages.” (Chitty on Contracts, 21st Edn., Vol. (2), p. 559 para
1040).”
46. An upshot of the aforementioned precedents indicates that
normally, in the domain of private employment governed exclusively by
a contract, the consequence of wrongful termination is determined by
the character of the agreement itself. Such agreements, founded on
mutual volition, fall outside the scope of judicial enforcement.
47. Consequently, even if the termination is alleged to be arbitrary,
mala fide, or procedurally flawed, the remedy in such cases remains
confined to monetary compensation. As discernible from the precedents
discussed above, the Courts have declined to interfere in such private
employment arrangements, recognizing that any equitable relief is
incompatible with the principles of contractual autonomy and the
intrinsically esoteric character of the employment relationship.
48. In the context of a purely private and determinable contract of
employment, such procedural irregularities cannot be assessed through
the prism of public law norms or statutory provisions. The private
employment relationship, being non-statutory and devoid of any public
duty overlay, is governed exclusively by the terms mutually negotiated
by the individual contracting parties. To import equitable or
administrative yardsticks into such private engagements would amount
to a dilution of the doctrine of contractual autonomy. It would, in effect,
superimpose obligations that neither emanate from statute nor arise ex
contractu.
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49. In the present case, the plaintiff has, with conscious restraint,
avoided any prayer for reinstatement or specific performance. The relief
sought is confined to a declaratory finding of termination being in
violation of the employment contract and consequential damages.
However, this distinction does not expand the scope of judicial
intervention in any manner whatsoever.
50. Even assuming procedural infirmities or mala fides in the process
leading to termination, the determinable nature of the contract and the
termination clause are undeniable. Furthermore, while Clause 10
permits termination without assigning reasons, it does not prohibit the
furnishing of justiciable reasons should the employer choose to do so.
The mere act of providing a rationale, in exercise of discretion, does not
transform the nature of the termination or invite a higher standard of
scrutiny. First and foremost, the very factum of crystallising in
contractual terms the idea of termination without assigning reasons
gives sufficient leeway to terminate without reasons or for reasons
which may not be justiciable in a strict sense. That is the nature of the
clause, which has been accepted with free will by both sides. Even
otherwise, if some reasons are assigned by the employer, it would not
mean that the mere act of assignment of reasons would render an
employer susceptible to a heightened judicial scrutiny of termination,
akin to the judicial review of termination in the realm of public law. The
limited scope of consideration envisaged in purely private contractual
engagements does not call for a dissection of the reasons mentioned in
the termination letter on the touchstone of procedural requirements,
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ordinarily implicit in relationships governed by public law, so as to
determine whether the termination was just or not. Moreover, the
defendant has also complied with Clause 10 by disbursing two months‟
notice pay, thereby satisfying its contractual obligation.
51. Accordingly, in the present factual matrix, where the employment
contract is unequivocally determinable at the discretion of either party in
accordance with its express terms, the remedy available to the plaintiff
is only confined to compensatory relief in the form of liquidated
damages. Furthermore, such compensation is strictly calibrated to the
quantum of salary corresponding to the stipulated notice period, which
has already been duly remitted by the defendant.
52. Furthermore, while the plaintiff may have demonstrated certain
lapses in the internal processes of the defendant company, these do not
translate into a justiciable claim for enhanced compensation or
declaratory relief. The sanctity of the private contractual arrangement
must take precedence. No doubt, the termination may have caused
distress to the plaintiff. However, the precedents discussed above
categorically indicate that emotional distress, challenges in securing
future employment, inconvenience etc., of the ousted employee cannot
be countenanced in light of a determinable termination clause, for the
purpose of quantification of damages/compensation when the
employment contract itself restricts such compensation to the salary of
the prescribed notice period.
53. Therefore, issues. 1 and 3 are decided against the plaintiff.
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Issue No.2: Whether the statement in the impugned termination letter
as issued by the defendant, has resulted in the defamation of the
plaintiff? OPP
54. In addition to asserting that the termination letter is in
contravention of the employment contract, the plaintiff has further
contended that the expressions employed therein, most notably the
phrases “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust”, are inherently
defamatory and have resulted in serious damage to the reputation of the
plaintiff.
55. At this juncture, it is imperative to emphasize that every
individual is vested with an intrinsic right to reputation, which has been
recognised as an integral facet of the right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Any act that infringes this right is often termed as
defamatory. Interestingly, the concept of defamation has been envisaged
as an exception to the freedom of speech and expression under Article
19 of the Constitution. It is so because an act of defamation is
committed in the course of free exercise of the freedom of speech and
expression, when such exercise breaches the permissible limits of
speech and transcends from the permissible to the impermissible. To
establish any injury or harm to the reputation of a person, whether
through spoken or written word, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved
party to demonstrate the fulfillment of the essential elements of
defamation. It is necessary to enforce the law of defamation within its
strict confines and upon strict fulfilment of the pre-conditions, as any
excessive enforcement may have a chilling effect on the cherished
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freedom of speech and expression. Thus, while dealing with defamation,
the Court always treads a cautious path.
56. Civil defamation, though uncodified, in the Indian context is
governed by common law principles derived from the English
jurisprudence. It refers to a tortious wrong whereby a person makes a
false imputation having the tendency to diminish another‟s reputation in
the estimation of right-minded members of society. The essential
constituents of civil defamation may be summarised as follows:
(i) a false statement, whether written (libel) or spoken
(slander); and defamatory in nature i.e., it must have the effect of
lowering the reputation in the eyes of others (right-thinking
members of the society);
(ii) publication of such statement to at least one person other
than the plaintiff; and
(iii) identifiability, i.e., the statement must refer to the plaintiff
either expressly or by implication
(iv) Absence of a valid defence such as justification, truth, or
privilege.
57. The first essential of civil defamation is the existence of a
defamatory statement. The statement must be such that it tends to
expose the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or to cause them to
be shunned or avoided by society, thereby lowering their moral or
intellectual character in public estimation. It is not sufficient that the
words are insulting or unkind; they must carry a false and defamatory
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imputation when viewed through the lens of a reasonable person. Even
innuendo, where defamatory meaning is implied, not stated expressly,
can satisfy this requirement, provided it would be so understood by
those acquainted with the plaintiff‟s background.
58. The second requirement is publication, which is the act of
communicating the defamatory content to at least one person other than
the person defamed. It is well established that communication of the fact
to a third party is indispensable for a successful civil action. If the
statement is made directly and solely to the plaintiff, the tort of
defamation is not complete, as injury to reputation presupposes the
perception of others. The nuanced concept of defamation does not take
into account the personal perception of the person allegedly defamed;
rather, it takes into account the perceptional effect of the statement on
others (subjectively addressed as „reasonable man‟, „reasonable woman‟
or „right thinking members of the society‟). The essential nature of
publication in cases of defamation has also been reiterated by the Court
in Ruchi Kalra and Ors v. Slowform Media and ors 28. The Court held
that publication is a sine qua non for the tort of defamation, as the
actionable wrong arises only upon communication of the defamatory
matter to a third party, thereby effectuating injury to the plaintiff‟s
reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. It
emphasised that mere authorship or printing does not suffice; rather,
liability accrues upon the act of making the defamatory content known
28
2025 : DHC: 2024
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to others, whether through circulation, dissemination, or authorisation.
The Court further clarified that jurisdiction vests where the defamatory
material is accessed and reputational harm is suffered, and that the tort is
consummated only when the defamatory imputation attains public
knowledge, thereby giving rise to civil consequences actionable under
law. The relevant extracts of the aforesaid read as under:-
“Decoding the ambit of “publication‟ in defamation
44. Publication of the defamatory statement is an essential element
of thecause of action in a suit for damages for defamation. The
injury caused by alibel arises from the effect produced upon its
readers. Publication means theact of making the defamatory
statement known to any person or personsother than the plaintiff
himself (see Salmond on Torts, page-215, FourteenthEdition). It is
the communication of words or doing the defamatory act inthe
presence of at least one person other than the person defamed. In
thecase of Khima Nand v. Emperor 16, it was held as under:-“There
can be no offence of defamation unless the defamatorystatement is
published or communicated to a third party, that is, toa party other
than the person defamed.”
45. Publication is the act of making known the defamatory matter,
after ithas been written, to some person other than the person about
whom it is written. Liability for a publication arises from
participation or authorisation. Thus, where a libel is published in a
newspaper or book, everyone who has takenpart in publishing it, or
in procuring its publication, or has submitted material published in
it, is prima facie liable (see Gatley, page-234, Eighth Edition). To
put it otherwise, an act of publication involves a wide range of15
(2022) 10 SCC 1.16 1936 SCC OnLine All 307.22actions and could
be done in any manner, however, the elementary test iswhether the
act complained of has exposed the defamatory matter to any person
other than the defamed person.
46. Reference can be made to the decision of this Court in the case
ofFrank Finn Management Consultants v. Subhash Motwani17
wherein it was held that publication in the sense of a libel is not the
mechanical act of printing of the magazine but is of communication
of the libelous article to atleast one person other than the plaintiff or
the defendant. The relevant extracts of the decision read as under:-
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“17. The wrong within the meaning of Section 19 of the CPC in
anaction for defamation is done by the publication. The
defendants areconfusing publication in the sense of printing, with
publication as inthe case of libel. The publication in the sense of a
libel is not themechanical act of printing of the magazine but is of
communicationof the libelous article to at least one person other
than the plaintiffor the defendant. In this regard also see Aley
Ahmed Abdi v Tribhuvan Nath Seth 1979 All. LJ 542. If the
magazine, asaforesaid, has a circulation at Delhi, then it cannot
be said that thewrong would not be done to the plaintiff at Delhi
and thus thecourts at Delhi would have jurisdiction under Section
19 of the Act. A Division Bench in T.N.Seshan v All India Dravida
MunnetiraKazahagam 1996 AlHC 4283(AP) has taken the same
view. Even If the test of Section 20 of the CPC were to be applied,
even then thecause of action in part at least would accrue in
Delhi. A Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay in the The
State of Maharashtrav. Sarvodaya Industries AIR 1975 Bombay
197 has held that thephrase wrong done in Section 19 would
clearly take in not only the initial action complained of but its
result and effect also and Section19 is wide enough to take in
those places where the plaintiffactually suffered the loss because
of the alleged wrongful act. It wasfurther held that the court
within whose local jurisdiction damagewas caused or suffered or
sustained, would clearly answer therequirements of Section 19 for
the purposes of the suits mentionedtherein. I respectfully concur
with the said view and unless Section 19 of the CPC is so
interpreted, the purpose thereof would bedefeated. Similarly,
State of Meghalaya & Ors v Jyotsna Das AIR17 2008 SCC
OnLine Del 1049.231991 Gauhati 96 also held that wrong done
includes and covers theeffect of the act. The counsel for the
defendants has relieduponRashtriya Mahila Kosh v The Dale
View 2007 IV AD (Delhi)593 to address the principle of forum
non conveniens. With respect,if under the CPC the court has
jurisdiction, I find it hard to holdthat on the doctrine in
international law of forum non conveniensthe plaintiff can be non
suited. I, therefore, decide issue No.1 infavour of the plaintiff and
against the defendants.”
47. This Court, in the case of Deepak Kumar v. Hindustan Media
Ventrues Ltd.18, held that it is settled law that defamation takes
place because a defamatory statement or article or any other
material is published i.e. it comes to the knowledge of the public and
the appellant/plaintiff is brought down in the estimation of the right-
thinking people of the society. It was further held that publication is
a sine qua non with respect to defamatory articles because
defamation is only caused when the general public learns about
them.
48. Thus, it is crystal clear that publication is an essential
requirement for the culmination of defamation.”
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59. The third essential is identifiability. The defamatory statement
must refer to the plaintiff expressly or by necessary implication, such
that an ordinary, reasonable person acquainted with the plaintiff would
understand that the statement pertains to them. The aforenoted essential
aligns with the maxim certum est quod certum redid potest, i.e., that is
certain which can be made certain. It is not necessary that the plaintiff
be named; if the description is such that those hearing or reading it can
reasonably infer the plaintiff‟s identity, the requirement is satisfied.
60. Furthermore, the fourth essential element of civil defamation is
the absence of a valid legal defence at the time of publication. For a
defamatory statement to be actionable, it must not be protected by any
recognized defence under law. Among the well-established defences,
justification of truth is one which allows the defendant to escape liability
by proving that the impugned statement is substantially true. Another
defence is fair comment or honest opinion, which applies when the
statement pertains to a matter of public interest and is based on true or
provably factual premises, even if the opinion itself is critical or severe.
Privilege also operates as a bar to liability. Absolute privilege applies in
certain protected contexts such as judicial, parliamentary, or quasi-
judicial proceedings, while qualified privilege covers communications
made in good faith pursuant to a legal, moral, or social duty.
Additionally, statutory protections or express or implied consent of the
plaintiff may also defeat a claim. Where any of these defences are
successfully invoked, the defamatory nature of the statement is
neutralised in the eyes of the law.
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61. In light of the foregoing discussion, a detailed examination of the
facts of the present case, tested on the anvil of the essential constituents
of civil defamation, is both apposite and warranted.
Whether the purportedly defamatory remarks are false and
defamatory, and is there an absence of a valid defence?
62. The Court has meticulously examined the material available on
record to determine whether the impugned statements contained in the
termination letter, specifically, the references to “malicious conduct”
and “loss of trust”, can withstand scrutiny either as true factual
assertions or as statements shielded by a valid defence.
63. It is noted that the defendant seeks to justify the impugned
remarks in the termination letter on the ground that they constitute
factual assertions necessitated by the plaintiff‟s conduct, particularly his
repeated correspondence with various internal and external entities. It is
the case of the defendant that the expression “malicious conduct” and
the assertion of “loss of trust” were merely reflective of circumstances
that compelled the defendant to articulate its position formally. Further,
it is avered that there was no publication of the termination letter beyond
the plaintiff himself, a fact that stands admitted during cross-
examination. It is also averred by the defendant that the plaintiff
unequivocally conceded that “the management of the defendant
company did not send information of this fact to any person or entity
other than me.” According to the defendant, while it may be inferred
that certain employees were aware of the termination of the plaintiff,
there is no evidence suggesting that they were privy to the impugned
contents of the letter. Based on this, the defendant submits that the
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essential element of publication, indispensable to a claim of defamation,
is conspicuously absent.
64. Per Contra, the plaintiff has placed on record a series of
contemporaneous performance evaluations that stand in stark contrast to
the allegations made in the termination letter. These include the
Archived Annual Appraisal for 2018-2019 exhibited as Ex. DW-1/P1,
the Wipro Leaders‟ Qualities Survey 2018-2019 exhibited as Ex. DW-
1/P2, and the Performance Appraisal for Q3 2019-2020 from the
myCareer portal exhibited as Ex. DW-1/P3. Though these documents
were objected to by learned counsel for the defendant, DW-1 did not
categorically deny their contents. On the contrary, DW-1 repeatedly
stated that he would need to “verify” the documents but did not
challenge their substantive contents. Notably, these records uniformly
reflect the feedback on the high degree of performance of the plaintiff,
him being rated as making a “Highly Valued Contribution” and
receiving positive feedback from both peers and managerial personnel.
65. Moreover, DW-1 categorically conceded in response to pointed
questions that none of the said documents describe the plaintiff as a
“poor performer” or attribute any “malicious conduct” to him. To the
contrary, the Ex. DW-1/P3 includes language such as “Good work
overall” and “Abhijit has done well overall this quarter,” with no
reference whatsoever to misconduct or breach of trust. The express
language of these performance reviews militates against the adverse
characterizations later inserted into the termination letter. In the absence
of any contrary documentation or inquiry report, the claims of the
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defendants remain unsubstantiated. If the conduct of the plaintiff indeed
qualified for such imputations, there ought to have been some
contemporaneous record to support the same, akin to the available
record which suggests otherwise.
66. The case of the plaintiff is further strengthened by the testimony
of DW-1, who admitted the importance of relieving letters in
employment background checks. To highlight the adverse impact of
such communications, the plaintiff placed on record documents marked
as Mark A and Mark B. Though not formally exhibited and without
evidentiary value, these documents demonstrate the practical
consequences that termination or relieving letters can have on an
individual‟s career and reputation. Even otherwise, without formal
proof, it is a matter of common knowledge and understanding of human
affairs in the ordinary course.
67. The plaintiff has also relied upon the decisions of this Court in
Himanshu Bhatt and S.P. Sharma, wherein the Court held that
termination letters containing adverse remarks about the conduct or
performance of the employee are stigmatic and inherently defamatory.
In S.P. Sharma, the Division Bench of this Court held that a termination
order referring to “lapses committed” in a specific project amounted to a
finding of negligence, thereby carrying a clear stigma against the
petitioner therein. The Court reiterated that where an order of
termination attributes specific blame or fault, it cannot be defended as
an administrative or performance-based action. The Court reiterated,
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relying on Hindustan Steels Ltd. v. A.K. Roy, 29 and Drummond-
Jackson, that termination orders impacting professional reputation fall
squarely within the domain of penal consequences and are capable of
being defamatory. The relevant extract of the aforementioned decision is
reproduced herein:-
10. An imputation which disparages a person in his profession,
calling, trade or business is bound to be stigmatic, and therefore any
imputation which is disparaging in the way of a person’s occupation
would be stigmatic.
11. The test whether an imputation against a person is
disparaging/stigmatic would be : whether the words used tend to
lower the person in the estimation of right thinking members of the
society. In the context of defamation/liable in the decision reported as
(1970) 1 ALLER 1094 Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical
Association, imputation of incompetence in the conduct of one’s
business was held capable of being defamatory even though such an
imputation does no expose such a person to hatred, ridicule or
contempt or cause others to shun or avoid him.
12. Tested on the anvil of the legal norms and principles aforenoted,
an imputation against a person in a letter of termination of service
that the reason for service being terminated is the lapses committed
by the person, would mean that in his occupation, the person is
labelled as a negligent person while discharging duties for the reason
a lapse is an act of omission and could be either deliberate or
negligent. Such a person would obviously face the penal consequence
of not being able to get a job for the reason the prospective future
employer would like to know the reason for cessation of a past
service. If informed that it was on account of the allegation of being
negligent in discharge of duties and the language used is that the
service is being terminated owing to the lapses committed, the
consequences would be adverse against the employee.”
68. Upon careful consideration of the aforesaid, the Court finds that
the defendant has failed to bring on record any documentary evidence,
such as warnings, disciplinary findings, or inquiry reports, to support the
29
(1969) 3 SCC 513
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grave allegations made in Ex. P-2. The absence of such records weakens
the case of the defendant as mere allegations in the written statement
and evidence affidavit, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence placed on
record, are in the teeth of the defence of the defendant.
69. Distinguishably, on a plain reading of the record, it is evident that
the plaintiff has successfully shown a clear mismatch between the
remarks in the termination letter and the consistent positive feedback
reflected in various official documents. These include internal emails,
performance appraisals, and assessments, all of which describe him as a
competent and professional individual. The allegations in the
termination letter, which suggest malicious conduct or poor
performance, are not supported by any of these records. On the contrary,
they stand in direct conflict with the documented track record of the
professional conduct of the plaintiff. The unwarranted allegations,
resting on no substantiated basis, have undoubtedly cast a long shadow
over the professional standing of the plaintiff. Further, the terms used in
the termination letter, without any material basis, have the effect of
clouding the professional commitment, ethics, and competence of the
petitioner in the eyes of others, especially potential employers.
70. Accordingly, it is found that the statements in question are
demonstrably false and defamatory in nature. Further, no valid defence
has been established by the defendant, as the truth of the statements has
not been proven, and the statements were not justified or made in good
faith with due care. The threshold for falsity and absence of valid
defence stands fulfilled.
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Whether the defamatory remarks are identifiably referring to the
plaintiff?
71. Applying the aforementioned legal principles to the facts of the
present case, it emerges unequivocally that the third requisite for
sustaining the cause of action in defamation stands duly fulfilled. At the
very threshold, there exists no ambiguity or contestation with respect to
the identification of the plaintiff as the person alluded to in the
impugned termination letter. The verbiage employed therein
undoubtedly refers to the plaintiff as the termination letter was issued in
the name of the plaintiff, thereby satisfying the requirement of a specific
and discernible reference essential for the sustenance of a defamation
claim.
Whether the defendant published the defamatory remarks?
72. It is now incumbent to consider the indispensable requirement of
publication in a civil defamation claim, which extends beyond mere
overt dissemination and encompasses any conduct, deliberate or
negligent, by which a defamatory statement is brought to the awareness
of a third party.
73. The foundation of the sine qua non nature of publication in
proving defamation lies in the core principle of the tort of defamation,
i.e., to preserve the reputation of a person from unjustified degradation
in the eyes of others. Building on that foundation, the act of publication
serves as the conduit through which reputational harm is transmitted to a
third party, without which the alleged defamation remains a private
grievance. It is the communication of the defamatory imputation to
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someone other than the claimant that transforms a mere assertion into a
legally actionable wrong. In essence, publication breathes juridical life
into the tort, giving rise to the very harm the law seeks to prevent.
74. The act of publication need not assume the form of express
transmission; it is sufficient if the person who has made the ostensibly
defamatory remarks, by act or omission, causes the defamatory material
to be read, seen, or heard by any person other than the person against
whom such remarks are made.
75. A reference may be made to the decision in Mahendra Ram v.
Harnandan Prasad 30 , wherein the Patna High Court examined the
doctrine of publication in the law of defamation and delineated its
contours in the context of foreseeability. The plaintiff therein, unfamiliar
with Urdu, alleged that defamatory content in a letter written in Urdu by
the defendant therein became publicly known when he had to rely on a
third party to read the letter aloud. The Court, however, emphasized that
mere access of the content by a third party does not ipso facto constitute
publication in law. Relying on the exposition in Clark and Lindsell on
Torts, the Court held that the writer of a letter is not liable for
publication unless it is established that he knew, or in the ordinary
course of circumstances ought to have known, that the contents would
be read by someone other than the addressee. The absence of such
knowledge, actual or constructive, severs the causal chain necessary to
impute liability. The relevant extract of the decision read as under:-
30
AIR 1958 Pat 445
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4. The law is succinctly stated in Clark and Lindsell on Torts (11th
Edition) paragraph 1267 at page 759, which runs as follows:”When
a letter is addressed to a particular person the writer is not as a
general rule responsible except for a publication to that person. If it
were stolen and published by the thief the writer would not be liable.
But if the sender knows or ought to know that the letter will probably
be read by some person other than the addressee, as for instance a
clerk in the latter’s service, he will be responsible in the event of its
being so read. If he wants to protect himself he should write „private‟
on the envelope.””If, however, the defendant has no knowledge of the
possibility of such a publication he is not liable if it should take place.
Thus, where a libellous letter was addressed to the plaintiff at his
office and in his absence was opened by his partner, it was held that
the defendant was not liable for the publication, the jury having found
that he did not know such a thing was possible. And where the libel
was sent in an unsealed envelope and the plaintiffs butler read it out
of curiosity,it was held that there was no evidence of publication by
the defendant, for there was no evidence that he knew of the
likelihood of his letter being opened by the butler or any one else but
the plaintiff.”
76. In rejecting the claim of publication, the Patna High Court
discussed the English authorities of Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer 31 and
Sharp v. Skues 32 . In the Duke of Brunswick, the libel therein was
republished nearly two decades later when an agent, acting at the behest
of the plaintiff, procured a copy of the defamatory newspaper. The
Court, nevertheless, held that delivery of a defamatory document to a
third person, even if acting on the plaintiff’s instructions, amounted to
publication, since the reputational harm could still arise in the mind of
the agent.
77. Conversely, in Sharp v. Skues, the Court of Appeal of England
declined to impose liability for publication where a letter addressed to
the plaintiff was opened by the partner of the plaintiff therein, during the
31
(1850) 14 QB 185
32
(1909) 25 TLR 336
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plaintiff’s absence. The determinative factor therein was the finding that
the defendant neither intended nor could have foreseen the letter being
opened by anyone other than the plaintiff. It was only where such
foreseeability or intent was demonstrable that the threshold of
publication could be crossed.
78. Distinguishing the finding rendered by the English Court in Duke
of Brunswick and aligning with findings in Sharp v. Skues, the Patna
High Court found that the plaintiff had failed to plead or prove that the
defendant knew of the plaintiff’s inability to read Urdu or had acted in
any manner that rendered third-party‟s reading of the letter a foreseeable
consequence. The letter had been sent to the plaintiff’s residence,
without any indication or evidence that the defendant anticipated or
should have anticipated its interpretation by another. The Court held
that the voluntary act of the plaintiff therein, seeking assistance to read
the letter, absent any culpable knowledge or intention on the part of the
defendant therein, was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of
publication.
79. Making a case for the application of the doctrine of foreseeability
in cases similar to one at hand, reference can also be made to the
decision of the English Courts in Theaker v. Richardson33. The English
Court of Appeal upheld the liability for publication where the
defamatory letter, placed in a plain envelope resembling routine
material, was opened by someone other than the plaintiff therein. The
33 (
1962) 1 WLR 151
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foreseeability of such access was imputed to the defendant therein, and
publication was deemed established.
80. More importantly, American jurisprudence has, of late,
undertaken a rigorous refinement of the principles of liability in
defamation doctrine by embracing and incorporating the doctrine of
compelled self-publication as a logical emanation of the foreseeability
principle. Under this modern but stern approach, an originator‟s liability
does not cease with the initial utterance of a defamatory imputation but
endures whenever that imputation predictably forces the injured party to
disclose it to prospective recipients. Emanating from the bedrock of the
foreseeability principle, the doctrine of compelled self-publication holds
that any originator whose conduct predictably forces another to disclose
defamatory matter must answer for its spread. Accordingly, an employer
who, by internal mandate or statutory compulsion, obliges a former
employee to reveal the reason for termination cannot exonerate itself
from liability for every foreseeable instance of that compelled disclosure
and the reputational injury it occasions.
81. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society 34 articulated the doctrine of compelled self-
publication, holding that where an employee is compelled to disclose the
defamatory reason for termination in a job search, the employer cannot
claim absence of publication. The Court rejected the notion that the
plaintiff could be expected to conceal or falsify the termination reason.
34 389 N.W.2d 876 (1986) Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:16.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 15:18:52 KUMAR KAURAV 39
82. Supporting authorities also emerge from the decisions in
Hedgepeth v. Coleman35 and Colonial Stores Inc. v. Barrett36, wherein
Courts held that republication, when reasonably foreseeable due to
statutory or circumstantial compulsion, may be imputed to the
originator. In Colonial Stores, the employer remained liable where the
employee was required to present the defamatory certificate of
separation to future employers.
83. Similarly, in McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 37 the
California Court of Appeal found that foreseeable disclosure by a
terminated employee to potential employers sufficed to establish
publication.
84. Furthermore, it can also be noted that the liability for publication
in civil defamation cases, does not depend only upon the presence of
malice or intent to harm; rather, it is premised on the role of the
originator in triggering a foreseeable chain of events that results in the
dissemination of defamatory material. As such, the tort of defamation is
akin to other civil wrongs predicated upon causative responsibility. It is
enough to establish that an act or omission caused the defamatory
statement to be read by someone other than the plaintiff, either due to
compulsive self-disclosure of the defamed person or forseeable
disclosure.
35 183 N.C. 309 36 73 Ga. App. 839 37 110 Cal. App. 3d 787 (1980), Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified Signed By:PRIYA Signed Signing Date:16.07.2025 By:PURUSHAINDRA 15:18:52 KUMAR KAURAV 40
85. In case involving employer-employee libel, the fulcrum of
judicial scrutiny, therefore, rests upon a dual inquiry: (i) did the
defendant have actual knowledge that third-party access was probable;
or (ii) would a reasonable person, similarly circumstanced, have
anticipated or foreseen that such access would occur.
86. In conclusion, the doctrine of compelled self-publication, though
an exception to traditional principles, represents a reasoned and
equitable development in defamation law. It ensures that employers
cannot evade liability by using confidential correspondence as a shield
when, in substance, their actions set in motion the very harm the law
seeks to redress. The traditional concept of publication, by way of an
explicit act, does not find any application to confidential
communications between employers and employees. However, without
being so, the employee may end up facing serious reputational stigma
owing to an expression of the employer, even if the expression was not
communicated explicitly to any third person. The underlying
prerequisite is that the employer ought to have foreseen the possibility
of disclosure of confidential communication to any third person or the
self-compulsion of the employee to disclose the same to any third
person, such as for seeking subsequent employment. Ultimately, the
underlying intent of the law is to protect the reputation of a person in the
eyes of others, and as long as the originator of a defamatory expression
could reasonably be linked with the acquisition of knowledge of such
expression by some third person, the law must respond.
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87. Although in the present case, there is no question of publication
via digital media platforms, it is apposite to observe that in the
contemporary landscape of instantaneous digital communication, the
principles underpinning the doctrine of foreseeability of publication
assume heightened relevance. The ease and rapidity with which
information can be disseminated in the digital age necessitate a more
nuanced application of this doctrine, particularly in cases where
reputational harm may be reasonably anticipated as a natural
consequence of documented communications. When a defendant elects
to transmit content through social media, the foreseeability of access by
multiple third parties is not merely probable but inevitable.
88. The viral nature of social media further compounds this
foreseeability. The originator, by utilising such a public or quasi-public
forum, is deemed to have constructively accepted the consequential risk
of widespread circulation. Hence, any claim of ignorance or denial of
publication is untenable in law, as the forum chosen by the defendant
militates against a finding of private, restricted communication. The
reputational harm emanating from such platforms flows directly from
the communicative choice of the defendant.
89. Moreover, even in instances where the defamatory statement is
repeated by the plaintiff, for example when responding to employment
inquiries or during job interviews, the originator‟s liability does not
stand extinguished. Under the doctrine of compelled self-publication,
Courts recognise that such disclosure, though technically by the
plaintiff, is a foreseeable consequence of the original act. When the
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plaintiff has no meaningful choice but to disclose the defamatory
rationale to prospective employers, the chain of causation remains
unbroken. The foreseeability of such compelled republication imposes
continuing responsibility upon the defendant, especially where the
employment ecosystem necessitates full transparency during
background verification processes.
90. The overarching legal position that, therefore, emerges is that the
requirement of publication in defamation encompasses not only direct
dissemination to third parties but also indirect transmission arising from
foreseeable consequences. The law eschews a narrow, formalistic view
of communication in favour of a pragmatic and substance-oriented
approach. The inquiry is not centered on the subjective intent of the
defendant but on whether, in the circumstances, a reasonable person in
the defendant‟s position would have foreseen the likelihood of third-
party access. As noted above, in such determination of the element of
forseeability, various factors are to be kept in consideration which
include, but are not limited to, the mode of communication, choice of
medium of dissemination, inevitability of third party access -owing to
the choice of medium or nature of content, element of self-compelled
disclosure, etc.
91. Turning to the facts of the present case, the defendant has raised
an objection that the termination letter, marked as Ex P-2, was addressed
and delivered solely to the plaintiff and therefore cannot be said to have
been published. Further, it has also been alleged that it is the plaintiff
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who has made the remarks of the termination letter known to third
parties on his own volition.
92. However, this contention is untenable in view of the doctrine of
compelled self-publication, which is attracted in the present case owing
to the respective positions of the parties and their relationship inter se.
The Court takes due note of the language employed in the impugned
letter, particularly the assertions referring to “malicious conduct”,
which, by their very nature, were bound to surface in the course of
future employment. It was a matter of common knowledge and ordinary
prudence that in matters such as job applications, background
verification, or reference checks, the plaintiff would be left with no
alternative but to disclose the impugned termination letter to prospective
employers. The defendant, being an employer itself, was, in all
probability, aware of the fact that prospective employers would want to
enquire about the antecedents of the plaintiff. Such disclosure, being a
foreseeable and natural consequence of incorporating the defamatory
remarks in the impugned termination letter, renders the act actionable in
law.
93. The Court, therefore, finds that the plea raised by the defendant
regarding the absence of publication is unsustainable. The foreseeable
circulation of theimougned termination letter, through compelled
disclosure by the plaintiff, satisfies the requirement of publication and
thereby fulfils the second essential element required to constitute
defamation.
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94. At this juncture, it is apposite to observe that in the facts of the
present case, the impugned termination letter issued by the defendant
did not merely effectuate the cessation of the employment relationship,
but was couched in a language intended to tarnish the plaintiff‟s
reputation and to impair his ability to pursue re-employment with
dignity. Although Clause 10 of the employment contract permitted
termination simpliciter, the impugned termination letter surpasses that
framework and is replete with stigma and insinuations likely to
accompany the plaintiff into future professional settings. The tenor of
the communication reveals a discernible intent to carry out a form of
character assassination under the semblance of administrative formality,
thereby compounding the damage to the plaintiff‟s reputation and
standing. Notably, the defendant has failed to place on record any
credible evidence, either testimonial or documentary, to establish that
the reputational harm suffered by the plaintiff was predicated on any
demonstrable act of misconduct. In the absence of a plea of truth or any
attempt to substantiate the impugned remarks, the allegations remain
entirely uncorroborated. To allow such unsubstantiated imputations to
subsist would result in a continuing injustice, undermining the
professional integrity of the plaintiff and frustrating the dignity attached
to the pursuit of gainful employment.
95. The Court is further of the opinion that such injury, being devoid
of factual support and yet carrying grave implications for the plaintiff‟s
future employability and professional standing, warrants the
intervention of this Court by way of appropriate and equitable relief. In
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the absence of any valid defence or evidentiary justification offered by
the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to the protection of his reputation.
The law cannot allow reputational harm, born of unsupported
accusations, to continue unabated where such harm significantly impacts
an individual’s career and prospects. Relief must, therefore, be tailored
to redress the wrongful infliction of reputational injury and to vindicate
the plaintiff‟s right to dignity in the sphere of employment.
96. Having held that the remarks made in the impugned termination
letter are defamatory and fulfil all essentials to constitute the tort of
defamation, the question now comes to the ascertainment of damages.
97. In the Indian legal system, the award of damages for defamation,
while recognised as a means of vindicating the reputation of the
aggrieved, remains largely compensatory and under- developed in
comparison to international jurisprudence. Unlike in England or
America, where substantial jury awards serve both compensatory and
deterrent functions through exemplary or aggravated damages over and
above the general compensation, Indian courts approach the question of
damages with caution. Reference can be made to the decision of this
Court in Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy 38 . Moreover, a
distinction needs to be drawn between public law or constitutional
violations by public authorities and purely private wrongs such as
defamation, insofar as the question of damages is concerned. Whereas,
the Supreme Court has ordered exemplary damages in constitutional
38
AIR 2006 DELHI 300
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violations at the hands of public authorities, we are yet to find a similar
authoritative approach in cases involving loss of reputation.
98. The law, ordinarily speaking, does not favour punitive or
exemplary damages in routine defamation claims, and instead focuses
on providing reasonable compensation for the loss of reputation, mental
anguish, and emotional suffering. However, the absence of a defined
formula for quantifying injury to honour or repute renders such awards
inherently discretionary based on the facts and gravity of the
defamation, in each and every case. The very idea of quantification of
reputational loss in terms of money makes the task of judicial
determination challenging. It is also attributable to the fact that there is
no real equivalence between the loss of reputation and monetary loss,
except in cases wherein reputational loss has been suffered by a
corporate entity leading to actual loss of income/business, or in cases
where monetary loss could be linked directly to the loss of repute.
However, such cases are not common, especially where an individual
suffers the injury. Across common law jurisdictions, it has been
acknowledged that damages for libel or slander are to be quantified “at
large,” i.e., without reference to any particular loss or damage. The
calculation of compensation on this principle takes into account a
myriad set of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the conduct of
the parties, circumstances of the case, gravity of the libel, extent of
publication, whether to a few or to public at large, refusal to accept
mistake or apology, effect of the libel on personal integrity, professional
honour, honesty and loyalty of the defamed person etc. In addition, the
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Court may also keep in mind the consequential effect of the loss of
reputation on future prospects and social standing, to the extent it could
be considered objectively and reasonably. Having said that, the Court
must be mindful that the award of damages or compensation on account
of reputational loss is not a means to unjustly enrich a plaintiff and thus,
the computation must restrict itself to the overall impact of the
reputational harm on the mind and life of the defamed person, insofar as
it could be inferred from the circumstances on record.
99. A useful reference in this regard may be made to the seminal
authority in John v MGN Ltd.39, which has been followed and quoted
with approval by the Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan
Unilever Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser India Limited 40 . In John, the
Court of Appeal held that:
“The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover,
as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him
for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must compensate him for
the damage to his reputation; vindicate his good name; and take
account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory
publication has caused. In assessing the appropriate damages for
injury to reputation the most important factor is the gravity of the
libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff‟s personal integrity,
professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core
attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The
extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to
millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel
published to a handful of people. A successful plaintiff may properly
look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the
significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant
asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology
than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what39
[1997] QB 586
40
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was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous
publication took place. It is well established that compensatory
damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to
the plaintiff‟s feelings by the defendant‟s conduct of the action, as
when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was
true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a
wounding or insulting way.”
(emphasis supplied)
100. No doubt, in principle, the possibility of exemplary or aggravated
damages has also been explored by the Courts in cases of libel or
slander, particularly in corporate defamation. It has been done on the
anvil of five principles for awarding exemplary damages, as laid down
in the decision of the House of Lords in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v.
Broome41.
101. However, no case for awarding exemplary damages is made out
by the plaintiff in the present case, and thus, the analysis of the said
principles in the present set of facts is unwarranted. The damages in the
instant case are to be quantified at large, in light of the principles for
awarding general compensation. Moreover, the damage suffered on
account of termination has already been computed and paid in terms of
the salary payable during the notice period. Pertinently, general
compensatory damages in defamation serve a tripartite function: they
console the plaintiff for the emotional distress suffered, repair the
damage to personal and professional reputation, and vindicate the
injured person‟s standing in society. As acknowledged in foreign and
comparative jurisprudence, the most serious defamations are those that
undermine core attributes of a character, inter alia, honesty, integrity,
41
1972 AC 1027
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and moral fibre. In such cases, actual pecuniary loss may be difficult or
even impossible to prove. Nevertheless, the psychological and social
harm is insidious, persistent, and often merits a substantial award. It
would also be apposite to note that damage is implicit in a case
involving loss of reputation. An assault on the reputation of a person is
per se actionable, and it is presumed to have caused damage to the
sufferer. Thus, general compensation is warranted.
102. In view of the foregoing findings, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned termination letter, replete with stigmatic
language and bereft of any foundation, constitutes actionable
defamation. The remarks therein, couched in the use of the term
“malicious conduct”, not only lack substantiation but also have a direct
and deleterious impact on the future employability and professional
dignity of the plaintiff. Given the compelling factual matrix and the
absence of any legitimate defence advanced by the defendant, the
tortious injury suffered by the plaintiff warrants an intervention.
103. Accordingly, this Court deems it just and proper to award a sum
of Rs. 2,00,000/- as general compensatory damages to the plaintiff, to
redress the reputational harm, emotional hardship, and loss of
professional credibility occasioned by the conduct of the defendant.
104. Furthermore, in the considered view of this Court, the ends of
justice would be ill-served if the defamatory remarks contained in the
termination letter were permitted to remain on record, thereby
continuing to impair the professional prospects of the plaintiff and his
dignity. Therefore, in furtherance of the principles of equity and with a
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view to effectuating complete restitution, the Court hereby directs that
the remarks with respect to the professional character of the plaintiff be
expunged. Further, a fresh termination letter shall be issued to the
plaintiff devoid of any defamatory content, and consequently, the
impugned termination letter shall cease to be of any effect insofar as the
defamatory content is concerned.
105. Needless to observe, the issuance of a fresh letter and
expungement of remarks shall not alter the decision of termination of
the petitioner in any manner whatsoever.
Relief
106. In view of the aforesaid directions, the instant suit stands partly
decreed in terms of issue No.2.
107. Accordingly, the Registry shall draw a decree sheet. Parties to
bear their own costs.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
JULY 14, 2025/p
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