Chattisgarh High Court
Agriculture Insurance Company Of India … vs Parmanand Chaudhary on 28 July, 2025
1
SMT
NIRMALA
RAO
2025:CGHC:36701
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 495 of 2025
1 - Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. Through Chief Regional Manager,
Regional Chief Lic Investment Building, Phase-2, Second Floor, Pandri, Raipur
(C.G.) Alternate Address- Office Block-1, Fifth Floor, Plate B And C, East Kidwai
Nagar, New Delhi- 110023.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Parmanand Chaudhary S/o. Late Bhav Singh Chaudhary Aged About 65 Years
R/o. Village - Birejhar, Tehsil - Rajnandgaon, District - Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
2 - Bank Of Baroda Through Branch Manager, Branch Rajnandgaon, Kikabhai
Complex, Ge Road, District - Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause Title is taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Shobhit Mishra, Advocate.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Sudhanshu Upadhyay, Advocate
holding the brief of Shri Sharad Mishra,
Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
28.07.2025
1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter
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referred to as “the Commission”) in Revision Petition No. 2734/2024,
dated 08.01.2025, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner
for condonation of delay was rejected and consequently, the revision
petition was dismissed.
2. The facts of the present case, are that the petitioner/Agriculture
Insurance Company of India Ltd. is primarily engaged in providing
insurance coverage and financial support to farmers in the event of
crop failure. The petitioner company is the implementing agency for the
Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana. The State of Chhattisgarh notified
the scheme in the State vide notification dated 08.07.2019, wherein the
petitioner was designated as the implementing agency for the districts
of Rajnandgaon, Raipur, Surguja, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Bemetara,
Balodabazar, Durg, Bastar, Korba, Balod, Koriya, Mahasamund,
Sukma, Dhamtari, Gariyaband, Surajpur, Raigarh, Kanker, Dantewada,
and Bilaspur.
3. Respondent No. 1/Complainant, a farmer of Village Birejhar, RIC Raj-2,
Tehsil and District Rajnandgaon, made a complaint regarding crop
damage during the year 2019-20. He stated that an amount of ₹8,752/-
was deducted from his bank account as crop insurance premiums. He
further stated that he suffered a loss in the year 2019 and other farmers
of the same village were paid more compensation, whereas he was not
paid compensation amount for his alleged crop loss.
4. A consumer complaint (CC No. 23/80) was filed against the petitioner
and Respondent No.2, claiming compensation to the tune of
Rs.2,89,400/-. Additionally, ₹25,000/- was claimed for mental
harassment and ₹5,000/- for financial loss.
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5. The petitioner filed a reply before the District Commission, denying the
allegations. The District Commission, vide order dated 13.12.2023,
partly allowed the complaint and directed the petitioner to calculate the
loss caused due to crop damage to the respondent No. 1/complainant
in 9.9450 hectares according to village Birejhar, RIC Raj-2 (Tedesara),
Tehsil & District Rajnandgaon and make payment of crop insurance
claim amount within a period of 60 days, Rs.25,000/- for mental
harassment, and ₹3,000/- for litigation costs. The said amount was to
carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the
complaint till the date of payment.
6. The petitioner preferred First Appeal (FA No. 85/2024) before the
Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raipur,
which modified the order on 20.06.2024 and directed that the petitioner
and the bank shall pay the amount jointly and severally.
7. The petitioner filed a revision petition (Revision Petition No. 2734/2024)
before the Commission, New Delhi, with a delay ranging between 27 to
31 days. The learned Commission rejected the application for
condonation of delay on the ground that complaints under the
Consumer Protection Act are to be decided in a time-bound manner,
and condoning delay without sufficient cause would defeat the spirit
and objective of the Act.
8. The Commission further held that the application for condonation of
delay did not assign sufficient reasons to justify the delay.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner, being the
implementing agency, was not liable, and the responsibility to pay
compensation rested with Respondent No.2/Bank. He contended that
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the delay of 27 to 31 days was sufficiently explained. He further
submitted that the delay occurred due to the time required for the
translation of documents from Hindi to English and for procuring
relevant documents. He argued that the learned Commission ought to
have taken a liberal view while considering the application for
condonation of delay.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
11. Admittedly, the crop was insured with the petitioner, and the
premium was deducted by Respondent No.2/Bank from the bank account
of the complainant. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and Respondent
No.2 paid more compensation to other farmers of village Chiwri, but
Respondent No.1 was not paid compensation amount for his alleged crop
loss. Respondent No.1 filed a complaint before the District Consumer
Forum, which was partly allowed. The petitioner preferred an appeal,
which was dismissed but Respondent No.2 was also held jointly and
severally liable. A revision petition was preferred by the petitioner before
the Commission, New Delhi, with a delay ranging from 27 to 31 days,
whereas the limitation period to prefer a revision was 90 days.
12. In the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner stated that
the delay occurred due to the translation of documents from Hindi to
English and the time taken for procurement of relevant documents.
However, the petitioner has not enclosed a copy of the application for
condonation of delay with this petition. It is a well-settled principle of law
that consumer complaints are to be decided in a time-bound manner. A
litigant approaching the court for condonation of delay must properly
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explain the delay. Before the Commission, the petitioner failed to properly
explain the delay, and the reasons assigned were neither plausible nor
acceptable.
13. The learned commission has placed reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anshul Aggarwal v. New
Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC),
wherein, it is held that while deciding an application filed in such cases for
condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special
period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the
object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get
defeated if the court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against
the order of the Consumer Forums.
14. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR
241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In
para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act
were considered and it was observed thus:-
“10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the
sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-
below:
3. Bar of limitation. – (1) Subject to the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal
preferred, and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about
suit, appeal and application but since in this
case we are concerned with appeal, we would
6hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal
only in context with the limitation, it being
barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its
filing is liable to be condoned.”
15. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of
Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which
are reproduced herein-below:-
“19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar
Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC
85, it had been held that the court cannot grant
an exemption from limitation on equitable
consideration or on the ground of hardship. The
court has time and again repeated that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and
delay is not properly, satisfactorily and
convincingly explained, it ought not to condone
the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be
made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of
Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50,
wherein while observing, as above, this Court
further laid down that if some person has
obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had
arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of
the same by approaching the court at a belated
stage simply on the ground of parity, equity,
sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 :
(2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court,
despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay
of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for
condonation of delay, this Court held that the
High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a
reasonable and objective manner. High Court
should have exercised the discretion in a
systematic and an informed manner. The liberal
approach in considering sufficiency of cause for
delay should not be allowed to override
substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal
approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and
‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
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22. It has also been settled vide State of
Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar
Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered while
dealing with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 :
(2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The expression
‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted
if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is
writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its
rigour as prescribed under the statute as the
courts have no choice but to apply the law as it
stands and they have no power to condone the
delay on equitable grounds.”
16. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the
above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law
laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by
forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3 has
to be construed in a strict sense whereas
Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice may be
kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
8defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that exercise of
power is discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others are
also entitled to the same benefit if the court is
not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay
in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the delay
for the reason that the conditions have been
imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
17. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of
the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case
for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is
reproduced herein-below:-
“30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any
ice as imposition of conditions are not
warranted when sufficient cause has not been
shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay
is not liable to be condoned merely because
some persons have been granted relief on the
facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in
such circumstances is in violation of the
legislative intent or the express provision of the
statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the
reason that the claimants have been deprived
of the interest for the delay without holding that
they had made out a case for condoning the
delay is not a correct approach, particularly
9when both the above decisions have been
rendered in ignorance of the earlier
pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj
(supra).”
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
oriented approach’ and ’cause for the advancement of substantial
justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to
allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived
and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. Taking into consideration the reasons assigned by the petitioner in the
application for condonation of delay; the findings recorded by the
learned Commission and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the above-cited judgment, in my opinion, no case is made out
for interference.
20. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed at the admission
stage itself. No cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi