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Delhi High Court
Ajay Kumar Singh vs Dharam Singh & Ors on 22 April, 2025
Author: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
Bench: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 10th March, 2025
Date of Decision: 22nd April, 2025
+ CRL.M.C. 2892/2018
AJAY KUMAR SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. with Mr.
Ashwani Sharma, Brother of deceased
versus
LALIT MOHAN & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Laksh Khanna, APP SI Mukesh,
Pervi Officer, SI Vivek, PTC, SI
Karmvir, ASI Vijay Kr.
20
+ CRL.REV.P. 311/2018
AJAY KUMAR SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. with Mr.
Ashwani Sharma, Brother of deceased
versus
DHARAM SINGH & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Laksh Khanna, APP SI Mukesh,
Pervi Officer, SI Vivek, PTC, SI
Karmvir, ASI Vijay Kr.
21
+ CRL.M.C. 3721/2022
AJAY KUMAR SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. with Mr.
Ashwani Sharma, Brother of deceased
versus
THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Laksh Khanna, APP SI Mukesh,
Pervi Officer, SI Vivek, PTC, SI
Karmvir, ASI Vijay Kr.
Signature Not Verified
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SHARMA
Signing Date:23.04.2025
12:30:43
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
% JUDGMENT
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:
CRL.M.C. 2892/2018
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’) impugning the order dated 20.02.2018
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ)/Special Judge, CBI-02,
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi District in Criminal Revision No.
283/2017. By the impugned order, the Revisional Court dismissed the
revision petition preferred by the Petitioner against the order dated
22.04.2017 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate – 02, Patiala House
Courts, New Delhi District (‘Trial Court’), whereby Complaint Case No.
43679/2016, filed by the Petitioner, was dismissed.
2. The brief facts relevant for adjudication of the present petition are as
follow: The deceased Petitioner, who passed away on 23.01.2024 during the
pendency of the present petition, was the registered owner of a commercial
bus bearing registration number DL-1PB-3581. It is a matter of record that
the Petitioner had State Transport Authority (STA) permit1 for operating the
said bus on the Shahdara-Karol Bagh route. It is stated that on 05.03.2005,
while the bus was being plied at its designated route the said bus was
challaned by Assistant Sub-Inspector, Chanakyapuri Traffic
Circle/Respondent no. 1, for having violated the guidelines issued by the
Supreme Court in M.C Mehta v. Union of India2 by overtaking another
bus bearing registration no. DL-1PA-6691 on Ashram Marg, New Delhi. It is
1
permit issued by the STA to allow commercial vehicles to operate within a specific state, either for
transporting goods or passengers.
2
1997 (8) SCC 770
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stated that pursuant to the issuance of the said challan, the Petitioner’s bus
was impounded by Respondent No. 1 and was subsequently released on
Superdari to the Petitioner on 06.03.2005.
2.1 A complaint was instituted by the Petitioner before the learned Trial
Court for prosecuting Respondent No. 1 under Sections
406/420/467/468/471/190/192/193/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(‘IPC‘) read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. for illegal issuance of challan dated
05.03.2005. It was contended that Respondent No. 1, being an Assistant
Sub-Inspector (‘ASI’), lacked the authority to impound the Petitioner’s
commercial bus, as per the directions of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta
(supra), which mandated that enforcement of such guidelines be carried out
by inter-departmental flying squads headed by SDM or other higher-ranking
officer. It is further stated in the complaint that the Petitioner was unlawfully
detained by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who also misbehaved with the
passengers on board the bus. It is stated that Petitioner despite alerting
Respondent No. 3, the then Traffic Inspector, through a mobile call, no
remedial action was taken. It was further stated that the Petitioner
approached Respondent No. 4, the then ACP Traffic, and Respondent No. 5,
the then DCP Traffic, but to no avail and a false challan was prepared by the
Respondent No. 1 at the instance of Respondent No. 3. In view thereof, the
Petitioner sought initiation of criminal proceedings against the Respondents
under Sections 406/420/467/468/471/190/192/193/34 of IPC read with
Section 340 of Cr.P.C.
2.2 After perusing the materials available on record, the learned Trial
Court vide order dated 22.04.2017, dismissed the criminal complaint filed
by the Petitioner against the Respondents, holding that there was no prima
facie evidence to substantiate the allegation that the challan was bogus or
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was fabricated by the Respondent No. 1. The Trial Court further observed
that the issuance of the challan constituted an act done in the discharge of
official duties by a public servant, and as such, prosecution could not
proceed in the absence of prior sanction from appropriate authority under
Section 197 Cr.P.C., which was admittedly not placed on record.
Consequently, the learned Trial Court held that no summons could be issued
against Respondent No. 1, and, by necessary implication, no proceedings
could be initiated against the remaining Respondents either.
2.3 The Petitioner impugned the order dated 22.04.2017, by filing
Criminal Revision Petition No. 283/2017 before the Court of Sessions
(‘ASJ’). The learned ASJ vide impugned order dated 20.02.2018 upheld the
order passed by the learned Trial Court and dismissed the Criminal
Revision, preferred by the Petitioner herein.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Trial Court and
learned ASJ, Petitioner herein has preferred this petition under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.
2.5 At the hearing held on 29.04.2024, this Court was apprised that the
Petitioner has since passed away. The learned counsel for the Petitioner
sought time to file an appropriate application for substitution of the legal
heirs of the Petitioner. However, on the subsequent date, i.e., 21.10.2024, the
learned counsel for the Petitioner informed the court of his inability to
establish contact with the family members of the deceased Petitioner and
accordingly sought discharge from the matter. The counsel was accordingly
discharged, and Court notice was issued to the family of the Petitioner at his
given address to find out if they wish to pursue the matter. On 03.02.2025,
one Mr. Ashwini entered appearance and stated that he is the brother of the
deceased and expressed his willingness to pursue the present petition. It is a
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matter of record that no application for substitution was filed by
Mr. Ashwini under the relevant provisions of law however, when the matter
was thereafter taken up on 10.03.2025, the same learned counsel who
represented the deceased Petitioner appeared on behalf of Mr. Ashwini.
While no formal application was filed, the learned counsel appearing for
Mr. Ashwini made an oral prayer to continue the proceedings in his capacity
as the brother of the deceased petitioner.
2.6 Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and in
furtherance of the ends of justice, this Court, in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., permitted Mr. Ashwini to addresses
arguments in the present petition. Reliance in this regard was placed on the
principles laid down in (Re: Praban Kumar Mitra v. State of West Bengal
and Another3)
Arguments of Petitioner/Mr. Ashwini
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner stated that the criminal complaint
was dismissed by the impugned orders solely on the ground of lack of
sanction from the appropriate authority under Section 197 Cr.P.C. He stated
that, in facts and circumstances of the present case, such sanctions were not
legally required.
3.1 He stated that Respondent No. 1 issued the impugned challan in
violation of the Supreme Court’s directions in M.C. Mehta (supra), as the
challan was issued by an ASI of Traffic Police, however, as per direction
(‘g’) of the said judgment, enforcement of the Court’s directions was
required to be undertaken by flying squad team headed by an SDM along
with an ACP or other higher-ranking officer. Accordingly, it was stated that
issuance of the challan by Respondent No.1 was not an act in discharge of
3
1958 SCC Online SC 79
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his official duty and consequently, sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was
not required.
3.2 He further placed reliance on a reply received under the Right to
Information act (RTI) from P.C. Chaturvedi, Dy. Commissioner (Enf./PCD),
Transport Department, Delhi-110054, which stated that the flying squad
constituted under the SDM had ceased to function as of 31.03.2001. Thus,
the act of Respondent No. 1, were ultra vires of his official duty.
3.3 He stated that on 08.06.2006 in compliance with Section 197 Cr.P.C.,
the Petitioner applied to the Home Secretary, Government of India, seeking
sanction against the Respondents. However, no response was received from
the office of Home Secretary.
3.4 He stated that the non-response from the Home Secretary’s office
ought to be construed as a case of “implied” or “deemed” sanction. In
support reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in
Subramanian Swami v. Manmohan Singh & Ors4 wherein it was
suggested, by way of recommendation to Parliament, that a failure to decide
on sanction within a stipulated timeframe should result in a deemed
sanction, thereby enabling the prosecuting agency or private complainant to
proceed with filing the chargesheet or complaint within 15 days of such
lapse.
Argument of Respondent
4. Mr. Laksh Khanna, learned APP, stated that the actions of Respondent
No. 1, which are the subject matter of this petition, were carried out in the
official discharge of his duty as an ASI of Traffic Police. He stated that the
learned Trial Court rightly held that there was no prima facie evidence on
record to establish that the challan in question was bogus or fabricated.
4
(2012) 3 SCC 64
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4.1 He stated that, upon perusal of the judgment of Supreme Court in
M.C. Mehta (supra), makes it evident that while the flying squad,
constituted pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision were to be headed by
the SDM or ACP, the judgment did not mandate their personal presence for
each enforcement action. He stated that their role is supervisory in nature
and it cannot be contended that the Supreme Court intended that the SDM or
ACP to personally impound vehicles under Section 207 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (Motor Vehicles Act). He stated that the Motor Vehicles
Act itself allows for the delegation of power to officers of the rank of ASI
and Sub-Inspector for vehicle impounding, therefore, the Respondent No.
1’s act of impounding the petitioner’s bus does not violate any guideline
issued by the Supreme Court.
4.2 Regarding the issue of sanction, he relied on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Amal Kumar Jha v. State of Chhattisgarh5, wherein it
was held that public servants are protected under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.
if the alleged act bears a reasonable nexus with the discharge of their official
duty, even if the officer has exceeded his authority. He stated that the nature
of the offence is not the test but whether the conduct in question was
committed while the public servant was acting in his official capacity.
4.3 He stated that Respondent No. 1’s actions were carried out in the
discharge of his official duties and no sanction for the prosecution of
Respondent No.1 and other Respondents had ever been granted by the
appropriate authority. And, therefore, in the absence of such sanction, their
actions cannot be deemed to have exceeded their official authority.
5
2016 (6) SCC 734.
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Analysis and Findings
5. This Court has heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused
the record.
6. The case of the Petitioner against Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is that
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 wrongfully issued a challan on 05.03.2005 against
his bus, violating the Supreme Court’s directions in M.C. Mehta (supra).
The Petitioner stated that Respondent No. 1, an ASI of Traffic Police and
Respondent No. 2, a Constable of Traffic Police, were not authorized to
issue the impugned challan, as per clause (‘g’) of the judgment, which
required a flying squad team to be led by an SDM, along with an ACP or
other higher-ranking officer, for enforcing the said directions.
7. The case of Petitioner against Respondents Nos. 3 to 7, who are the
supervising officers, is that against the alleged illegal action of that
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, Petitioner had lodged complaints with
Respondents Nos. 3 to 7 at the contemporaneous time. However, no action
was taken by the supervising officers against Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
8. The Trial Court and the Revisional Court dismissed the Petitioner’s
criminal complaint and revision petition, finding no prima facie evidence
that the impugned challan was bogus or fabricated. Further, both the Courts
below held that the act of issuing the challan was one performed in the
discharge of official duties of Respondent No. 1 and, therefore, even
assuming that the Respondent No. 1 exceeded the power vested in him (by
impounding the Petitioner’s bus); since the said Act was done in discharge
of his official duty, therefore, before filing of the criminal complaint; the
complainant required prior sanction from competent authority under Section
197 Cr.P.C.
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9. The Petitioner disputed this finding, contending that Respondent No.
1 and 2 were not acting in discharge of any official duty and, therefore, no
sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required. Additionally, it is stated
that the Petitioner had already applied for sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
vide letter dated 08.06.20066 but received no response. The Petitioner
contends that this lack of response from the competent authority should be
construed as “deemed sanction”.
10. In light of these facts and material available on record, two key
questions arise before this Court for consideration:
i. In the facts of this case, is prior sanction under Section 197 of the
Cr.P.C. required to prosecute the Respondents?
ii. Does the absence of a response from the appropriate authority to the
Petitioner’s sanction request constitutes deemed sanction?
In the facts of this case, is prior sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. required
to prosecute the Respondents?
11. It is a well-established principle of criminal law that a Magistrate’s
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C. is
restricted by Section 197 Cr.P.C., when an accused is a public servant. This
provision mandates prior sanction from the competent authority before
prosecution can proceed, ensuring that public servants are protected from
frivolous or vexatious litigation for acts performed in the discharge of their
official duties.
11.1 However, an important exception to this rule exists i.e., if the alleged
act committed by the public servant falls outside the scope of his/her official
duty, meaning it is not intrinsically connected to the discharge of their public
functions then the bar under Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not apply. In such
6
Annexure P-8
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cases, the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190
Cr.P.C. without requiring prior sanction. This exception serves to balance the
protection afforded to public servants with the principle that no individual,
including those in public office, should be immune from legal accountability
for acts that are criminal in nature and beyond the scope of their official
functions.
11.2 Before dwelling further in adjudicating the said issue it would be
apposite to refer to a recent judgement of Supreme Court in Om Prakash
Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay7, wherein the Court summarized the
position of law regarding the necessity of prior sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C., before the Trial Court can take cognizance of offence alleged to be
committed by public servant. The relevant extract of the said Judgement
reads in Para 65 and the most appropriate sub-paras are paras (vii) and (ix)
are as under:
“65. Thus, the legal position that emerges from a conspectus of all the decisions
referred to above is that it is not possible to carve out one universal rule that
can be uniformly applied to the multivarious facts and circumstances in the
context of which the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is sought for. Any
attempt to lay down such a homogenous standard would create unnecessary
rigidity as regards the scope of application of this provision. In this context, the
position of law may be summarized as under: —
…
(vii) If in performing his official duty, the public servant acts in
excess of his duty, the excess by itself will not be a sufficient ground
to deprive the public servant from protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. if it is found that there existed a reasonable
connection between the act done and the performance of his official
duty.
(ix) The legislature has thought fit to use two distinct expressions
“acting” or “purporting to act”. The latter expression means that even if
the alleged act was done under the color of office, the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be given. However, this protection must not be7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726
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excessively stretched and construed as being limitless. It must be made
available only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and not merely a cloak for doing the
objectionable act.
…
(Emphasis Supplied)
11.3 To substantiate its claim that Respondent No. 1 was not “acting” or
“purporting to act” in the discharge of his official duty, the Petitioner has
relied on direction (‘g’) issued by the Supreme Court in the judgment of
M.C. Mehta (supra). The Petitioner contends that Respondent No. 1 lacked
the authority to impound the vehicle, as such action must be carried out by
an officer of the rank of SDM or ACP, or higher.
12. In the considered opinion of this Court the Petitioner’s contention is
incorrect. The Supreme Court’s decision in M.C. Mehta (supra) mandated
all authorities entrusted with administration and enforcement of Motor
Vehicles Act, to ensure compliance of the directions issued therein. The
relevant portion of the Supreme Court order reads as under:
ANNEXURE
1. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and learned amicus
curiae, for reasons indicated separately, in exercise of the power
of this Court under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, we hereby give the following directions,
namely:
A. The Police and all other authorities entrusted with the
administration and enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act
and generally with the control of the traffic shall ensure the
following:
(a) No heavy and medium transport vehicles, and light goods
vehicles being four-wheelers would be permitted to operate on the
roads of the NCR and NCT, Delhi, unless they are fitted with
suitable speed-control devices to ensure that they do not exceed
the speed-limit of 40 kmph. This will not apply to transport
vehicles operating on inter-State permits and national goods
permits. Such exempted vehicles would, however, be confined to
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such routes and such timings during day and night as the
police/transport authorities may publish. It is made clear that no
vehicle would be permitted on roads other than the
aforementioned exempted roads or during the times other than the
aforesaid time without a speed-control device.
(b) In our view the scheme of the Act necessarily implies an
obligation to use the vehicle in a manner which does not imperil
public safety. The authorities aforesaid should, therefore, ensure
that the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake any other
four-wheel motorised vehicle.
(c) They will also ensure that wherever it exists, buses shall be
confined to the bus lane and equally no other motorised vehicle is
permitted to enter upon the bus lane. We direct the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, NDMC, PWD, Delhi Government and
DDA, Union Government and the Delhi Cantt. Board to take steps
to ensure that bus lanes are segregated and road markings are
provided on all such roads as may be directed by the police and
transport authorities.
(d) They will ensure that buses halt only at bus-stops designated
for the purpose and within the marked area. In this connection also
Municipal Corporation of Delhi, NDMC, PWD, Delhi
Government, DDA and Union of India and Delhi Cantt. Board
would take all steps to have appropriate bus-stops constructed,
appropriate markings made and “bus-bays” built at such places as
may be indicated by transport/police authorities.
(e) Any breach of the aforesaid directions by any person would,
apart from entailing other legal consequences, be dealt with as
contravention of the conditions of the permit which could entail
suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the
vehicle.
(f) Every holder of a permit issued by any of the road transport
authorities in the NCR and NCT, Delhi will within ten days from
today, file with its RTA a list of drivers who are engaged by him
together with suitable photographs and other particulars to
establish the identity of such persons. Every vehicle shall carry a
suitable photograph of the authorised driver, duly certified by the
RTA. Any vehicle being driven by a person other than the
authorised driver shall be treated as being used in contravention of
the permit and the consequences would accordingly follow.
No bus belonging to or hired by an educational institution shall be
driven by a driver who has
— less than ten years of experience;
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— been challaned more than twice for a minor traffic offence;
— been charged for any offence relating to rash and negligent
driving.
All such drivers would be dressed in a distinctive uniform, and all
such buses shall carry a suitable inscription to indicate that they
are in the duty of an educational institution.
(g) To enforce these directions, flying squads made up of inter-
departmental teams headed by an SDM shall be constituted and
they shall exercise powers under Section 207 as well as Section 84
of the Motor Vehicles Act.
The Government is directed to notify under Section 86(4) the
officers of the rank of Assistant Commissioners of Police or above
so that these officers are also utilised for constituting the flying
squads.
(h) We direct the police and the transport authorities to consider
immediately the problems arising out of congestion caused by
different kinds of motorised and non-motorised vehicles using the
same roads. For this purpose, we direct the police and transport
authorities to identify those roads which they consider appropriate
to be confined only to motorised traffic including certain kind of
motorised traffic and identify those roads which they consider
unfit for use by motorised or certain kinds of motorised traffic and
to issue suitable directions to exclude the undesirable form of
traffic from those roads.
(i) The civic authorities including DDA, the Railways, the police
and transport authorities, are directed to identify and remove all
hoardings which are on roadsides and which are hazardous and a
disturbance to safe traffic movement. In addition, steps be taken to
put up road/traffic signs which facilitate free flow of traffic.
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. Respondent No. 1 would fall within the authorities entrusted with
enforcement of Motor Vehicles Act. In the facts of this case, the challan
dated 05.03.2005 was issued for violation of the direction (‘c’) of the M.C.
Mehta (supra) judgement. It is a matter of fact that the power to detain
vehicles is statutorily vested in traffic police officials under Section 207 of
the Motor Vehicles Act. The limits of these powers are governed by the
Motor Vehicles Act. Learned APP in its written submissions dated
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16.12.2023 has stated that the power to impound vehicles under Section 207
of the Motor Vehicles Act can be delegated to officers of rank of ASI and
Sub-Inspector. Though no document evidencing the said delegation has been
placed on record. However, Petitioner in CRL. REV. 311/2018 has placed on
record a circular dated 06.10.2025 issued by DCP, Traffic HQ, Delhi8
directing not to challan and/or prosecute buses, which halt at red signal and
allow passengers to board/de-board. The said circular relied upon by the
Petitioner itself indicates that the power to impound is being exercised by
the traffic police officials, however circular seeks to regulate the
impounding.
Moreover, the Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993 (DMV Rules),
framed under the powers conferred by Sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96, 101, 111,
138, 176, 211, and 213, read with clause (41) of Section 2 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, delegate specific powers to Police Officers, which includes the
power of seizure to an ASI. For instance, Rule 123(7) of Chapter X
empowers a police officer not below the rank of ‘Assistant Sub-Inspector’ to
impound such vehicles if there is reason to believe that the vehicle has been
or is being used in violation of Sections 3, 4, 39, or without the permit
required under Section 66(1), or in breach of any condition of such permit.
The revenant extract of the said rules reads as under:
123.Functions and Powers of officers of Motor vehicles
Department.- (1) The State Government may delegate any power
under the Act and the rules made thereunder to any person for the
proper implementation of the Act and the rules made thereunder
and such persons shall discharge all function and perform all
duties as assigned to them most diligently.
….
(7) Any police officer(s) or the person(s) appointed as officer(s)
under Section 213 of the Act and specified as such in rule 123,
8
Annexure P-3 in CRL. REV. 311/2018
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not below the rank of (Assistant Sub-Inspector), shall have
power, if they have reasons to believe that a motor vehicle has
been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of
Section 3 or Section 4 or Section 39 or without the permit
required by sub-section (1) of section 66 or in contravention of
any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or
the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be
used to seize and detain the vehicle, and shall keep the same in
safe custody of the nearest police station or police post or traffic
police circle officer or any other designated place declared by the
Delhi Police or in the designated impounding pits of the Transport
Department against a proper receipt to be given by him in Form
O.S.S. to the owner or in charge of the vehicle from whose
custody the vehicle was seized and detained.
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that power to
impound vehicles is vested in an ASI, which the officer can exercise as per
the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and DMV Rules.
15. Be that as it may, even if it is assumed that only SDM or ACP or other
high ranking officials had the authority to issue the challan and impound the
bus of the Petitioner, for violation of the directions issued by the Supreme
Court in in the judgment of M.C. Mehta (supra); even then the act of
Respondent No. 1 would still fall within the scope of his official duty under
the Motor Vehicles Act, albeit as an excess of authority, which is covered by
the judgement of Om Prakash Yadav (supra); as the excess by itself will
not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from protection
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. as there exists a reasonable connection between
the act done by Respondent No. 1 and the performance of his official duty as
an ASI, Traffic Police. This is also because the ground on which the challan
has been issued falls within the directives issued by the Supreme Court in
M.C. Mehta (supra).
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16. In its recent judgment of G.C. Manjunath & Others v. Seetaram9,
the Supreme Court reiterated the legal position that when there is a
reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the duties which a
police officer is empowered or required to perform under the law, then a
mere excess or overreach in the discharge of those official duties does not,
by itself, strip the public servant of the statutory protection provided under
Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. The relevant extract of the said judgement reads
as under:
“33. This Court in Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of
Uphaar Tragedy, (2023) 16 SCC 239 held that the State performs
its obligations through its officers/public servants and every
function performed by a public servant is ultimately aimed at
achieving public welfare. Often, their roles involve a degree of
discretion. But the exercise of such discretion cannot be separated
from the circumstances and timing in which it is exercised or, in
cases of omission, when the omission occurs. In such
circumstances, the courts must address, whether the officer was
acting in the discharge of official duties. It was observed that
even when an officer acts under the purported exercise of
official powers, they are entitled to protection under
Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.. This protection exists for a valid
reason so that the public servants can perform their duties
fearlessly, without constant apprehension of legal action, as long
as they act in good faith. While Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. does
not explicitly mention the requirement of good faith, such a
condition is implied and is expressly included in several other
statutes that offer protection to public servants from civil and
criminal liability.
34. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C., read with Section 170 of the Police Act, this Court
in D. Devaraja observed that not every offence committed by a
police officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard
under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 170 of the Police
Act is limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably
connected to the officer’s official duties. The law does not offer9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 718
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protection if the official role is used as a mere excuse to commit
wrongful acts. However, it was held that the protection of prior
sanction will be available when there is a reasonable connection
between the act and their duty. While enunciating when the
protection of prior sanction will be applicable, this Court held
that even if a police officer exceeds his official powers, as long
as there is a reasonable connection between the act and his
duty, they are still entitled to the protection requiring prior
sanction. Excessiveness alone does not strip them of this
safeguard. The language of both Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and
Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that sanction is required not
only for acts done in the discharge of official duty as well as for
the acts purported to be done in the discharge of official duty
and/or acts done “under colour of or in excess of such duty or
authority”. Sanction becomes mandatory if there is a reasonable
connection between the act and the officer’s official duties, even if
the officer acted improperly or exceeded his authority. Therefore,
if a complaint against a police officer involves actions reasonably
related to his official role, the Court cannot take cognisance unless
sanction from the appropriate Government has been obtained
under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 170 of the Police
Act….”
…
36. In light of the aforesaid judgments, the guiding principle
governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystallised.
The pivotal inquiry is whether the impugned act is reasonably
connected to the discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly
unconnected or manifestly devoid of any nexus to the official
functions of the public servant, the requirement of sanction is
obviated. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link
between the act complained of and the official duties of the
public servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C. and Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. In
such cases, prior sanction assumes the character of a sine qua non,
regardless of whether the public servant exceeded the scope of
authority or acted improperly while discharging his duty.
37. Turning to the case at hand, there is little doubt that the
allegations levelled against the accused persons are grave in
nature. Broadly classified, the accusations against the accused
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persons encompass the following: (1) abuse of official
authority by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the
complainant in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven
by malice or vendetta; (2) physical assault and ill-treatment of
the complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of
alleged police excess; (3) wrongful confinement of the
complainant; and (4) criminal intimidation of the
complainant.
38. In the circumstances at hand, we are of the considered opinion
that the allegations levelled against the accused persons, though
grave, squarely fall within the ambit of “acts done under colour of,
or in excess of, such duty or authority,” and “acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as envisaged under
Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C. respectively. This Court, while adjudicating on
instances of alleged police excess, has consistently held
in Virupaxappa and D. Devaraja, that where a police officer, in
the course of performing official duties, exceeds the bounds of
such duty, the protective shield under the relevant statutory
provisions continues to apply, provided there exists a reasonable
nexus between the impugned act and the discharge of official
functions. It has been categorically held that transgression or
overstepping of authority does not, by itself, suffice to displace
the statutory safeguard of requiring prior government
sanction before prosecuting the public servant concerned.
39. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the
complainant was declared a rowdy sheeter by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Law and Order (West), Bengaluru City,
pursuant to a request made by the Mahalakshmi Layout Police
Station, Bengaluru, upon due consideration of the criminal cases
registered against the complainant, vide order dated 23.08.1990.
Subsequently, multiple criminal cases have been instituted against
the complainant. It is in the course of the investigation of these
cases that the instant allegations have been levelled against the
accused persons. As noted above, any action undertaken by a
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public officer, even if in excess of the authority vested in them or
overstepping the confines of their official duty, would nonetheless
attract statutory protection, provided there exists a reasonable
nexus between the act complained of and the officer’s official
functions.
40. In the present case, it is evident that the actions attributed to
the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their official
duties, specifically in connection with the investigation of
criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously
observed, a mere excess or overreach in the performance of
official duty does not, by itself, disentitle a public servant from the
statutory protection mandated by law. The safeguard of
obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, as
envisaged under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 170 of
the Police Act cannot be rendered nugatory merely because
the acts alleged may have exceeded the strict bounds of official
duty. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion
that the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
erred in taking cognisance of the alleged offences against the
accused persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in
the instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the
very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused
persons.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
17. The Petitioner has also contended that, based on an RTI response
received from P.C. Chaturvedi, Deputy Commissioner (Enf./PCD),
Transport Department, Delhi, the flying squads constituted under the
supervision of SDMs pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions in M.C.
Mehta (supra) ceased operations on 31.03.2001. Therefore, the Petitioner
argues that Respondent No. 1 could not have impounded the vehicle as on
05.03.2005. In the considered opinion of this Court said argument is
unsubstantiated. A plain reading of the RTI response reveals that it merely
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states, “no deployment has been made after 31.03.2001.” This does not
imply that the traffic police officials ceased to have powers of impounding
vested under Section 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As noted above, the
power to impound vehicles exists in the statute even prior to the judgement
of M.C Mehta (supra); however, it appears that the grounds on which the
impounding could be carried out had been further elucidated in the said
judgment. The said judgment is in force even as on date. Therefore, the
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit and does not establish that Respondent
No. 1 ex-facie acted without authority of law.
18. In light of the discussion above and aforenoted judgements, having
returned a finding that the action of Respondent No. 1 in issuing the challan
on 05.03.2005 and impounding the Petitioner’s bus was an act done in
discharge of his official duty, the prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is
required to prosecute the Respondent No. 1 and consequently all other
Respondents.
19. It is clarified that these findings are only with respect to the necessity
to obtain prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before prosecuting a
criminal complaint.
Does the absence of a response from the appropriate authority to the
Petitioner’s sanction request constitutes deemed sanction?
20. The Petitioner states that on 08.06.2006, he applied to the Home
Secretary, Government of India, seeking sanction against the Respondents in
compliance with Section 197 Cr.P.C. However, no response was received
from the Home Secretary’s office.
20.1 The Petitioner argues that the absence of a response should be
interpreted as deemed sanction. In support of this argument, the Petitioner
relies on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Subramanian Swamy (Supra),
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wherein the Court suggested that Parliament should consider implementing a
Rule whereby, if no decision on sanction is taken within the stipulated time,
sanction should be deemed to have been granted, enabling the prosecuting
agency or private complainant to proceed with filing the charge sheet or
complaint within 15 days of the expiration of the time limit.
20.2 However, this Court notes that, in law as it stands today, there is no
concept of “deemed sanction” under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The observations
in the judgment relied upon by the Petitioner is a recommendation to
Parliament, which remains a recommendation and has not resulted in a
legislative amendment. This has been reiterated by Supreme Court in
Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Anr10 wherein the Court noted the
judgment Subramanian Swamy (supra) and held that there is no concept of
“deemed sanction” under Section 197 Cr.P.C. as per law as it stands today.
The relevant extract of the said judgement reads as under:-
30. The argument advanced by the respondent-State and the
complainant with respect to “deemed sanction” is also not
tenable. Section 197 of Cr.P.C. does not envisage a concept of
deemed sanction. The chargesheet, as well as the counter
affidavit of the respondent-State, have relied upon the judgment of
this Court in Vineet Narain to contend that lack of grant of
sanction by the concerned authority within relevant time would
amount to deemed sanction for prosecution. However, a perusal of
the said judgment reveals that it did not deal with Section 197
Cr.P.C. and rather it dealt with the investigation powers and
procedures of Central Bureau of Investigation and Central
Vigilance Commission. While it did mention that the time limits
for grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to,
there is no observation to the effect that lack of grant of
sanction for prosecution within the time limit would amount to
deemed sanction for prosecution.
31. Similarly, learned counsel for the complainant had placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy10
2025 INSC 267
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to lend credence to the argument of deemed sanction for
prosecution. However, even the said judgment does not in any
manner lay down the notion of deemed sanction. First, the said
judgment dealt primarily with the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and the sanction for prosecution under that Act. Secondly
G.S. Singhvi, J. while penning his separate but concurring opinion
in the said judgment, had given some guidelines for the
consideration of the Parliament, one of which is to the effect that
at the end of the extended period of time limit, if no decision is
taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the
proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the
private complainant will proceed to file the chargesheet/
complaint in the court to commence prosecution within fifteen
days of the expiry of the aforementioned time limit. However,
such a proposition has not yet been statutorily incorporated
by the Parliament and in such a scenario, this Court cannot
read such a mandate into the statute when it does not exist.
(Emphasis Suppled)
21. Thus, the submission of the Petitioner that the Trial Court ought to
have presumed there was a deemed sanction is misconceived.
22. Accordingly, there is no infirmity in the order dated 22.04.2017 of the
Trial Court and the order dated 20.02.2018 of the Revision Court. The
present petition is without any merits and the same is dismissed. Pending
applications, if any, stands disposed of.
CRL.REV.P. 311/2018
23. The present criminal revision petition has been filed under Section
401 Cr.P.C. impugning the order dated 23.12.2017 passed by Special Judge,
CBI-01, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in Criminal
Complaint No.03/2017 (‘Trial Court’) dismissing the criminal complaint
filed by the Petitioner under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
24. The brief facts relevant for adjudication of the present petition are as
follow: The deceased Petitioner, who passed away on 23.01.2024 during the
pendency of the present petition, was the owner of the commercial bus
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bearing registration number DL-1PB-3581 and had STA permit for plying
bus on the route Shahdara-Karol Bagh. It is stated that on 10.05.2006 when
the bus was being plied at its designated route the said bus was challaned by
ASI Parliament Street/Respondent no. 1, on the ground that it had violated
the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in M.C Mehta (supra) by
stopping the bus at other than the designated bus stop and allowed
passengers to onboard and deboard, in respect of which challan under
section 66(1)/192A/177 of the Motor Vehicle Act and Section 7 of DMV
Rules was issued. It is stated that the by the said challan, the bus of the
Petitioner was impounded by Respondent No. 1 and was released on
Superdari to the Petitioner on 11.05.2006.
24.1 It is stated that a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. was
filed by the Petitioner before the learned Judicial Magistrate against the
Respondent no. 1 for issuing challan, without authority of law and against
the other Respondents for not taking action against Respondent no. 1.
However, upon perusal of the complaint learned Judicial Magistrate found
that allegations under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘P.C Act‘) were
also made and, therefore, the concerned learned District and Session Judge
transferred the complaint before the learned ASJ/Trial Court.
24.2 The learned ASJ/Trial Court, after examining the material on record,
dismissed the complaint filed by the Petitioner against the Respondents. The
Trial Court held that the complaint was directed against public servants for
actions carried out in the discharge of their official duties, therefore, prior
sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of P.C Act was a
pre-requisite for prosecution. As it was an admitted fact that no such
sanction had been granted by the competent authority, the Respondents
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could not be prosecuted, and the criminal complaint was consequently
dismissed.
24.3 Aggrieved by the dismissal of the criminal complaint by the learned
Trial Court petitioner has filed the present criminal revision petition before
this Court.
Arguments of Petitioner/Mr. Ashwini
25. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that no sanction under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. or Section 19 of the P.C Act is required to prosecute the
Respondents, in the facts of the present case as Respondents were in breach
of their official duty as the challan dated 10.05.2006 was issued by the
Respondent No. 1 in violation of the circular dated 06.10.2005 issued by
DCP, Traffic HQ, Delhi11 directing all the Traffic Inspectors not to challan
and/or prosecute buses, which halt at red signal and allow passengers to on-
board/de-board.
25.1 With respect to the issue of sanction, he stated that an application
dated 08.08.2006 was made in this regard before the office of Home
Secretary, Government of India, however, no response was received from
the Home Secretary’s office. It was only on 13.03.2014, that the Home
Secretary’s office issued a letter12 informing the Petitioner that the
application had been considered and that the matter had been closed. He
stated that the said letter does not clarify whether sanction was granted or
denied. He stated that the non-response from the Home Secretary’s office
should be deemed as deemed sanction.
26. Learned counsel of Petitioner adopted all other submissions made by
him in CRL.M.C. 2892/2018.
11
Annexure P-3
12
Annexure P-5
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Arguments of Respondent
27. Mr. Laksh Khanna, learned APP adopted the submissions made by
him in CRL.M.C. 2892/2018 and the written submissions dated 16.12.2023
filed therein.
Analysis and Findings
28. In light of the findings in CRL.MC 2898/2018 vis-à-vis the
mandatory requirement of sanction from the competent authority under
Section 197 Cr.P.C., this Court finds no error in the impugned judgment of
the Trial Court dated 23.12.2017. In the present case as well, the issuance of
the challan by Respondent No. 1 was an act performed in the course of his
official duties as a traffic police officer. The contention that this action may
have contravened the circular dated 06.10.2005 issued by the DCP, Traffic
HQ, Delhi does not by itself strip the Respondent No. 1 of the protection
afforded under Section 197 Cr.P.C. because of the fact that even if the
Respondent No. 1’s conduct exceeded the scope of authority conferred upon
him by challaning and impounding the vehicle of Petitioner, it still
maintained a reasonable nexus with his official functions as a traffic police
officer and as held by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Yadav(supra)
and G.C. Manjunath (supra), when an act is reasonably connected to the
discharge of official duties, protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is
applicable. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1 is entitled to such protection.
29. In addition, the effect of the letter dated 13.03.2014 is non-grant of
sanction and this letter has not been challenged by the Petitioner.
30. Accordingly, the present petition is without any merits and the same is
dismissed.
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CRL.M.C. 3721/2022
31. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
impugning the order dated 10.03.2022 passed by the learned ASJ-03,
Karkardooma Courts, East District, Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 07/2022,
whereby the revision petition filed against the order dated 12.08.2021 passed
by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, East District, Delhi
(‘Trial Court’) was dismissed.
The Trial Court vide order dated 12.08.2021 had dismissed Complaint
Case No. 52619/2016 filed by the Petitioner.
32. The brief facts relevant for adjudication of the present petition are as
follows:
The deceased Petitioner, who passed away on 23.01.2024 during the
pendency of the present petition, was the registered owner of the
commercial bus bearing registration number DL-1PB-3581 and had STA
permit for plying bus on the route Shahdara-Karol Bagh. It is stated that on
14.06.2004, while the bus was operating on its designated route, it was
intercepted and subsequently challaned and impounded by the Traffic
Inspector, Gandhi Nagar Traffic Circle, Delhi /Respondent No. 2, on the
allegation that they had violated the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court
in M.C Mehta (supra), by overtaking another bus bearing registration
number DL-1PA-7976 in respect of which challan No. AH644961 was
issued under Section 66(1)/192A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
32.1 It is stated that vide order dated 15.06.2004, the learned Special
Metropolitan Magistrate (Traffic), Karkardooma Courts, East District, Delhi,
quashed the said challan and ordered discharge of the Petitioner’s vehicle.
32.2 A criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. was filed by the
Petitioner against the impounding officer i.e., Respondent No. 2 and his
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subordinate officers i.e., Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on the ground that the
challan was issued with malice and personal vendetta, as the Petitioner had
earlier lodged complaints, including a legal notice dated 11.05.2004, against
the impounding officer. The criminal complaint alleged commission of
offences under Sections 167/218/420/465/466/471/120-B read with Section
34 of IPC. Though initially dismissed in 2011, the complaint was revived in
appeal vide order dated 26.10.2012.
32.3 The learned Trial Court, after taking cognizance, issued summons to
the Respondents vide order dated 06.12.2020. Thereafter, an application was
filed by the Respondents seeking discharge on the ground that no prior
sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was obtained. The Trial Court, vide the
impugned order dated 12.08.2021, allowed the said application and
dismissed the complaint by holding that the Respondents were public
servants and the acts complained of were performed in discharge of their
official duties. Consequently, prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was a
necessary pre-condition for taking cognizance, and the Petitioner had failed
to place any material on record to show that such sanction was obtained.
32.4 Aggrieved by the order dated 12.08.2021, the Petitioner preferred
Criminal Revision Petition No. 07/2022 before the Court of Sessions. The
learned ASJ, vide impugned order dated 10.03.2022, upheld the decision of
the learned Trial Court and dismissed the Revision Petition.
32.5 Feeling aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Trial Court and
the learned ASJ, the Petitioner has filed the present petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.
Analysis and Findings
33. In light of the findings in CRL.MC 2898/2018 vis-à-vis the
mandatory requirement of sanction from the competent authority under
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Section 197 Cr.P.C., this Court finds no error in the impugned judgment of
the learned ASJ dated 10.03.2022 and learned Trial Court dated 12.08.2021.
Similarly in the facts of this case, the action of Respondent no. 1 in issuing
the impugned challan has a reasonable nexus with his official duties.
34. Accordingly, the present petition is without any merits and the same
is dismissed.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
(JUDGE)
APRIL 22, 2025/mt/AKT/AKP
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