Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ajay Tandon vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 January, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:3622
1 MCRC-29918-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 20th OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 29918 of 2024
AJAY TANDON
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Brahmendra Pathak - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Alok Agnihotri - Government Advocate for the respondents-State.
ORDER
Case diary is available.
2. This petition, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has been moved by the
petitioner for quashing of the order dated 02.08.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed
by the Court below rejecting an application filed under Section 468 of
Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge-sheet and quashing the criminal case
registered under Crime No.293/2021 against the present petitioner and
charge-sheet filed in that regard as charge-sheet No.187/22.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the case is squarely
covered by the order of this Court passed in M.Cr.C. No.19690 of 2024
(Bisahu Lal Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh) decided on 09.12.2024.
He submits that the facts of the present case are similar to the case of Bisahu
Lal Singh (supra).
4. As per the facts of the case, police registered an F.I.R. on
16.04.2021 against the present petitioner and also against the other co-
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accused persons. The petitioner being an Ex. M.L.A., the case was tried by a
Special Court (M.P./M.L.A.). The incident is said to have been occurred on
14.04.2021 whereby the petitioner along with other co-accused persons have
violated the order of District Magistrate imposing Section 144 of Cr.P.C.
However, even after registration of F.I.R. on 16.04.2021 under Sections 188,
142, 143 and 294 of IPC, the charge-sheet could not be filed though it was
prepared on 15.04.2022 but the same was filed on 21.07.2023 and as such, it
is claimed that there was a delay of almost one year and three months but no
application for condoning the delay and seeking extension in the limitation
to file charge-sheet was filed, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner has
assailed the proceedings initiated before the trial Court by filing the charge-
sheet saying that the same cannot be continued and it can be quashed on the
ground of delay because charge-sheet has been filed after much delay of
limitation prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. However, trial Court has
rejected the application taking shelter of Section 473 of Cr.P.C. saying that
the delay has been properly explained and as such, charge-sheet cannot be
quashed.
5. As per the case of prosecution, when the Code of Conduct and
Section 144 of Cr.P.C. was in force, the petitioner along with some other
persons have formed a gathering of 30-40 persons and therefore, the offence
was registered against him. The F.I.R. was lodged on 16.04.2021 and
therefore, as per the petitioner, limitation for filing the charge-sheet as per
Section 468 starts from the date of registration of offence. The Court has
observed that the charge-sheet was filed after a delay of almost one year and
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three months without there being any application for condoning the delay or
seeking permission to extend the period of limitation, as can be done under
the provision of Section 473 of Cr.P.C.
6. The Court below after discussing the facts of the case, condoned
the delay assigning reason therein that the charge-sheet was prepared on
15.04.2022 and it was bought before the Court for producing the same on
24.08.2022 but due to over work, the Court has not accepted the charge-sheet
and that reason has been assigned in the Rojnamcha Sanha and thereafter, on
the given date, it was not produced but the same was produced on
11.09.2022.
7. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the reason
assigned and considered to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay, was
sufficient and therefore, according to him, there is nothing wrong committed
by the Court whereas as per the petitioner, that reason cannot be considered
to be sufficient cause because not filing the charge-sheet in time and even
not giving proper explanation before the Court while seeking extension, the
Court could not have taken the cognizance in the matter and could have
dismissed the charge-sheet.
8. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to convince
this Court on the ground that the offence has not rightly been registered
against the present petitioner because he has violated the restriction imposed
by the administration.
9. Instead of entering into the said field, I am only confining myself to
the extent to see whether the offence can be continued as the charge-sheet
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has been filed after a long delay of almost 01 year and 03 months and reason
explained by the authority for delay is sufficient or not, and the delay can be
condoned as per the provision of section 473 of Cr.P.C. or not ?
10. I have considered the submissions made by counsel for petitioner
and also the order of the trial Court in which reason for delay has been
explained.
11. From perusal of order passed by the Court below and reason for
delay contained therein, it is clear that the explanation given by the
authorities that the petitioner was a contesting candidate from Congress Party
at the relevant point of time and being a public leader, he was not available
and also not contacted to the Investigating Officer and as such Investigating
Officer could not complete the investigation.
12. It is also alleged that the petitioner had not cooperated with the
Investigating Officer and, therefore, the delay occurred in completing the
investigation and the prosecution had no option but to submit the charge-
sheet.
13. I am not convinced with the explanation given by the respondent.
If the petitioner was not available and was not cooperating with the
investigation team, then the investigation team should have not waited for
such a long time and could have completed the investigation and produced
the charge-sheet even in absence of accused but they did not do so and
waited for almost one year and three months, thereafter, the charge-sheet was
produced. As per the provisions of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., the limitation
for filing the charge-sheet has to be mandatorily complied with because the
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provision starts from non-obstante clause and in view of the offence
registered against the present petitioner, the maximum punishment
prescribed is within a period of three years and therefore, the charge-sheet
had to be filed within the period prescribed under the said provision.
Although the Court is empowered to condone the delay if there is any
sufficient reason shown by the prosecution for condoning the delay, but that
power is given to the Court under Section 473 of the CrPC. For the purpose
of convenience, Section 468 of CrPC is apt to be reproduced and is being
reproduced hereinbelow along with the respective provision i.e. Section 473
which empowers the Court to condone the delay:-
“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Coed, no Court
shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in
sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2)The period of limitation shall be –
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years
[(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in
relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be
determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with
the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most
severe punishment:]
473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of
this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after
the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the fats
and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been
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properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests
of justice.”
14. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the delay can be
condoned by the Court exercising the power provided under Section 473 of
CrPC, but it cannot be done in a routine manner unless any sufficient reason
is explained to condone the delay, therefore, in the facts of present case, the
reason mentioned for condoning the delay which has been considered by the
Court for condoning the delay, in my opinion, is not sufficient and the Court
below failed to see that the period of limitation in respect of taking
cognizance in the matter and to file the charge-sheet in time has to be strictly
followed. Although in exceptional cases, the delay can be condoned, but the
reason explained in the present case so mentioned in the impugned order,
does not come within the exceptional circumstances. The Supreme Court in
the case of State of H.P. Vs. Tara Dutt & Another reported in (2000) 1 SCC
230, considering the scope of applying Section 473 of CrPC, has observed as
under:-
“7. Section 473 confers power on the court taking cognizance after
the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts
and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been
properly explained and that it is necessary so to do in the interest
of justice. Obviously, therefore in respect of the offences for
which a period of limitation has been provided in Section 468, the
power has been conferred on the Court taking cognizance to
extend the said period of limitation where a proper and satisfactory
explanation of the delay is available and where the Court taking
cognizance finds that it would be in the interest of justice. This
discretion conferred on the Court has to be exercised judicially and
on well recognised principles. This being a discretion conferred on
the Court taking cognizance, where-ever the Court exercises this
discretion, the same must be by a speaking order, indicating theSignature Not Verified
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satisfaction of the Court that the delay was satisfactorily explained
and condonation of the same was in the interest of justice. In the
absence of a positive order to that effect it may not be permissible
for a superior Court to come to the conclusion that the Court must
be deemed to have taken cognizance by condoning the delay
whenever the cognizance was barred and yet the Court took
cognizance and proceeded with the trial of the offence. But the
provisions are of no application to the case in hand since for the
offences charged, no period of limitation has been provided in
view of the imposable punishment thereunder. In this view of the
matter we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the
High Court committed serious error in holding that the conviction
of the two respondents under Section 417 would be barred as on
the date of taking cognizance the Court could not have taken
cognizance for the said offence. Needless to mention, it is well
settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that if an accused is
charged of a major offence but is not found guilty thereunder, he
can be convicted of a minor offence if the facts established
indicate that such minor offence has been committed.”
15. Thus, in view of the above enunciation of law, in my opinion, the
reason mentioned for condoning the delay is not sufficient to do so,
therefore, the cognizance taken by the Court when there was no sufficient
reason, is not proper and the order rejecting the objection of the accused is
not sustainable especially when the Court has considered the judgments of
the Supreme Court, which very clearly provide that exercising the power
under Section 473 of CrPC, the Court should be very cautious and the said
power should be exercised in exceptional and special circumstances, but here
in the case at hand, it is not done, therefore, the impugned order is liable to
be and is hereby set-aside. The offence registered against the petitioner and
proceedings initiated pursuant thereto vide Crime No.293/2021, are hereby,
quashed.
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16. With the aforesaid, the petition is allowed and disposed of.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
PK
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