Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ajeet Yadav & Others vs Dr. Himakshi Sharma on 10 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 670 of 2024 a/w
Cr.MMO No. 1305 of 2023
Reserved on: 24.3.2025.
Date of decision : 10.4.2025.
1. CMPMO No. 670 of 2024
Ajeet Yadav & others ...Petitioners.
Versus
Dr. Himakshi Sharma ...Respondent.
2. Cr.MMO No. 1305 of 2023
Ajeet Yadav & others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & another ...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the petitioners : Mr. Ajeeet Yadav, Petitioner in
person.
For the respondents : Mr. N. K. Thakur, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, for
the respondent.
Mr. Baldev K. Negi, Addl. A.G., for
the respondent State.
Satyen Vaidya, Judge:
Both these petitions Cr.MMO No. 1305 and
CMPMO No. 670 of 2024 have been heard and are being
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
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decided together, as common question of facts and law are
involved.
2. Cr.MMO No. 1305 of 2023 has been filed by the
petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for quashing of FIR No. 21 of 2023 dated
24.5.2023 under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code,
registered at Women Police Station, District Una, H.P. and
consequential proceedings arising from the said FIR i.e.
Criminal Case No. 252 of 2023, titled as, State of H.P. vs.
Ajeet Yadav, pending before the learned Judicial
Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No.2, Una.
3. Initially petitioner had filed his second petition
also under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
registered as Cr.MMO No. 134 of 2024 with a prayer to
quash complaint filed under the provisions of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act (for short ‘DV Act‘),
registered as Domestic Violence Act Case No. 80 of 2022,
titled as, Dr. Himakshi Sharma vs. Ajeet Yadav, pending in
the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court
No.3, Una. However, vide order dated 20.11.2024, the
same has been converted to the one under Article 227 of
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the Constitution of India and has been registered as
CMPMO 670 of 2024.
4. Certain facts, which have emerged as
undisputed are noticed in the first instance, as under:-
i) Petitioner Ajeet Yadav and the respondent
Dr. Himakshi Sharma (hereinafter referred
to as wife) were married to each other in
accordance with Hindu rites on 20.1.2020
at Una, Himachal Pradesh.
ii) Petitioner is a serving officer of Indian Army
and holds the rank of Major.
iii) The wife is BAMS qualified.
iv) The parents of Petitioner are ordinarily
residents of Gandhinagar in Gujrat and the
parents of the wife are ordinarily residents
of Una, Himachal Pradesh.
5. The wife filed a written complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Una, H.P. on 9.9.2022, alleging
inter alia as under: –
(a) At the time of marriage, the parents of the
wife had gifted gold chain and ring to the
-4-husband; gold earrings to the mother and
sisters of the petitioner and another gold
ring to father of the petitioner. The parents
of wife had spent about Rs. 20,00,000/- at
the time of marriage including all expenses.
(b) Till about two and half months after the
marriage, the attitude of the petitioner was
positive and normal towards the wife but
thereafter, there was a change in his
behavior and the petitioner started
taunting the wife with respect to small
things and also started to misbehave with
her. The Petitioner started torturing and
beating the wife without any reason and
also demanded dowry in the form of car
and plot of land. Once, the wife had
forgotten to wear “Mangalsutra”, the
petitioner had abused her badly in the
locality and on reaching home, she was
badly abused and slapped by the husband.
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(c) The petitioner was in the habit of indulging
in forcible intercourse with the wife and on
being shown resistance, he would start
beating the wife.
(d) In the month of May, 2020, petitioner and
wife went to Gandhinagar. The mother of
petitioner abused and taunted at the wife
that her parents had not given car at the
time of marriage. On the wife showing
inability of her parents to gift car, she and
her parents were abused by her mother-in-
law (petitioner No.2). It was observed by
the petitioner No.2 that her son was an
army officer but the wife and her parents
were so cheap that they had not given a car
in the form of dowry, therefore, the wife
and her parents would not be tolerated and
the petitioner would get some rich family
for marriage. The wife was further
threatened that her belongings would be
thrown out of the house.
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(e) The petitioner No.2 had kept all the
household items in the kitchen under lock
and key and when once the wife had asked
for the same, petitioner No.2 had retaliated
by attempting to throw a brick on the head
of wife.
(f) In January, 2021, the wife and petitioner
again went to Gandhinagar for the purpose
of shopping on the occasion of wedding of
sister of the petitioner. At that point of
time also, the petitioner No.2 again started
taunting for demand of dowry in the form
of plot and car. At the time of marriage of
the sister of the husband, the petitioner
No.2 again abused the parents of the wife.
The wife was asked to leave the petitioner
so that his second marriage could be
solemnized to a girl who could give them a
big car, plot and cash. The parents of the
wife made request to the petitioner No.2
with folded hands not to behave like that
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but the petitioner No.2 abused them to get
lost along with their daughter. Even after
returning of the parents of the wife to their
house, petitioner No.2 called them and
started hurling abuse.
(g) The wife when shared her experience with
petitioner, he also supported his parents
and used the same abusive language, as
used by his mother. Thereafter, the wife
joined her job at Yamunanagar in the
month of May, 2021, however, the attitude
of the husband remained the same as he
used to indulge in forcible intercourse and
continued to abuse and slap the wife on
small matters.
(h) In order to make their relations better, the
wife visited Leh in the month of October,
2021, she was again treated with hostility.
There also the petitioner smashed the wife
against the bed, tried to strangulate her
neck and broke her chain.
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(i) Thereafter, the petitioner was posted at
Meerut. The father of the husband
(hereinafter referred to as the petitioner
No.3) was also staying along with him.
Though, the wife took every care of the
petitioner No.3 but she was again treated
with abuses and humiliation. Even the
petitioner No.3 used to taunt her that she
was lucky that she got an officer. The
petitioner instead of intervening, cursed
her that she was unlucky and a burden in
the family. During the night period, the
husband again gave beatings to the wife.
(j) Reconciliation took place between the
parties in the month of July, 2022 with the
understanding that both will begin their
new inning after forgetting the past but
such promise remained short lived and
again the petitioner dragged the wife and
pulled off her in front of her parents.
When, the mother of the wife tried to stop
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the husband, he abused the mother also.
The matter had gone from bad to worse in
the month of August, 2022 and thereafter,
the wife started residing with her parents.
6. The wife thereafter filed an application under
Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. on 2.11.2022 in the Court of
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1,
Una, seeking directions for registration of FIR against the
petitioners. The said application of the wife was allowed on
9.5.2023 and a direction was issued to the police to
register the FIR. In compliance, FIR No. 21 of 2023 came
to be registered on 24.5.2023 at Women Police Station,
Una. The investigation was carried and challan has been
presented against the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 in the Court
of competent jurisdiction.
7. On the identical allegations, the wife has also
initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act (for short, ‘the DV Act‘). The
complaint under DV Act is pending in the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No.3, Una.
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8. The wife had filed a third complaint with similar
allegations to Army authorities through Army Wives
Welfare Association (AWWA).
9. The petitioner has sought the quashing of both
the proceedings i.e. the FIR No. 21 of 2023 alongwith the
proceedings initiated on its basis as also the proceedings
under the DV Act. He alleges that the wife has initiated
prosecution against the petitioners out of sheer vengeance.
It is claimed that the petitioner is bound by a discipline of
an army officer and is innocent. The legal proceedings
initiated against him by the wife have been alleged to be
abuse of process of law.
9.1 It is averred by the petitioner that he along with
his wife lived together for five months in Devlali
Cantonment (Maharashtra) after the marriage, whereas his
parents were separately residing in Gandhinagar in
Gujarat. Thereafter, the petitioner was posted in Galwan
Valley (Indo-China Border) from July, 2020 to October,
2021, where the family was not allowed. During this
period, the wife resided at Zirakpur in Punjab. In between
the petitioner had availed the leave of 12 days, 30 days and
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6 days on three different occasions and during one of
them, the marriage of his sister was also solemnized. After
24.11.2021, the wife and petitioner started residing at
Meerut. On 28.12.2021, the father of the petitioner was
diagnosed with cancer stage-II. He had received treatment
included surgery from Army Hospital, New Delhi between
January, 2021 to March, 2021.
9.2 It is also the case of the petitioner that the wife
deserted him on 10.4.2022 but later she realizes her
mistake and apologizes through e-mail on 10.5.2022. She
sought forgiveness and in July, 2022, the matter was
formally reconciled. The husband and wife started residing
together w.e.f. 16.7.2022 but thereafter, the wife
permanently left the house on 13.8.2022.
9.3 It is alleged that before marriage, the petitioner
and wife had a courtship for about four years as it was a
love-cum-arranged marriage.
10. The petitioner has, thus, tried to demonstrate
that the allegations leveled by the wife in her complaints
are false, smeared with malafide and motivated. The
petitioner has tried to point out certain contradictions in
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the complaint filed by wife to contend that the allegations
were false. The petitioner has marked that at one place
she talks about the car and at other place about car and
plot and lastly about car, plot and cash. It has also been
submitted that in the complaint under DV Act, there is no
allegation regarding demand of dowry. The petitioner has
contended that he did not require any car, as he had
purchased the one out of his own funds before the
marriage. In order to further show his bonafide, the
husband has submitted that after the marriage, the
account of wife had been credited with Rs. 5,03,602/- paid
by him besides jewellery worth Rs. 1,88,375/- gifted by
him to the wife on first wedding anniversary.
10.1 As regards the allegation of breach of trust, the
husband has submitted that the wife has again
contradicted herself by making different statements at
different points of time. Reference has been made to the
statement given by the wife in Women Police Station,
where she had allegedly stated that the ‘Istridhan’ was not
in possession of the petitioners.
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10.2 The next allegation of physical assault leveled by
the wife has been refuted being the total falsehood. It is
contended that the wife herself being a medical practitioner
was fully aware about the medico legal implications but
she had neither made any complaint regarding physical
assault nor can substantiate the allegation with any
medical record.
10.3 Similarly, the allegations with respect to abuse,
torture and taunt have been alleged to be false and
concocted. The petitioner has placed reliance on certain e-
mails exchanged between the parties.
11. It is further submitted by the petitioner that
since the matter had been settled in July, 2022, the wife
was estopped from alleging about incidents prior to such
date as the wrong, if any, stood condoned.
12. In above backdrop, the petitioners seek the
quashing of the proceedings. According to them even if the
allegations are taken to be correct on its face value, no
offence under Section 498-A or any wrong in terms of DV
Act is made out.
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13. Another aspect highlighted by the petitioner is
that the wife had submitted a complaint with identical
allegations to the President, Army Wife Welfare Association.
This had led to an enquiry ordered by the Army
authorities. After thorough inquiry, the petitioner was
exonerated from all the charges of dowry, domestic
violence, physical assault, harassment and maltreatment
etc. His contention is that the criminal prosecution
against him on the same allegation on which he has been
exonerated by the army authorities was not maintainable.
14. Additionally, the petitioner has alleged the
conduct of wife to be abuse of process of law. He has
submitted that the allegations against his parents are not
only false but are general and omnibus in nature, which by
itself reflects the falsity thereof.
15. According to the petitioner, there is no chance of
successful prosecution and conviction of the petitioners in
the prosecution launched against them by the wife and the
holding of trial in both the cases will not only to be an
abuse of process of law but is likely to prejudice the service
career of the petitioner/husband.
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16. I have heard the petitioner Sh. Ajeet Yadav in
person and Sh. N. K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate and
Sh. Baldev Kumar Negi, learned Additional Advocate
General and have also gone through the record carefully.
17. The petitioner would contend that there was no
allegation of demand or acceptance of dowry against the
petitioner or his parents. From the averments made in the
complaint filed by the wife, what at the most can be
inferred is that the husband or his mother had extended
taunts to the wife and her parents for not providing car
and plot to the petitioner. As per petitioner, he has
sufficiently shown on record that he did not require the car
as he had purchased the one even before marriage. He also
alleged to have paid into the account of the wife a sum of
more than Rs. 5,00,000/- besides gifting her valuable
jewellery. Further, he has also referred to the
contradictions in the complaint, highlighted in her three
different versions, as already noticed above.
18. The petitioner has made reference to a judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SC 67,
wherein it is held that taunt for not bringing sufficient
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dowry is distinctive from demand of dowry and does not
come within the purview of Section 498-A of IPC. He
further refers to a judgment passed by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No. 1012 of 2022 in case
titled Veena Anand vs. State of H.P. & another, wherein the
general allegations of dowry were found to be not sufficient
to constitute evidence under Section 498A of IPC. The
petitioner has also placed reliance of the affidavit filed by
the wife in proceedings pending before the Family Court,
Meerut, which according to petitioner once again belies the
allegations of demand of dowry.
19. Petitioner has submitted that even the
allegations of misbehavior were general and omnibus in
nature.
20. The petitioner would next contend that the
allegations with respect to physical assault are vague and
lacking in material particulars. According to him, such
allegations were required to be ignored keeping in view the
attending circumstances. He submitted that there is no
medico legal or any other record or independent evidence
to support the allegations. Further support has been
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sought to be drawn by the petitioner from the evidence
recorded in Family Court, Meerut in a divorce suit filed by
the petitioner against the wife. Reliance has been placed
on the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Criminal Appeal No.87 of 2006, titled State of H.P.
vs. Krishan Kumar and Criminal Revision No. 49 of 2010,
titled Ramesh Chand vs. State of H.P.
21. Similarly, the allegations as to mis-appropriation
of ‘Istridhan’ have been alleged to be false and concocted.
22. The petitioner has vehemently argued that he
has already been exonerated by the army authorities after
a thorough inquiry held into the allegations leveled by the
wife, which were identical in nature. He would submit that
once he has been exonerated, on the same allegations he
cannot be criminally prosecuted. Reliance has been placed
on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Radheyshyam Kejriwal Vs State of West Bengal, 2011
(3) SSC 581 followed by Hon’ble High Court Delhi in
Subhash Sharma vs. Government of NCT Delhi and
others, Cr. ML 450 of 2017.
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23. On the other hand, Sh. N.K. Thakur, learned
Senior Advocate representing the wife has contended that
the criminal prosecution or the proceedings under the DV
Act cannot be scuttled at this stage, without affording the
wife/complainant to prove her allegations in accordance
with law. He submitted that the commission of offence
under Section 498-A of IPC as also the violation of the
provisions of DV Act is sufficiently made out from the
allegations in the complaint. He submitted that the police
investigated the allegations and after finding prima-facie
substance therein, has filed challan under Section 173 of
the Cr.P.C. in the Court.
24. He further contended that the findings of Army
authorities, if any, will not be an impediment in
prosecution of the petitioner and such findings cannot
operate as res-judicata for the reasons that the army
authorities had not allowed the evidence to be taken in
accordance with law. As per him, the report relied upon by
the husband does not reveal as to whether any judicial
procedure was adopted and whether the officer holding
inquiry had any judicial experience or training.
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25. On consideration of rival contentions and
records of the case, I am of the considered view that the
petitioner cannot succeed in seeking the reliefs, as prayed
in the instant petitions for the reasons detailed hereafter.
26. Noticeably, the wife has leveled various
allegations, which according to her have caused her
physical and mental agony and torture. She has alleged
that abuses and taunts were hurled upon her repeatedly
by the petitioners. The filing of complaints by the wife to
different authorities is reflection of the pain and agony
(physical and mental) allegedly suffered by her. From the
averments made in the instant petition also, it can be
inferred that everything was not right in the matrimonial
life of the petitioner and the wife, as the husband has
himself admitted that in July, 2021, there was a settlement
between them and it was agreed to forget past with a
resolve to start a new life. At this juncture, it would be
relevant to notice the following observations made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while delivering judgment in the
case of Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, 2007 (4) SCC 511,
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“98. On proper analysis and scrutiny of the
judgments of this Court and other Courts, we have
come to the definite conclusion that there cannot be
any comprehensive definition of the concept of
‘mental cruelty’ within which all kinds of cases of
mental cruelty can be covered. No court in our
considered view should even attempt to give a
comprehensive definition of mental cruelty.
99. Human mind is extremely complex and human
behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human
ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the
entire human behaviour in one definition is almost
impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not
amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty
differs from person to person depending upon his
upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family
and cultural background, financial position, social
status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human
values and their value system.
100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty
cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the
passage of time, impact of modern culture through
print and electronic media and value system etc. etc.
What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a
mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa.
There can never be any strait-jacket formula or fixed
parameters for determining mental cruelty in
matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate
way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on
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its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking
aforementioned factors in consideration.
101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate
some instances of human behaviour which may be
relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’.
The instances indicated in the succeeding
paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of
the parties, acute mental pain, agony and
suffering as would not make possible for the
parties to live with each other could come within
the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire
matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes
abundantly clear that situation is such that
the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked
to put up with such conduct and continue to
live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot
amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of
language, petulance of manner, indifference
and neglect may reach such a degree that it
makes the married life for the other spouse
absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling
of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration
in one spouse caused by the conduct of other
for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.
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(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or
render miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour
of one spouse actually affecting physical and
mental health of the other spouse. The
treatment complained of and the resultant
danger or apprehension must be very grave,
substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied
neglect, indifference or total departure from the
normal standard of conjugal kindness causing
injury to mental health or deriving sadistic
pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness, possessiveness, which causes
unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional
upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce
on the ground of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear
and tear of the married life which happens in
day to day life would not be adequate for grant
of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole
and a few isolated instances over a period of
years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct
must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period,
where the relationship has deteriorated to an
extent that because of the acts and behaviour of
a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely
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difficult to live with the other party any longer,
may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation
of sterilization without medical reasons and
without the consent or knowledge of his wife
and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy
or abortion without medical reason or without
the consent or knowledge of her husband, such
an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have
intercourse for considerable period without
there being any physical incapacity or valid
reason may amount to mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife
after marriage not to have child from the
marriage may amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of
continuous separation, it may fairly be
concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond
repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though
supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever
that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve
the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it
shows scant regard for the feelings and
emotions of the parties. In such like situations,
it may lead to mental cruelty”.
27. Section 498-A of the IPC talks about the
subjection of woman to cruelty by the husband or relative
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of the husband of a woman and as per explanation
appended to the section, cruelty has been defined as
under:-
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injuries or
danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman whether such
harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure
by her or any person related to her to meet
such demand.
28. Clause-(a) of the explanation deals with willful
conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to
injury of health (whether mental or physical). Thus, to
constitute an offence under Section 498-A, it is sufficient if
a woman is driven to danger of mental or physical health
by willful conduct of her husband or the relative of the
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husband. It need not have relation with dowry or its
demand.
29. Further, the domestic violence, as defined in the
DV Act, is multi faceted. It also speaks about any act or
omission or conduct that even endangers the health, well
being whether mental or physical of the aggrieved person.
30. Keeping in view the observations in Samar
Ghosh (supra), the danger felt by a woman to her physical
or mental health from the willful conduct of her husband
or his relatives cannot be measured in a strait-jacket
formula. It will always depend upon the particular facts of
a case and will require adjudication keeping in view all
attending factors including the level of sensitivity of the
woman complaining of such willful conduct. The point of
view sought to be projected by the woman by making
complaint(s) cannot be ignored without putting the
allegations to test.
31. For assessing required parameters, the
appropriate Court has to hold a trial and cannot be
assessed by this Court in jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
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32. In the case at hand, since the wife has alleged
having suffered physical and mental harassment, it cannot
be said that no case under Section 498-A of IPC or a case
of wrong against the rights conferred under DV Act is made
out, even if the allegations in the complaint are presumed
to be correct. Without making any comment on the
truthfulness of veracity of the allegations made by the wife,
it needs to be emphasized that even if the allegations of
demand of dowry are not strictly made out, still the
mischief of section 498-A IPC can be attracted under
explanation (a) to sub section (1) of said section.
33. This Court is fully conscious of its jurisdictional
limits, as circumscribed by various judicial
pronouncements. In the first instance, a reference can be
made to a judgment passed in State of Haryana &
others vs. Bhajan Lal & others 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC
335 as under:-
“103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
-27-to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that
the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to
its whim or caprice.”
34. Recently, in A.M. Mohan vs. State of 2024 SCC
Online SC 339, the principles have been reiterated as
under:_
“9. The law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints
and criminal proceedings has been succinctly
summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil
Corporation v. NEPC India Limited1 after considering
the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to
the following observations of this Court in the said
case, which read thus:
“12. The principles relating to exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and
criminal proceedings have been stated and
reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To
mention a few–Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre
[(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC
194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries
Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla
[(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
-28-628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999)
3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl
Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E.
Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC
645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283].
The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out the case alleged against
the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be
examined as a whole, but without examining
the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the
material nor an assessment of the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations in the complaint,
is warranted while examining prayer for
quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as when
the criminal proceeding is found to have been
initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used
to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The
power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
-29-
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is
laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that
a few ingredients have not been stated in
detail, the proceedings should not be quashed.
Quashing of the complaint is warranted only
where the complaint is so bereft of even the
basic facts which are absolutely necessary for
making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a
civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or
(c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for
seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a
criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a
civil proceeding are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to
quash the criminal proceedings. The test is
whether the allegations in the complaint
disclose a criminal offence or not.”
35. Further, in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs.
State of Gujarat & others 2018 (3) SCC 104, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“30. At this stage, the High Court could not
appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own
inferences from the contents of the FIR and the
material relied on. It was more so when the material
-30-relied on was disputed by the Complainants and
visa-se-versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job
of the investigating authority at such stage to probe
and then of the Court to examine the questions once
the charge sheet is filed along with such material as
to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed
on such material.
31. In our considered opinion, once the Court finds
that the FIR does disclose prima facie commission of
any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and
allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate
the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the Code.
32. The very fact that the High Court in this case
went into the minutest details in relation to every
aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages judgment to
quash the FIR in part lead us to draw a conclusion
that the High Court had exceeded its powers while
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code. We cannot concur with such approach of
the High Court.
33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which
are obviously not defined being inherent in its very
nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can
such powers be equated with the appellate powers of
the High Court defined in the Code. The
parameters laid down by this Court while exercising
inherent powers must always be kept in mind else it
would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in
deciding the case. Such is the case here”.
-31-
36. In the instant case, the police has completed the
investigation and challan has been submitted to the Court.
In such view of the matter, the material collected during
investigation by the police becomes relevant, which needs
to be proved in accordance with law and for such purpose,
the trial is the only available course. The record of the
report prepared under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. by the police
has also been placed on record. Noticeably, reliance has
been placed on contents of a CD, which according to the
wife are corroborative of her versions. This piece of
evidence is in addition to other evidence collected by the
investigating agency. This Court will not be in a position to
adjudicate on the evidentiary value of any of the pieces of
evidence collected by the investigating agency. In this
regard, reference can be made to a judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaptain Singh vs. State of
U.P.& others 2021 (9) SCC 35 in which it has been held
as under:-
“9.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the
present case the High Court in exercise of powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has quashed the criminal
-32-proceedings for the offences under Sections
147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 of IPC. It is required
to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quashed the
criminal proceedings, by the time the Investigating
Officer after recording the statement of the witnesses,
statement of the complainant and collecting the
evidence from the incident place and after taking
statement of the independent witnesses and even
statement of the accused persons, has filed the
charge-sheet before the Learned Magistrate for the
offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and
386 of IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took
the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court, it does not appear
that the High Court took into consideration the
material collected during the investigation/inquiry
and even the statements recorded. If the petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was at the stage of FIR in
that case the allegations in the FIR/Complaint only
are required to be considered and whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be
considered. However, thereafter when the statements
are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-
sheet is filed after conclusion of the
investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different
footing and the Court is required to consider the
material/evidence collected during the investigation.
Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this
Court in catena of decisions, the High Court is not
-33-required to go into the merits of the allegations
and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High
Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or
conducting the trial. As held by this Court in the case
of Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel (Supra) in order to
examine as to whether factual contents of FIR
disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court
cannot act like the Investigating agency nor can
exercise the powers like an Appellate Court. It is
further observed and held that question is required to
be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and
prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At
such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate
evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from
contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further
observed it is more so, when the material relied on is
disputed. It is further observed that in such a
situation, it becomes the job of the Investigating
Authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court
to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed
along with such material as to how far and to what
extent reliance can be placed on such material”.
37. No doubt, in case of K. Subba Rao & others vs.
State of Telangana 2018 (14) SCC 452 and Kahkashan
Kausar vs. State of Bihar & others 2022 (6) SCC 599 a
view has been taken against the malicious prosecution
based on omnibus and general allegation against the
-34-
relative of the husband. However, in the case at hand, as
noticed above, there are specific allegations against the
mother of the husband. In the prosecution launched
under Section 498-A of IPC by the State, the father of the
husband has already been left out, as probably sufficient
incriminating material was found against him.
38. As regards the contention of the petitioner that
he cannot be prosecuted again in view of his exoneration
by the inquiry held by his employer, again the petitioner
cannot succeed for more than one reasons. It is not known
as to in exercise of which jurisdiction or by adoption of
what procedure has the complaint of wife been dealt with
by the ‘Colonel CO’. His report dated 28.12.2022 does not
reveal any judicial or any other form of formal enquiry
having been undertaken. It appears prima facie that it was
just an informal in house proceeding held by some officer
without taking any evidence in support of allegations and
defence etc.
39. In State of (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ajay Kumar
Tyagi, 2012 (9) SCC 685, it has been held as under:-
-35-
“18. Thereafter, this Court in P.S. Rajya case [(1996)
9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] referred to its earlier
decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , and
reproduced the illustrations laid down for exercise of
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
quashing the criminal prosecution. The categories of
cases by way of illustrations, wherein power could be
exercised either to prevent the abuse of the process of
the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
read as follows: (Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , SCC pp. 378-79, para
102)
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of
-36-any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
The aforesaid illustrations do not contemplate that on
exoneration in the departmental proceeding, the
criminal prosecution on the same charge or evidence
is to be quashed. However, this Court in P.S. Rajya
case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] quashed
the prosecution on the peculiar facts of that case,
-37-
finding that the said case can be brought under more
than one head enumerated in the guidelines. This
would be evident from paras 21 and 22 of the
judgment, which read as follows: (P.S. Rajya
case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 9)
“21. The present case can be brought under more
than one head given above in Bhajan Lal case [1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] without any
difficulty.
22. The above discussion is sufficient to allow this
appeal on the facts of this case.”
19. Even at the cost of repetition, we hasten to add
that none of the heads in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 897] is in relation to the effect of
exoneration in the departmental proceedings on
criminal prosecution on identical charge. The decision
in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] ,
therefore, does not lay down any proposition that on
exoneration of an employee in the departmental
proceeding, the criminal prosecution on the identical
charge or the evidence has to be quashed.
20. It is well settled that the decision is an
authority for what it actually decides and not
what flows from it. The mere fact that in P.S.
Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , this
Court quashed the prosecution when the accused
was exonerated in the departmental proceeding
would not mean that it was quashed on that ground.
This would be evident from para 23 of the judgment,
which reads as follows: (SCC p. 9)
-38-
“23. Even though all these facts including the report
of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to
the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High
Court took a view that the issues raised had to be
gone into in the final proceedings and the report of
the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the
appellant of the same charge in departmental
proceedings would not conclude the criminal case
against the appellant. We have already held that for
the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case,
the criminal proceedings initiated against the
appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not
agree with the view taken by the High Court as
stated above. These are the reasons for our order
dated 27-3-1996 [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar,
Criminal Appeal No. 434 of 1996, order dated 27-3-
1996 (SC)] for allowing the appeal and quashing the
impugned criminal proceedings and giving
consequential reliefs.”
(emphasis supplied)
From the reading of the aforesaid passage of the
judgment it is evident that the prosecution was not
terminated on the ground of exoneration in the
departmental proceeding but, on its peculiar facts.
40. Similar reiteration of law has been made in State
of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar Shrivastava and others
-39-
Criminal Appeal 2551 of 2014 decided on 9.12.2014
reported in 2014 Supreme (SC) 995, as under:
“25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
exoneration in the departmental proceedings ipso
facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal
prosecution. We hasten to add, however, that if the
prosecution against the accused is solely based on a
finding in a proceeding and the finding is set aside by
the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very
foundation goes and the prosecution may be
quashed. But that principle will not apply in the
departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the
departmental proceedings are held by two different
entities. Further they are not in the same hierarchy.”
41. In view of above exposition of law the reliance
placed by petitioner on the judgment passed by Hon’ble
Delhi High Coourt in Subhash Chandra (supra) is not
going to benefit his case. Even otherwise in Subhash
Chandra (supra) reliance was placed on Radheyshyam
Kejriwal (2011) 3 SCC 581, wherein the earlier proceedings
were undertaken under the provisions of Foreign Exchange
Regulations Act and in such context it was held that once
the person was exonerated under such proceedings after
due adjudication, in criminal proceedings launched against
-40-
him on same set of facts the earlier exoneration will not be
irrelevant.
42. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the
judgments passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Cr. Revision No. 49 of 2010 and Cr. Appeal No. 87 of 2006
will again not help his cause as these judgments have been
passed in cases where the convicted persons had
approached this Court against their conviction after
completion of trial.
43. In light of above discussion, the petitions are
dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.
(Satyen Vaidya)
Judge
10th April, 2025
(kck)