Ajmera Shyam vs Kova Laxmi on 14 August, 2025

Supreme Court of India

Ajmera Shyam vs Kova Laxmi on 14 August, 2025

Author: Surya Kant

Bench: Surya Kant

2025 INSC 992
                                                                      REPORTABLE


                                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13015 OF 2024


                            AJMERA SHYAM                         ...APPELLANT(S)


                                                      VERSUS



                            SMT. KOVA LAXMI & ORS.             …RESPONDENT(S)



                                                    JUDGMENT

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

1. The present civil appeal has been filed under
Section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951
(hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), against the
impugned judgment and order dated 25.10.2024
passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at
Hyderabad, whereby, the High Court dismissed the
Election Petition No. 10/2024 preferred by the
Appellant herein, Ajmera Shyam, the election
petitioner.

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2025.08.18
17:52:02 IST
Reason:

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2. The issue which arose for consideration in the
said election petition, and which has been canvassed
before us is whether non-disclosure of the income as
shown in the income tax return for four financial years
out of the last five financial years in the Form 26
Affidavit, while submitting the nomination paper by
the Respondent No.1, Smt. Kova Laxmi, the returned
candidate and acceptance of the said nomination by
the Returning Officer would amount to improper
acceptance of her nomination and/or whether such
non-disclosure would amount to a corrupt practice by
the returned candidate. Further, whether such non-
disclosure would amount to non-compliance of the
provisions of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 and rules or orders made under the said Act,
thus, rendering the election of Respondent No. 1 liable
to be declared void under Section 100 of the Act, at the
instance of the unsuccessful candidate being the
Appellant herein.

3. The High Court rejected the election petitioner’s
arguments, holding that the omission of income
details in the income tax return for four out of the last
five financial years is not of a significant nature. Based
on this, the election of Respondent No. 1 cannot be
declared null and void under Section 100 of the Act. It
was also concluded that such non-disclosure does not
constitute a corrupt practice that would have
materially affected the outcome of the election.

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Furthermore, the High Court found that Respondent
No. 1 did not deliberately suppress information, and
therefore, there is no corrupt practice or undue
influence on the voters. Accordingly, the High Court
dismissed the election petition, and the election
petitioner is now before us, challenging the said
dismissal.

4. FACTS IN BRIEF:

4.1 Before we proceed to examine the issue(s), it
would be apposite to briefly refer to the facts of the
case as can be culled out from the pleadings.
4.2 Prior to the impugned election of 2023,
Respondent No.1 was a member of the Legislative
Assembly for the State of Telangana from the Asifabad
Assembly Constituency (ST) (hereinafter referred to as
the “Constituency”) for the period 2014-2018.

Subsequently, in 2019, Respondent No.1 contested
the elections to the Zilla Parishad Territorial
Constituency (ZPTC) and was elected as a ZPTC
Member on 02.05.2019. She was then elected as the
Chairperson of Kumuram Bheem Zilla Parishad,
Asifabad, and continued in that role until 03.12.2023,
before being re-elected as an MLA, which is the subject
matter of this challenge.

4.3 Upon notification of the General Election to the
Telangana Legislative Assembly by the Election

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Commission of India in 2023, Respondent No.1
submitted her nomination along with the required
Form 26 Affidavit on 09.11.2023, as a nominee of the
Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) Party. There were a
total of 17 candidates contesting from the
constituency, including the Appellant (as a nominee of
the Indian National Congress) and Respondent No.1.
4.4 The polling was held on 30.11.2023, and the
result of the said election was declared on 03.12.2023.
The Respondent No.1 had secured 83,036 votes,
whereas the Appellant secured 60,238 votes. Thus,
the Respondent No.1 was declared as the returned
candidate by a margin of 22,798 votes.

4.5 Thereafter, the Appellant filed the Election
Petition No.10 of 2024 before the High Court of
Telangana, challenging the election of the Respondent
No. 1 as void, and consequently, to declare the
Appellant election petitioner as the elected candidate
from the said Constituency.

5. The Appellant challenged the election of the
Respondent No.1 by raising the following pleas:

(i) Firstly, the Respondent No.1, while
submitting the Form 26 Affidavit, at the
time of filing the nomination paper, did
not disclose her income shown in the
income tax returns for four completed
financial years (as of 31st March), i.e.,
F.Y. 2018-2019 to F.Y. 2021-2022, out of

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the last five financial years, i.e., F.Y.
2018-2019 to F.Y. 2022-2023, as
required to be furnished in the Form 26
Affidavit under Rule 4A of the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Rules”). Instead, the
Respondent No.1 mentioned her income
as “Nil” for the said period in her Form
26 Affidavit.

It was alleged that Respondent No. 1

failed to disclose the income she was
earning from her monthly honorarium of
Rs. 1,00,000/- while serving as the
Chairperson of Zila Parishad, Kumuram
Bheem, Asifabad District.

It was further contended that the
Respondent No.1 did not disclose the Ex-
Legislator’s Pension received by her
during the relevant financial years on
account of her being an MLA from the
same constituency during 2014-2018.

Thus, the nomination form of the
Respondent No.1 was improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer, which
materially affected the election of the
returned candidate, being the
Respondent No.1, which would render
her election as void.

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(ii) Secondly, due to the non-disclosure of
income for the four financial years viz.,
honorarium, and pension, the
Respondent No.1 engaged in a corrupt
practice as contemplated under Section
123(2) of the Act, making her election
void.

(iii) Thirdly, since the Respondent No.1
concealed the relevant information
required to be mentioned in the Form 26
Affidavit, it amounts to non-compliance
with the provisions of the Act, in
particular Sections 33, 33A, and 34 of
the Act and the rules framed thereunder,
rendering her election liable to be
declared as void.

6. RESPONDENT NO.1’S CASE:

6.1 The Respondent No.1 contested the election
petition by filing her written statement/counter-

affidavit.

6.2 Although Respondent No.1 did not specifically
deny the allegation that she did not provide
information regarding her income for four financial
years, she argued that she disclosed all her assets,
both immovable and movable, along with PAN details,

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occupation, and the source of her income. Therefore,
such non-disclosure did not constitute a material
defect, as it was not of a substantial character. It was
contended that her nomination was not improperly
accepted and did not materially affect the outcome of
her election, thus, not warranting voiding of her
election.

6.3 It was also argued that, since she had submitted
her latest income tax returns for the financial year
2022-23 along with her PAN details, there was no
deliberate suppression to mislead voters, and
therefore, it does not constitute a corrupt practice. It
was also mentioned that Respondent No. 1 was elected
as a member of the Legislative Assembly in 2014 from
the same constituency and served as an MLA until
2018.

6.4 She contended that she had also disclosed her
source of income through the honorarium she was
receiving as the Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad of
Kumuram Bheem, Asifabad District.

6.5 The Respondent No.1 contended that after her
election as the Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad,
Kumuram Bheem, Asifabad District, from 04.07.2019
to 03.12.2023, she did not receive the Ex-MLA pension
as alleged in the election petition. To support this
contention, Respondent No.1 submitted a Non-drawal

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Certificate dated 20.06.2024, issued by the Assistant
Secretary to the State Legislature.

6.6 It was argued that the nomination paper of
Respondent No.1 was properly scrutinised by the
Returning Officer, and the election petitioner never
raised any objection regarding the alleged defects or
non-disclosure of information in Respondent No.1’s
nomination paper before the Returning Officer at the
time of scrutiny, which was conducted in the presence
of all the candidates and their agents. Hence, her
nomination was accepted.

It was, thus, argued that since the nomination of
Respondent No.1 was accepted, as no defect was
found or pointed out by the election petitioner during
the scrutiny, the election petitioner is now estopped
from raising this issue in the election petition.

6.7 It was further argued by the Respondent No.1 that
the election petition is not maintainable because it
does not demonstrate how the outcome of Respondent
No.1’s election was materially affected by the alleged
non-disclosure of the relevant information.

It was also argued that the election petitioner
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 83 of
the Act read with Rule 94A of the Rules, which states
that when the election petition alleges any corrupt
practice, it must be supported by an affidavit in the

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format of Form 25, providing details of such corrupt
practice.

7. THE ISSUE(S) BEFORE US:

The primary issues that call for our consideration
are,

Firstly, whether the non-mentioning of the income
shown in the income tax return for four financial years
in the Form 26 Affidavit and its portrayal as “Nil”
would amount to non-disclosure, thereby rendering
the acceptance of the nomination of Respondent No.1
as improper and making her election liable to be
declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act, and,

Secondly, whether such non-disclosure constitutes
a corrupt practice, rendering her election liable to be
declared void under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act, and,

Thirdly, does such non-disclosure amount to a
violation of Rule 4A of the Rules, despite mentioning
the assets and liabilities, source of income, and
profession, thereby materially affecting the election of
Respondent No. 1 and warranting the voiding of her
election under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act?

The secondary issues that arise are whether the
Respondent No. 1 had fully disclosed her income in
the form of honorarium she was drawing and whether
she was receiving ex-MLA pension during the relevant
period.

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8. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION:

8.1 Having identified the core issues, we will now
focus our attention on the relevant law, which will
facilitate resolving the dispute at hand.

8.2 As our country became free and independent, we
took a solemn resolution to make this country a
democratic republic, as encapsulated in the Preamble
to the Constitution of India. Democracy, in its essence,
means a society governed by the elected
representatives of the people based on universal adult
franchise in a free and transparent manner. Thus, free
and fair elections go to the root of a functional
democracy. Because of the great significance attached
to it, the subject of election finds a special place in the
Constitution of India under Part XV which lays down
the constitutional mechanism under a constitutional
body viz., the Election Commission of India as
provided under Article 324 of the Constitution, has
been assigned the unique responsibility of
superintending, directing and controlling, amongst
others, the conduct of all elections to the Parliament
and the Legislature of every State and of elections to
the office of the President and Vice President.

Article 327 of the Constitution empowers the
Parliament to make laws covering all aspects related
to elections for the Houses of Parliament and the State

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Legislatures. Based on this Article, the Parliament has
passed the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
which explicitly details the conduct of elections to the
Parliament and State Legislatures, the qualifications
and disqualifications for membership, the corrupt
practices and other offences connected with these
elections, and the procedure for resolving doubts and
disputes arising from them.

Thus, the Act of 1951 offers a comprehensive and
self-contained framework for the conduct of elections
by the Election Commission of India.

To implement the provisions of the Act, the
Central Government, in consultation with the Election
Commission of India, framed rules known as “The
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961” (hereinafter
referred to as the “Rules”).

8.3 It may be apt to mention herein that the framers
of the Constitution had envisaged a robust electoral
system to sustain democracy in our country by
incorporating Constitutional provisions, and since the
Independence, the Election Commission of India has
successfully undertaken periodical elections for
electing the representatives to the Houses of the
Parliament and the State Legislatures. Unfortunately,
certain pernicious malaise like criminalisation of
politics crept in the electoral system compromising
with the purity of the elections, causing a serious dent

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in the electoral system and credibility of the results,
which in turn posed a serious challenge to the rule of
law and the principles of democracy which are the
foundational tenets of our Constitution and the
society.

8.4 One of the remedies widely discussed in the
public domain was how to prevent criminal elements
from taking part in the electoral process and subvert
the electoral mandate. The most effective means
perceived was to disqualify such candidates who had
been convicted of serious crimes and/or for corrupt
practices, corruption or disloyalty, etc. as incorporated
under Section 8 to Section 11A of the Act. With the
passage of time, even such deterrent provisions
appeared to be inadequate and there were calls from
the public demanding complete disclosure of the
antecedents and assets of the candidates, so that the
electorate can make a meaningful and informed choice
at the time of exercise of franchise, which was also
recommended by the Law Commission of India, in its
170th Report.

8.5 It was in this background that when the
Parliament and the Election Commission of India, did
not show any inclination to bring in the desired
appropriate legal measures, a Writ Petition, C.W.P.
No. 7257 of 1999 came to be filed before the Delhi High
Court in the year 1999 by a public spirited

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organisation called the Association for Democratic
Reforms, seeking for directions to be issued to the
Union of India and the Election Commission of India
for the implementation of the
suggestions/recommendations of the Law
Commission of India to make it mandatory for every
candidate to provide information on various aspects
including criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities,
educational qualifications, etc. by amending the
Forms 2-A to 2-E prescribed under the Rules, and to
make the information public in print form as well as
on electronic media for proper dissemination so as to
enable the voters to make an informed decision while
exercising their voting rights.

8.6 The intrinsic link between a robust democracy and
well-informed citizens who periodically elect the
representatives who will have the legitimate right to
manage the affairs of the society for a specified period
can never be overstated. For making the right choice
of the elected representatives, there is nothing more
important than a well-informed electorate, who have
the right to get the information about the candidates.
This right to have information by the citizens of the
particulars of the candidates has been acknowledged
to be part of the fundamental right of speech and
expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.

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It also goes without saying that strong leadership
can be provided by individuals who are held in high
esteem by the people and who are above board in
terms of integrity and public standing. Certainly,
candidates who are involved in criminal activities
cannot be ideal candidates and are to be shunned.
Thus, making the antecedents of the candidates
known to the electorate before the election assumes
great significance for a healthy democracy.

It is for this reason that there had been a strident
movement to make the antecedents of the candidates’
public. Spurred by this necessity and popular
demand, to ensure proper functioning of the
parliamentary democracy, which is a basic structure
of the Constitution, and in view of the reluctance of
the Parliament and the Election Commission to take
appropriate remedial steps, the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of the Court was invoked.

8.7 In this background, the Delhi High Court, at the
instance of Association for Democratic Reforms in
Association for Democratic Reforms vs. Union of
India and Anr., (2001) 57 DRJ 82 (DB), issued the
following directions to ensure that the antecedents
and assets of the candidates are made public and
known to the electorate:

“……………….Accordingly, it is directed
that the Election Commission shall
secure to the voters the following

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information pertaining to each of the
candidates standing for election to the
Parliament and to the State Legislatures
and the parties they represent:—

1. Whether the candidate is
accused of any offence(s)
punishable with imprisonment? If
so, the details thereof.

2. Assets possessed by a
candidate, his or her spouse and
dependent relations.

3. Facts giving insight to
candidate’s competence, capacity
and suitability for acting as
parliamentarian or legislator
including details of his/her
educational qualifications.

4. Information which the election
commission considers necessary
for judging the capacity and
capability of the political party
fielding the candidate for election to
Parliament or the State Legislature.

…………………………………………
…………………………….”

8.8 The aforesaid directions of the Delhi High Court
were unsuccessfully challenged by the Union of India
before this Court in Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 294,
in which this Court elaborately discussed the various
legal issues including the right of the citizen to know
about the candidates contesting the elections and
clarified the legal position, emphasising the
importance of the right to information of the voters of
the candidates, as are relevant, as follows:

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“46. To sum up the legal and
constitutional position which emerges
from the aforesaid discussion, it can be
stated that:

1. The jurisdiction of the Election
Commission is wide enough to
include all powers necessary for
smooth conduct of elections and the
word “elections” is used in a wide
sense to include the entire process
of election which consists of several
stages and embraces many steps.

2. The limitation on plenary
character of power is when
Parliament or State Legislature has
made a valid law relating to or in
connection with elections, the
Commission is required to act in
conformity with the said
provisions. In case where law is
silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of
power to act for the avowed
purpose of having free and fair
election……………….

3.
…………………………………………

4. To maintain the purity of
elections and in particular to bring
transparency in the process of
election, the Commission can ask
the candidates about the
expenditure incurred by the
political parties and this
transparency in the process of
election would include
transparency of a candidate who
seeks election or re-election. In a
democracy, the electoral process
has a strategic role. The little man
of this country would have basic
elementary right to know full
particulars of a candidate who is to
represent him in Parliament where
laws to bind his liberty and
property may be enacted.

5. The right to get information in
democracy is recognised all
throughout and it is a natural right

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flowing from the concept of
democracy. At this stage, we would
refer to Article 19(1) and (2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which is as under:

“(1) Everyone shall have the
right to hold opinions without
interference.

(2) Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression;

this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other
media of his choice.”

6. On cumulative reading of a
plethora of decisions of this Court
as referred to, it is clear that if the
field meant for legislature and
executive is left unoccupied
detrimental to the public interest,
this Court would have ample
jurisdiction under Article 32 read
with Articles 141 and 142of the
Constitution to issue necessary
directions to the executive to
subserve public interest.

7. Under our Constitution, Article
19(1)(a) provides for freedom of
speech and expression. Voter’s
speech or expression in case of
election would include casting of
votes, that is to say, voter speaks
out or expresses by casting vote.

For this purpose, information about
the candidate to be selected is a
must. Voter’s (little man — citizen’s)
right to know antecedents
including criminal past of his
candidate contesting election for
MP or MLA is much more
fundamental and basic for survival
of democracy. The little man may
think over before making his

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choice of electing law-breakers
as law-makers.”

8.9 Thereafter, in the light of the above legal
principles enunciated, this Court in Assn. for
Democratic Reforms (supra) issued following
directions for disclosure of certain relevant
information about antecedents relating to criminal
offenses, assets and liabilities and educational
qualification:

“48. The Election Commission is
directed to call for information on
affidavit by issuing necessary order in
exercise of its power under Article 324
of the Constitution of India from each
candidate seeking election to Parliament
or a State Legislature as a necessary
part of his nomination paper, furnishing
therein, information on the following
aspects in relation to his/her
candidature:

(1) Whether the candidate is
convicted/acquitted/discharged of
any criminal offence in the past —
if any, whether he is punished with
imprisonment or fine.

(2) Prior to six months of filing of
nomination, whether the candidate
is accused in any pending case, of
any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or
more, and in which charge is
framed or cognizance is taken by
the court of law. If so, the details
thereof.

(3) The assets (immovable,
movable, bank balance, etc.) of a
candidate and of his/her spouse
and that of dependants.

(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly
whether there are any overdues of

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any public financial institution or
government dues.

(5) The educational qualifications of
the candidate.”

8.10 After the aforesaid judgment of this Court in
Assn. for Democratic Reforms (supra), an
Ordinance was promulgated by the President of India
on 24.08.2002 by way of which, Sections 33A and 33B
were inserted in the Representation of People Act,
1951 purportedly in compliance of the directions
issued by this Court. Later the said Ordinance was
repealed and the Representation of People (3rd
Amendment) Act, 2002 (72 of 2002) was notified
inserting Sections 33A and 33B in the 1951 Act.

Section 33A requires the candidate to furnish
additional information as to-

(i) whether he is accused of any offence
punishable with imprisonment for 2 (two)
years or more in a pending case in which
a charge has been framed by the Court of
competent jurisdiction;

(i) whether he has been convicted of an
offence other than any offence referred to
in sub-section (1) or subsection (2), or
covered in sub-section (3), of section 8
and sentenced to imprisonment for one
year or more.

Section 33B, however, provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any court or any direction, order or
any other instruction issued by the Election

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Commission, no candidate shall be liable to disclose
or furnish any such information, in respect of his
election, which is not required to be disclosed or
furnished under this Act or the rules made there
under.

8.11 It may be noted that, the aforesaid Section 33A
did not provide for furnishing of the information as
directed by this Court in Assn. for Democratic
Reforms (supra) and the scope of the directions
issued by this Court was further sought to be whittled
down by incorporating Section 33B.

8.12 Thus, Section 33B came to be challenged before
this Court in People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) & anr. v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399.
This Court in PUCL (supra) while dealing with this
issue touched upon various aspects of the directions
issued by this Court in the earlier decision of
Association for Democratic Reforms‘ case (supra)
and reaffirmed the said decision requiring furnishing
of information by the candidates as regards the
antecedents relating to criminal cases/offences,
assets, liabilities and debts of the candidates, their
spouses and children and educational qualification of
the candidates. The directions by this Court for
furnishing such information was based on a broader
interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees
freedom of speech and expression to the citizens of this

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country. The aforesaid information was held to be an
essential ingredient of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly,
this Court in PUCL (supra) made the following
observations:

“18. So, the foundation of a healthy
democracy is to have well-informed
citizens-voters. The reason to have right
of information with regard to the
antecedents of the candidate is that
voter can judge and decide in whose
favour he should cast his vote. It is the
voter’s discretion whether to vote in
favour of an illiterate or literate
candidate. It is his choice whether to
elect a candidate against whom criminal
cases for serious or non-serious charges
were filed but is acquitted or
discharged. He is to consider whether
his candidate may or may not have
sufficient assets so that he may not be
tempted to indulge in unjustified means
for accumulating wealth. For assets or
liability, the voter may exercise his
discretion in favour of a candidate
whose liability is minimum and/or there
are no overdues of public financial
institution or government dues. From
this information, it would be, to some
extent, easy to verify whether
unaccounted money is utilized for
contesting election and whether a
candidate is contesting election for
getting rich or after being elected to what
extent he became richer. Exposure to
public scrutiny is one of the known
means for getting clean and less
polluted persons to govern the country.
A little man — a citizen — a voter is the
master of his vote. He must have
necessary information so that he can
intelligently decide in favour of a
candidate who satisfies his criterion of
being elected as an MP or MLA. On
occasions, it is stated that we are not
having such intelligent voters. This is no

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excuse. This would be belittling a little
citizen/voter. He himself may be
illiterate but still he would have the guts
to decide in whose favour he should cast
his vote. In any case, for having free and
fair election and not to convert
democracy into a mobocracy and
mockery or a farce, information to voters
is a necessity.”
(emphasis added)

8.13 M.B. Shah, J in his elaborate judgment in the
case of PUCL (supra) summarised the conclusions as
mentioned in para 78 of the judgment, relevant
portions of which are reproduced herein below:

“78. What emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus:

(A) The legislature can remove the
basis of a decision rendered by a
competent court thereby rendering
that decision ineffective but the
legislature has no power to ask the
instrumentalities of the State to
disobey or disregard the decisions
given by the court. A declaration
that an order made by a court of
law is void is normally a part of the
judicial function. The legislature
cannot declare that decision
rendered by the Court is not
binding or is of no effect.

It is true that the legislature is
entitled to change the law with
retrospective effect which forms the
basis of a judicial decision. This
exercise of power is subject to
constitutional provision, therefore,
it cannot enact a law which is
violative of fundamental right.

(B) Section 33-B which provides
that notwithstanding anything
contained in the judgment of any

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court or directions issued by the
Election Commission, no candidate
shall be liable to disclose or furnish
any such information in respect of
his election which is not required to
be disclosed or furnished under the
Act or the rules made thereunder,
is on the face of it beyond the
legislative competence, as this
Court has held that the voter has a
fundamental right under Article
19(1)(a) to know the antecedents of
a candidate for various reasons
recorded in the earlier judgment as
well as in this judgment.

The Amended Act does not wholly
cover the directions issued by this
Court. On the contrary, it provides
that a candidate would not be
bound to furnish certain
information as directed by this
Court.

(C) The judgment rendered by this
Court in Assn. for Democratic
Reforms has attained finality,
therefore, there is no question of
interpreting constitutional
provision which calls for reference
under Article 145(3).

(D) The contention that as there is
no specific fundamental right
conferred on a voter by any
statutory provision to know the
antecedents of a candidate, the
directions given by this Court are
against the statutory provisions is,
on the face of it, without any
substance. In an election petition
challenging the validity of an
election of a particular candidate,
the statutory provisions would
govern respective rights of the
parties. However, voters’
fundamental right to know the
antecedents of a candidate is
independent of statutory rights
under the election law. A voter is

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first citizen of this country and
apart from statutory rights, he is
having fundamental rights
conferred by the Constitution.

Members of a democratic society
should be sufficiently informed so
that they may cast their votes
intelligently in favour of persons
who are to govern them. Right to
vote would be meaningless unless
the citizens are well informed about
the antecedents of a candidate.

There can be little doubt that
exposure to public gaze and
scrutiny is one of the surest means
to cleanse our democratic
governing system and to have
competent legislatures.

(E) It is established that
fundamental rights themselves
have no fixed content, most of them
are empty vessels into which each
generation must pour its content in
the light of its experience. The
attempt of the Court should be to
expand the reach and ambit of the
fundamental rights by process of
judicial interpretation. During the
last more than half a decade, it has
been so done by this Court
consistently. There cannot be any
distinction between the
fundamental rights mentioned in
Chapter III of the Constitution and
the declaration of such rights on
the basis of the judgments
rendered by this Court.

8.14 Thus, Section 33B was accordingly declared as
null and void being contrary to the directions of this
court in Association for Democratic Reforms
(supra).

Page 24 of 74

8.15 P. Venkatarama Reddi, J. though endorsed the
view as regards the unconstitutionality of Section 33B,
expressed his disagreement in certain areas, inter alia,
holding that the failure to provide for disclosure of
educational qualification, does not, in practical terms,
infringe the freedom of expression as summarised in
para 123 of the judgment, which is reproduced herein
below:

“123. Finally, the summary of my
conclusions:

(1) Securing information on the basic
details concerning the candidates
contesting for elections to Parliament or
the State Legislature promotes freedom
of expression and therefore the right to
information forms an integral part of
Article 19(1)(a). This right to information
is, however, qualitatively different from
the right to get information about public
affairs or the right to receive information
through the press and electronic media,
though, to a certain extent, there may be
overlapping.

(2) The right to vote at the elections to the
House of the People or Legislative
Assembly is a constitutional right but
not merely a statutory right; freedom of
voting as distinct from right to vote is a
facet of the fundamental right enshrined
in Article 19(1)(a). The casting of vote in
favour of one or the other candidate
marks the accomplishment of freedom of
expression of the voter.

(3) The directives given by this Court in
Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic
Reforms1 intended to operate only till
the law was made by the legislature
and in that sense “pro tempore” in
nature. Once legislation is made, the
Court has to make an independent

Page 25 of 74
assessment in order to evaluate
whether the items of information
statutorily ordained are reasonably
adequate to secure the right of
information available to the
voter/citizen. In embarking on this
exercise, the points of disclosure
indicated by this Court, even if they be
tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be
given due weight and substantial
departure therefrom cannot be
countenanced.

(4) The Court has to take a holistic view
and adopt a balanced approach in
examining the legislation providing for
right to information and laying down the
parameters of that right.

(5) Section 33-B inserted by the
Representation of the People (Third
Amendment) Act, 2002 does not pass
the test of constitutionality, firstly, for
the reason that it imposes a blanket ban
on dissemination of information other
than that spelt out in the enactment
irrespective of the need of the hour and
the future exigencies and expedients
and secondly, for the reason that the
ban operates despite the fact that the
disclosure of information now provided
for is deficient and inadequate.
(6) The right to information provided for
by Parliament under Section 33-A in
regard to the pending criminal cases
and past involvement in such cases is
reasonably adequate to safeguard the
right to information vested in the
voter/citizen. However, there is no good
reason for excluding the pending cases
in which cognizance has been taken by
the Court from the ambit of disclosure.
(7) The provision made in Section 75-A
regarding declaration of assets and
liabilities of the elected candidates to
the Speaker or the Chairman of the
House has failed to effectuate the right
to information and the freedom of

Page 26 of 74
expression of the voters/citizens.

Having accepted the need to insist on
disclosure of assets and liabilities of the
elected candidate together with those of
the spouse or dependent children,
Parliament ought to have made a
provision for furnishing this information
at the time of filing the nomination.
Failure to do so has resulted in the
violation of guarantee under Article
19(1)(a).

(8) The failure to provide for disclosure
of educational qualification does not, in
practical terms, infringe the freedom of
expression.

(9) The Election Commission has to issue
revised instructions to ensure
implementation of Section 33-A subject
to what is laid down in this judgment
regarding the cases in which cognizance
has been taken. The Election
Commission’s orders related to
disclosure of assets and liabilities will
still hold good and continue to be
operative. However, Direction 4 of para
14 insofar as verification of assets and
liabilities by means of summary enquiry
and rejection of nomination paper on the
ground of furnishing wrong information
or suppressing material information
should not be enforced.”
(emphasis added)

8.16 Relating to the desirability of disclosure of
assets and liabilities, this Court, in the words of P.
Venkatarama Reddi, J., took the view that, it is
primarily to ascertain whether unaccounted money is
used for electoral gain and whether an elected
representative gets enriched after assuming public

Page 27 of 74
office. Thus, this prior disclosure acts as a deterrent
to any possible misuse of money and public office.

In this regard, we may refer to paragraphs no.
119 and 120 of the judgment wherein the justification
for disclosure of information about assets has been
explained which are reproduced herein below:

“IV. (2) Assets and liabilities

119. Disclosure of assets and liabilities
is another thorny issue. If the right to
information is to be meaningful and if it
is to serve its avowed purpose, I am of
the considered view that the candidate
entering the electoral contest should be
required to disclose the assets and
liabilities (barring articles of household
use). A Member of Parliament or State
Legislature is an elected representative
occupying high public office and at the
same time, he is a “public servant”
within the meaning of the Prevention of
Corruption Act as ruled by this Court in
the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State
[(1992) 3 SCC 637] . They are the
repositories of public trust. They have
public duties to perform. It is borne out
by experience that by virtue of the office
they hold there is a real potential for
misuse. The public awareness of
financial position of the candidate will
go a long way in forming an opinion
whether the candidate, after election to
the office had amassed wealth either in
his own name or in the name of family
members viz. spouse and dependent
children. At the time when the candidate
seeks re-election, the citizens/voters
can have a comparative idea of the
assets before and after the election so
as to assess whether the high public
office had possibly been used for self-

aggrandizement. Incidentally, the
disclosure will serve as a check against
misuse of power for making quick

Page 28 of 74
money, a malady which nobody can
deny, has been pervading the political
spectrum of our democratic nation. As
regards liabilities, the disclosure will
enable the voter to know, inter alia,
whether the candidate has outstanding
dues payable to public financial
institutions or the Government. Such
information has a relevant bearing on
the antecedents and the propensities of
the candidate in his dealings with public
money. “Assets and liabilities” is one of
the important aspects to which
extensive reference has been made in
Assn. for Democratic Reforms case. The
Court did consider it, after an elaborate
discussion, as a vital piece of
information as far as the voter is
concerned. But, unfortunately, the
observations made by this Court in this
regard have a been given a short shrift
by Parliament with little realization that
they have a significant bearing on the
right to get information from the
contesting candidates and such
information is necessary to give effect to
the freedom of expression.

120. As regards the purpose of
disclosure of assets and liabilities, I
would like to make it clear that it is not
meant to evaluate whether the
candidate is financially sound or has
sufficient money to spend in the election.
Poor or rich are alike entitled to contest
the election. Every citizen has equal
accessibility in the public arena. If the
information is meant to mobilize public
opinion in favour of an
affluent/financially sound candidate,
the tenet of socialistic democracy and
the concept of equality so firmly
embedded in our Constitution will be
distorted. I cannot also share the view
that this information on assets would
enable the public to verify whether
unaccounted money played a part in
contesting the election. So long as
Explanation 1 to Section 77 of the RP

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Act, 1951 stands and the contributions
can legitimately come from any source,
it is not possible for a citizen/voter to
cause a verification to be made on those
lines. In my opinion, the real purposes of
seeking information in regard to assets
and liabilities are those which I
adverted to in the preceding paragraph.
It may serve other purposes also, but, I
have confined myself to the relevancy of
such disclosure vis-à-vis right to
information only.”

(emphasis added)

8.17 Dharmadhikari, J. while agreed with Paras 78
(A) to (E) of the opinion of M.B. Shah, J, and the
Conclusions (1), (2), (4), (5), (6) (7) and (9) of the
opinion of P. Venkatarama Reddi, J, however,
expressed his inability to agree with Conclusions (3)
and (8) of the opinion of P. Venkatarama Reddy, J.,
and on those aspects expressed his agreement with
views of M.B. Shah J. as mentioned in para 131 and
132 of the judgment, which are quoted herein below:

“131. With these words, I agree with
Conclusions (A) to (E) in the opinion of
Brother Shah, J. and Conclusions (1),
(2), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) in the opinion
of Brother P.V. Reddi, J.

132. With utmost respect, I am unable
to agree with Conclusions (3) and (8) in
the opinion of Brother P.V. Reddi, J., as
on those aspects, I have expressed my
respectful agreement with Brother
Shah, J.”

8.18 Thus, Dharmadhikari J. did not agree with the
view of P. Venkatarama Reddi J. that the failure to

Page 30 of 74
provide for disclosure of educational qualification does
not in practical terms infringe the freedom of
expression.

However, as regards other conclusions including
requirement for disclosure of assets, there appears to
be unanimity in the Bench.

8.19 Pursuant to the decision of this Court in
Association for Democratic Reforms (supra), Rule
4A was inserted in the Conduct of Election Rules,
1961, by S.O. 935(E) dated 8th September, 2002 which
reads as follows:-

“4A. Form of affidavit to be filed at
the time of delivering nomination
paper.- The candidate or his proposer,
as the case may be, shall, at the time of
delivering to the returning officer the
nomination paper under sub-section
(1) of section 33 of the Act, also deliver
to him an affidavit sworn by the
candidate before a Magistrate of the
first class or a Notary in Form 26.”

8.20 This Court in Resurgence India v. Election
Commission of India, (2014) 14 SCC 189 re-

examined the decisions rendered in Association for
Democratic Reforms (supra) and PUCL (supra) when
a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution for a meaningful implementation of the
directions issued in the two judgements mentioned
above. This Court in Resurgence India (supra)
revisited the relevant laws and issued the following

Page 31 of 74
directions, clarifying the importance of mentioning of
the information as required in the Form 26 affidavit,
as mentioned in para 29 of the judgment, which reads
as follows:

“29. What emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised in
the form of the following directions:

29.1. The voter has the elementary right
to know full particulars of a candidate
who is to represent him in
Parliament/Assemblies and such right
to get information is universally
recognised. Thus, it is held that right to
know about the candidate is a natural
right flowing from the concept of
democracy and is an integral part of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
29.2. The ultimate purpose of filing of
affidavit along with the nomination
paper is to effectuate the fundamental
right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution of India. The citizens
are supposed to have the necessary
information at the time of filing of
nomination paper and for that purpose,
the Returning Officer can very well
compel a candidate to furnish the
relevant information.

29.3. Filing of affidavit with blank
particulars will render the affidavit
nugatory.

29.4. It is the duty of the Returning
Officer to check whether the information
required is fully furnished at the time of
filing of affidavit with the nomination
paper since such information is very
vital for giving effect to the “right to
know” of the citizens. If a candidate fails
to fill the blanks even after the reminder
by the Returning Officer, the nomination
paper is fit to be rejected. We do
comprehend that the power of the
Returning Officer to reject the

Page 32 of 74
nomination paper must be exercised
very sparingly but the bar should not be
laid so high that the justice itself is
prejudiced.

29.5. We clarify to the extent that para
73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties
case will not come in the way of the
Returning Officer to reject the
nomination paper when the affidavit is
filed with blank particulars.
29.6. The candidate must take the
minimum effort to explicitly remark as
“NIL” or “Not Applicable” or “Not known”
in the columns and not to leave the
particulars blank.

29.7. Filing of affidavit with blanks will
be directly hit by Section 125-A(i) of the
RP Act. However, as the nomination
paper itself is rejected by the Returning
Officer, we find no reason why the
candidate must be again penalised for
the same act by prosecuting him/her.”

(emphasis supplied)

8.21 Thus, from the aforesaid directions of this Court,
the right to know full particulars of the candidates as
a vital part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India was reiterated. It was emphasised in
Resurgence India (supra) that filing of an affidavit
with blanks on the particulars of the affidavit would
make it liable to be rejected by the Returning Officer.

8.22 In the light of the above, an amendment was
made in the year 2002, inserting Section 125 A to the
Act, which provides for penalty for filing false affidavit,
which reads as follows:

Page 33 of 74

“125A. Penalty for filing false
affidavit, etc.—A candidate who
himself or through his proposer, with
intent to be elected in an election,—

(i) fails to furnish information relating to
sub-section (1) of section 33A; or

(ii) give false information which he
knows or has reason to believe to be
false; or

(iii) conceals any information, in his
nomination paper delivered under sub-

section (1) of section 33 or in his affidavit
which is required to be delivered under
sub-section (2) of section 33A, as the
case may be, shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both.”

8.23 It is significant to note that Section 33A of the
Act referred to above, introduced in the year 2002
pursuant to the decision of this Court in Association
for Democratic Reforms (supra), which mandatorily
requires disclosure of criminal antecedents of the
candidate does not provide for disclosure of assets and
educational qualifications.

The requirement of disclosure of the assets
and education qualification is to be found not on any
Section/provision of the Act, but in the Form 26
Affidavit required to be filed under Rule 4A of the
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. Rule 4A merely
provides that the candidate or his proposer, as the
case may be, shall, at the time of delivering to the
Returning Officer the nomination paper also deliver to

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him an affidavit sworn by the candidate before a
Magistrate or a Notary in Form 26.

8.24 Reference to the said judicial discourse is
essential to appreciate that the obligation to disclose
information regarding criminal antecedents, assets
and educational qualifications has been shaped and
strengthened through judicial directions to promote
transparency in the electoral process. These
requirements, as incorporated into the relevant rules,
are thus a result of judicial evolution complementing
the existing legislative framework, rather than arising
solely from an original statutory mandate.

8.25 This foray into judicial pronouncements
provides the contextual perspective of the requirement
to provide information about assets of the candidates
in contradistinction to the requirement to disclose the
criminal antecedents, and how the issue should be
dealt with by the courts.

9. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS:

9.1 Having examined the legal and constitutional
aspects of the right to information in relation to the
election process, we can now turn our attention to the
relevant statutory provisions governing the election
process, more particularly relating to the annulment
of election due to non-disclosure of information.

Page 35 of 74

9.2 As empowered by Article 327 of the Constitution,
the Parliament enacted the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, to establish the procedure for
elections to the Houses of Parliament and the State
Legislatures, covering qualifications and
disqualifications for membership, corrupt practices,
other offences related to such elections, and resolution
of doubts and disputes arising from or connected to
these elections.

Chapter II of Part II of the Act provides for
qualifications for membership of State Legislatures
and Chapter III provides for disqualifications for
membership of State Legislatures.

Section 5 under Chapter II provides that a person
shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the
Legislative Assembly of a State unless he is an elector
for any Assembly constituency in that State.

Section 8 of Chapter III on the other hand
stipulates the conditions under which a person shall
be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament or of the
Legislature of a State. It provides for the grounds for
disqualification of a candidate upon conviction for
certain offences. When a person is convicted of
offences punishable under any of the acts mentioned
therein, he shall be disqualified from contesting
election from the date of conviction and shall continue

Page 36 of 74
to be disqualified for a further period of six years since
his release, as the case may be.

Section 8A provides for disqualification on the
ground of corrupt practices.

Section 9 lists the grounds for disqualification for
dismissal for corruption or disloyalty for a period of
five years from the date of such dismissal.

Sections 9A and 10 entail disqualification under
certain circumstances viz., if there subsists a contract
between the candidate and the appropriate
Government, or if the candidate holds an office under
a Government company as mentioned therein.

Further, Section 10A provides for disqualification
on the failure to lodge an account of election expenses.

Section 11 empowers the Election Commission to
remove any of the abovementioned disqualifications
for reasons to be recorded.

Section 100 deals with the grounds for declaring
election to be void.

9.3 In the present case we are primarily concerned
with the applicability of Section 100 of the Act. If we
carefully analyse the nature of grounds for declaring
an election to be void under Section 100 of the Act,
these can be broadly categorized in the following
manner.

Page 37 of 74

9.3.1 As regards the ground contemplated under
Section 100(1)(a) of the Act, on the date of the election,
the returned candidate was either not qualified or
disqualified from being chosen to fill the seat under
the Constitution, the Act, or the Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963. This is a ground which is
relatable to other provisions of the Act and was already
in existence in the statute enacted by the Parliament
before the judicial intervention through Association
for Democratic Reforms (supra), PUCL (supra), etc.
The existence of facts applicable to this ground
predates the election process. Thus, a candidate who
was not eligible—either because he was “not qualified”
or “disqualified” is an attribute existing prior to the
election process.

This ground, as is clear, goes to the root of the
eligibility of the candidate and there can be no
ambiguity in the application of this rule. There is no
scope for judicial consideration as to whether such a
deficiency is substantial or not. Either it exists or does
not exist, and such consideration cannot arise for the
reason that once a candidate is found ineligible or
disqualified as under Chapter II & Chapter III of the
Act, it will be covered under Section 100(1)(a) of the
Act and the election shall be declared void. There is no
subjective element involved in this process for
determination. Neither can there be any liberal

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approach to it as such a deficiency is fatal to the
candidacy.

9.3.2 Regarding the second ground related to corrupt
practice as mentioned under Section 100(1)(b) of the
Act, the questioned acts will clearly be those
committed by the candidate during the election
process. This second ground pertains specifically to
the acts committed by the returned candidate or on
behalf of the returned candidate and is not connected
to the candidate’s attributes or qualifications. It is also
a ground that already existed in the statute as enacted
by Parliament before the judicial intervention as
mentioned above.

Such acts are censured to ensure the integrity of
the election process, to prevent voters from being
misled or unduly influenced, and are essential for the
proper conduct of elections, and there can be no
leniency when addressing the issue of corrupt
practices.

9.3.3 As regards the other grounds concerning
improper acceptance or rejection of nominations, or
the non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution, or the Act, or rules, or orders made
under the Act, it is observed that these issues are
mainly technical and involve some element of
subjectivity, since no nomination paper can be

Page 39 of 74
rejected for a defect that is not of a substantial
character as provided under Section 36 (4) of the Act.

9.4 In light of the foregoing legal position, it is clear
that disclosure concerning criminal antecedents is
linked to the existing provisions under Section 8 and
9 of the Act, which specify that a candidate would be
disqualified if convicted of any offences listed under
Section 8 or dismissed for corruption or disloyalty
under Section 9 of the Act.

9.5 However, regarding voidance of the election of the
returned candidates due to non-disclosure of assets,
it is not explicitly stated in the Act. It has become part
of election law through judicial intervention and it is
to be mentioned as part of the Form 26 Affidavit filed
during the nomination process, as discussed above.

9.6 At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that
considering the evolution of law concerning disclosure
of information relating to criminal antecedents and
assets and the “raison d’etre” for the same, these
considerations cannot be placed at the same pedestal.
By its very nature, the requirement to disclose
criminal antecedents has to be examined more
scrupulously and dealt with more strictly as the
involvement of criminals is a bane in our electoral
system, which was the prime focus of judicial
intervention which is reflected in the insertion of
Section 33A of the Act. On the other hand, disclosure

Page 40 of 74
of information about assets and educational
qualification were attending requirements to improve
the quality of the electoral process and the elected
members for which no specific statutory provision has
been made in the Act, but forms part of the
information required to be mentioned in the Form 26
Affidavit in terms of Rule 4A.

9.7 Certainly, there was concern also about assets
when it was noticed that apart from criminal acts of
the candidates, money was being misused by the
candidates to influence the voters. Further, it was also
observed that there is a tendency of the elected
members to misuse their official positions to enrich
themselves at the expense of public funds while in
office. It is for these reasons that it was felt that
candidates must disclose their assets when seeking
re-election.

9.8 It may, however, be noted that there can be no
disqualification under the law based on a candidate’s
wealth or financial status unlike in the case of
candidates with criminal antecedents, who will stand
disqualified if convicted of certain offences mentioned
under Section 8 of the Act. There is no restriction on
contesting an election due to having immense wealth
or being impoverished in a democracy. Ultimately, the
people elect their representative regardless of the
candidate’s financial condition, judging instead

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primarily on whether the candidate can genuinely
represent their interest.

9.9 This aspect has been succinctly articulated by P.
Venkatarama Reddi, J in PUCL (supra) in paragraphs
no. 119 and 120 of the judgment as quoted earlier,
which in essence conveys the idea that the purpose of
disclosure of assets and liabilities of the candidate is
not to associate with the prospect or eligibility of his
candidature or his capacity to spend money in the
electoral process, but primarily to evaluate at a
subsequent point in time after the election, whether
there has been disproportionate increase in wealth by
misusing official position and by self-aggrandizement.

9.10 This issue relating to disclosure of information
may be viewed from another perspective.

There is a provision under the statute to probe
the nomination of a candidate before the election is
held and result is declared, i.e., during the scrutiny by
the Returning Officer, who can reject it at the
nomination stage if there has been a failure to disclose
necessary information by the candidate.

This exercise of examining the validity of
nomination can also be undertaken by the Court after
the election is over in an election petition and result is
known to the voters, as in the present case.

Page 42 of 74

9.10.1 This post-election judicial scrutiny about any
such irregularity or deficiency in not disclosing
necessary informtion serves as a safeguard against
arbitrary actions by the Returning Officer or any
injustice caused to a candidate.

9.10.2 Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference
between these two stages in examining the issue of
non-disclosure of information. At the time the
Returning Officer scrutinizes the nomination papers of
the candidates, the voters are yet to express their mind
through the ballot box. However, once the election is
concluded and the voters have delivered their verdict
and the same has been made public, a new dimension
is introduced — that is, the people’s mandate, which
cannot be overlooked by the court when examining the
legality of the acceptance of the nomination.

9.10.3 Election is a hugely expensive and time-
consuming process involving not only the candidates
in the race but also the vast electorate, who take their
valuable time off, to exercise their franchise and
choose their representatives. Several State agencies
are also involved in ensuring proper and smooth
conduct of the elections. A successful election results
from the coordinated efforts of various agencies where
significant time and national resources are invested.
Based on the electoral outcome, the process of forming
a new government gets activated, and any interference

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with the election result would have a bearing on the
government formation. Hence, any tinkering with the
election result has the potential to undermine the
voice of the people and their participation in shaping
the government.

9.10.4 In a democracy, the will of the people expressed
through election is sacrosanct, which in Latin, is
conveyed by the maxim, “Vox Populi, Vox Dei,”
signifying that the voice of the people and collective
wisdom should be respected which can even be placed
on the highest pedestal of divine authority.

9.10.5 As noted above, participation by voters who are
well-informed not only of the affairs of the state but
also with knowledge of the candidates’ backgrounds
invigorates the electoral process, reaffirming that
election is one of the fundamental features of
democracy. Voters obtain essential information about
the candidates through the exercise of the
fundamental right to know about them, derived from
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

This right to know the backgrounds of
candidates, which corresponds to their obligation to
disclose such information, must, however, be
balanced with the people’s mandate expressed
through ballot boxes, which is central to democracy.

9.10.6 Under the circumstances, once the people have
spoken their mind by casting their votes through the

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ballot box and reposed their confidence in the elected
candidate, whenever the issue of invalidating the
people’s mandate is raised before the court, the court
must be very careful and circumspect.

A fine balance must be struck between holding
free and fair election— which involves the
fundamental right of voters to have information about
the candidates— and maintaining the sanctity of the
mandate of the voters upon the declaration of the
result. After all, election result is the embodiment of
the will of the people expressed through the exercise
of the constitutional right of the people to vote.

The court, therefore, must keep in mind that
declaring an election void solely for non-disclosure of
assets, if it lacks substantiality, could undermine the
validity of the popular mandate. To nullify the choice
of the people on a minor technicality and insignificant
non-disclosure of assets by the elected candidate,
would have serious repercussions on the democratic
process.

Thus, while the court plays a vital role in
upholding the rule of law, utmost care must be taken
to ensure that election results are not invalidated
based on subjective interpretation and minor or
technical irregularities that do not substantially
impinge on the law, since unwarranted interference
with the electoral process and overturning election

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results can erode public trust in democratic
institutions.

9.10.7 Under such circumstances, nullifying the
election result and overturning the people’s verdict
through cold, clinical legal analysis and tools should
be avoided, unless the electoral process has been
vitiated by gross irregularities that undermine
electoral integrity. Courtroom interventions should
only happen when there are clear and blatant
violations of the law that threaten fairness, legality,
and constitutional principles.

9.10.8 Minor procedural errors or purely technical
objections of inconsequential nature thus, should not
be allowed to override the mandate of the electorate.
Courts must be careful not to become tools that
undermine the popular mandate in the name of
technical perfection. The will of the people, expressed
through the election result, should be respected,
unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices,
in which case, the court should intervene without
hesitation. A judicial victory based on technicalities
rather than the electoral victory won in the electoral
battlefield should be avoided, unless the mandate and
the integrity of the electoral process are compromised
by fraud or corrupt practices.

Page 46 of 74

9.11 Statutory provisions and judicial approach in
elections law have also been shaped by this cautious
approach.

It is for this reason that it has been aptly noted
by this Court in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh,
(1954) 1 SCC 57 as follows:

“7. The general rule is well settled that the
statutory requirements of election law
must be strictly observed and that an
election contest is not an action at law or a
suit in equity but is a purely statutory
proceeding unknown to the common law
and that the court possesses no common
law power. It is also well settled that it is
a sound principle of natural justice that the
success of a candidate who has won at an
election should not be lightly interfered
with and any petition seeking such
interference must strictly conform to the
requirements of the law. None of these
propositions however have any application
if the special law itself confers authority on
a tribunal to proceed with a petition in
accordance with certain procedure and
when it does not state the consequences of
non-compliance with certain procedural
requirements laid down by it. It is always
to be borne in mind that though the election
of a successful candidate is not to be
lightly interfered with, one of the
essentials of that law is also to safeguard
the purity of the election process and also
to see that people do not get elected by
flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt
practices.……”
(emphasis added)

9.11.1 This word of caution against overturning
electoral verdicts by the courts was pithily put by this
Court in Madhukar G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant

Page 47 of 74
Chobbildas Rajani & Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 70 in the
following words:

“ 6. It is plain democratic sense that the
electoral process should ordinarily receive
no judicial jolt except where pollution of
purity or contravention of legal mandates
invite the court’s jurisdiction to review the
result and restore legality, legitimacy and
respect for norms. The frequency of
forensic overturning of poll verdicts injects
instability into the electoral system,
kindles hopes in worsted candidates and
induces post-mortem discoveries of
“disqualifications” as a desperate gamble
in the system of fluctuating litigative
fortunes. This is a caveat against overuse
of the court as an antidote for a poll defeat.
Of course, where a clear breach is made
out, the guns of law shall go into action,
and not retreat from the rule of law.

Similar view was expressed by this Court in

Santosh Yadav v. Narender Singh, (2002) 1 SCC

160.

9.11.2 For the said reason, strict conditions are set in
the statute for challenging the outcome of an election.

Unlike other common lawsuits, the Representation of
the People Act of 1951 states that no election can be
questioned except through an election petition filed
according to the provisions of Part VI of the Act. The
Act of 1951 itself specifies the procedure to be followed
for challenging elections.

Section 83 of the Act requires that every election
petition should include a concise statement of the

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material facts on which the petitioner relies. The
petition must be signed and verified in accordance
with the procedures established for pleadings in the
Code of Civil Procedure. It must be accompanied by an
affidavit in Form 25, as required under Rule 94-A of
the Rules, verifying the details under two headings:

statements true to the petitioner’s own knowledge and
statements true based on the petitioner’s information.

The election petitioner is also obliged to disclose
the source of his information regarding the corrupt
practice to link the returned candidate to the charge,
to prevent fishing or roving inquiries, as well as to
prevent the returned candidate from being caught off
guard. The allegations must be interpreted very
strictly and narrowly, considering the serious
consequences they may entail, such as
disqualification from contesting future elections.
Thus, the procedure prescribed by the Act for
challenging an election must be strictly followed and
any deviation or non-compliance can lead to the
dismissal of the petition.

In an election petition involving a charge of
corrupt practice, the person charged with corrupt
practice enjoys the presumption of innocence. The
charge must be proved “to the hilt,” meaning that the
standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial, i.e.,

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proof beyond reasonable doubt, not merely on
preponderance of probabilities.

Such is the nature of an election petition.

These well settled principles have been pithily
put by this Court in Jeet Mohinder Singh v.
Harminder Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386 in the
following words:

40. Before we may proceed to deal, in
exercise of our appellate jurisdiction, with
the pleas raised on behalf of the appellant-

petitioner canvassing commission of
corrupt practices by the respondent which
in the opinion of the High Court the election
petitioner has failed in proving, we would
like to state a few well-settled legal
principles in the field of election
jurisprudence and relevant to our purpose.
They are:

(i) The success of a candidate who
has won at an election should not be
lightly interfered with. Any petition
seeking such interference must
strictly conform to the requirements
of the law. Though the purity of the
election process has to be
safeguarded and the court shall be
vigilant to see that people do not get
elected by flagrant breaches of law
or by committing corrupt practices,
the setting aside of an election
involves serious consequences not
only for the returned candidate and
the constituency, but also for the
public at large inasmuch as re-

election involves an enormous load
on the public funds and
administration. (See Jagan
Nath v. Jaswant Singh [AIR 1954
SC 210 : 1954 SCR 892] , Gajanan
Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji

Page 50 of 74
Raghobaji Meghe [(1995) 5 SCC
347] .)

(ii) Charge of corrupt practice is
quasi-criminal in character. If
substantiated it leads not only to the
setting aside of the election of the
successful candidate, but also of his
being disqualified to contest an
election for a certain period. It may
entail extinction of a person’s public
life and political career. A trial of an
election petition though within the
realm of civil law is akin to trial on a
criminal charge. Two consequences
follow. Firstly, the allegations
relating to commission of a corrupt
practice should be sufficiently clear
and stated precisely so as to afford
the person charged a full
opportunity of meeting the same.

Secondly, the charges when put to
issue should be proved by clear,
cogent and credible evidence. To
prove charge of corrupt practice a
mere preponderance of probabilities
would not be enough. There would
be a presumption of innocence
available to the person charged. The
charge shall have to be proved to the
hilt, the standard of proof being the
same as in a criminal trial.

(See Quamarul Islam v. S.K.
Kanta [1994 Supp (3) SCC 5 : AIR
1994 SC 1733] , F.A.
Sapa v. Singora [(1991) 3 SCC 375 :

AIR 1991 SC 1557] , Manohar
Joshi v. Damodar Tatyaba [(1991) 2
SCC 342] and Ram Singh v. Col.

Ram Singh [1985 Supp SCC 611 :

AIR 1986 SC 3])

(iii) The appellate court attaches
great value to the opinion formed by
the trial Judge more so when the
trial Judge recording findings of fact
is the same who had recorded the
evidence. The appellate court shall
remember that the jurisdiction to try

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an election petition has been vested
in a Judge of the High Court.

Secondly, the trial Judge may have
had the benefit of watching the
demeanour of witnesses and
forming first-hand opinion of them in
the process of evaluation of
evidence. The Supreme Court may
reassess the evidence and come to
its own conclusions on feeling
satisfied that in recording findings
of fact the High Court has
disregarded settled principles
governing the approach to evidence
or committed grave or palpable
errors. (See Gajanan Krishnaji
Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji
Meghe [(1995) 5 SCC 347]
and Kripa Shankar
Chatterji v. Gurudas
Chatterjee [(1995) 5 SCC 1] .)

(iv) Section 83 of the Act requires
every election petition to contain a
concise statement of the material
facts on which the appellant relies.
If the election petition alleges
commission of corrupt practice at the
election, the election petition shall
set forth full particulars of any
corrupt practice including as full a
statement as possible of the names
of the parties alleged to have
committed such corrupt practice and
the date and place of the
commission of each such practice.

Every election petition must be
signed and verified by the appellant
in the manner laid down for the
verification of pleadings in CPC. An
election petition alleging corrupt
practice is required to be
accompanied by an affidavit in
Form 25 read with Rule 94-A of the
Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.

Form 25 contemplates the various
particulars as to the corrupt
practices mentioned in the election
petition being verified by the

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appellant separately under two
headings: (i) which of such
statements including particulars are
true to the appellant’s own
knowledge, and (ii) which of the
statements including the particulars
are true to information of the
appellant. It has been held
in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat
case [(1995) 5 SCC 347] that the
election petitioner is also obliged to
disclose his source of information in
respect of the commission of the
corrupt practice so as to bind him to
the charge levelled by him and to
prevent any fishing or roving
enquiry, also to prevent the returned
candidate from being taken by
surprise.”

10. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT FACTS:

10.1 Coming to the case at hand, there is no dispute
to the fact that the Respondent No.1 had not
mentioned the income as per the income tax return for
the last four financial years of F.Y. 2018-19, F.Y.
2019-20, F.Y. 2020-21, F.Y. 2021-22 in Form 26
Affidavit. Respondent No.1, however, did not leave the
relevant column blank but filled it as “NIL”.

10.2 The main issue as discussed above in this case
is whether non-disclosure of income, as per the
income tax return for four years in Form 26 Affidavit,
and showing it as ‘NIL’ in the relevant column,
amounts to concealment of asset-related information
and whether this constitutes a material defect that
would make the acceptance of the Respondent No.1’s

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nomination improper, thereby attracting the penal
clause of Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.

Furthermore, whether such non-disclosure
constitutes a corrupt practice that renders the election
of Respondent No. 1 void under Section 100(1)(b), and
whether it also amounts to non-compliance with the
provisions of the Act and Rules, making the election of
Respondent No. 1 liable to be declared void under
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.

10.3 Rule 4A of the Rules, provides that the candidate
or his proposer, as the case may be, at the time of
delivering the nomination paper under sub-section (1)
of Section 33 of the Act, to the returning officer, shall
also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the candidate
before a Magistrate of the first class or a Notary in
Form 26.

10.4 Clause no. 4 of Form 26 requires the details of
the PAN and the status of filing of income tax return
for the last five financial years to be mentioned.

The Respondent No.1 has mentioned the income
as per the Income Tax Return for the FY 2022-23
as Rs.11,50,000/-. As regards the remaining four
financial years, she has mentioned the same as “NIL”
only.

In view of the above, there is no doubt that she
did not provide the full details of all financial years in

Page 54 of 74
Form 26. To that extent, it cannot be denied that
Respondent No.1 has not supplied all the required
details in Form 26 Affidavit, which is a violation of the
mandate of Rule 4A mentioned above. As a result, it
can be said that the said Form 26 Affidavit filed by the
Respondent No.1 is defective and does not conform to
the rules.

10.5 Under the circumstances, since the Form 26
Affidavit was deficient in providing relevant
information, the nomination papers of Respondent No.
1 risked being rejected by the Returning Officer. As it
turned out, such an adverse action was not taken
during the scrutiny conducted by the Returning
Officer under Section 36 of the Act, and the
nomination of Respondent No. 1 was accepted, which
the petitioner has alleged in the election petition was
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer.

10.6 The Respondent No.1 was, however, ultimately
elected, having secured 83,036 votes (44.97%),
compared to the Appellant, who secured 60,238 votes
(32.62%). The other candidates received votes ranging
from 408 to 16,469. The vote margin between
Respondent No.1 and the Appellant was 22,798.
Therefore, it is clear that Respondent No.1 was elected
with a substantial number of votes and a significant
margin.

Page 55 of 74

10.7 This Court, in numerous decisions, has held that
non-disclosure of assets by candidates and/or their
wives and dependents, which is not in conformity with
the provisions of the Act and Rules, would render the
acceptance of their nomination improper. Such non-
disclosure would also amount to a corrupt practice.
Therefore, the election of any candidate who has not
disclosed their assets could be declared void under
Section 100 of the Act.

10.8 In Lok Prahari v. Union of India & Ors.
(2018) 4 SCC 699 this Court summarized the legal
and contextual position regarding non-disclosure of
assets as amounting to a corrupt practice under
Section 123(2) of the Act, relevant paragraphs of which
are reproduced as below.

“79. We shall now deal with Prayer 2
which seeks a declaration that non-
disclosure of assets and sources of
income would amount to “undue
influence” — a corrupt practice under
Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. In this
behalf, heavy reliance is placed by the
petitioner on a judgment of this Court in
Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar
[Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3
SCC 467: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359: AIR
2015 SC 1921]. It was a case arising
under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act,
1994. A notification was issued by the
State Election Commission stipulating
that every candidate at an election to
any panchayat is required to disclose
information, inter alia, whether the
candidate was accused in any pending
criminal case of any offence punishable
with imprisonment for two years or more

Page 56 of 74
and in which charges have been framed
or cognizance has been taken by a court
of law. In an election petition, it was
alleged that there were certain criminal
cases pending falling in the above
mentioned categories but the said
information was not disclosed by the
returned candidate at the time of filing
his nomination. One of the questions
before this Court was whether such non-

disclosure amounted to “undue
influence” — a corrupt practice under
the Panchayats Act. It may be
mentioned that the Panchayats Act
simply adopted the definition of a
corrupt practice as contained in Section
123 of the 1951 RP Act.

80. On an elaborate consideration of
various aspects of the matter, this Court
in Krishnamoorthy case
[Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3
SCC 467: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359: AIR
2015 SC 1921] held as follows: (SCC p.
522, para 91)

“91. … While filing the nomination
form, if the requisite information, as
has been highlighted by us,
relating to criminal antecedents, is
not given, indubitably, there is an
attempt to suppress, effort to
misguide and keep the people in
dark. This attempt undeniably and
undisputedly is undue influence
and, therefore, amounts to corrupt
practice. …”

81. For the very same logic as adopted
by this Court in Krishnamoorthy we are
also of the opinion that the non-

disclosure of assets and sources of
income of the candidates and their
associates would constitute a corrupt
practice falling under heading “undue
influence” as defined under Section
123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. We, therefore,
allow Prayer 2.”

Page 57 of 74
10.9 Similarly, in the case of S. Rukmini
Madegowda v. State Election Commission & Ors.
(2022) 18 SCC 1, this Court held that false
declaration about assets would constitute a corrupt
practice, and observed that,

“37. In our considered view, a false
declaration with regard to the assets of
a candidate, his/her spouse or
dependants, constitutes corrupt practice
irrespective of the impact of such a false
declaration on the election of the
candidate. It may be presumed that a
false declaration impacts the election.”

10.10 At the same time, this Court has also held that
the mere failure to disclose assets in the affidavit, if it
does not constitute a material defect and is not of a
substantial character, will not make the acceptance of
the nomination improper, thus invalidating the
election.

Further, whether the non-disclosure of assets is
of a substantial character or not, must be determined
by the court based on the specific facts of each case,
as observed by this Court in Karikho Kri v. Nuney
Tayang & Anr., 2024 SCC Online SC 519 as follows:

“40. Having considered the issue, we
are of the firm view that every defect in
the nomination cannot straightaway be
termed to be of such character as to
render its acceptance improper and
each case would have to turn on its own
individual facts, in so far as that aspect

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is concerned. The case law on the
subject also manifests that this Court
has always drawn a distinction
between non-disclosure of substantial
issues as opposed to insubstantial
issues, which may not impact one’s
candidature or the result of an election.
The very fact that Section 36 (4) of the
Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning
Officer not rejecting a nomination unless
he is of the opinion that the defect is of
a substantial nature demonstrates that
this distinction must always be kept in
mind and there is no absolute mandate
that every non-disclosure, irrespective of
its gravity and impact, would
automatically amount to a defect of
substantial nature, thereby materially
affecting the result of the election or
amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to
qualify as a corrupt practice.”

It was further observed that,

“44. Though it has been strenuously
contended before us that the voter’s
‘right to know’ is absolute and a
candidate contesting the election must
be forthright about all his particulars,
we are not inclined to accept the blanket
proposition that a candidate is required
to lay his life out threadbare for
examination by the electorate.
…………… Every case would have to
turn on its own peculiarities and there
can be no hard and fast or
straitjacketed rule as to when the
nondisclosure of a particular movable
asset by a candidate would amount to a
defect of a substantial
character………….”

(emphasis added)

10.11 Section 36 (4) of the Act clearly states that the
Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination
paper on the basis of a defect that is not of a

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substantial character. Consequently, if the defect is
not considered substantial, the nomination cannot be
rejected, and acceptance of such nomination cannot
be deemed improper to invoke the provisions of
Section 100 (1)(d)(i) of the Act.

10.12 Applying the same legal standard,
consequently, if such defect in not disclosing the
assets or income is not of a substantial nature, it
cannot be said to be a corrupt practice within the
meaning of Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.

For the same reasons, the provisions of Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act cannot be attracted, if the defect
is not a material one.

10.13 Thus, in the present case, as we examine the
issue as to whether non-disclosure of income as
shown in the income tax return for four years amounts
to non-compliance with the mandate of Rule 4A of the
Rules, and if so, whether the acceptance of the
nomination paper of Respondent No.1 was improper to
attract the provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(i), Section
100(1)(b), or Section 100(1)(d)(iv), it must first be
ascertained whether such a defect of non-disclosure
was of a substantial character under the
circumstances. If it is so proved, it has to be then
determined whether, this will attract adverse actions
contemplated under Section 100, which the election
petitioner, the Appellant herein, seeks to invoke.

Page 60 of 74

10.14 Regarding the details of the assets to be
declared under Clause 7 of the Affidavit, Respondent
No.1 has listed her assets and those of her spouse.
Likewise, the details of the immovable assets required
under Clause 7(B) have been provided. The liabilities
of Respondent No.1 and her spouse have also been
specified. Additionally, the details of their professions,
occupations, and sources of income have been
disclosed.

10.15 The election petitioner’s allegation primarily
concerns the Respondent No. 1’s omission of income
details as per income tax returns for four financial
years, as provided under Column 4 of the Form 26
Affidavit. The petitioner has not raised any other
issues regarding the accuracy or insufficiency of
information related to assets, movable or immovable,
or sources of income, except for the allegation that
Respondent No.1 did not disclose her income from
honorarium and pension.

10.16 From the pleadings, it is apparent that
Respondent No.1 was not contesting the assembly
election for the first time. She had served as an MLA
from 2014 to 2018 in the same Constituency, and
later, was elected as a Member/Chairperson of the Zila
Parishad before contesting the assembly election
again, which she won.

Page 61 of 74

It is, thus, clearly evident that she is a well-
known political figure in her Constituency from which
it can be safely inferred that the people of her
Constituency are familiar with her work and her
reputation, and that she was quite popular in the area.
It is also important to note that there has been no
allegation of malpractice or corrupt practices or
providing false information by her.

10.17 To substantiate the allegations made in the
election petition, the election petitioner examined only
himself. No other witness was examined. The election
petition involved a full-scale trial where the petitioner
had all the opportunities to prove his case, but besides
examining himself as a witness, no other witnesses
were called.

10.18 During the trial, apart from the allegation that
the Respondent No.1 did not disclose her income as
per the income tax return of the specified period, and
her honorarium and pension as mentioned above, no
other facts or materials were presented to demonstrate
any significant concealment of assets or sources of
income.

10.19 In view of the above undisputed facts and
circumstances, the question this Court needs to
consider is whether non-disclosure of income for the
specified period in the income tax return, along with
her honorarium and pension, constitutes a

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substantial or material defect concerning declaration
of her assets.

10.20 Regarding the allegation by the election
petitioner that Respondent No.1 was drawing a
pension of Rs.30,000/- per month on account of her
previous term as an MLA from 2014 to 2018 which she
had not disclosed, Respondent No.1 stated that she
did not receive any pension after being elected as
Chairperson of the Zila Parishad. She supported her
claim with a certificate issued by the Assistant
Secretary to the State Legislature, dated 20.06.2024,
confirming non-drawal of pension. Since the election
petitioner did not rebut this claim of the returned
candidate, the allegation does not require further
consideration.

10.21 Concerning the allegation that Respondent
No.1 had not disclosed her income as the Chairperson
of the Zilla Parishad, this is also an aspect that may
not require further enquiring, as she had disclosed in
paragraph 9 of the Form 26 Affidavit that, at the time
of filing of nomination, she was serving as the Zilla
Parishad Chairperson and her source of income was
the honorarium she received for that position.
Therefore, merely because the honorarium amount
was not explicitly mentioned, in our opinion, it does
not constitute concealment, since her source of

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income in the form of honorarium she was receiving
was clearly disclosed.

10.22 Addressing the most contentious issue of non-
disclosure of income as per the income tax return for
the four financial years, we have noted that
Respondent No.1 had already disclosed her assets,
both movable and immovable, source of income, and
profession, about which there is no real dispute except
for the aspects we have already discussed above.

10.23 Filing of an Income Tax Return is intrinsically
related to and based on a person’s assets and sources
of income. An Income Tax Return cannot be
considered in isolation or independently of the
person’s assets. It merely provides a reference
framework for the assets and sources of income from
the perspective of Income Tax authorities for the
purpose of levying income tax. The Income Tax Return
in essence reflects a person’s financial position, viz-a-
viz the assets and sources of income. An income tax
statement is a declaration in fiscal terms for
assessment by the income tax authority, intended for
taxation on the assets and income received by a
person. It is not to be considered as a statement of fact
of the existence of assets or source of income. As long
as the assets, income, and sources of income are
otherwise disclosed, and if there is no dispute of the
same, non-disclosure of the tax return for certain

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financial years, although a technical defect under the
rules, in our opinion cannot be considered to be a
defect of significant importance as it does not in any
manner amount to hiding the assets. What has not
been disclosed in the form of Income Tax Returns is
certain information relating to assets and not “of
assets”, as there was full disclosure of her assets and
source of income

10.24 It is also not the case that Respondent No.1 did
not disclose her Income Tax Returns at all. She did
disclose her Income Tax Returns for the Financial Year
2022-2023, which is reflective of her assets and
income. Hence, unless it is shown that the assets and
income during the other financial years were
substantially in variance and these were not disclosed,
not much grievance can be made by the election
petitioner, for these income tax returns not disclosed
would not have been in variance substantially from the
Income Tax Return already filed. However, nothing has
been shown by the election petitioner about any
disproportionately higher income vis-à-vis the sources
of income in respect of the period for which the income
tax returns had not been filed.

10.25 The matter could have been, however, entirely
different had there been an averment made by the
election petitioner that the returned candidate
deliberately did not disclose the income tax returns to

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hide her real income and assets during that period, or
that the returned candidate had accumulated wealth
disproportionate to her income, which could have been
detected from the income tax returns that were never
filed. In that case, one could say without any
hesitation that the information withheld was
significant enough to invoke the penal provisions of
Section 100(1)(d)(i) for improperly accepting the
Respondent No.1’s nomination. Similarly, under such
circumstances, the provisions of Section 100(1)(b) or
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) could also have been invoked.

10.26 Under the circumstances, since there is no
serious dispute about the assets and the source of
income of Respondent No.1 which have been already
disclosed, non-disclosure of income tax returns,
though a procedural and technical defect, in our
opinion, does not amount to misrepresentation or
non-disclosure of assets which is of consequence.

10.27 It is also noted that Respondent No.1 had
not left the relevant column in the Affidavit blank,
which would have made the nomination paper fatally
defective and liable to be rejected, as per the
judgement in Resurgence India (supra).

10.28 As already discussed above, this Court has held
as in the case of Karikho Kri (supra) that what needs
to be examined in cases of non-disclosure of
information of assets is whether such non-disclosure

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is of a substantive nature or not. If it is found that the
non-disclosure was not of substantial character, the
court need not interfere with the election. The court
must, therefore, determine whether there was
substantial compliance with the legal requirements, or
if the deficiency was merely technical or procedural,
before the court proceeds to interfere with the election.

10.29 Examined from the above perspective, it is
noted that Respondent No.1 did not make a false
statement or attempt to mislead the voters by
providing erroneous information about the net income
or assets as required under Para 4 of the Affidavit.

This is not a case of providing false information
or engaging in disinformation, but rather a failure to
provide certain information concerning the assets
which, in our opinion, as mentioned above, does not
amount to a defect of substantial character warranting
declaration of Respondent No.1’s election as void.

The present case does not involve any
concealment or misrepresentation of criminal
antecedents that would warrant censure under the
statutory framework or lead to judicial invalidation of
the election. The issue here is of lack of full disclosure
of information concerning income tax returns of the
returned candidate which is of inconsequential
import.

Page 67 of 74

10.30 There is another important aspect noticeable in
this case, which is the absence of objection during the
scrutiny of the nomination forms by the Returning
Officer under Section 36 of the Act. Although this
failure to object will not prevent anyone from
challenging the validity of the nomination by filing an
election petition later, the fact that the Appellant did
not raise any objection when certain deficiencies
which could be easily ascertained and detected is very
significant. We note that the election petition mentions
that the petitioner’s agent verbally objected to the
nomination paper, but that agent was not examined at
the trial. Therefore, this claim cannot be considered to
have been proved, and hence, this argument is of no
consequence.

It can, therefore, be inferred that no objection
was raised regarding any such deficiency during
scrutiny. If no objections were raised by any of the
contesting candidates including the petitioner about
certain easily noticeable or discernible deficiencies, it
is reasonable to assume that the candidates did not
have any serious reservation about the Respondent
No.1’s candidacy. Under the circumstances, having
participated in the election and competed with other
candidates and taken the chance to be elected, the
election petitioner’s attempt now to challenge the
elected candidate’s victory on a technicality, which we
have already discussed, lacks substantial basis, does

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not inspire confidence of this Court as far as the bona
fide of the election petitioner is concerned. The Court’s
proceeding should not be reduced to a legal gamble,
when electorally defeated.

10.31 We are mindful of the fact that it has also been
held by this Court in PUCL (supra), and Kisan
Shankar Kathore (supra) that it may not be desirable
to reject a nomination at the stage of scrutiny
considering the fact that the disputes relating to the
correctness or non-disclosure of information may
require a full scale enquiry during the election trial
and there can be no estoppel because of non-raising
of objection during the scrutiny. Yet, failure to raise
any objection at the time of scrutiny raises a question
mark on the bona fide of the election petitioner, which
would prompt the court to minutely examine such a
claim by the election petitioner.

It may also be noted that in most of the earlier
decisions of this Court referred to by the parties, there
were serious objections about the non-disclosure of
certain information at the stage of scrutiny by the
Returning Officer.

10.32 What is also to be noted in the present case is
that apart from the fact that there was no objection at
the time of scrutiny, during the election trial, no
material has been produced by the election petitioner
regarding the non-disclosure of any material

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information by the returned candidate, which would
have had a significant impact on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the information regarding the disclosed
assets and income of the returned candidate.

10.33 Regarding the plea of the election petitioner that
Respondent No.1’s election be declared as void due to
non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution, the Act, or rules or orders made under
the Act, it must be demonstrated that such non-
compliance was of a substantial nature, and that it
materially affected the result of the election as far as
the Respondent No.1 is concerned, which is not the
case here.

10.34 We are, thus, of the view that merely because a
returned candidate has not disclosed certain
information related to the assets, courts should not
rush to invalidate the election by adopting a highly
pedantic and fastidious approach, unless it is shown
that such concealment or non-disclosure was of such
magnitude and substantial nature that it could have
influenced the election result.

In this case, it has not been demonstrated that
such concealment or non-disclosure of certain
information related to assets was of a substantial
nature that could have materially affected the result of
the election of the returned candidate. Of course, it
was observed by this Court in Lok Prahari (supra),

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S. Rukmini Madegowda (supra), etc., that if it is
found that there has been non-disclosure of assets, it
amounts to a corrupt practice. But the non-disclosure
of income as per Income Tax Return in the present
case, as discussed above, is not of a substantial nature
to be considered a corrupt practice.

10.35 The true test, in our opinion, would be whether
the non-disclosure of information about assets in any
case is of consequential or inconsequential import,
finding of which will be the basis for declaring the
election valid or void as the case may be.

11. CONCLUSION

11.1 Judicial intervention in election disputes
concerning disclosure of information, as discussed
above, was prompted by the quest for sanitising the
electoral process by eliminating polluting elements by
making candidates’ criminal antecedents public.
Aiming to prevent criminals from participating in
elections to maintain purity of the electoral process —
essential for the proper functioning of parliamentary
democracy — the court was compelled to exercise its
extraordinary power to issue specific directions.
Consequently, not only disclosure of criminal
antecedents, but also related obligations to disclose
assets, liabilities, and educational qualifications of
election candidates became mandatory. The
knowledge of the criminal antecedents, assets and

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educational qualifications of the candidates by voters
certainly invigorates the electoral process, which is
ensured by obligatory disclosure by the candidate.
However, the Court has made a subtle distinction
between non-disclosure of criminal antecedents and
that of assets and educational qualifications. While
disclosure of criminal antecedents in the electoral
process was the most critical element to maintain the
purity of the electoral process which has to be
scrupulously adhered to, disclosure of assets and
educational qualifications were considered as
attending supplementary requirements to strengthen
the electoral process, of which there will be certain
scope for consideration as to whether it is of
substantial or inconsequential nature.

In the light of the above, this disclosure
requirement as far as assets and educational
qualification is concerned, should not be
unreasonably stretched to invalidate an otherwise
validly declared election over minor technical non-
compliances that are not of substantial character, and
should not be the basis for nullification of the people’s
mandate.

11.2 In the light of the legal position exposited, on
examination of the facts in the peculiar background
obtaining in the case, we hold that the non-disclosure
of income in the income tax return for four financial

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years by Respondent No.1, is not a defect of
substantial character. Therefore, the nomination
could not have been rejected under Section 36(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 as contended
by the Appellant and hence, no illegality was
committed by the Returning Officer in accepting the
nomination of the Respondent No.1. Resultantly, the
penal clause cannot be invoked to invalidate
Respondent No.1’s election under Section 100(1)(d)(i)
of the Act on the ground that the nomination of
Respondent No.1 was improperly accepted.

11.3 As we have held that the defect of non-disclosure
mentioned is not of a substantial nature, for the same
reason the Respondent No.1 cannot be considered to
have indulged in a corrupt practice within the
meaning of Section 123 (2) of the Act, and thus, the
election of Respondent No.1 cannot be rendered void
under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.
11.4 Consequently, on the same consideration, it
cannot be also said that the Respondent No.1 did not
comply with the relevant provisions of the Act or any
rule or order made under the Act, to attract the
provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.
11.5 Furthermore, we also hold that the allegation
that the Respondent No.1 did not disclose the income
from honorarium she received as the Chairperson of
Zilla Parishad, or that she did not disclose receiving

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ex-MLA pension—cannot be considered to have been
proved or established, nor these are of any material
consequences.

12. VERDICT:

For the reasons stated above, the present appeal,
Civil Appeal No.13015 of 2025, is dismissed as devoid
of merit.

Parties to bear their own costs.
Registry to notify the concerned authorities by
taking necessary steps as required under Section
116C(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.

…. …………………J.
(SURYA KANT)

……..…………..….……………….………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 14, 2025

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