Kerala High Court
Anila vs Maintenance Tribunal And Sub … on 16 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIJU ABRAHAM
WEDNESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JULY 2025 / 25TH ASHADHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 22270 OF 2021
PETITIONERS:
1 ANILA, AGED 33 YEARS
W/O. JAYARAMAN, PALAKKIL HOUSE, KANNIABRAM,
OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
2 SUBRAMANIAN
C/O. ANILA, PALAKKIL HOUSE, KANNIABRAM,
OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
3 GEETHA
W/O. SUBRAMANIAN, PALAKKIL HOUSE,
KANNIABRAM, OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
4 AKHIL
S/O. SUBRAMANIAN, POOZHITHODI KOVILINGAL HOUSE,
PALODE PO, THACHANATTUKARA, MANNARKKAD.
5 ROSHNI, W/O. AKHIL, POOZHITHODI KOVILINGAL HOUSE,
PALODE PO, THACHANATTUKARA, MANNARKKAD,
PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
BY ADVS. SRI.K.MOHANAKANNAN
SRI.H.PRAVEEN (KOTTARAKARA)
RESPONDENTS:
1 MAINTENANCE TRIBUNAL AND SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE
OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT-679 101.
2 RAMANI
W/O. RAVUNNI, PALAKKAL HOUSE, KANNIAPURAM (PO),
OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT-679 101.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.HARIDAS
SHRI.BIJU HARIHARAN
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SMT.SHIJIMOL M.MATHEW
SRI.P.C.SHIJIN
SRI.RISHIKESH HARIDAS
SMT.ROSHIN MARIAM JACOB
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
16.07.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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'CR'
VIJU ABRAHAM, J.
.................................................................
W.P.(C) No.22270 of 2021
.................................................................
Dated this the 16th day of July, 2025
JUDGMENT
The above writ petition is filed challenging Ext.P10 order issued
by the 1st respondent as per the provisions of the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short, “Senior
Citizens Act, 2007“).
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ petition are as
follows: The 2nd respondent is the mother-in-law of the 1 st petitioner, and
the petitioner before the 1st respondent Maintenance Tribunal, and other
petitioners are parents and relatives of the 1 st petitioner. The 2nd
respondent filed Ext.P1 complaint before the 1st respondent Tribunal
requesting to permit her to reside on the first floor of the building in which
the petitioners are residing on the ground floor. Ext.P1 complaint was
resisted by the petitioners herein by filing Exts.P2 and P3 objections
mainly contending that the 1st petitioner has approached the Judicial First
Class Magistrate Court, Mannarkkad filing M.C.No.28 of 2021 (Ext.P4)
invoking Section 18 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
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Act, 2005 (in short, “Domestic Violence Act, 2005“), alleging domestic
violence and C.M.P.No.549 of 2021 (Ext.P5) was filed seeking protection
orders. Ext.P6 interim order dated 05.03.2021 was issued whereby
respondents 2 to 6 were restrained from causing any kind of nuisance or
hindrance to the petitioners’ peaceful living in the shared house bearing
No.9/28 (old survey No.28/13). In Ext.P6 interim order further directions
were also issued. Petitioners would submit that complaints were also filed
before the police as Exts.P8 and P9, alleging harassment and ill-treatment
by the 2nd respondent and others. Without considering any of these
aspects, by Ext.P10 order, the 1st respondent Tribunal invoking the powers
under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, permitted the 2nd respondent to reside
in the said building where the petitioners are residing, and the petitioners
were directed not to cause any mental or physical torture towards the 2 nd
respondent. It is aggrieved by the same that the present writ petition has
been filed.
3. It is contended that as the 1st petitioner is the daughter-in-law of
the 2nd respondent, no complaint is maintainable against her as per the
provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It is also submitted based on
the judgment of the Apex Court in Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District, 2021 (1) KLT 80 that the right of the 1st
petitioner to secure a residence or in respect of a shared household
cannot be defeated by securing an order of eviction by adopting the
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summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 as directed in the
present case. It is further submitted that if the 2nd respondent is allowed to
stay in the house where the petitioners are residing on the strength of
Ext.P6 order issued under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, there is every
chance of threatening and harassing the petitioner. It is on the said
grounds, the present writ petition has been filed.
4. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the 2 nd respondent
denying the fact that her son who is the husband of the 1 st petitioner has
neglected the 1st petitioner and their minor children and contended that her
son is working abroad in connection with his employment and the 1 st
petitioner is residing at Kannur and is working as a teacher in Government
service. Though the 2nd respondent admitted the issuance of Ext.P6 order,
it is contended that the proceedings issued as per Ext.P10 are not in
conflict with Ext. P6 order. It is further submitted that the 2 nd respondent
and her husband have no other property/building to reside and the subject
property originally belongs to the 2nd respondent as per sale deed No.2021
of 2016 of SRO, Ottappalam and the same was transferred in favour of
her son as per settlement deed No.2368 of 2020 and that the said building
is a two storied one with separate entrance to the first floor and it is
considering all these aspects that Ext.P10 order was issued permitting the
2nd respondent and her husband to reside in the first floor of the building
having door No.28/13-2. Ext.R2(a) series of photographs are produced to
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show that a separate entrance is provided to the first floor of the building.
It is further contended that though the property was transferred in favour of
her son, who is the husband of the 1 st petitioner as per settlement deed
No.2368 of 2020, a suit was filed as O.S.No.196 of 2023 before the
Munsiff’s Court, Ottappalam wherein the gift deed in favour of the son was
set aside and the suit was allowed as per Exts.R2(b) judgment and R2(c)
decree was passed. In view of the above, the 2nd respondent is now in
ownership of the said building and the petitioners cannot object to the
residence of the 2nd respondent on the first floor of the building bearing
No.28/13-2. It is further submitted by the 2 nd respondent that she has no
intention to violate the directions in Ext.P6 order issued by the Judicial
First Class Magistrate Court, Mannarkkad, as per the provisions of the
5. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides.
6. It is true that by Ext.P6 interim order invoking the power under
the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a direction was issued to respondents 2
to 6 therein, which includes the 2nd respondent herein, not to cause any
kind of nuisance or hindrance to the petitioners’ peaceful living in the
shared house bearing No.9/28. On the other hand, it is invoking the
provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, that Ext.P10 order was issued
by the Maintenance Tribunal in favour of the 2nd respondent. It is an
admitted case that Ext.P6 order was issued at a time when the husband of
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the 1st petitioner was in ownership and possession of the building and that
alleging harassment and physical abuse against the husband that the 1st
petitioner along with minor children has approached the Judicial First
Class Magistrate Court, Mannarkkad under the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 which led to issuance of Ext.P6 order. It is also not in
dispute that the 2nd respondent was the original owner of the said property,
which has been assigned to her son, who is the husband of the 1 st
petitioner and later the gift deed was cancelled as per Ext.R2(b) judgment
in O.S.No.196 of 2023 of the Munsiff’s Court, Ottappalam.
7. Essentially, three grounds are raised by the petitioners
challenging Ext.P10 order passed by the 1st respondent in favour of the 2nd
respondent. First contention is that the said order violates the decision of
the Apex Court in Vanitha’s case cited supra, and contended that the right
of women to secure a residence in respect of a shared household cannot
be defeated by an order under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Yet another
contention raised by the petitioners is that the 1st petitioner, being the
daughter-in-law of the 2nd respondent, proceedings under the Senior
Citizens Act, 2007, cannot be maintained against her, and therefore,
Ext.P10 order is without jurisdiction. Further contention raised by the
petitioners is that there were several instances of physical torture on the
1st petitioner, and if the 2nd respondent is permitted to reside in the said
building where the 1st petitioner and others are residing, it will result in
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further physical and mental torture towards the 1st petitioner.
8. Let me first consider the contention raised based on the
judgment of the Apex Court in Vanitha’s case cited supra. Paragraphs 22
and 23 of the said judgment read as follows:
“22. This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was promulgated
with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens.
Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under S.7. These Tribunals have the power
79to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts,
under S.8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred under S.27
of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. However, the over-riding effect for remedies
sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 under S.3, cannot be
interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are
sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act, 2005. The PWDV Act, 2005 is also in the
nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender
discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a
largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the
legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act,
2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged under S.2(b) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under
other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act, 2005. S.26 (26. Relief in other
suits and legal proceedings. – (1) Any relief available under S.18, S.19, S.20, S.21
and S.22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court, Family
Court or a Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent
whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this
Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and
along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal
proceeding before a Civil or Criminal Court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any
proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform
the Magistrate of the grant of such relief) of the PWDV Act empowers certain
reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in
any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged,
such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation
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constituted under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after
noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act, 2005
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. S.3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be
deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a
woman’s right to a ‘shared household’ under S.17 of the PWDV Act, 2005. In the
event that the “aggrieved woman” obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under
the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, she shall duty- bound to inform the Magistrate under
the PWDV Act, 2005, as per sub-section (3) of S.26 of the PWDV Act, 2005. This
course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act,
2007 and the PWDV Act, 2005– of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups
who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realized. Rights in
law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their
realization.
23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the provisions of sub-
section (2) of S.23 of the Senior Citizen Act, 2007, it is evident that it applies to a
situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate
and such estate or part thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the appellant’s
simple plea is that the suit premises constitute her ‘shared household’ within the
meaning of S.2(s) of the PWDV Act, 2005. We have also seen the series of
transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of the
appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the marriage but
subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered sale deed at the same
price to his father (the father-in-law of the appellant), who in turn gifted it to his
spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the appellant after divorce proceedings were
instituted by the Fourth respondent. Parallel to this, the appellant had instituted
proceedings of dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged
spouse; and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The appellant had
also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth respondent and the
divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events, that the
Second and Third respondents instituted an application under the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act, 2005 had not
been instituted when the application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed,
should not lead to a situation where the enforcement of an order of eviction
deprives her from pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a
woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a
consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we
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are clearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplated by
the Senior Citizen Act, 2007 was not available for the purpose of facilitating
strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the appellant in respect of a
shared household. A shared household would have to be interpreted to include the
residence where the appellant had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely
because the ownership of the property has been subsequently transferred to her
in-laws (Second and Third Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth
respondent) is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant of the
protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act, 2005.”
The Apex Court in Vanitha’s case cited supra has not held that the
provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be invoked when there
is a protection order granted as per the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005. The Court has only held that the overriding effect of
remedy sought under Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be
interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that
are sought to be conferred by the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the
Apex Court further held that merely because the ownership of the property
has been subsequently transferred to the in-laws or that her estranged
spouse is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant
therein of the protection that was envisaged under the Domestic Violence
Act, 2005. The Apex Court in the said judgment only held that by any
order passed under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, any benefit obtained by
an applicant as per the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
cannot be precluded. In the present case, the specific submission of the
learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent is that the building is a
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two storied one and the petitioners are residing in the ground floor of the
building and that a separate entrance is provided to the first floor of the
said building and the 2nd respondent intend to reside in the first floor and
has no objection in the petitioners residing in the ground floor as permitted
in Ext.P6 order and she has no intention to violate any of the terms and
conditions stated in Ext.P6. Therefore, Ext P10 order will not in any
circumstances, interfere with the right of the petitioner to have a shared
household as provided for in Ext P6 order. The High Court of Delhi in
Pooja Mehta and others v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others,
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7112 while considering the balancing rights of the
parties as per the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has held that the Court must evaluate the
nature of relationship between the parties and strike a balance between
the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In
view of the above, I find no merit in the first contention raised by the
petitioners.
9. The second contention raised by the petitioners is that the
proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, will not lie against the 1 st
petitioner, who is the daughter-in-law of 2nd respondent. Referring to
Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which deals with the
maintenance of parents and senior citizens, it is submitted that an
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application under Section 5 of Senior Citizens Act, 2007 for maintenance
could be filed only against the children or relatives in case the senior
citizen is childless. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that
the word “children” is defined in Section 2(a) and the word “relative” is
defined in Section 2(g) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Sections 2(a) and
2(g) dealing with the definition of words “children” and “relative” are
extracted below:
2. “(a) “children” includes son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter but does
not include a minor”
“(g) “relative” means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor
and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death”
Section 4 of of Senior Citizens Act, 2007 deals with “maintenance of
parents and senior citizens” which provides that a senior citizen, including
a parent who is unable to maintain himself, could make an application
under Section 5. Section 5 deals with the filing of an application for
maintenance. It is profitable to extract the definition of “maintenance” and
“welfare” as available in Section 2(b) and (k), which reads as follows:
2. (b) “maintenance” includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical
attendance and treatment;
(k) “welfare” means provision for food, health care, recreation centres and other
amenities necessary for the senior citizens.
(underline supplied)
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It is true that a contention is raised by the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners that the complaint is not maintainable based on the
judgment of this Court in Pramod V. v. Vimala V., 2024 KHC 778 wherein
this Court while considering an application filed under Section 23 of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to declare a transfer of property as void and held
that an application for maintenance before the Maintenance Tribunal
seeking eviction from the residential house could be invoked only against
the children or relative as defined in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the
petitioner therein not being a child or relative of the senior citizen, an
application in this regard is not maintainable before the Maintenance
Tribunal. It is true that the 1st petitioner, being the daughter-in-law of the
2nd respondent, is not coming within the definition of ‘children’ or ‘relative’
as provided in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It is pertinent to note that in
the present case, Ext.P6 order as per the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 was issued at a time the house was in the ownership
of the husband of the petitioner, who is the 1st respondent in the said
proceedings and direction was issued permitting the petitioners peaceful
living in the shared household. While so, Ext.P10 was also issued in
favour of the 2nd respondent as per the provisions of the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007, permitting her residence in the very same house, but on the first
floor, which is assigned a separate number and also a separate entrance.
After Ext.P10 was issued, the property is now in the ownership of the 2 nd
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respondent based on the judgment and decree of the competent Civil
Court, which declared the transfer of the property in the name of the
husband of the petitioner as null and void. It is also not in dispute that the
2nd respondent and her husband, who are senior citizens, have no other
place of residence. Further, it is admitted by the 2nd respondent that she
has no intention to evict the petitioner from the present shared household,
and only that is required is to permit her to reside along with her husband
on the first floor of the said building. It is only the petitioners who are
residing in the said building who are challenging the residence of the 2 nd
respondent in the said building on the basis of Ext.P10 order. It is in this
factual context that the challenge against Ext.P10 order is to be examined.
10. The object of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is to protect and
provide effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents
and senior citizens. The definition of maintenance in Section 2(b) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 includes provision for residence also. Section
2(k) defines ‘welfare’ to include provision for food, healthcare, recreation
centres and other amenities necessary for the senior citizens. What is
required by the 2nd respondent is a provision for residence, which has
been granted as per Ext.P10. Providing a safe shelter/residence to a
senior citizen will also come under the purview of “maintenance” in Section
2(b) and also “welfare” as per Section 2(k) of the Senior Citizens Act,
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2007. The Telangana High Court in Deepika H. v. Maintenance Welfare
of Parents and Others, 2020 KHC 3702 considered the definition of
“children” and “relative” as provided in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007
keeping in view the purpose of the enactment and held as follows:
“15. S.2(a) of the Act defines ‘Children’ and S.2(g), defines ‘relative’. They are
extracted as under:
‘Children’ includes son, daughter, grandson and grand – daughter but does not
include a minor.
‘Relative’ means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor
and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death.
16. If the above definitions of ‘children’ and ‘relative’ are read, keeping in view
the purpose of enactment as stated under the ‘objects and reasons’, it is clear
that their meaning under the definitions, is restricted only to son, daughter,
grandson and grand – daughter, and legal heir of the childless senior citizen, who
is not a minor and is in possession or would inherit the property of a senior
citizen after his death. As noted above, the object of the enactment is to cast an
obligation not only on the family, but also on the ‘persons’ who inherit the
property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives. Family has larger
connotations and the same is also defined under the Act. In a given situation,
like the present case, where the daughter – in – law is in possession of the
property of parents – in – law, and made them to reside in a rented
accommodation, and her husband, who is the son of respondents 3 and 4, living
somewhere, can it be said that claim against the ‘daughter – in – law’ for
protection of property of senior citizens, is not maintainable, as she is not
covered under the above definitions? The answer would always be ‘no’ . In
situations where the applicant will be having children, and the circumstances
justify claim for maintenance, or for protection of life and property against his or
her son – in – law and daughter – in – law, and also on such other persons who
are in possession, and could inherit the property of senior citizen, then going by
the definitions of ‘children’ or ‘relative’ , the applicant would be disabled to make
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as such, the purpose of enactment, would be of no avail to such senior citizen, or
a parent as the case may be, and they have to undergo the ordeal of regular trial
under the common law remedies, which is of time consuming and expensive. In
order to avoid such time consuming process, and to provide simple and
inexpensive speedy remedy, Parliament in all its wisdom, have introduced the
special enactment, to help people, who are in their old age. Therefore, if the
persons like son – in – law and daughter – in – law and such other persons, who
would be entitled in law, to inherit the property of such relative, are not brought
within the sweep of the definition of ‘children’ under S.2(a), it would be
amounting to giving a narrow interpretation, and in a way defeating the very
purpose of enactment.
……….. …………… ……….
18. In view of the objects and reasons of the Act and the judgment of the Apex
Court and to achieve the intendment of the enactment, and having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case, where the daughter – in – law has squat
over the property of the parents – in – law and made them to reside in a rented
accommodation, this court is of the considered view, that ‘daughter – in – law’ ,
would also come within the sweep of the definition of ‘children’ and the
respondents 3 and 4 herein, are entitled to maintain application against the
petitioner invoking the provisions of the Act.
…………… ………….. ………….
44. To sum up, in the present case, as the petitioner has married the son of
respondents 3 and 4, she became their daughter – in – law, and by virtue of said
relation, she has come into the possession of the subject property, and she is
also asserting her right over the property by virtue of said relation. Admittedly,
the property belongs to the 3rd respondent, which is stated to be her sthridhana
property. As the respondents 3 and 4, are forced to reside in a rented
accommodation, in spite of having their own, which is in the possession of the
petitioner, they sought for restoration of possession by invoking the provisions of
the Act. As discussed above, this court held that provisions of the Act are
applicable not only for seeking maintenance by the senior citizen or a parent as
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that the petitioner who is their daughter – in – law, would fall within the ambit of
definition of ‘children’ under S.2(a) of the Act, and hence amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Act. To resist the claim of 25 respondents 3 and 4 for
restoration of possession, the petitioner has no justifiable defence. Therefore,
the Tribunal, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, ordered for
restoration of possession, and hence no exception can be taken. Moreover, this
court is not sitting in appeal over the findings given by the Tribunal. ”
(underline supplied)
The Telangana High Court in Deepika H.‘s case cited supra has held that
the daughter-in-law who is in possession of the property will also come
within the ambit of the definition of children under Section 2(a) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007. This Court in Sheeja S. v. Maintenance
Appellate Tribunal/District Collector, Tvm and others, 2018 (5) KHC
634 while considering the provisions of Sections 2(b), 2(g) and 4(4) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 has held that a person would be construed to be
a relative of a childless senior citizen, if such person is in possession or
would inherit his/her property. A similar view was taken by this Court in
Reju and another v. Maintenance Tribunal, Tvm and others, 2016 (2)
KHC 429, considering the definition of the words “children” and “relative”
under Sections 2(a) and 2(g) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 with specific
reference to the definition of the word “welfare” in Section 2(k) of Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 and held that it is open to the Tribunal to impose a
liability for providing welfare measures on whom the Tribunal deem fit that
it can be imposed, based on the accepted relationship between the
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parties, though, such persons would not come within the ambit of children
or relative as defined under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, or else the very
purpose of the Act would be defeated.
11. It is pertinent to note that the definition of the word “children” in
Section 2(a) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 mandates that “children”
includes son, daughter, grandson and grand daughter but does not include
a minor. The Telangana High Court in Deepika H.‘s case cited supra while
considering a contention as to who all will come within the word “children”
has held that if there is a doubt as to whether a person is included in the
definition of “children” or “relative” in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the
Court has to take the aid of tools like purposive interpretation and casus
omissus to achieve the intended purpose of the enactment. In view of the
objects and reasons of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and to achieve the
intendment of the enactment and having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case it was also held that the daughter-in-law has
squat over the property of the parents-in-law and made them to reside in a
rented accommodation, the daughter-in-law would also come within the
sweep of the definition of “children” and an application for maintenance will
be perfectly maintainable before the Maintenance Tribunal. The Apex
Court in Singareni Collieries Co.Ltd. v. Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao
and others, 2013 KHC 4677 was considering whether the doctrine of
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“casus omissus” could be applied in formulating the intended purport of
the statute or provision in question and what would be the substance of
the provision that the Parliament would have made but for the error in the
bill of law and held in paragraphs 18 and 19 as follows:
“18. Secondly, because the legal position regarding applicability of the doctrine of
casus omissus is settled by a long line of decisions of this Court as well as Courts
in England. Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities v. Jones, 1980 AC 1974, revived
the doctrine which was under major criticism, by formulating three conditions for its
exercise namely, (1) What is the intended purpose of the statute or provision in
question; (2) Whether it was by inadvertence that the draftsman and the
Parliament had failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and
(3) What would be the substance of the provision that the Parliament would have
made, although not necessarily the precise words that the Parliament would have
used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House of Lords while approving
the above conditions in Inco Europe v. First Choice Distribution, 2000 (1) All ER
109, went further to say that there are certain exceptions to the rule inasmuch the
power will not be exercised when the alteration is far-reaching or when the
legislation in question requires strict construction as a matter of law.
19. The legal position prevalent in this country is not much different from the law
as stated in England. This Court has in several decisions held that casus omissus
cannot be supplied except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is
found within the four corners of the statute itself. The doctrine was first discussed
by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central
Calcutta v. National Taj Tradus, 1980 (1) SCC 370. Interpretative assistance was
taken by this Court from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg. 33
and 47. The Court said:
“10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in
regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the
former the following statement of law appears in Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33:
Omissions not to be inferred-“It is a corollary to the general rule of literal
construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are
adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something
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2025:KER:53464which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: ‘It is a strong thing to read into an
Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity
it is a wrong thing to do.’ ‘We are not entitled,’ said Lords Loreburn L.C., ‘to read
words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the
four corners of the Act itself.’ A case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt
with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been
omitted, and the omission in consequence to have been unintentional.
In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law appears in Maxwell
at page 47:
A statute is to be read as a whole-“It was resolved in the case of Lincoln College
(1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should ‘make
construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself.’ Every
clause of a statute is to ‘be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of
the whole statute.’ (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. R: 1898
AC 735)
In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the
Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it found in the
four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not
be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be
construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with
reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be
put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by
the Legislature. “An intention to produce an, unreasonable result”, said
Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, 1966 (1) Q.B. 878 “is not to be imputed
to a statute if there is some other construction available.” Where to apply words
literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly
unreasonable result” we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve
that obvious intention and produce a rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke
v. I.R.C.-1968 AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed: “this is not a new
problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges. In the light
of these principles we will have to construe Sub-section (2)(b) with reference to
the context and other clauses of Section 33B.”
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It is pertinent to note that the word used in the definition of “children” in the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is ‘includes’ son, daughter etc. The Apex Court
in P. Kasilingam and others v. P.S.G. College of Technology and
others, 1995 KHC 606 was considering the expressions “means” and
“includes” and held that use of the word “means” indicates that the
definition is a hard and fast definition and no other meaning can be
assigned to the expression than what is put down in definition, but the
word “includes” when used enlarges the meaning of the expression
defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify
according to their natural import but also those things which the clause
declares that they should include. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment
reads as follows:
“19. We will first deal with the contention urged by Shri Rao based on the
provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is no doubt true that in view of clause (3)
of S.1 the Act applies to all private colleges. The expression “college” is,
however, not defined in the Act. The expression “private college” is defined in
clause (8) of S.2 which can, in the absence of any indication of a contrary
intention, cover all colleges including professional and technical colleges. An
indication about such an intention is, however, given in the Rules wherein the
expression “college” has been defined in R.2(b) to mean and include Arts and
Science College, Teachers Training College, Physical Education College,
Oriental College, School of Institute of Social Work and Music College. While
enumerating the various types of colleges in R.2(b) the rule making authority
has deliberately refrained from including professional and technical colleges in
the said definition. It has been urged that in R.2(b) the expression “means and
includes” has been used which indicates that the definition is inclusive in nature
and also covers categories which are not expressly mentioned therein. We are
unable to agree. A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by
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2025:KER:53464using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and
includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “definition is a
hard and fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the
expression than is put down in definition.” (See : Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB
665; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court, 1990 (3) SCC 682, at p.717. The word ‘includes’ when
used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not
only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those
things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words ‘means and
includes’, on the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation of the meaning
which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or
expressions.” (See : Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 AC 99 at pp.
105-106 (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
1989 (1) SCC 164, at p. 169 : (AIR 1989 SC 335 at p. 339). The use of the
words ‘means and includes’ in R.2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the
definition of “college” is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would
cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in R.2(b)
and other educational institutions are not comprehended. In so far as
engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the reason that
the opening and running of the private engineering colleges are controlled
through the Board of Technical Education and Training and the Director of
Technical Education in accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE from
time to time. As noticed earlier the Grant in Aid Code contains provisions which,
in many respects cover the same field as is covered by the Act and the Rules.
The Director of Technical Education has been entrusted with the functions of
proper implementation of those provisions. There is nothing to show that the
said arrangement was not working satisfactorily so as to be replaced by the
system sought to be introduced by the Act and the Rules. R.2(d), on the other
hand, gives an indication that there was no intention to disturb the existing
arrangement regarding private engineering colleges because in that Rule the
expression “Director” is defined to mean the Director of Collegiate Education.
The Director of Technical Education is not included in the said definition
indicating that the institutions which are under the control of Directorate of
College Education only are to be covered by the Act and the Rules and
technical educational institutions in the State of Tamil Nadu which are controlled
by the Director of Technical Education are not so covered. “
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The Apex Court in N.D.P. Namboodripad (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of
India and others, 2007 KHC 5286 was also considering the expression
“means” and “includes” and by interpreting the word “includes” held that
the word “includes” can be used in interpretation clauses either generally
in order to enlarge the meaning of any word or phrase occurring in the
body of a Statute, or in the normal standard sense, to mean “comprises” or
“consists of” or “means and includes”, depending on the context.
12. The Senior Citizens Act, 2007 have been promulgated to provide
a statutory basis for more effective provisions for the maintenance and
welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under
the Constitution of India and for matters connected thereto. In the Act,
there are various provisions to protect the interests of the senior citizens.
In the present case, the daughter-in-law is occupying a portion of the
residence, i.e., ground floor, on the basis of the protection granted by
Ext.P6 order as per the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The said order was obtained at a time when the husband of the 1 st
petitioner was in ownership of the property. Now after the decree of the
Munsiff’s Court, Ottappalam in O.S.No.196 of 2023, the 2 nd respondent is
in ownership and possession of the property and she was earlier in
possession and ownership of the property before the same was gifted to
the husband of the 1st petitioner. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent has no
other building or residence available, and she is entitled to reside in the
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residence which is the subject matter of the case. The only impediment
which prevents the 2nd respondent in residing in the said building is that
the petitioners are objecting to the residence of the 2nd respondent in the
said house and therefore only if an order is passed against the 1 st
petitioner, who is the daughter-in-law of the 2 nd respondent, that the 2nd
respondent would be permitted to be accommodated in the said building.
Therefore, a purposive interpretation should be given to the word
“children” defined under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 especially when the
definition of “children” starts with the word ‘includes’ son, daughter, etc.,
and therefore, a petition under the provisions of Senior Citizens Act 2007
will lie against the daughter-in-law also, who is the petitioner herein, in the
light of the facts and circumstances available in the present case, where
the petitioner is in possession of the property. If not, as held in Deepika
H.‘s case cited supra, the same would result in dragging a senior citizen to
undergo the ordeal of regular trial under the Common Law remedies,
which is time-consuming and expensive, especially when the Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 itself was enacted to avoid such time consuming
process and to provide a simple and inexpensive speedy remedy to help
people who are in their old age. Therefore, I am of the view that the
contention raised by the petitioners on the strength of the judgment in
Pramod‘s case cited supra that the proceeding before the Maintenance
Tribunal as per the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is not
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maintainable, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
13. The final contention raised by the petitioners is that if the 2nd
respondent is allowed to stay in the house, they will be harassed
physically and mentally and that there were several instances where the
1st petitioner was attacked, resulting in registration of crimes. I am of the
opinion that only given such apprehension raised by the petitioners, the 2nd
respondent cannot be prevented from staying in the residential house,
which is now owned by the 2nd respondent herself. Learned counsel for the
2nd respondent has undertaken that the 2nd respondent and her husband
will be residing on the first floor of the building, which is provided with a
separate building number and a separate stair to reach the said floor and
has no intention to harass or cause any harm, physical or mental, to the 1 st
petitioner. The petitioners will be free to approach the concerned Court
which issued Ext.P6 order if there is any instance of violation of any of the
directions in the said order and that the Court is well within its power to
take appropriate action for violation of the orders as provided under
Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Further, Section 19(f) of
the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 mandates that a direction could be
issued to the respondents concerned to secure a same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by them in the
shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so
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require. So, if the 1st petitioner has a specific case that she is unable to
reside in the place where she is residing on the strength of Ext.P6 interim
order, then she could apprise the Court concerned about the same and
seek for an order under Section 19(f) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
directing the respondents therein to secure same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by them in the
shared household or to pay rent for the same. But the abovesaid
apprehension raised by the 1st petitioner cannot be reason for not
permitting the 2nd respondent to reside in the first floor of the residence as
requested by her, especially when she has undertaken that the same will
not be in violation of the directions in Ext.P6 order.
In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with Ext.P10
order and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
VIJU ABRAHAM
JUDGE
cks
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 22270/2021
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE IST RESPONDENT
TRIBUNAL DATED 4.7.2021.
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTIONS FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS 4 AND 5.
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTIONS FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS 4 AND 5.
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PENDING IN MC
28/2021 FILED BY THE IST PETITIONER
BEFORE THE J.F.C.M. MANNARKKAD.
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PENDING IN
CMP 549/2021 BEFORE THE J.F.C.M.
MANNARKKAD.
Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE,
MANNARKKAD IN CMP 549/2021 IN MC 28/2021
DATED 5.3.2021.
Exhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF THE OP 216/2021 FILED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT AND ANOTHER BEFORE
THE FAMILY COURT OTTAPALAM.
Exhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED
23.8.2021 WITH RECEIPT FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE POLICE STATION,
OTTAPALAM.
Exhibit P9 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT WAS ALSO
FILED BEFORE THE PROTECTION OFFICER, BY
THE IST PETITIONER ON 7.9.2021, BY E
MAIL WITHOUT ENCLOSURES.
Exhibit P10 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.K.DIS/H-
2779/2021 DATED 30.9.2021 ISSUED BY THE
IST RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P11 True copy of the FIR in Crime No. 331 of
2023 of Ottappalam Police Station dated
05.04.2023
Exhibit P12 True copy of the Crime No. 766 of 2023
of Ottappalam Police Station dated
02.08.2023
Exhibit P13 True copy of the FIR in Crime No.619 of
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2024 before the Ottappalam Police
Station dated 09.05.2024
Exhibit P14 True copy of the FIR in Crime No. 635 of
2024 of Ottappalam Police Station dated
09.05.2024
Exhibit P15 True copy of the Order No. R1-16644/23
by the Secretary of Ottappalam
Municipality dated 11.09.2023
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R2(a) True copy of the photographs of the
residential building
Exhibit R2(b) True copy of the judgment in OS NO.
196/2023 of Munsiff Court, Ottappalam
dated 14.2.2024
Exhibit R2(c) True copy of the decree in OS NO.
196/2023 of Munsiff Court, Ottappalam
dated 14.2.2024 with english
transalation of malayalam portion of the
decree
Exhibit R2(d) TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO. 0707/2023 OF
OTTAPALAM POLICE STATION PALAKKAD
DISTRICT REGISTERED UNDER SECTIONS 341,
323, 324 R/W 34 IPC DATED 18.07.2023