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Uttarakhand High Court
Anuj Jindal And Another … vs State Of Uttarakhand And Another on 14 May, 2025
Author: Pankaj Purohit
Bench: Pankaj Purohit
Judgment reserved on:-30.04.2025
Judgment delivered on:-14.05.2025
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc. Application U/s 482 No. 1698 of 2022
Anuj Jindal and another ........Applicants
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and another ............Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Siddhartha Singh, Advocate for the applicants.
Mr. Vipul Painuli, A.G.A. for the State.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate for respondent no.2.
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Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J.
Present C482 application has been filed by the
applicants for quashing the impugned summoning order
dated 01.05.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar
along with entire proceedings of Criminal Case No.1164 of
2019, M/s R.S. Industry Vs. M/s Haryana Rice Mill &
another, under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, pending
before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kashipur, Udham Singh Nagar.
2. The facts in brief are that respondent no.2 and
accused/applicant had business transactions. Respondent
no.2 alleged that he supplied cattle fodder to the tune of
₹40,00,000/- to the accused/appellant, who in turn
supplied three cheques of which one was of ₹10,00,000/-
and other two cheques were of ₹15,00,000/- each , in lieu
of payment for the aforesaid amount. On presenting
aforesaid cheques to the bank for payment, the cheques
were dishonoured as the payment was stopped by the
drawer. Thereafter respondent no.2 served a registered
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notice dated 13.02.2019 to the appellant who paid no heed
to it, though it was replied by the applicant denying his
liability under cheques in-question. Respondent no.2 filed a
complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act resulting in
impugned summoning order.
3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that
the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed as
single notice/complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act, will
not suffice for dishonor of three cheques of different dates.
4. He further submits that due compliance of
Section 141 N.I. Act has also not taken place. As the
complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act, is lodged without
asserting the liability of the proprietor in regard to in
charge and day to day working of the business of the firm.
In order to substantiate his argument he has placed
reliance on judgment passed by Apex Court in Himanshu
Vs. B. Shivamurty & others reported in (2019) 3 SCC 797
and two judgment passed by this Court referred as under:-
i. Himanshu Vs. B. Shivamurthy and another
reported in (2019) 3 SCC 797 (Supreme Court).
ii. Vandana Arora and ors. Vs. M/s Chhote Lal
Ashok Kumar in Crl. Misc. Application No.738 of 2024 (High
Court of Uttarakhand).
iii. Manish Gaur Vs. State of Uttarakhand and
another in Crl. Misc. Application No.764 of 2017 (High Court
of Uttarakhand).
5. He submitted that in all these judgments the
Hon’ble Court has quashed the proceedings on the ground
that summons were not issued to the company and only
against the directors. He further stated that the ratio of all
these judgments was that without taking cognizance
against the firm, or company or director as the case may
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be, the cognizance order against the accused/partner
would be illegal.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.2
submitted that compliance under Section 141 of N.I. Act is
only mandatory in cases of “Company” and a proprietary
concern (different from partnership firm) stands absolutely
on different footing. He further stated that applicants were
although carrying the business in name of the firm of
applicant no.1, but he being proprietor thereof would be
solely responsible for conduct of its day to day affair. He
placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Raghu Lakshminarayan Vs. M/s Fine Tubes
reported in (2007) 5 SCC 103 in which Apex Court
differentiated between companies and proprietary concern
and opined that compliance under Section 141 of N.I. Act is
only mandatory for companies and partnership firms. Para
no.9 of the judgment is quoted as under:-
“9. The description of the accused in the
complaint petition is absolutely vague. A juristic
person can be a company within the meaning of the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or a
partnership within the meaning of the provisions of
the Partnership Act, 1932 or an association of persons
which ordinarily would mean a body of persons which
is not incorporated under any statute. A proprietary
concern, however, stands absolutely on a different
footing. A person may carry on business in the name
of a business concern, but he being proprietor thereof,
would be solely responsible for conduct of its affairs. A
proprietary concern is not a company. Company in
terms of the Explanation appended to Section 141 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, means any body
corporate and includes a firm or other association of
individuals. Director has been defined to mean in
relation to a firm, a partner in the firm. Thus, whereas
in relation to a company, incorporated and registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other statute,
a person as a Director must come within the purview
of the said description, so far as a firm is concerned,
the same would carry the same meaning as contained
in the Partnership Act.”
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7. So far as argument of learned counsel for the
applicants regarding filing of single notice and complaint
with regard to dishonor of three cheques is concerned the
learned Advocate appearing for respondent no.2 submitted
that there is no illegality in filing the single complaint on
single notice of dishonor of three cheques. It will prevent
the multiplicity of the case. He further argued that all three
cheques were being issued by the same party i.e., the
applicant and were payable to respondent no.2-
complainant only and all three cheques were returned by
Bank on 17.01.2019 with the note ‘stop payment by
drawer’ and a single legal notice was sent on 13.02.2019,
which was served upon the applicant on 20.02.2019,
therefore, it was well within legal frame to file a single
complaint. The argument made by learned counsel for the
applicant is therefore misconceived and deserves to be
rejected.
8. I have gone through the complaint, the C482
application supported by an affidavit and the counter
affidavit filed by respondent no.2.
9. In order to appreciate the argument regarding
the applicability of Section 141 of N.I. Act, 1881, the said
section is quoted hereunder:-
141. Offences by companies. —
“(1)If the person committing an offence under section
138 is a company, every person who, at the time the
offence was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business of the company, as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be
liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall render any person liable to punishment if
he proves that the offence was committed without his
knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to
prevent the commission of such offence:
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Provided further that where a person is
nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his
holding any office or employment in the Central
Government or State Government or a financial
corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may
be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this
Chapter.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), where any offence under this Act has been
committed by a company and it is proved that the
offence has been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer
of the company, such director, manager, secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,–
(a)”company” means any body corporate and includes
a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b)”director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in
the firm.”
10. Having considered the provision of Section 141
of N.I. Act, 1881, there is no manner of doubt in the mind
of this Court that Section 141 of N.I. Act, 1881, will not be
attracted in case of propriety concern, which is different to
a company and partnership firm which is clear from the
explanation appended to Section 141 of N.I. Act, 1881. This
Court is convinced that trial court committed no illegality
in summoning the accused-applicants vide summoning
order as the essential ingredients of Section 138 of N.I. Act,
1881 are made out.
11. The case laws cited by learned counsel for the
applicants is of no help to him while case cited by learned
counsel for respondent no.2 is applicable to the present set
of facts.
12. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of
the view that the C482 application deserves to be
dismissed.
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13. Accordingly the present C482 application is
dismissed.
14. Interim order dated 21.09.2022 stands vacated.
15. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of
accordingly.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.)
14.05.2025
SK
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