Chattisgarh High Court
Anurag Sharma vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 14 January, 2025
1
Digitally signed
by REKHA
SINGH 2025:CGHC:2212
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 7209 of 2018
1 - Anurag Sharma S/o Shri N.P. Sharma Aged About 47 Years Asstt.
Engineer, Presently Working At Municipal Council, Bhatapara, District-
Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh., District : Balodabazar-
Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Urban
Administration And Development, Mahanadi, Mantralaya, New Raipur,
District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Uban Administration And Development Department, Indravati
Bhavan, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
3 - Joint Director (Regional Office) Raipur Division, Urban Administration
And Development Department, R.D.A. Building G.E. Road, Raipur,
District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
---- Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Navin Shukla, Advocate
For State : Mr. S.P. Kale, Additional A.G.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
14.01.2025
1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):-
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“(i) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for
the entire records concerning the case of the petitioner from
the possession of the respondent authorities for its kind
perusal.
(ii) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner
for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer as per Rule
10(1) Schedule III of Rules, 2007 from the month May, 2014
without further delay and thereafter, promote him to the said
post.
(iii) Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case be also
granted.”
2. Mr. Shukla, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
submit that the petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Sub-
Engineer and posted at Nagar Palika, Beergaon on 11.05.2006. He
would further submit that in the year 2015, a proceeding for
departmental promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer from the
post of Sub-Engineer was initiated but the name of the petitioner
was not considered for promotion by the Departmental Promotion
Committee for the reasons best known to it. He would also submit
that the petitioner filed a Writ Petition bearing W.P.(S) No.4162 of
2018 before the Court and vide order dated 26.06.2018, the writ
petition was disposed of directing the respondent authorities to
take appropriate steps regarding promotion. He would contend that
vide order dated 28.07.2018, though the petitioner was granted
promotion by the respondent authorities, he ought to have been
granted promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer from May,
2014 after completion of 8 years of service.
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3. On the other hand, Mr. Kale, the learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the State would oppose the submissions
made by Mr. Shukla. He would submit that the petitioner has
claimed promotion from May, 2014, whereas the present petition
was filed on 22.10.2018 i.e. after four years. It is also contended
that the petitioner has not explained the delay properly and thus,
the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of
delay and laches.
4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused
the documents placed on the record.
5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others
Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as
under:-
’17. In the case at hand, though there has been four
years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ
court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of
the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay
is to be ignored without any justification. That apart,
in the present case, such belated approach gains
more significance as the respondent employee being
absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain
unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of
ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does
not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it
brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such
delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and
may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in
4acceptable realm of probability, may have been
treated to have attained finality. A court is not
expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons
-who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter
“Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such
delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the
said ground alone the writ court should have thrown
the petition overboard at the very threshold.
6. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of Rushibhai
Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation
reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 64 held as under:-
‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that
matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be
statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though
some contrary opinions have been expressed (in
Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC
1704). The courts have expressed the view that the
law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater
public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that
long dormant claims have more of cruelty than
justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii)
that persons with good causes of action (who are
able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R.
Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para
605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021)
para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period
of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure
certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy
considerations why period of limitation is prescribed
by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ
petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a
constitutional court is exercised with caution as
delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to
secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud
and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent
oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs.
State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC
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510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do
not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour,
especially and rightly in cases where the persons
suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the
courts for relief. However, other decisions, while
accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and
laches, have observed that such rules are not
meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a
larger public interest and are founded on public
policy. There must be a lifespan during which a
person must approach the court for their remedy.
Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as
to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N.
Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC
123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches,
this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R.
Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR
1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed
by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum
Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram
Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the
following words:
” Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case,if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
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7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda
Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw
(SC) 883, under relevant para 21 held as under:-
“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant
passagesfrom certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC
648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related
claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a
continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is
based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative decision
which related to or affected several others also, and
if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled
rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to
payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may
be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the
rights of third parties. But if the claim involved
issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale
and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied.
Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of
arrears for a past period is concerned, the
principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs
will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will
restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears
normally to a period of three years prior to the date
of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis
supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC
25:
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“Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected
on many occasions. However, they have their
distinct characters and distinct elements. One can
say that delay is the genus to which laches and
acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might
be called a genus to a species by name
acquiescence. However, there may be a case
where acquiescence is involved, but not laches.
These principles are common law principles, and
perhaps one could identify that these principles find
place in various statutes which restrict the period of
limitation and create non consideration of
condonation in certain circumstances. They are
bound to be applied by way of practice requiring
prudence of the court than of a strict application of
law. The underlying principle governing these
concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of
prejudice is also an important issue to be taken
note of by the court.
Laches
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French
language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It
thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in
pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while
causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on
the part of a party to do an act which law requires
while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in
the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length
of the delay and the nature of acts done during the
interval. As stated, it would also involve
acquiescence on the part of the party approaching
the court apart from the change in position in the
interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for
a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who
knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a
waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put
the other party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a
challenge before the court. Thus, a man
responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
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23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when
there is no statutory bar. The question as to
whether there exists a clear case of laches on the
part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact
and so also that of prejudice. The said principle
may not have any application when the existence of
fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To
determine the difference between the concept of
laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving
mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply
to all the defences that are available to a party.
Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various
grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue
concerned alone would be amenable to
acquiescence.
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship
between acquiescence on the one hand and delay
and laches on the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive
acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to
an act. In other words, such an action would qualify
a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes
place, it presupposes knowledge against a
particular act. From the knowledge comes passive
acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action
against any alleged refusal to perform the original
contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms,
and instead being allowed to continue by
consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding
further, acquiescence does take place. As a
consequence, it reintroduces a new implied
agreement between the parties. Once such a
situation arises, it is not open to the party that
acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of
the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the
conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the
distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When
acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become
laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the
concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-
to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied)
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James,
(2022) 2 SCC 301:
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“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a
straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form
of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. A right not exercised
for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and
laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-
suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate
authorities belatedly without any justifiable
explanation for bringing action after unreasonable
delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of
dismissal from service by way of appeal was after
four years and five months, which is certainly highly
belated and beyond justifiable time. Without
satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is
difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within
a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was
primarily on the ground that the respondent was not
allowed to be represented by a representative of his
choice. The respondent knew that even if he were
to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the
writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be
prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is
a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been
also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is
highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the
appellants by the delayed challenge. We would,
subsequently, examine the question of
acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of
the present case.
Xxx
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v.
Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P.
v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC
126] this Court observed that if the statutory
authority has not performed its duty within a
reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking
the plea that the person who has been deprived of
his rights has not approached the appropriate forum
for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any
orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory
mandate within reasonable time, they normally
should not be permitted to take the defence of
laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay
furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases
as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh
[Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC
10648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing
cause of action.The State being a virtuous litigant
should meet the genuine claims and not deny them
for want of action on their part. However, this
general principle would not apply when, on
consideration of the facts, the court concludes that
the respondent had abandoned his rights, which
may be either express or implied from his conduct.
Abandonment implies intentional act to
acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.
[Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144]
Applying this principle of acquiescence to the
precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal
Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant
Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S)
500] after referring to several judgments, has
accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury’s
Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 :
(2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras
1213)
“12. The statement of law has also been
summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Para
911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay
as to amount to laches, the chief points to be
considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress,but assent after the violation has been
completed and the claimant has become aware of
it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where,
by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not
waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a
position in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are
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most material. Upon these considerations rests the
doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised
above, the respondents are guilty since the
respondents have acquiesced in accepting the
retirement and did not challenge the same in time.
If they would have been vigilant enough, they could
have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter.
Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants
lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the
occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in
such cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has
also to be taken into consideration the question of
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the
incumbent whether other parties are going to be
prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present
case, if the respondents would have challenged
their retirement being violative of the provisions of
the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken
appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the
liability but by not asserting their rights the
respondents have allowed time to pass and after a
lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ
petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is
going to have serious financial repercussions on
the financial management of the Nigam. Why
should the court come to the rescue of such
persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver
and acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to
clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and
“delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an
equitable doctrine which applies when a party
having a right stands by and sees another dealing
in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the
act is in progress and after violation is completed,
which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He
cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v.
Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC
(L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das
Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine
Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the
term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit
consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See
12Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine
Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes
conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to
abandon an equitable right and also to denote
conduct from which another party will be justified in
inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v.
Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP
34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full
knowledge and express approbation, or indirect
where a person having the right to set aside the
action stands by and sees another dealing in a
manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of
the infringement takes no action mirroring
acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore
Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription,
Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will
not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or
consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However,
both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but
not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based
upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike
acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the
other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and
is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form
of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from
complaining of the violation of the right. Even
indirect acquiescence implies almost active
consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence
or inaction which is involved in laches.
Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from
delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of
the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT,
1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584]
Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive
acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be
inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the
period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this
acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars
the respondent from claiming violation of the right of
fair representation.”
8. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous
delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining
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innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of
justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect
others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and
may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable
realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained
finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent
persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the
said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this
petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or
for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during
which a person must approach the court for their remedy.
Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights
and obligations of the parties.
9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in
light of the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matters of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra),
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra) and Bichitrananda
Behera (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached
this Court after a delay of 4 years and in para 7 of the writ petition,
he has stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. The
petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the
instant petition. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court,
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this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of
delay and laches. No costs.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Rekha