Arun Naik vs State Of Odisha And …. Opp. Parties on 8 April, 2025

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Orissa High Court

Arun Naik vs State Of Odisha And …. Opp. Parties on 8 April, 2025

Bench: S.K. Sahoo, Chittaranjan Dash

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                          W.P.(C) No.3292 of 2025

              Arun Naik                            ....      Petitioner

                                  Mr. Subash Chandra Puspalaka,
                                  Advocate

                                        -versus-

              State of Odisha and                  ....   Opp. Parties
              others
                                  Mr. Tapan Kumar Dash,
                                  Addl. Government Advocate

                             CORAM:
                THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
            THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
                                    ORDER
Order No.                         08.04.2025
   01.            This   matter    is    taken     up   through   Hybrid

arrangement (video conferencing/physical mode).

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the State.

This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
Arun Naik with a prayer to quash the order dated
23.09.2024 passed by the Additional District Magistrate,
Subarnapur in rejecting his petition dated 14.03.2024
with a further prayer to direct the opposite parties to
settle the land in favour of the petitioner to which the
petitioner has acquired or alternative land in the nearby
place to be settled in favour of the petitioner as he is a
displaced person.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner during course of
argument placed the Resolution of the Government of
Odisha, Department of Water Resources dated
27.08.1994, wherein it is stated under the heading of
Allotment of Land that land for land should be the main
objective of R & R and land may be allotted in the
benefited zone and for that matter, ceiling surplus land
may be assessed for allotment to affected persons.
Government may also consider the acquisition of land
for such allotment. But land gradually becoming scarce,
should not be allotted indiscriminately. Displaced
persons losing whole of their land will get priority over
those losing land partially and displaced persons losing
homestead land will be given developed homestead plot
in the colony with all civic amenities.

The petition, which was filed before the Additional
District Magistrate on 14.03.2024 was filed by Krushna
Chandra Naik, the father of the petitioner so also the
petitioner, who seems to have approached this Court in
W.P.(C) No.38969 of 2023 and W.P.(C) No.38971 of
2023 and it is stated that W.P.(C) No.38971 of 2023
was disposed of on 07.02.2024 directing the Collector,
Subarnapur to dispose of the representation of the
petitioner Arun Naik keeping in view the enquiry report
submitted by the opposite party no.5.

From the impugned order, it appears that both the
petitioner and his father received the Rehabilitation
Assistance package on 24.08.1994 and it is also

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mentioned in the order that which Government land,
both the petitioner and his father have occupied.
Though reliance was placed during the hearing before
the Additional District Magistrate, Subarnapur on the
Resolution of the Government in Water Resources
Department dated 27.08.1994 that claiming themselves
to be coming under Tribal Community, but on enquiry
and documents available, it was found that the
petitioner belonged to ‘KEUTA’ by caste which comes
under Scheduled Caste (SC) and moreover, the occupied
land is un-settable in nature and coming under Forest
Rights Act, 2006.

When the lands have been acquired since 1993-94
and the petitioner and his father have received the
Rehabilitation Assistance package way back on
24.08.1994, if in terms of the Resolution of the
Government, they were claiming land for land, which
was not provided to them, they should have approached
the authorities at the earliest and also to the Court but it
seems that the petitioner approached this Court for the
first time in 2023. No explanation has been offered in
the writ petition regarding the delay approach of the
petitioner to claim the relief as sought for.

Although the Limitation Act is not strictly
applicable to a writ petition, but the principles apply. It
is also the settled principle of law that delay defeats
equity. While exercising discretionary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, delay or laches

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is one of the factors which is to be kept in mind by the
High Court as a party who is guilty of delay and laches
cannot be granted any relief.

In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply & Sewerage Board -Vrs.- T.T. Murali Babu
reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the effect of
laches in litigation and held as follows:

“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches
should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ
court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same.
The court should bear in mind that it is
exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a
duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
primary principle that when an aggrieved
person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of
equity. In certain circumstances delay and
laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only
invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at
the doors of the court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the
basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the
greatest thief of time” and second, law does
not permit one to sleep and rise like a
phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis.

17. In the case at hand, though there has
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been four years’ delay in approaching the
court, yet the writ court chose not to
address the same. It is the duty of the court
to scrutinise whether such enormous delay
is to be ignored without any justification.
That apart, in the present case, such
belated approach gains more significance as
the respondent employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility
had remained unauthorisedly absent on the
pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat
at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not
foster the cause of justice. On the contrary,
it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect
others. Such delay may have impact on
others’ ripened rights and may
unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability,
may have been treated to have attained
finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons – who
compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that
matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered
opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone the
writ court should have thrown the petition
overboard at the very threshold.”

In the case of Mrinmoy Maity -vrs.- Chhanda
Koley and others : A.I.R. 2024 S.C. 2717 : 2024
LiveLaw SC 318, where an application under Article
226
had been filed by an applicant for grant of LPG
distributorship after a delay of four years challenging
the selection of a rival applicant, the Supreme Court has
held as follows:-

“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and

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on perusal of the facts obtained in the
present case, we are of the considered view
that writ petitioner ought to have been
nonsuited or in other words writ petition
ought to have been dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches itself. An applicant who
approaches the court belatedly or in other
words sleeps over his rights for a
considerable period of time, wakes up from
his deep slumber ought not to be granted the
extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This
Court time and again has held that delay
defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the
factors which should be born in mind by the
High Court while exercising discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In a given case, the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
laxity on the part of the applicant to assert
his right has allowed the cause of action to
drift away and attempts are made
subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of
action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be
with care and caution. If the delay which has
occasioned in approaching the writ court is
explained which would appeal to the
conscience of the court, in such
circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
contesting party that for all times to come
the delay is not to be condoned. There may
be myriad circumstances which gives rise to
the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction
and it all depends on facts and circumstances
of each case, same cannot be described in a
straight jacket formula with mathematical
precision. The ultimate discretion to be
exercised by the writ court depends upon the
facts that it has to travel or the terrain in
which the facts have travelled.

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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no
doubt that no fixed period of limitation is
prescribed. However, when the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has
to be seen as to whether within a reasonable
time same has been invoked and even
submitting of memorials would not revive the
dead cause of action or resurrect the cause
of action which has had a natural death. In
such circumstances on the ground of delay
and laches alone, the appeal ought to be
dismissed or the applicant ought to be
nonsuited. If it is found that the writ
Petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the
High Court ought to dismiss the petition on
that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ
courts are not to indulge in permitting such
indolent litigant to take advantage of his own
wrong. It is true that there cannot be any
waiver of fundamental right but while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226, the High Court will have to
necessarily take into consideration the delay
and laches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. This Court in the
case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others –
vrs.- State of W.B and others reported in
(2009) 1 S.C.C. 768 has held to the
following effect:

“56. We are unable to uphold the
contention. It is no doubt true that
there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction
under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136
of the Constitution, this Court takes
into account certain factors and one
of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant
in approaching a writ court. It is
well settled that power to issue a
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writ is discretionary. One of the
grounds for refusing reliefs under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
is that the petitioner is guilty of
delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke
jurisdiction of a writ court, he
should come to the Court at the
earliest reasonably possible
opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will
indeed be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is
not to encourage agitation of stale
claims and exhume matters which
have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the
meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai
[AIR 1964 SC 1006
: (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial
Court [AIR
1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh
v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC
136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :

(1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle
applies even in case of an
infringement of fundamental right
(vide Tilokchand Motichand v.

H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC
110], Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports

[(1969) 1 SCC 185] and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India
[(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and
there is no lower limit as to when a
person can approach a court. The
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question is one of discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of
facts before the court depending on
and varying from case to case. It
will depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy
claimed are and when and how the
delay arose.”

In view of the settled principle of law and
particularly after going through the impugned order
dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Additional District
Magistrate, Subarnapur, we do not find any illegality or
infirmity in the aforesaid order more particularly since
the writ petition suffers from delay and laches, we are
not inclined to entertain the same.

Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of
merits, stands dismissed.

Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on
proper application.

( S.K. Sahoo)
Judge

( Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
RKM

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: RABINDRA KUMAR MISHRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 10-Apr-2025 11:39:08

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