Delhi High Court
Arun vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 7 April, 2025
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 18th March, 2025
Pronounced on:- 07th April, 2025
+ BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023
ARUN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arun Khatri, Ms. Poonam Rani,
Ms. Shelly Dixit, Ms. Anoushka
Bhalla, Advocates
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for the
State with ACP Narender Singh, PS
ACP/ NR-II, Crime Branch and SI
Sachin, PS NR-II, Crime Branch
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J.:
1. The present application has been filed under Section 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 19731 read with Section 21(4) of the Maharashtra
Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999,2 seeking grant of regular bail in the
proceedings arising from FIR No. 55/2016 dated 19th April, 2016 registered
at P.S. Crime Branch under Sections 3/4 of MCOCA.
Prosecution’s Case
2. The factual background leading to the filing of the FIR, as per the
Prosecution is summarised as follows:
2.1 The aforementioned case was registered against one Manoj Morkheri
and his associates, part of a structured and well-organised criminal1
“CrPC”
2
“MCOCA”
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syndicate, operating primarily in Delhi NCR and adjoining states. The
syndicate is stated to be involved in a series of grave offences, including
murder, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, robbery, and attempt to murder,
which are committed through acts of violence, intimidation, and other
unlawful means. These offences were carried out with the objective of
deriving pecuniary benefit and securing undue economic advantage. The
gang’s sustained criminal activities have instilled fear in the region. The
members of this syndicate, acting either individually or in concert, operate
as part of, or on behalf of, an organised crime network.
2.2 The impugned FIR was registered following a proposal for approval
to invoke the provisions of MCOCA under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act in
light of the consistent and continuing criminal activities of the syndicate.
Manoj Morkheri, acting in concert with his associates, is engaged in
organised criminal activity within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of
MCOCA, primarily for pecuniary gain. They constitute an organised crime
syndicate as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act. Their continued
engagement in criminal conduct has resulted in accumulation of
considerable illicit assets, both movable and immovable, which have been
derived from the proceeds of crime. The network allegedly functions with a
high degree of coordination, and exerts influence through sustained patterns
of criminal conduct.
2.3 The Applicant is an active gang member of the Manoj Morkheri
syndicate. He is accused of playing a direct role in multiple offences,
including those involving murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping for
ransom, and extortion, across different jurisdictions. His arrest in the present
case led to his being committed to trial before the Court of the Additional
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Sessions Judge, Rohini Courts, where the matter is presently at the stage of
prosecution evidence.
2.4 The Applicant has a serious criminal history, including his conviction
for murder in FIR No. 215/2010 registered at P.S. Bahadurgarh, Haryana,
under Sections 302/307 IPC read with Section 25 of the Arms Act, for
which he has been sentenced to life imprisonment. He has also been named
and arrested along with co-accused Manoj Morkheri in FIR No. 47/2011 at
P.S. Dhaula Kuan under Sections 364A/120B/34 IPC, and in FIR No.
158/2012 at P.S. Kundli under Sections 386/506 IPC. In light of this record,
the Applicant is a habitual and hardened criminal.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT:
3. Mr. Arun Khatri, counsel for the Applicant, urges the following
grounds for seeking grant of bail:
3.1 Long Period of Custody and Delay in Trial: The Applicant was
arrested on 2nd June, 2016, and has already been in custody since then for
over 8 years. The trial is far from conclusion, with only 30 out of 60 listed
witnesses having been examined so far, and no indication that the remaining
evidence will be recorded in the near future. The protracted nature of the
trial, which cannot be attributed to any delay on the part of the Applicant,
ought to weigh in favour of granting him bail. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that even in cases involving special statutes like MCOCA,
the stringent bail conditions can be relaxed when the accused has undergone
long periods of incarceration. In Mohd. Enamul Haque v. Enforcement
Directorate,3 the Supreme Court held that prolonged incarceration will inure
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him. In Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),4 the Court affirmed that bail
can be granted if there is an undue delay in the trial, even under the stringent
provisions of special statutes like the NDPS Act. Reliance is also placed on
the judgement in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb.5
3.2 Lack of Evidence to satisfy twin conditions under MCOCA: To
invoke Sections 3 and 4 of MCOCA, the Prosecution must establish two
essential elements: (i) continuing unlawful activity, and (ii) the involvement
of the accused in an organised crime syndicate for pecuniary gain.6 Neither
of these elements is made out in the present case against the Applicant.
3.3 Absence of evidence to establish Continuing Unlawful Activity and
membership in an Organized Crime Syndicate: To establish continuing
unlawful activity and membership in an organized crime syndicate, it is
imperative that there are multiple chargesheets in which the competent court
has taken cognizance. In the present case, the Applicant is not involved in
any continuing unlawful activity, nor is he a member of any organized crime
syndicate. Although the charge order dated 9th March, 2022 was passed
against multiple accused, the Trial Court did not classify the Applicant as a
member of the syndicate. Further, while the FIR references eight earlier
cases, none pertain to the Applicant. Even the 23 additional FIRs later relied
upon do not implicate him. The only case cited against him is FIR No.
47/2011, in which the Applicant was acquitted prior to registration of the
present FIR under MCOCA. Significantly, this FIR cannot be considered
against the Applicant on the grounds of parity, as it was not considered in3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 4069.
4
(2023) 18 SCC 166.
5
(2021) 3 SCC 713.
6
Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., MANU/SC/0449/2015.
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the case of co-accused Parvesh, who has already been discharged.
Furthermore, witnesses Paramvir Rana and IO Dinesh Kumar, who have
been examined in this case with respect to the allegations in FIR No. 47/11,
have both deposed in favour of the Applicant. In any event, even if this FIR
were to be considered against the Applicant, there are no other offences
committed by the Applicant that could demonstrate his involvement in
continuing unlawful activity. Reliance is placed on the judgement of the
Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Shiva.7
3.4 Absence of Pecuniary Gain: The chargesheet is silent on the
pecuniary advantage gained by the Applicant. As such, the essential
ingredients of MCOCA have not been satisfied in this case, and no evidence
has been shown to establish that the Applicant profited from any criminal
activity.
3.5 FIR No. 215/2010, P.S. Bahadurgarh: The only potentially
incriminating circumstance presented by the Prosecution is the involvement
of the Applicant in FIR No. 215/2010, under Sections 302/307 IPC,
registered at P.S. Bahadurgarh, Haryana. However, it is important to note
that the Prosecution did not consider this FIR as part of the continuing
unlawful activity under the provisions of MCOCA, and it was not relied
upon in the chargesheet. Consequently, this FIR cannot be regarded as an
incriminating factor against the Applicant in the context of his bail
application. Furthermore, the Applicant has already been convicted in
relation to this FIR and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment.
In fact, the Applicant had filed an application before the Punjab and Haryana
High Court seeking parole in connection with FIR No. 215/2010. The said
7
(2015) 14 SCC 272.
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relief was granted, and the Applicant was permitted to be released on parole
for a period of four weeks, conditional on his being granted bail in all
ongoing cases. Therefore, the Applicant will only be able to avail himself of
the parole granted in that matter if he is released on bail in the present case.
3.6 Confessional Statements-Lack of Corroborative Evidence: The
evidence against the Applicant in the present case consists of the
confessional statements of co-accused individuals Manoj, Anil, Parvesh
Grewal, and Rohit under Section 18 MCOCA, as well as the testimonies of
Paramvir Rana and Investigating Officer Dinesh Kumar. Of these, both
Paramvir Rana and Dinesh Kumar have already deposed in favour of the
Applicant. Further, the confessional statements of the co-accused cannot be
relied upon as evidence against the Applicant, especially given that these
statements are not substantiated by any corroborative evidence and were
also not true or voluntary. These statements were immediately retracted and
denied by the co-accused persons, stating that they had not provided any
statement under Section 18 MCOCA, and that their signatures were obtained
on blank papers under threat. These statements, therefore, do not have any
evidentiary value in terms of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, as per
the judgement of the Supreme Court in Raja @ Ayyappan v. State of Tamil
Nadu.8 Additionally, co-accused Parvesh Grewal has already been
discharged in this case. A bare perusal of the chargesheet shows that there is
not even an iota of difference between the evidences against the co-accused
Parvesh Grewal and the Applicant.
3.7 Absence of substantive offences: The impugned FIR has been
registered in the absence of substantive offences, along with Sections 3/4 of
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MCOCA. It is crucial to note that the Applicant cannot be convicted for the
offence under MCOCA in the absence of such substantive offences. In this
regard, reliance is placed on the judgement of the Bombay High Court in
Darasing v. State of Maharashtra.9
3.8 Parity with Co-Accused Granted Bail: The Applicant seeks parity
with co-accused Sumit @ Sam and Anil Kumar @ Ganja, who have already
been granted bail by the ASJ in this case.
3.9 In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, it is
abundantly clear that the Applicant has been unjustly detained in custody in
the present case, despite the absence of any tangible evidence linking him to
the ongoing unlawful activities allegedly carried out by the purported crime
syndicate. Moreover, there is no valid or legally admissible evidence on
record to demonstrate that the Applicant derived any pecuniary benefit from
purportedly being involved in the alleged crime syndicate, and is therefore,
entitled to grant of bail.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE:
4. Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for the State, strongly opposes the bail
application and makes the following submissions:
4.1 The Applicant’s previous criminal record clearly establishes that he is
a hardcore criminal. Given this background, there exists a significant
apprehension that if granted bail, he may attempt to destroy or obstruct
evidence, which justifies his continued detention.
4.2 The allegations against the Applicant are of a serious nature. He is a
prominent member of the “Morkheri Gang”, and has been implicated in8
(2020) 5 SCC 118.
9
Crl. Appeal No. 901/2018, decided on 3 rd August, 2021.
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various criminal activities, including kidnapping for ransom and murder
across Delhi and NCR, as evidenced by his previous criminal records.
Therefore, releasing him on bail could result in the commission of similar
offences, pose threats to witnesses, and interfere with the course of justice.
4.3 In this case, the proposal to invoke the provisions of MCOCA under
Section 23(1)(a) of the Act against the Applicant and his associates was
initiated by the ACP, Crime Branch Delhi. This request led to the
registration and investigation of the case under Sections 3 and 4 of MCOCA.
According to the proposal, several cases from 2011 reported incidents where
the Applicant and his associates were involved in committing serious
offences such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, and other unlawful
activities. These acts were carried out using violence, intimidation, and other
illegal means with the sole objective of obtaining pecuniary benefits or
undue economic advantage.
4.4 For the purpose of establishing “continuing unlawful activity” under
Section 2(1)(d), “organised crime” under Section 2(1)(e), and “organised
crime syndicate” under Section 2(1)(f), the Prosecution highlighted in the
proposal before the competent authority that over the past ten years, the
court of competent jurisdiction had taken cognizance of more than one
chargesheet against this crime syndicate. The summary of the cases referred
to in the proposal are set out in the chargesheet dated 17th October, 2016.
4.5. Reliance is placed on the following judgements: Kamlesh Kothari v.
State (NCT of Delhi),10 Zakir Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra,11
and Abhishek v. State of Maharashtra.12
10
2023 SCC OnLine Del 3984.
11
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1092.
12
(2022) 8 SCC 282.
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ANALYSIS:
5. The Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced by the
parties as well as perused the record. Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes
stringent conditions for granting bail, stipulating as follows:
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of
an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be released on
bail or on his own bond, unless–
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while
on bail.
6. In the present case, the principal thrust of the Applicant’s plea lies in
the prolonged period of incarceration and the undue delay in the conclusion
of trial; and the principle of parity with co-accused who have already been
granted bail. The Applicant also seeks to invoke his right to avail parole
granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in FIR No. 215/2010, P.S.
Bahadurgarh, where the Applicant is serving a life sentence, which can only
be realised upon his release on bail in the present matter.
7. The right to a speedy trial, now firmly entrenched in our constitutional
jurisprudence under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is not an abstract
or illusory safeguard. It is a vital facet of the right to personal liberty and
cannot be whittled down merely because the case arises under a special
statute such as MCOCA.
8. The Supreme Court has consistently held that where trials under
special laws are unduly delayed, the rigour of stringent bail provisions must
yield to the constitutional promise of liberty. The more rigorous the
provisions of the legislation, the more expeditious the adjudication must
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be.13 In other words, where enactments stipulate strict conditions for
granting bail, it is the unequivocal responsibility of the State to ensure that
such trials are prioritized and concluded within a reasonable timeframe.
Therefore, although Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes stringent conditions
for the grant of bail, these provisions must be balanced with the fundamental
right to personal liberty of the accused, the presumption of innocence, and
the societal interest in ensuring the right to a speedy trial.14
9. In this context the observations in the recent decision of Mohd.
Muslim, are apposite, where the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section
37 of the NDPS Act, which is pari materia to Section 21(4) of MCOCA,
held that protracted incarceration as an undertrial, even in cases involving
serious offences, must weigh heavily in favour of granting bail, particularly
when such delay is not attributable to the accused. The relevant observations
are excerpted below:
“12. This court has to, therefore, consider the appellant’s claim for
bail, within the framework of the NDPS Act, especially Section 37. In
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial
Prisoners) v. Union of India, this court made certain crucial
observations, which have a bearing on the present case while dealing
with denial of bail to those accused of offences under the NDPS Act:
“On account of the strict language of the said provision very few
persons accused of certain offences under the Act could secure bail.
Now to refuse bail on the one hand and to delay trial of cases on the
other is clearly unfair and unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of
Section 36(1) of the Act, Section 309 of the Code and Articles 14, 19
and 21 of the Constitution. We are conscious of the statutory provision
finding place in Section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions which
have to be satisfied before a person accused of an offence under the Act
can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this section in the earlier
part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the interpretation
placed on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by the13
Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51.
14
Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC Online SC 929.
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Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC
569]. Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the
call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in some
cases quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether, as held by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[(1992) 1 SCC 225] , release on bail, which can be taken to be
embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the
demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the
extreme submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the
accused whose trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time for
reasons already alluded to, we have felt that deprivation of the
personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial would also not be in
consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21. Of course, some
amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in such
cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly
long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. It is
because of this that we have felt that after the accused persons have
suffered imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment
provided for the offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty
would be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article 21,
which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article 14
which also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in
procedural matters.”
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure
bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, in the present case), this court has upheld them for
conflating two competing values, i.e., the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest
– as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan (“the
concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to
restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and
presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They
are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab made observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare
Association v. Union of India again, this court expressed the same
sentiment, namely that when stringent provisions are enacted,
curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is
on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
10. This view was reaffirmed in the case of Satender Kumar Antil v.
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Central Bureau of Investigation,15 where the Supreme Court undertook a
comprehensive analysis of earlier decisions dealing with prolonged
incarceration and delay in trials. The Court clarified that the mandate under
Section 436A of the CrPC, requiring release of an undertrial on bail if the
trial is not concluded within a stipulated period, applies equally to
prosecutions under special statutes, notwithstanding the rigours they impose.
The Court observed as follows:
“We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each special Act has
got an objective behind it, followed by the rigour imposed. The general
principle governing delay would apply to these categories also. To make it
clear, the provision contained in Section 436-A of the Code would apply to
the Special Acts also in the absence of any specific provision. For example,
the rigour as provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in
the way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a person. We do
feel that more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought to be. After
all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would be very less and
there may not be any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there
is a need to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the process
and also a stricter compliance of Section 309 of the Code.”
11. A similar position was adopted in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,16
where while dealing with bail application under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, the Supreme Court underscored that the
constitutionality of stringent bail conditions under special enactments, such
as the NDPS Act or the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1987, must be primarily justified based on the requirement of speedy trials,
ensuring that the fundamental rights of accused persons are safeguarded.
12. In Ranjana Tanaji Wanve v. State of Maharashtra,17 the Supreme
Court considered a bail plea in a case where the accused had remained in
15
(2022) 10 SCC 51.
16
(2021) 3 SCC 713.
17
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 12740/2024, decided on 22 nd October, 2024.
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custody for over two years with minimal progress in trial. This case involved
Sections 364A, 384, 386, 388, 323, 506(2), 143, 120B and 34 of the IPC, as
well as Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(2), and 3(4) of MCOCA. The Court noted that
charges had not yet been framed, and a large number of witnesses remained
to be examined. In light of this, it was held that prolonged detention without
trial was contrary to the principles of justice, holding that extended
detention, without any foreseeable progress in the case, necessitated a
reconsideration of the accused’s bail application. In such circumstances, the
Court granted bail to the accused.
13. Likewise, in the case of Siddhant v. State of Maharashtra,18 the
Supreme Court considered a bail application under MCOCA, and reiterated
that excessive pre-trial incarceration, particularly in the absence of any
meaningful progress in the proceedings, infringes the fundamental rights of
an accused. Relying on the decision in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of
Enforcement,19 the Court observed that the right to a speedy trial is an
essential facet of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It was held that
prolonged incarceration, without trial, amounts to punitive detention prior to
adjudication, which cannot be countenanced within our constitutional
framework. In Siddhant, where the accused had already spent six years in
custody without framing of charges, the Court observed:
“10. The material placed on record would reveal that for a period of the
last six years, out of 102 dates, the accused has not been produced before
the Court either physically or through virtual mode on most of the dates.
On the last date, we had put a query to the learned counsel appearing for
the State as to why the charges were not framed as of date in this case.
Shri Kilor fairly states that the charges have not been framed in the cases
which are registered prior to the registration of the present case. We may18
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3798.
19
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say with anguish that this is a very sorry state of affairs. If an accused is
incarcerated for a period of approximately five years without even
framing of charges, leave aside the right of speedy trial being affected, it
would amount to imposing sentence without trial. In our view, such a
prolonged delay is also not in the interest of the rights of the victim.”
14. In view of the above principles, this Court is of the considered
opinion that while Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes stringent statutory
conditions for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, these provisions
cannot be construed in a manner that forecloses judicial scrutiny under
Article 21 of the Constitution. Where there is a manifest and continuing
violation of the right to a speedy trial, constitutional courts are not only
empowered but duty-bound to intervene. The Court now turns to analyse the
case at hand in light of the accused’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. As per the nominal roll dated 27th September 2024,
the Applicant has already spent 8 years, 4 months, and 3 days in custody.
Thus, as of today, he has been in custody for nearly 9 years, and despite the
prolonged detention, the trial remains far from its conclusion. Accordingly,
this case falls squarely within the purview of constitutional scrutiny under
Article 21, which guarantees the right to a speedy trial. The status report
filed by the State indicates that out of 60 prosecution witnesses, only 35
have been examined so far. The inordinate delay and excessive period of
detention violate the Applicant’s fundamental rights under Article 21.
Therefore, the Applicant’s plea for bail, based on these constitutional
grounds has merit.
15. In light of the above, the rigour of Section 21(4) of MCOCA stands
diluted. Nevertheless, the Court deems it appropriate to briefly address the
merits of the Applicant’s case, especially in the context of plea of parity.
The Applicant has drawn attention to the fact that co-accused Sumit @ Sam
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and Anil Kumar @ Ganja, both of whom have multiple prior criminal
involvements (seven and nine, respectively), have already been granted bail.
By contrast, the Applicant’s name figures only in FIR No. 47/2011, P.S.
Dhaula Kuan, in which he was acquitted even before the registration of the
present FIR under MCOCA. It has also been brought to the Court’s attention
that co-accused Parvesh Grewal, against whom similar allegations were
levelled and whose case rests on comparable evidentiary footing, has already
been discharged in the present proceedings. If a co-accused, against whom
the evidence is of the same character and attributes, has either been granted
bail or discharged, it would be manifestly unjust to deny the Applicant the
benefit of parity.
16. At this juncture, it is also crucial to emphasize that the Applicant is
currently serving a life sentence in FIR No. 215/2010, P.S. Bahadurgarh,
Haryana. In the said case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, has by order
dated 12th April, 2019, granted the Applicant parole for a period of 4 weeks,
with the condition that he would not be released until securing bail in all
pending cases. More than five years have passed since the parole order was
granted. Yet, the Applicant cannot take benefit of the parole solely because
he continues to be under trial in the present proceedings. Thus, the pendency
of this case has become the only impediment to the Applicant availing the
limited liberty granted by a constitutional court, which facilitates prisoners’
rehabilitation and reintegration into the society, and enables them to re-
establish social ties with their family members. This denial of liberty,
despite a favourable judicial order, cannot be overlooked, especially when
the trial in the present case is proceeding at a slow pace. The delay,
therefore, not only prolongs the Applicant’s pre-trial detention, but also
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renders nugatory the parole relief granted to him in another matter. Such an
outcome defeats the ends of justice and cannot be permitted to persist
indefinitely.
17. The Applicant has also sought to advance his case on merits, arguing
that the essential ingredients required for an offence under MCOCA-
continuing unlawful activity and membership in an organized crime
syndicate with the intent to gain pecuniary benefits-are not satisfied in his
case. However, at this stage, the Court is not inclined to engage in a detailed
examination of the merits of the case or conduct a mini-trial to determine
whether the offence against the Applicant is made out. It must, however, be
emphasized that the provisions under MCOCA are invoked specifically
pursuant to “continuing unlawful activity” committed by the accused. In the
present case, the Applicant was not involved in any of the eight prior FIRs
considered by the Prosecution for the registration of the current FIR, nor was
he named in any of the additional 23 FIRs that the Prosecution relied upon
after the investigation concluded.
18. The only FIR that implicates the Applicant is FIR No. 47/11, P.S.
Dhaula Kuan, in which he was acquitted well before the registration of the
impugned FIR under MCOCA. A perusal of the approval granted under
Section 23(1)(a) of MCOCA reveals that the Joint Commissioner of Police,
while recording his observations in the approval, acknowledged the
Applicant’s involvement in only one case, i.e., FIR bearing No. 47/11.
However, the authorities failed to consider the fact that the Applicant had
already been acquitted in the aforementioned case.
19. It is also pertinent to highlight that FIR No. 215/2010, P.S.
Bahadurgarh, Haryana, in which the Applicant is convicted and currently
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Signing Date:07.04.2025
22:29:30
serving a life sentence, was not considered by the authorities when granting
approval under MCOCA, indicating that that this conviction did not factor
into their conclusion that the Applicant was involved in the offense under
MCOCA. Consequently, the sole basis for implicating the Applicant in the
present FIR appears to be his involvement in FIR No. 47/11 and the alleged
criminal activities of Manoj Morkheri and his associates, who are
purportedly part of a larger crime syndicate. This, at the very least, prima
facie casts a serious doubt in favour of the Applicant.
20. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this Court is of the
considered view that the Applicant has made out a case for grant of bail.
Accordingly, it is directed that the Applicant shall be released on regular bail
on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of INR 50,000/- along with one
surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/
Metropolitan Magistrate, subject to the following conditions:
20.1 The Applicant will not leave the country without prior permission of
the Court.
20.2 The Applicant shall provide permanent address to the Trial Court. The
Applicant shall intimate the Court by way of an affidavit and to the IO
regarding any change in his residential address.
20.3 The Applicant shall appear before the Court as and when the matter is
taken up for hearing.
20.4 The Applicant shall provide all mobile numbers to the concerned IO,
which shall be kept in working condition at all times.
20.5 The Applicant shall not switch off his phone or change his mobile
number without prior intimation to the concerned IO.
20.6 The Applicant will report to the concerned IO on the second andSignature Not Verified
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fourth Friday of every month, at 4:00 PM, and will not be kept waiting for
more than an hour.
20.7 The Applicant shall not indulge in any criminal activity and shall not
communicate with or come in contact with any of the prosecution witnesses,
or tamper with the evidence of the case.
20.8 It is clarified that the Applicant shall not be released on bail till the
time he has secured bail in other cases, as required as per law.
21. It is explicitly clarified that, observations, if any, concerning the
merits of the case are solely for the purpose of deciding the question of grant
of bail and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits
of the case.
22. In case the Applicant violates any of the aforenoted conditions, or is
found to be involved in any other or similar offence, the Prosecution shall be
at liberty to seek cancellation of the bail granted to the Applicant,
uninfluenced by this order.
23. A copy of the order be sent to the Jail Superintendent for information
and necessary compliance.
24. With the foregoing directions, the present application is disposed of.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
APRIL 7, 2025
as
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Digitally Signed
By:NITIN KAIN BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023 Page 18 of 18
Signing Date:07.04.2025
22:29:30
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