Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Arvind And Ors vs State on 30 May, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:25500-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 226/2001
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
1. Tej Karan son of Ranu Lal
2. Arvind son of Tej Karan
3. Smt. Rambha Devi wife of Tej Karan
All resident of Kamla Nehru Nagar, House NO.326, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 752/2000
1. Tej Karan son of Ranu Lal
2. Arvind son of Tej Karan
3. Smt. Rambha Devi wife of Tej Karan
All resident of Kamla Nehru Nagar, House No.326, Jodhpur.
----Appellants
Versus
State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ramesh Devasi, AGA
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vineet Jain, Sr. Advocate asst. by
Mr. Rajeev Bishnoi
For Complainant(s) : Mr. Prithvi Raj Singh Balot
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL
Judgment
Reserved on : 20/05/2025
Pronounced on : 30/05/2025
(Per Sunil Beniwal, J.)
1. Since both the appeals have been filed against the impugned
judgment dated 11.12.2000 passed by learned District & Sessions
Judge, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No.45/1995, therefore, the same
are being decided by this common judgment.
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1.1 D.B. Criminal Appeal No.226/2001 has been preferred on
behalf of the State against the impugned judgment to the extent
of acquittal of the accused namely Tej Karan, Arvind and Rambha
Devi.
1.2. D.B. Criminal Appeal No.752/2000 has been preferred to
challenge the impugned judgment to the extent of conviction of
the accused-appellants.
1.3. The accused-appellants herein have been convicted and
sentenced as below vide the aforementioned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 11.12.2000.
Offence Sentence Fine u/S 498-A IPC 3 Years' R.I. Rs.1000/- and in default of which to further undergo one month's S.I. However, vide the impugned judgment, the accused-
appellants namely Tej Karan, Arvind and Rambha Devi have been
acquitted of the charged offences under Sections 302 and 304-B
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. During the pendency of the present appeals, Tej Karan
(respondent No.1 In DB CA No. 226/2001) expired and the D.B.
Criminal Appeal No.226/2001 qua him stood abated.
3. As per the prosecution’s case, the marriage between
respondent No. 2, Arvind Kumar, and the deceased, Manju, was
solemnized on 29.06.1990. It was alleged that soon after the
marriage, the accused-respondents, Arvind Kumar (husband), Tej
Karan (father-in-law), and Smt. Rambha Devi (mother-in-law),
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subjected the deceased to cruelty and harassment due to the non-
fulfillment of their dowry demands.
3.1 According to the prosecution, the accused-respondents were
responsible for Manju’s murder as a consequence of these unmet
dowry demands. In support of the allegations, the prosecution
presented the ocular testimony of 20 witnesses along with 44
exhibits. The defense statements under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure were recorded. After considering the evidence
on record, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment
and order, acquitting the accused of the offences under Sections
302 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, while convicting them
under Section 498-A of the IPC. Hence, these appeals.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the
prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the learned Trial Court erred in ignoring the evidence
brought on record to demonstrate that there was a demand for
dowry, and that such demand was made soon before the death of
the deceased.
4.1 Heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for
the State on a letter (Ex.P-31), purportedly written by the
deceased Manju in January 1995, approximately 15 to 17 days
prior to her death. The letter is argued to be a crucial piece of
evidence that sheds light on the circumstances leading to her
demise. Drawing the Court’s attention to the contents of the letter,
counsel contended that it clearly indicates continued cruelty and
harassment at the behest of the accused-respondents. It was
further submitted that the letter (Ex.P-31) provides compelling
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evidence of a persistent demand for dowry and shows that the
deceased was subjected to sustained cruelty due to the non-
fulfillment of such demands, ultimately leading to her death.
4.2 Learned counsel for the State further submits that the
testimonies of PW-3 (father), PW-7 (brother), and PW-11
(mother) are not only credible and trustworthy but also clearly
establish that there was a consistent demand for dowry made by
the accused-respondents. The statements of these three witnesses
corroborate the prosecution’s case and demonstrate that the
unfortunate incident was a direct consequence of the non-
fulfillment of the dowry demand. Counsel thus argued that the
prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. Shri Prithvi Raj Singh Balot, learned counsel appearing for
the complainant, while supporting the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the State, submitted that all the essential
ingredients required under Section 304-B of the IPC are fully
established in the present case. It is contended that the deceased,
Manju, died under unnatural circumstances within seven years of
her marriage. The incident took place at her matrimonial home.
Moreover, the evidence clearly establishes that there was a
demand for dowry soon before her death, accompanied by cruelty
and harassment.
5.1 Learned counsel for the complainant further submitted that
the evidence on record unambiguously shows that the accused
initially demanded a sum of ₹10,000 and later demanded ₹50,000
from the deceased’s father. He also submitted that the contents of
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the letter written by Manju prior to the incident clearly reflect her
mental state at the relevant time. The language used in the letter
unmistakably indicates that she was suffering from severe mental
harassment, as she was neither permitted to meet her parents nor
allowed to visit her parental home.
5.2 Learned counsel for the complainant, while drawing the
attention of this Court to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the impugned
judgment, submitted that even the learned Trial Court has
acknowledged that the harassment by the accused-respondents is
established, as evident from the wording used in the letter written
by the deceased before her death. In support of his submission,
learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Satbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in
(2021) 6 SCC 1.
6. Per contra, Shri Vineet Jain, Senior Advocate asst. by
Mr. Rajeev Bishnoi learned counsel appearing for the accused-
respondents submitted that the fact of the death of the deceased
Manju within seven years of her marriage is not disputed;
however, the other essential ingredients required to attract the
offence under Section 304-B IPC are missing.
6.1 While elaborating his arguments, learned Senior Counsel for
the respondents contended that the prosecution has failed to
prove that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in
connection with a demand for dowry shortly before her death. In
the absence of such proof, it is submitted that the offence under
Section 304-B IPC cannot be said to have been made out.
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6.2 It was further contended that the prosecution relied on the
alleged demands of Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 50,000; however, in view
of the statements made by prosecution witnesses Ganeshi Lal
(PW-3), father of the deceased, Narender (PW-7), brother of the
deceased, and Rukma Devi (PW-11), mother of the deceased, it is
evident that the demand of Rs. 10,000 was specifically for
expenses incurred during the delivery of the first child born from
the wedlock of the deceased Manju and accused Arvind. As
regards the demand of Rs. 50,000, it is submitted that even
according to the statement of Ganeshi Lal (PW-3), the demand
arose from the fact that accused Arvind, who was employed in
Bombay, had decided to return to Jodhpur with the intention of
setting up his own business. The amount of Rs. 50,000 was
required for establishing that business. In light of these
statements made by the prosecution witnesses themselves, it
cannot be held that the said amount constituted a dowry demand.
Consequently, it cannot be conclusively inferred that the
unfortunate incident occurred due to the non-fulfillment of such a
demand.
6.3 While countering the submissions of the counsels for the
complainant and the State, learned senior counsel appearing for
the accused contended that the document marked as Ex.P-31, the
letter purportedly written before the death of the deceased Manju,
does not indicate any demand for dowry. Learned senior counsel
read out the entire contents of the letter and submitted that there
is not even a whisper of any dowry demand or of harassment
inflicted upon the deceased by her in-laws due to the non-
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fulfillment of such a demand. Learned counsel further contended
that the letter clearly reflects that she was unhappy in her
matrimonial home and was not treated well. It also reveals her
strong desire to return to her parental home. Additionally, it was
emphasized that, in the present case, the cause of death is
hanging and medical report do not indicate any struggle before
deceased Manju hanged herself.
6.4 While concluding the arguments, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that in D.B. CA No. 752/2000, appellant No. 1, Tej
Karan, has passed away, and the surviving appellant No. 3,
Rambha Bai, is now approximately 78 years old and has
undergone incarceration of approximately nine months during the
trial. The surviving appellant No. 2, Arvind, is about 57 years old
and has also undergone incarceration of about nine months.
Counsel further stated that the present incident occurred more
than 30 years ago, and considering the ages of the accused
appellants, the sentence should be reduced to the period of
incarceration already served. In support of the submissions made
by learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, reliance was
placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Major Singh
& Ors. v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2015 SC 2081;
Karan Singh v. The State of Haryana (2025 INSC 133); and
the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in
Bhanwar Singh @ Pupi v. State while deciding D.B. Criminal
Appeal No. 172/2003 on 05.12.2024.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
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8. As per the prosecution’s story and the submissions made by
the respective parties, certain facts are undisputed in the present
appeals. It is not in dispute that the deceased, Manju, was
married to the accused Arvind on 29.06.1990 and that she died
under unnatural circumstances during the intervening night of
17.01.1995 and 18.01.1995. The incident occurred at her
matrimonial home, and the death took place within seven years of
her marriage. In view of the above admitted facts, the issues
requiring adjudication in the present appeals are:
(i) Whether the deceased Manju was subjected to cruelty and
harassment by the accused on account of non-fulfillment of dowry
demands, which ultimately led to her unnatural death?
(ii) Whether such cruelty or harassment occurred ‘soon before her
death and was directly related to dowry demands, as required
under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code?
9. The prosecution relied on the statement of Dr. M.P. Joshi
(PW-18) to support its claim that the present case falls under
Section 302 IPC. A perusal of PW-18’s testimony reveals that five
injuries were found on the body of the deceased. Injury No. 1 was
a ligature mark around the neck, while Injuries Nos. 2 to 5 were
contusions (निलगु निशान). According to the doctor, the cause of
death was evidently hanging. He further stated that Injury No. 1
could be caused if a person was hanged using a rope. During
cross-examination, the doctor suggested that Injuries Nos. 2 to 5
could have occurred if the person had fallen.
9.1 Upon analysis of the statement given by the doctor (PW-18),
it is evident that there were no injuries on the body of the
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deceased, Manju, to suggest that any force was inflicted upon her.
Furthermore, there is no indication that any struggle took place
prior to her death. In view of this, the prosecution has failed to
establish the offence under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable
doubt.
9.2 So far as the charges under Section 304-B IPC against the
accused are concerned, it would be appropriate to revisit the
statements of the principal witnesses, namely PW-3 Ganeshi Lal
(father of the deceased), PW-7 Narender (brother of the
deceased), PW-11 Rukma Devi (mother of the deceased), and PW-
5 Amrit Lal (uncle of the deceased).
9.3 PW-3 Ganeshi Lal was thoroughly examined before the trial
Court. He deposed that a few months after the marriage of his
daughter Manju to the accused Arvind, whenever Manju visited
her paternal home, she consistently complained about her in-laws,
particularly highlighting the persistent demands for dowry made
by the accused respondents. It was further brought on record that
a girl child named Poonam was born to Manju and Arvind on
02.03.1991. PW-3 stated that the delivery took place in a hospital,
and subsequent to the delivery, Manju was taken by her in-laws
back to her matrimonial home.
9.4 On careful perusal of the testimony of PW-3, Shri Ganeshi
Lal, it emerges that the deceased Manju stayed at her paternal
home continuously for two years until 05.10.1994. PW-3 clearly
deposed that during this period, accused Tej Karan, the father-in-
law of the deceased, demanded Rs. 50,000, purportedly for the
purpose of setting up a business, as accused Arvind (the husband)
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had planned to shift his base from Bombay to Jodhpur. Further, an
additional demand of Rs. 10,000 was made by accused Rambha
Devi (mother-in-law), allegedly as reimbursement for expenses
incurred towards the delivery of the first child, Poonam.
9.5 On careful analysis of the statement of PW-3, Shri Ganeshi
Lal, it clearly emerges that specific monetary demands were made
by the accused persons. A demand of ₹10,000 was made by the
mother-in-law of the deceased, allegedly towards expenses
incurred on account of the delivery of the first child, Poonam.
Additionally, a separate demand of ₹50,000 was attributed to
accused Tej Karan, the father-in-law, which was purportedly
sought for the purpose of establishing a business, as accused
Arvind had decided to shift from Bombay to Jodhpur.
9.6 PW-5, Shri Amrit Lal, younger brother of PW-3 Ganeshi Lal,
was also examined during the course of the trial. In his deposition,
PW-5 fully supported the version of PW-3, particularly with respect
to the allegations of dowry demand. PW-5 specifically referred to
the demand of ₹10,000 made by the mother-in-law of the
deceased, allegedly towards the expenses of the first delivery, and
the demand of ₹50,000 attributed to accused Tej Karan for the
purpose of establishing a business following accused Arvind’s
proposed relocation from Bombay to Jodhpur. Notably, PW-5 did
not refer to any other instances or forms of dowry demand apart
from these two specific monetary demands.
9.7 PW-7, Narender, the brother of the deceased Manju, also
deposed before the Court that the deceased had told him
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regarding the monetary demands of Rs.10,000/- and ₹50,000/-
made by the accused.
9.8 PW-11, Smt. Rukma Devi, mother of the deceased Manju,
also referred to the demand of Rs. 10,000 made by the accused.
She further deposed that after the delivery of the first child, she
visited her daughter’s matrimonial home with clothes and other
items. However, Manju’s in-laws were not pleased with her visit.
She further stated that during her visit, the in-laws raised the
issue of dowry demands and that she was ill-treated.
10. On a conjoint reading of the testimonies of the witnesses
examined, it emerges that the two monetary demands of Rs.
10,000 and Rs. 50,000 referred to cannot be construed as dowry
demands within the definition of ‘dowry’ under Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of
1961’). The demand of Rs. 10,000 was shown to be a
reimbursement for delivery expenses incurred during the birth of
the first child of the deceased Manju, while the demand of Rs.
50,000 appears to be linked to capital for setting up a business,
related to accused Arvind’s decision to shift from Bombay to
Jodhpur. Given that both these demands were directed towards
distinct and specific purposes unrelated to customary dowry
demands, they do not meet the criteria of ‘dowry’ as contemplated
under Section 2 of the Act of 1961. Therefore, these demands
cannot be legally treated as dowry demands in the context of the
present proceedings.
11. The prosecution, along with the complainant, placed
significant reliance on Exhibit P-31 to substantiate the allegation
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[2025:RJ-JD:25500-DB] (12 of 19) [CRLA-226/2001]
that a demand was made shortly before the death, purportedly at
the instance of the accused. This contention is supported by the
contents of a letter authored by the deceased, Manju, immediately
prior to her demise. The contents of the said letter (Exhibit P-31)
are reproduced hereunder:
^^vknj.kh; ikikth eEehth
eSa ;g i= fy[k jgh gwaA eSa muds lkFk i= Hkst
jgh gwaA esjk ;gka ij eu ugha yxrk gSA vki yksxksa ls
feyus ds fy, esjk eu djrk gSA esjk ges”kk ds fy,
fi;j tkus ds can gks x;k gSA fnu&jkr vdsyh jgrh
gwaA esjk eu ugha yxrk gSA lklqth iwue ds ikik dks Hkh
gj ckr dgrh jgrh gSA os Hkh esjk ls ugha cksyrs gS 10
fnu gq,A esjs ls lc f[kykQ gSA esjk ;gka ij thuk
gjke gks x;k gSA ikikth vki Hkh llqjth ls <j x;sA
esjk ?kj ds vUnj eu ugha yxrk gS “kkafr uxj okys lc
yksx ml fnu yM+ ds pys tkus fd otg ls esjk fi;j
vkuk tkuk can gks x;k gSA tc rd os yksx gekjs ;gka
okfil ugha vkxs tc rd eq>s fi;j ugha Hkstsaxs A vki
fdlh izdkj mUgksaus euk,A rkbZth vk;s gSa muls Hkh
llqjth us yM+kbZ dh vkSj os Hkh pys x;sA esjs ls dksbZ
ugha cksyrk gSA esjk eu ugha yxrk gSA vki fdlh rjg
esjs dks ysus dks vk;sA eSa ;gka ij ugha jguk pkgrh gwaA
eSa ;g i= Hkst jgh gwa esjs dks 3 eghus gks x;s gSaA
fy[kus okyh eUtq gSA^^11.1 On perusal of the aforementioned letter and in light of the
statements of the witnesses and other material on record, it is
evident that the deceased, Manju, was unhappy in her
matrimonial home. The contents of the letter further reveal that
the accused-respondents were not talking to her. Rambha Devi
(Mother in law) was telling each and every thing to Arvind and
therefore he stopped talking to her. Tej Karan (Father in law) is
also not communicating with her and on account of fight with
Shanti Nagar’s person, she would not be allowed to go to her
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[2025:RJ-JD:25500-DB] (13 of 19) [CRLA-226/2001]paternal home. She was subjected to harassment, particularly by
being denied the opportunity to visit her parental home, resulting
in her living in isolation. The letter also notes that her husband
had not spoken to her for the past ten days and that all members
of the matrimonial household appeared to be acting against her.
11.2 The letter further indicates that a dispute had occurred,
resulting in a complete breakdown of the relationship between the
Shanti Nagar wale (शां ति नगर वाले ) and her in-laws. The relevant
portion of the letter, as highlighted, clearly reflects that the cause
of this breakdown was the said altercation. However, the letter
does not make any reference, either direct or indirect, to any
demand for dowry. Given this, it cannot be conclusively
established that a dowry demand was made soon before the death
of the deceased. Accordingly, this letter cannot be treated as
concrete or conclusive evidence to substantiate the allegation of a
dowry demand within the meaning of Section 304-B IPC.
12. As far as the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is
concerned, there is insufficient evidence on record to conclusively
establish that the deceased, Manju, was subjected to continuous
harassment and that too such harassment towards dowry demand
soon before death which have compelled her to take the drastic
step of hanging herself. However, certain facts on record do
indicate instances of harassment: the deceased was not allowed to
meet her parents; she was not permitted to visit her parental
home; there was a demand of Rs. 10,000 towards delivery
expenses; an additional demand of Rs. 50,000 was made by
Manju’s father-in-law from her father for the purpose of setting up
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[2025:RJ-JD:25500-DB] (14 of 19) [CRLA-226/2001]a business for his son Arvind, who was employed in Bombay and
decided to return to Jodhpur; her husband, Arvind, seldom visited
her parental home; within the short span of five years of
marriage, Manju spent approximately two years at her parental
home; the husband was not communicating with her for past 10
days; Mother-in-law was conveying his son every minor instances;
Father-in-law was also not speaking to her; Shanti Nagar wale had
quarrel with her in laws and attitude of Arvind (her husband) was
not supportive.
12.1 The element of harassment is further substantiated by Ex. P-
31, in which she explicitly stated that she was not allowed to visit
her parental home. Additionally, it has been brought on record
that she was residing alone at her matrimonial home and was
subjected to social isolation, as no member of the household
communicated with her. She was evidently unhappy in her marital
life. These circumstances, when viewed cumulatively, establish
that the harassment meted out to her, primarily at the behest of
the accused-respondents, led to her unnatural death and clearly
attract the provisions of Section 498-A IPC.
13. In view of the discussion above and after carefully
considering the reasoning advanced by the learned trial Court, we
are of the considered opinion that the trial Court was fully justified
in convicting the accused under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal
Code. However, in light of the evidence on record and the analysis
made hereinabove, the ingredients necessary to constitute
offences under Sections 302 and 304-B IPC are not satisfactorily
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established. Accordingly, no case is made out against the accused
under the said provisions.
14. As regards the instant D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 226/2001
filed by the State, at this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate
to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs.
State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011,
decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal
Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as
hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the
safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are
intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which
come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could
be summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal
trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive
of all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a
miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two
views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view,
mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the
reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in
appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal
and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
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“38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378 of CrPC as follows:
“8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens
the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and
documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is
required to consider whether the view taken by the trial
court is a possible view which could have been taken on
the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.”
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate Court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour
of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners
of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same
is based on a misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are
possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the
accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”
15. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-
respondents under Sections 302 and 304-B IPC, which in the
given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled
principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the
Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it
demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in
arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial
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Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each
and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed
the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of
the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned
judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as
to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
16. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
17. In the above view of the matter, as regards the instant D.B.
Criminal Appeal No. 752/2000 the same as filed by the deceased-
accused namely Tej Karan is dismissed as abated. So far as
accused-Arvind and accused- Smt. Rambha Devi are concerned,
keeping into consideration the submission made by the learned
Senior Counsel for converting the sentence of three years’
imprisonment to the period already undergone, we deem it
appropriate, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, to
modify the sentence accordingly. The surviving accused-
respondents, namely Smt. Rambha Devi, aged 78 years, and
Arvind Kumar, aged 57 years, are of advanced age, and the
incident in question occurred nearly 30 years ago. Considering
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these mitigating factors, we find it just and proper to reduce the
sentence imposed on the accused-respondents from three years to
the period already undergone.
18. Accordingly, the findings of the learned trial Court are
affirmed insofar as they relate to the acquittal of the accused
under Sections 302 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. However,
the conviction of the accused under Section 498-A IPC is upheld.
In view of the mitigating circumstances discussed above, the
sentence awarded under Section 498-A IPC is modified, and the
punishment is reduced to the period of incarceration already
undergone by the accused.
19. Consequently, the D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 226/2001 filed
by the State is dismissed. However, the D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
752/2000 filed by the surviving accused (convicted) the same is
partly allowed for the reasons indicated above. The impugned
judgment qua the surviving accused (convicted) Arvind and Smt.
Rambha Devi stands modified accordingly.
19.1 However, while keeping in view the provision of Section 437
A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023, the accused Arvind son of Tej Karan and Smt. Rambha Devi
wife of Tej Karan are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum
of Rs. 25,000/- each and a surety bond in the like amount each,
before the learned trial Court, which shall be made effective for a
period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of
Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave,
the accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as and when called upon to do so.
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20. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
AbhishekK/-
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