Arvind Kumar Shaw vs State Of West Bengal on 28 April, 2025

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Arvind Kumar Shaw vs State Of West Bengal on 28 April, 2025

Author: Debangsu Basak

Bench: Debangsu Basak

                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
                     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                              APPELLATE SIDE

     Present:

     The Hon'ble Justice Debangsu Basak
                       And
     The Hon'ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi


                             CRA (DB) No. 88 of 2022

                               Arvind Kumar Shaw
                                       Vs.
                              State of West Bengal


     For the appellant           :    Mr. Surajit Basu, Adv.
                                      Mr. Arun Halder, Adv.
                                      Ms. Jasika Alam, Adv.

     For the State               :    Mrs. Amita Gaur, Sr. Govt. Adv.
                                      Ms. Purnima Ghosh, Adv.

     Heard on                    :    07.04.2025

     Judgment on                 :    28.04.2025



Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.:

1. The appeal is in assailment of judgment of conviction dated November

25, 2020 and order of sentence dated November 26, 2020 passed by
2

learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Howrah, in connection with

Sessions Trial No. 89 of 2014.

2. By the impugned judgment and order, the appellant was convicted for

the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine

of ₹10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, the appellant was

directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six

months.

3. According to the case made out by the prosecution, the appellant and

the victim used to work as labourers at a tea stall belonging to the de

facto complainant where other 7/8 labourers were employed. On

September 16, 2013 the de facto complainant along with his

labourers, was going to his house. Suddenly, at about 12.30 a.m. he

saw an altercation between two of his labourers namely Raju Singh,

the victim and the appellant Arvind Kumar. During such quarrel,

Arvind Kumar brought out a knife from his behind and stabbed the

victim Raju Singh in his stomach. Upon alarm raised by the de facto

complainant and his labourers, the appellant pulled out the knife and

fled away. All the efforts of the de facto complainant to catch the

appellant went in vain.

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4. The victim was taken by the de facto complainant to hospital in

injured condition where the doctors declared him brought dead. The

matter was immediately reported to Belur Police Station. On the basis

of such report by way of a written complaint, Belur Police Station Case

No. 321 dated September 16, 2013 under Section 302 of the Indian

Penal Code was started against the appellant.

5. The police took up investigation and on completion of such

investigation, submitted charge sheet against the appellant.

Accordingly, on the basis of material in the case diary, the learned

trial court framed charges against the appellant under Section 302 of

the Indian Penal Code on January 4, 2016. The appellant denied the

charge and claimed to be tried.

6. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no previous

enmity between the appellant and the victim. The incident took place

in course of an altercation out of sudden provocation. It was further

submitted on behalf of the appellant that death of the victim was

caused without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion

upon a sudden quarrel. The appellant did not take undue advantage

or acted in a cruel or unusual manner in the incident. There was only

single blow and thereafter, the appellant fled away. As such, according

to learned advocate for the appellant, the appellant cannot be held
4

guilty of murder. In support of such contention, learned advocate for

the appellant, relied upon (2019) 11 Supreme Court Cases 381

(Sunny Khanna vs. State of Chhattisgarh) and (2003) 3 Supreme

Court Cases 528 (Ghapoo Yadav and Others vs. State of M.P.).

7. On the other hand, learned advocate for the State submitted that the

prosecution has led sufficient evidence at the trial and has been able

to substantiate the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code, framed against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. As

such, the impugned judgment and order should not be interfered with.

8. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 12

witnesses in all. Besides, prosecution also relied upon several

documentary and material evidences.

9. The de-facto complainant deposed as PW1. He stated that he had a

snacks stall at 73, G. T. Road, Liluah within Belur police station. At

the time of incident, 7/8 employees including the victim and the

appellant, used to work at his shop. He also stated that the appellant

Arvind Kumar Shaw killed Raju Singh in the midnight of September

16, 2013 at about 12.30 a.m. PW1 further stated that this shop was

situated in the ground floor of his house on the roadside. Some

portion of the house was broken at the relevant time for the purpose of
5

reconstruction. There was a bedroom on the first floor of the building

which was under the use of the employees of the shop.

10. PW1 further stated that after stabbing the victim, the appellant fled

away from the said bedroom on the first floor with his knife. The

victim was taken to T.L. Jaiswal Hospital where the doctor declared

him brought dead. PW1 informed the police over telephone from the

hospital itself. Police arrived in the hospital, thereafter, he lodged a

written complaint. He proved the written complaint written in his pen

and signature. PW1 also proved his signature on the seizure list under

which police recovered and seized the offending knife from near Zero

Miles Bar on G.T. Road, Liluah, Howrah, on September 16, 2013 itself.

PW 1 proved the offending knife produced in court. He also identified

the appellant in the dock. PW 1 was cross examined by defense but

nothing favourable could be elicited.

11. PW 2 is an employee of the shoproom belonging to the de facto

complainant. This witness failed to identify the appellant in court. He

stated that the victim Raju Singh died on September 16, 2013.

According to PW 2, there was a quarrel between Raju Singh and the

appellant Arvind Kumar shaw on September 16, 2013. The appellant

assaulted the victim with a knife on his chest. PW 2 mock up hearing

the hue and cry whereupon the appellant started to flee away towards
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G.T. Road. He further stated that after running some distance, the

appellant threw away the knife. PW 2 accompanied by Dharambir

Singh chased the appellant in court and brought him back to the spot

where the occurrence took place.

12. PW 2 also stated that he along with Dharambir Singh and PW 1 took

the victim to Jaiswal Hospital at Liluah by a rickshaw. The Doctor

examined the victim and advised to take him to Calcutta Medical

College & Hospital. They tried to call a taxi for the purpose but in the

meantime the victim died. He also stated that the police visited the

hospital as well as the place of occurrence and recovered the offending

knife from a drain near Zero Miles shop over G. T. Road and seized the

same under a seizure list. PW 2 proved his signature on the seizure

list. He also identified the offending weapon.

13. A local resident deposed as PW 3. He stated that he knew the victim

who used to work in the shop of PW 1. He died at about 12. 00/12. 30

a.m. on September 16, 2013. PW 3 further stated that at the relevant

time he was walking along with others in front of his house. At that

time he saw one person fleeing away with a knife in his hand and was

going towards Liluah Don Bosco and he was being chased by some

persons. The fleeing person, threw away his knife in a drain in front of

Zero Miles Bar. PW 3 also stated that he along with the son of PW 1
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detained the said person and identified him as the appellant. He also

stated that at the information of PW 1, police arrived at the spot and

recovered the knife under a seizure list. PW 3 was interrogated by

police and his statement was recorded. He however, stated that he

heard that the appellant assaulted the victim with a knife and fled

away. After the incident the victim was taken to T. S. Jaiswal hospital

where he expired subsequently. PW 3 identified the appellant in court.

14. A shop owner was examined as PW 4. He stated that since he had a

stationery shop adjacent to hospital, he used to sell small knife used

for the purpose of cutting fruits. There was the shop of PW 1 adjacent

to his shop and the appellant used to purchase small glass from his

shop. He further stated that on September 13, 2009 at 11.00/11.30,

the appellant, who used to work in the shop of PW 1 came to his shop

and asked for a big knife stating that PW 1 wanted the knife for

cutting fruits. PW 4 also stated that he handed over a knife to the

appellant for a consideration of ₹15/20-. He identified the appellant in

court. He also identified the knife which was purchased from his shop.

15. The autopsy surgeon was examined as PW 5. He stated that on

September 6, 2013 he was posted at Howrah District Hospital. On the

said date he held post-mortem examination upon the dead body of one

Raju Singh in connection with Belur P.S./U.D. Case No. 321/13 dated
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September 16, 2013. He proved the post-mortem report prepared in

his pen and signature. He opined that the death of the victim was

caused due to the injuries as mentioned in his report which was ante

mortem and homicidal in nature. In His Cross-Examination, PW 5

stated that it was not possible for him to say about the size of the

weapon used.

16. Another medical officer of Howrah District Hospital deposed as PW 6.

He has stated that on December 3, 2013 he conducted ossification test

of the appellant and submitted his report on December 4, 2013. He

proved his report and the x-ray plates.

17. The Judicial Magistrate was examined as PW 7. He stated that on

December 2, 2013 he recorded the statement of one Swapan Das

under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection

with Belur P. S. Case No. 321 of 2013. PW 7 proved the statement

recorded under his pen and signature.

18. A police officer was examined as PW 8. He stated that on September

16, 2013 he was posted at Belur police station as a constable. In such

capacity, he carried the dead body of one Raju Singh from T. S.

Jaiswal hospital to Mollick Fatak morgue under a dead body Chalan.

He proved the dead body Chalan.

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19. Another medical officer of T. L. Jaiswal hospital deposed as PW 9. He

stated that on September 16, 2013 he was posted as a medical officer

at T.L. Jaiswal hospital and examined one Raju Singh who was

brought dead by Mahesh Singh, PW 1 at about 12. 50 a.m. in the

emergency department of the hospital. He also stated that on

examination he found the patient dead and he informed Belur police

station. He proved the copy of such information.

20. A seizure list witness deposed as PW 10. He stated that on September

16, 2013 at about 8. 30 p.m., the nails, hair, wearing apparels etc. of

the victim were seized by police under a seizure list which he signed.

He identified his signature on the seizure list as well as the seized

wearing apparels.

21. The Recording Officer was examined as PW 11. He stated that on

September 16, 2013, he was posted at Belur Police Station as a Sub-

Inspector of Police. In such capacity, he received a written complaint

from one Mahesh Singh and endorsed the receipt on the written

complaint itself. He further stated that upon receipt of the written

complaint, he filled up the Formal First Information Report and

started a police case. He proved the endorsement of receipt and the

Formal First Information Report in his pen and signature.
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22. The investigating officer deposed as PW12. He stated that on

September 16, 2013, he was endorsed with the investigation of Belur

Police Station Case No. 321 of 2013 dated September 16, 2013. He

examined the de facto complainant at Belur Police Station whereupon

the complainant corroborated his statement in the written complaint

for which he did not record his statement. PW 12 further stated that at

that time of such examination, it was reported that the miscreant was

detained by the labourers of de facto complainant at Singkata. PW 12

accompanied by force and the de facto complainant went to Singkata

and found 2/3 persons had detained one person. On interrogation, the

said person identified himself as the appellant. He also confessed his

guilt. The appellant was arrested by PW 12.

23. PW 12 also stated that during interrogation, the appellant disclosed

that he will locate the place where he had kept the offending weapon.

The appellant led PW 12 to a closed shop under the name and style of

Zero Mile and identified the place where he had kept the offending

knife. Accordingly, the offending knife was recovered, sealed and

labelled and seized by PW 12 under a seizure list. He proved the

seizure list.

24. In course of investigation, PW 12 visited the place of occurrence,

prepared rough sketch map thereof, interrogated and recorded the
11

statement of witnesses. He also collected the blood stained earth from

the place of occurrence under a seizure list. He also visited T.S.

Jaiswal Hospital for conducting inquest over the dead body but for

insufficient light at 4.30 a.m. he could not perform the inquest in the

hospital. It was later done at the police station. PW 12 also forwarded

the appellant to court and sought police remand which was allowed.

During the police custody, the appellant disclosed the shop from

where he purchased the knife. He was taken to the shop and was

identified by the shop owner as the purchaser of knife two days prior

to the Vishwakarma Puja. PW 12 also collected the post mortem report

of the victim. He also arranged for ossification test of the appellant

where his age was determined as above 18 years but below 20 years.

PW 12 also sent the seized articles to Forensic Science Laboratory for

examination. On completion of investigation, he submitted charge

sheet.

25. Upon conclusion of the evidence of the prosecution, the appellant was

examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The

appellant denied the incriminating evidence appearing against him

and pleaded innocence. He however, refused to adduce any defense

witness.

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26. The appellant was convicted of the offence punishable under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code for intentionally causing death of the

victim Raju Singh. According to the case made out by the prosecution,

the appellant had an altercation with the victim. Both of them used to

work at the tea stall of the de facto complainant. In course of such

altercation, the appellant stabbed the victim. As a result of such

stabbing, the victim sustained bleeding injuries and he died. The

autopsy surgeon (PW 5) deposed at the trial that in his opinion, death

of the victim was caused due to injuries mentioned the post mortem

report (Ext. 3) which was ante mortem and homicidal in nature. Ext. 3

shows one puncture stab wound over right upper abdominal wall

which had pierced through the liver and extending up to right lung. It

is evident from the deposition of PW 5 as well as testimony of Exhibit 3

that the victim died an unnatural death caused due a stab injury

which was ante mortem and homicidal in nature.

27. As to the person responsible for inflicting the ante mortem homicidal

injury, it is the case of the prosecution that the appellant perpetrated

such injury in course of an altercation with the victim. PW1 has

testified that it was the appellant who perpetrated the stab injury up

on the victim. PW 2 has also stated that on September 16, 2013 there

was a quarrel between the victim and the appellant and in course of
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such quarrel, appellant assaulted the victim with a knife on his chest.

He also testified that he along with one other person Dharambir Singh

chased and apprehended the victim after the incident. Such fact was

corroborated by the investigating officer, PW 12, in whose presence,

the information of apprehension of the appellant by some of the

employees of de facto complainant was received. On the basis of such

information, PW 12 proceeded to the place of occurrence and arrested

the appellant. There is evidence that the appellant himself led to the

recovery of the alleged offending weapon. PW 1 has stated that he took

the victim to T.S. Jasiwal Hospital immediately after the incident. PW

9 has testified that the victim was brought to hospital by PW 1 in an

injured condition. Therefore, on the basis of such evidence led at the

trial, there appear no qualms that the appellant is the only person

responsible for inflicting fatal injury upon the victim as a result of

which, the victim died an unnatural death.

28. So far as the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 is concerned, Section 300 of the Code defines

murder in following words:

“300. Murder.–Except in the cases hereinafter excepted,
culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death
is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or–

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2ndly.–If it is done with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the
death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or–

3rdly.–If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or–

4thly.–If the person committing the act knows that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause
death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Exception 1.–When culpable homicide is not murder.–
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst
deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden
provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the
provocation or causes the death of any other person by
mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:–

First.–That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily
provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing
harm to any person.

Secondly.–That the provocation is not given by anything
done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the
lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

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Thirdly.–That the provocation is not given by anything
done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.–Whether the provocation was grave and
sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to
murder is a question of fact.

Exception 2.–Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private
defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to
him by law and causes the death of the person against
whom he is exercising such right of defence without
premeditation, and without any intention of doing more
harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Exception 3.–Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant
acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the
powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an
act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and
necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public
servant and without ill-will towards the person whose
death is caused.

Exception 4.–Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the
offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.–It is immaterial in such cases which party
offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

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Exception 5.–Culpable homicide is not murder when the
person whose death is caused, being above the age of
eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death
with his own consent.”

29. For brevity of discussion, it would be apposite to set out Section 299 of

the Indian Penal Code which defines the offence of Culpable Homicide.

It reads as:

“299. Culpable homicide.–Whoever causes death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death, or with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to
cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

Explanation 1.–A person who causes bodily injury to
another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or
bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that
other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.

Explanation 2.–Where death is caused by bodily injury,
the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed
to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper
remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been
prevented.

Explanation 3.–The causing of the death of a child in the
mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to
culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any
part of that child has been brought forth, though the child
may not have breathed or been completely born.”

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30. In the instant case, as it transpires from the evidence on record, the

appellant had an altercation with the victim on the date and time of

occurrence. Such altercation is not preceded by any previous enmity.

There is nothing to suggest that the two persons had any relationship

or connection with each other. There is no evidence that the victim

and the appellant had previous disputes. The squabble between the

victim and the appellant broke out all on a sudden at the time of

incidence. The evidence is also silent about the cause or point of

altercation between the two. Not only that, the conduct of the

appellant in fleeing away after the incident merely emboldens that the

incident took place out of sudden provocation. There is nothing on

record to suggest that the appellant took any undue advantage over

the victim in the incident. Exhibit 3 goes to show that the appellant

inflicted only one injury which caused the death of the victim. If that

be so, we are of the opinion that the incident squarely falls within the

Exception-4 appended to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The facts and circumstances of the case as manifested from the

evidence on record reasonably suggests that the incident took place in

course of an altercation between the appellant and the victim and the

appellant did the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause
18

death, but he had no intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily

injury as was likely to cause death of the victim.

31. PW 12 has stated that he interrogated the appellant and as shown by

him, the offending weapon was allegedly recovered. However, there is

nothing on record that the statement of appellant was recorded under

Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No such statement was

proved at the trial in order to press Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act

into service. Moreover, mere recovery of alleged offending weapon, in

no way, brings the case out of the purview of Exception-4 appended to

Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

32. In Ghapoo Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that,

“10. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts
done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a
case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after
which its place would have been more appropriate. The
exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both
there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of
Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case
of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which
clouds men’s sober reason and urges them to deeds which
they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in
Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the
direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4
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deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may
have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of
the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have
originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts
them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A “sudden fight”

implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The
homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to
unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole
blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception
more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There
is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight
suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or
less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if
the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would
not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual
provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion
the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help
of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused : (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4
all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be
noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section
300
IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two
to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be
no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the
parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of
the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat
between two and more persons whether with or without
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weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as
to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a
question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not
must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each
case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to
show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender
has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as
used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.

11. In the case at hand, out of the seven injuries, only
Injury 2 was held to be of grievous nature, which was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of
the deceased. The infliction of the injuries and their nature
proves the intention of the accused-appellants, but causing
of such injuries cannot be termed to be either in a cruel or
unusual manner for not availing the benefit of Exception 4
to Section 300 IPC. After the injuries were inflicted the
injured had fallen down, but there is no material to show
that thereafter any injury was inflicted when he was in a
helpless condition. The assaults were made at random.
Even the previous altercations were verbal and not
physical. It is not the case of the prosecution that the
accused-appellants had come prepared and armed for
attacking the deceased. The previous disputes over land do
not appear to have assumed the characteristics of physical
combat. This goes to show that in the heat of passion upon
a sudden quarrel followed by a fight the accused persons
had caused injuries on the deceased, but had not acted in a
cruel or unusual manner. That being so, Exception 4 to
21

Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable. The fact situation
bears great similarity to that in Sukhbir Singh v. State of
Haryana
[(2002) 3 SCC 327 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 616] . The
appellants are to be convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC
and custodial sentence of 10 years and fine as was
imposed by the trial court would meet the ends of justice.
The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.”

33. Similarly in Sunny Khanna (supra), it was observed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that,

“7. So far as the conviction of the appellants under Section
302
IPC regarding the death of Irfan alias Golu is
concerned, from the evidence of Salim Khan (PW 10) it
emerges that when preparation was going on to burn
Holika and when they were all standing there, juvenile
accused Chotu was using abusive language and Irfan alias
Golu asked Chotu to stop using abusive language and there
were heated arguments, scuffle and sudden fight between
them. It is in these circumstances, the juvenile accused
Chotu inflicted injuries on deceased Irfan alias Golu while
the appellants herein held the deceased Irfan alias Golu. As
the occurrence took place in the course of sudden fight
between the deceased and the accused party, the
occurrence would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
The injuries inflicted on the deceased Irfan alias Golu is on
the backside piercing the left lung which shows the
intention of the juvenile accused who inflicted the injury.
Keeping in view the nature of the injuries and considering
the fact that the appellant-accused had not taken undue
22

advantage of the deceased and in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellants
under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC is modified
as the one under Section 304 Part I IPC. It is submitted that
both the appellants have undergone imprisonment for more
than ten years.”

34. As noted above, in the case at hand, there is no evidence on record the

appellant had previous enmity with the victim or the attack upon him

was premediated. Evidence goes to show that the appellant inflicted

the stab blow upon the victim under sudden provocation in the midst

of an ongoing altercation. There is nothing on record to establish that

such provocation was voluntarily invited by the appellant. In such

view of the facts, considering Exception 4 appended to Section 300 of

the Indian Penal Code and applying the ratio laid down in the case of

Ghapoo Yadav (supra) and Sunny Khanna (supra), we are of the

opinion that the appellant ought to have been convicted of the offence

punishable under Section 304 of the Code of 1860.

35. In the light of discussions made hereinabove, we do hold that the

appellant is the person who inflicted the fatal injury upon the victim

but the facts and circumstances of the case, nature of injury and

subsequent conduct of the appellant does suggest that the appellant
23

should be held guilty of offence punishable under Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code instead of Section 302 of the Penal Code.

36. Consequently, we modify the impugned judgment and convict the

appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304 of the Indian

Penal Code. We also modify the impugned order of punishment

imposed upon the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for ten years

instead of imprisonment for life. We however, affirm the impugned

order of conviction so far as it relates to fine of ₹10,000/- and

imprisonment in default of payment of fine imposed.

37. The period of detention undergone during investigation, enquiry and

trial shall be set off against the substantive punishment imposed in

terms of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

38. The instant appeal being CRA (DB) 88 of 2022 is accordingly disposed

of. Connected applications, if any, shall also stand disposed.

39. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied

for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal

formalities.

[MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.]

40. I agree.

[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]

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