Delhi District Court
Ashok Chaturvedi vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 24 May, 2025
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUMIT DASS, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE - 05, NEW DELHI DISTRICT, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No.193/2025
Ashok Chaturvedi
s/o Late Vasudev Chaturvedi
r/o 3 Shivpriya, Cedar Avenue
DLF, Chhatarpur, Hauz Khas,
New Delhi-110074. .......Revisionist
VERSUS
Directorate of Enforcement
Through its Assistant Directorate
Government of India
New Delhi-110011. ...... Respondent
Date of Institution : 16.04.2025
Judgment reserved : 22.05.2025
Date of Decision : 24.05.2025
ORDER (oral)
1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated
07.08.2023 impugned order passed by Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, New
Delhi [in short Ld. CJM] in case titled as ‘ Directorate of Enforcement v/s
Ashok Chaturvedi‘ whereby Ld. CJM had taken cognizance of the offence
U/s 174 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [in short IPC] and had summoned the
revisionist to appear.
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2. For the sake of convenience the revisionist shall be referred to be
as ‘Ashok Chaturvedi’ and the respondent shall be referred to as ‘ ED’.
3. This revision petition was assigned to this Court on 16.04.2025.
On 19.04.2025 arguments as advanced by Ld Counsel appearing on behalf
of Ashok Chaturvedi were heard/noted in the ordersheet itself and the matter
was listed for 25.04.2025. The proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court were
stayed and notice was directed upon the ED.
3.1 ED has filed the reply to the revision petition and contested the
same.
4. Submissions have been heard at length advanced by Sh. Pramod
Kumar Dubey, Ld. Sr. Advocate assisted by Sh. Apoorva Agarwal, Ms.
Divya Verma, Ms. Amrita and Sh. Ramachandruni Siddhartha, Advocates on
behalf of revisionist/Ashok Chaturvedi.
On behalf of ED Sh. N.K.Matta and Sh. Simon Benjamin, Ld.
SPP assisted by Sh. Harshit Gupta, Sh.Faizan Khan, Sh. Shaurya and Sh.
Rohit Singh Bora, Advocates have addressed the submissions.
5. TCR has been called for. I have perused the same.
6. Before I proceed further it would be trite to note down section
174 IPC and Section 63 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
[ in short PMLA] and also the impugned order dated 07.08.2023. Same
reads as here under :
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3Section 174 IPC –
Whoever, being legally bound to attend in person or by an
agent at a certain place and time in obedience to a
summons, notice, order, or proclamation proceeding from
any public servant legally competent, as such public
servant, to issue the same, intentionally omits to attend at
that place or time, or departs from the place where he is
bound to attend before the time at which it is lawful for him
to depart, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month, or with fine which
may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;
Or, if the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to
attend in person or by agent in a Court of Justice, with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both.
**************************************************
Section 63 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering
Act, 2002
63. Punishment for false information or failure to give
information, etc.
(1)Any person wilfully and maliciously giving false
information and so causing an arrest or a search to be made
under this Act shall on conviction be liable for
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or
with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees or
both.(2)If any person,(a)being legally bound to state the
truth of any matter relating to an offence under section 3,
refuses to answer any question put to him by an authority
in the exercise of its powers under this Act; or(b)refuses to
sign any statement made by him in the course of any
proceedings under this Act, which an authority may legally
require to sign; or(c)to whom a summon is issued under
section 50 either to attend to give evidence or produce
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4books of account or other documents at a certain place and
time, omits to attend or produce books of account or
documents at the place or time, e shall pay, by way of
penalty, a sum which shall not be less than five hundred
rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees for
each such default or failure.(3)No order under this section
shall be passed by an authority referred to in sub-section
(2) unless the person on whom the penalty is proposed to
be imposed is given an opportunity of being heard in the
matter by such authority.(4)[ Notwithstanding anything
contained in clause (c) of sub-section (2), a person who
intentionally disobeys any direction issued under section
50 shall also be liable to be proceeded against under
section 174 of the Indian Penal Code.]
**********************************************“07.08.2023
Fresh complaint is filed. It be checked and registered.
Present: Mr. Arun Khatri and Mr. NK Matta, Ld. SPP
for the Department.
The present complaint has been filed through
the Department. Affidavit of the concerned officer for
department along with relevant documents are filed.
Perused.
Since the complaint has been filed by a public
servant in discharge of his official duties, hence, recording
of pre-summoning evidence is dispensed with. Personal
attendance of the complainant is also dispensed with till
further orders. The complainant is allowed to be
represented through Ld SPP for the department.
Heard. Perused.
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I take cognizance of the offences punishable U/Sec. 174
IPC.
Let summons be issued to accused through department for
12.09.2023.
(Snigdha Sarvaria)”
7. Sh. P.K.Dubey, Ld. Sr. Advocate had argued as here under :
The order dated 07.08.2023 is a non-reasoned one.
It was passed in a mechanical manner and the Ld. CJM had not
appreciated the controversy in correct perspective and the first
question as to whether any offence perse is made out or not was not
touched.
The version of the ED has been believed on its face value.
In support thereof he states/argues that there is no personal service of
summons at any point of time on Ashok Chaturvedi. Summons were
always being issued insofar as production of documents and that too
addressed at the company’s email ID or to the email ID of company’s
official(s). He had read over the complaint particularly para no.5
wherein there is a table and at column no. 4 there is no personal
service whatsoever to Ashok Chaturvedi. As a natural fortiari he
contends that there cannot be any disobedience or any intentional
default which is the crux of Section 174 IPC.
Insofar as supply of documents as sought for by the ED the same were
duly supplied – the representatives of the company were called. They
had given their statements/supplied the documents and infact all the
documents have been supplied to ED.
Before initiation of a complaint before the Ld. CJM, Sh. C.P.Meena,
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6Asstt. Director, ED who had filed the instant complaint had also given
the show cause notice U/s 63 of PMLA whereafter in terms of order
dated 11.04.2023 a penalty of Rs. 30,000/- was imposed which was
also paid. Still, the instant complaint has been filed to harass the
revisionist.
Mr. Dubey, Ld. Sr. Advocate further submits that if the limitation is
counted from the date of issuance of summons, some of them cannot
be made the basis of a complaint U/s 174 IPC as qua same the
complaint ought to have been filed within a period of one year, which
is not the case
It is further contended that there is a delay of 109 days in filing the
revision petition which has been duly explained and even otherwise
he had relied upon the judgment of Jayjeet Singh v/s State reported in
2015 SCC Online Delhi 8613.
8. On the other hand Sh. N.K.Matta and Sh.Simon Benjamin, Ld.
Special Public Prosecutors appearing on behalf of ED argued that first of all
bar of limitation/delay ought to be crossed by the revisionist Ashok
Chaturvedi for the reason that the impugned order is dated 07.08.2023. He
was appearing before the Court not personally and through counsel and
therefore if it is counted from the said date i.e. when the cognizance order
was passed, there is a delay of one year and the same has not at all been
explained. This is the first hurdle which the revisionist has to cross and the
explanation given in the revision petition in the accompanying application
U/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is exfacie false. On this short score the
revision petition should be dismissed.
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8.1 Infact the ED was carrying out investigation insofar as M/s
Unitech and its associated companies and during the course of investigation
which as per the direction of Hon’ble Apex Court they had come across that
there was transfer of money in the account of company M/s U-Flex which
belonged to Ashok Chaturvedi. Accordingly he was noticed U/s 50 of
PMLA Act. He failed to appear despite service. Show cause notice U/s 63
(2) of PMLA Act was given but still he had not appeared and had given his
reply which was found insufficient and penalty was imposed. He had chosen
not to appear before ED in reference to notice U/s 50 of PMLA and as such
the instant complaint U/s 174 IPC was filed.
8.2 The summoning order cannot be faulted for the reason that it is
cryptic as the accused would be having full opportunity to reply/explain his
version once he appears before the Court.
8.3 Reliance has been placed on the following judgments on behalf
of ED :-
i. Amit Kapoor v/s Ramesh Chander & Anr. (2012) 9 SCC 460.
ii. State of Haryana v/s Chandramani 1996 SCC Online SC 202.
iii. Union of India v/s G.M.Kokil 1984 Supp SCC 196.
iv. Ashish Mittal v/s Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. 2023 SCC
Online De 2484.
v. Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v/s State (NCT of Delhi) & anr. (2012) 5 SCC
424.
vi. Abhishek Banerjee & Anr. v/s Directorate of Enforcement.
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8.4 Much reliance was placed on the judgment of Abhishek Banerjee
& Anr. v/s Directorate of Enforcement (supra) and it was contended that at
this juncture there is no infirmity in the cognizance/summoning order.
9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions
made at bar. The first and foremost point is with regard to the aspect of
limitation. The cognizance order is dated 07.08.2023. The application U/s 5
of the Limitation Act is at pages 432 to 438 of the revision petition and in the
said application it is stated as here under :-
i. The copy of the complaint was served only on 24.09.2024 in
compliance of direction passed by the Ld. CJM.
ii. Counting from the same the period of limitation expired on24.12.2024. Revision petition was filed on 11.04.2025.
iii. The delay occurred as the same pertained to the
proceedings/documents from the the year 2007 to 2023. The same
took considerable period of time to locate/retrieve.
iv. Copy of the impugned order was not uploaded on the website of the
Court for which the petitioner had to apply a copy on 24.03.2025. The
said copy was also not given to the petitioner. As such there was no
negligence, inadvertent delay or deliberate inaction on the part of the
revisionist.
9.1 On these aspects let me check the Trial Court Record. The first
date of hearing was 12.09.2023 when the matter was taken up before the
Link MM as the Ld. CJM had gone for Jail duty. Subsequently next date of
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hearing was fixed as 29.02.2024 when also the Ld. Presiding Officer/Ld
CJM was on judicial training. On the subsequent date i.e. on 14.03.2024
there is a direction passed by Ld. CJM that copy of the complaint be
provided to the accused during the course of the day. Again on 24.09.2024
which is the date when the matter was taken up by the Ld. CJM this fact was
reiterated. It was stated that the copy of the complaint be provided to
accused counsel through acknowledgment. As such the first and foremost
question which arises for consideration is as to whether the copy was
supplied or not/ when the copy was supplied to the revisionist Ashok
Chaturvedi.
9.2 I have also checked the Trial Court Record. The first date of
hearing was 07.08.2023 whereafter the matter was listed for 12.09.2023.
Again the summons were served/received by the guard of the revisionist. In
the summons there is no endorsement as to the number of documents
annexed. Copy of summons served or sent by Mr. C.P.Meena on behalf of
ED to Ashok Chaturvedi also was not accompanied with the copy of the
petition but only summons were sent. There is nothing on record to suggest
that the summons were accompanied with the copy of the petition and the
documents relied upon.
9.3 That being scenario in absence of copy of the petition being
supplied to the accused alongwith the summons, the version of the accused
cannot be faulted or has to be believed that limitation has to be counted from
24.09.2024.
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9.4 The judgment of Jayjeet Singh v/s State (supra) incorporates
another angle or reason wherein it deals with the ground of condonation of
delay as here under :
8. Having gone through the application for condonation of
delay, it appeared to the Court that the petitioner had a
“sufficient” ground for condonation of delay. In catena of
Supreme Court Judgments, it has been observed by the
Supreme Court that Limitation Act is not meant to destroy the
right of the parties.
i) In N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC
3222, it was held as under:
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but see their remedy promptly. The object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for
such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered.
Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit.
During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the
maxim Interest republicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be
kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result In
foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no
presumption that delay in approaching the court is always
deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause”
Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal
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construction so as to advance substantial justice
vide Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC
575 and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah
Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749.”
ii) In State of U.P vs. Gauri Shanker and Others, 1992 AllLJ
606 the Court had observed that:-
“6. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 397/401 of the
code is a sort of special jurisdiction somewhat similar to the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court. That power can be exercised
suo moto also. This court, therefore, gets the power to condone
the delay so as to enable it to exercise the revisional
jurisdiction.
As the revision is the power of the court and not of a litigant, the
strict rules of limitation need not apply. In other words, it is for
the High Court or Court of Session to decide as to whether to
exercise jurisdiction or not. This revisionary power is
discretionary and unfettered by limitation.
“12. In such matter of considerable magnitude, court need not
be technical”
“13. The expression “sufficient cause” under Section
5 Limitation Act has to be scrutinised in a justice oriented
manner and narrow pedantic approach need not be made.
Explanation of each day’s delay is not a correct formula in
every case.”
iii) Also in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Girdharilal
Sapru and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 758 it was held that revision
petition should not be dismissed on technical grounds:-
“5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the
revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention
is founded on a very technical ground that even though the
revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite
power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the
petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted
the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this
too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the
CrPC enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo11/22
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12motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a
clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the
petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and
miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order
is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is
settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order
terminates the proceedings and, therefore it is revisable under
Section 397(1), Cr. PC and Section 397 (1) in terms confers
power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High
Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be
denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed
for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If
in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a
glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably
established by this case itself. We however, do not propose to
say a single word on the merits of the cause because there
should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who
in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the
learned Magistrate.”
9.5 The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the
parties and insofar as revisional jurisdiction is concerned it is a sort of
special jurisdiction somewhat similar to the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court and which power enables the Court to condone the delay and
thereafter to exercise its revisional jurisdiction.
9.6 Now the revisional jurisdiction is to evaluate the correctness,
propriety and legality of the order passed by the Court subordinate to the
Court of Sessions/ Hon’ble High Court. This power to my mind otherwise
also cannot be negated/truncated by the law of limitation except in the facts
that when with the passage of time further proceedings have taken place in
the subject case/proceedings have taken place whose reversal is not easy or
otherwise cumbersome. To put it simply the clock should not be turned
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back. In the case in hand the same is not the situation as the case is still at the
stage of appearance as such there is no difficulty insofar as checking the
correctness/legality and propriety of the impugned order. The delay does
not in any manner prohibit the dealing/adjudication of the revision petition
on merits.
9.7 As such the application seeking condonation of delay is allowed.
10. Coming to the specific/main arguments raised by either side
touching the merits of the case. I have extracted the impugned order dated
07.08.2023. If I just look at the recent judgment passed in Jm Laboratories
v/s State of Andhra Pradesh reported in Indiankanoon.org/doc/1970 86421
wherein nearly identical question was before the Hon’ble Apex Court as to
the legality of the summoning order. The Hon’ble Apex Court had observed
as here under :
6. However, we do not find it necessary to consider the
submissions made by the appellants on various grounds
inasmuch as the present appeal is liable to be allowed on the
short ground that the learned Magistrate has issued the
process without assigning any reasons.
7. It will be relevant to refer to the summoning order which
reads thus:
“Whereas your attendance is necessary to give evidence in a
charge Sec.18(a)(i) r/w Sec. 16(i)(a) of Drugs & Cosmetics
Act, 1940 against the accused M/s J.M. Laboratories, Vill.
Bhanat, P.O-Ghtti, Subathu Road, Solan (H.P.). You are
hereby requested to appear in person before the Hon’ble Court
of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kurnool at 10:30 AM on the13/22
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1410th day of August 2023. Given under my hand the seal of the
court this ______ day of July 2023.”
8. In the judgment and order of even date in criminal appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled “INOX Air
Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air Products Private
Limited and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh”, we
have observed thus:
“33. It could be seen from the aforesaid order that except
recording the submissions of the complainant, no reasons are
recorded for issuing the process against the accused persons.
34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and
Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others (1998) 5
SCC 749 (supra):
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two
witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have
the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate
summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his
mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He
has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint
and the evidence both oral and documentary in support
thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to
succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that
the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of
preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The
Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on
record and may even himself put questions to the complainant
and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness
of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”
35. This Court has clearly held that summoning of an accused
in a criminal case is a serious matter. It has been held that the
order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect
that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto. This Court held that the Magistrate is
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required to examine the nature of allegations made in the
complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in
support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for
proceeding against the accused. It has been held that the
Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of
preliminary evidence before summoning the accused.
36. The said law would be consistently following by this
Court in a catena of judgments including in the cases of Sunil
Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC
609, Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and
Others (2015) 12 SCC 420 and Krishna Lal Chawla and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2021) 5 SCC
435.
37. Recently, a Bench of this Court to which one of us (Gavai,
J.) was a Member, in the case of Lalankumar Singh and
Others v. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383
(supra), has observed thus:
“38. The order of issuance of process is not an empty
formality. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to
whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or
not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated
in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no
reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that
there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that
the order need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this
respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in the case
of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation9,
which reads thus:
“51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with
the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking
cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for
proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a
criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a
case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to
whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a
consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint,
examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present,
or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie
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16case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue
process against the accused.
52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of
process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not
to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been
filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate
ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because
he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction.
53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding”
appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is
these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be
formed only after due application of mind that there is
sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and
formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself.
The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein
while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case
against the accused, though the order need not contain
detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if
the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.”
39. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of
Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra).
40. In the present case, leaving aside there being no reasons in
support of the order of the issuance of process, as a matter of
fact, it is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge of
the High Court, that there was no such order passed at all. The
learned Single Judge of the High Court, based on the record,
has presumed that there was an order of issuance of process.
We find that such an approach is unsustainable in law. The
appeal therefore deserves to be allowed.”
9. In the present case also, no reasons even for the namesake
have been assigned by the learned Magistrate. The
summoning order is totally a non-speaking one. We therefore
find that in light of the view taken by us in criminal appeal
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled “INOX Air
Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air Products Private
Limited and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh”, and the
legal position as has been laid down by this Court in a catena
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of judgments including in the cases of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and
Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others1, Sunil
Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation2, Mehmood
Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and
Others3 and Krishna Lal Chawla and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another4, the present appeal deserves to be
allowed.
1 (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1997 INSC 714 2 (2015) 4 SCC 609 :
2015 INSC 18 3 (2015) 12 SCC 420 : 2015 INSC 983 4
(2021) 5 SCC 435 : 2021 INSC 160
10. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The present appeal is allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 4th October
2023 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati
in Criminal Petition No. 5766 of 2023 is quashed and set
aside; and
(iii) The summoning order dated 19th July 2023 passed by the
Trial Court in C.C. No. 1051 of 2023 and the proceedings
arising therefrom are also quashed and set aside.
10.1 The said judgment squarely applies in the given facts and
circumstances as the impugned order is conspicuously silent and does not
take into account the controversy in question and more importantly as to the
existence of the ingredients of the offence for which cognizance/summoning
order is passed.
11. Apart from the aforesaid there are other factors also which to my
mind goes to the root of the controversy and glossed over by the Ld CJM
which ought to have been looked into at the same stage – at the stage of
cognizance/summoning.
11.1 The allegations levelled in the complaint are that some amount
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had come from Unitech to the company of U-Flex of which Ashok
Chaturvedi was the CMD. There is a difference between the criminal
liability of any individual or any person who is the official/director/office
bearer of any corporate entity. The reliance can be made to the judgment of
Sunil Bharti Mittal v/s CBI reported in Indiankanoon.org/doc/159121041 to
the said effect wherein it is observed as here under:
“The Penal Code, 1860 save and except in some matters does
not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a
person. Commission of an offence by raising a legal fiction
or by creating a vicarious liability in terms of the provisions
of a statute must be expressly stated. The Managing Director
or the Directors of the Company, thus, cannot be said to have
committed an offence only because they are holders of
offices. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in
issuing summons without taking into consideration this
aspect of the matter. The Managing Director and the
Directors of the Company should not have been summoned
only because some allegations were made against the
Company.”
11.2 In the aforesaid facts and circumstances it is evident that the
notice U/s 50 of PMLA Act were being issued repeatedly to the company and
were being replied by and in fact the same is the consistent position
throughout that the documents have been given by the company. Thus, it is
not at the first instance that there is a deliberate non compliance of the
notices sent to the company with regard to the production of the documents.
In the event if the summons have been issued to Ashok
Chaturvedi in his personal capacity and duly served personally upon him
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19
then only the question of willful defiance or intentional disobedience would
arise.
Infact in the entire body of the complaint there is no mention of
the notice U/s 50 of PMLA served upon Ashok Chaturvedi personally. The
compliance or the documents etc. were all being filed/ given on behalf of
company to whom the money had been allegedly transferred. Thus, the first
important fact that notice ought to have been served upon the noticee/Ashok
Chaturvedi and thereafter the same not having been replied/complied does
not arise qua revisionist herein. The judgment of Abhishek Banerjee & Anr.
v/s Directorate of Enforcement (supra) was strongly relied upon by the ED.
In my considered opinion para 22 is not applicable for the reason that in the
said case notices were not replied nor any document was produced by the
said accused persons.(Abhishek Banerjee)
12. Relevant to again note herein the reply which has been furnished
by Ashok Chaturvedi before the officer concerned at the time of adjudication
of the show cause notice [SCN]. I am quoting the same as here under :
March 25, 2023
Mr. Chandra Prakash Meena, Assistant Director,
Head Quarter Investigation Unit-II, Gate No.3, B Block,
Enforcement Directorate, Pravarthan Bhawan, APJ Abdul
Kalam Road, New Delhi-110011Sub.: Your Show Cause Notice u/s 63 (3) r/w Section 50 of
PMLA, 2002Dear Sir,
1. Ashok Chaturvedi, CMD of Uflex Limited (hereinafter
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Ashok Chaturvedi v/s Directorate of Enforcement
20“the Company“), hereby respond to the aforementioned
Show Cause Notice dated 22.03.2023 (hereafter “SCN”):
Vide letter dated 05.08.2022, the Company had provided a
detailed reply to all the queries raised by your good self
together will all the supporting documents clearly
establishing that the Company had entered into a bonafide
commercial agreement dated 17.01.2007 with Unitech
Limited for the purposes mentioned thereunder….
That you are well aware that documentary evidence
prevails over oral evidence and in the present case, all the
requisite documentation necessary for your investigation
has been duly and promptly provided to you by the
Company. That no useful purpose is likely to be served by
my personal presence since I have nothing further to add to
what is already in your possession. Further, I have no
personal knowledge about these transactions not having
been involved in the same, and have already shared the
name of the Company personnel who was actually
involved.
In view of the extensive documentation provided by the
Company and its related parties to all your queries
unequivocally establishing the legitimacy of each
transaction and utilization of funds received (in one case,
i.e. with CIG Infrastructure Limited and Unitech Hitech
Private Limited where only investment was made and no
money received and thus outside the pale of any alleged
money laundering) way back in the years 2005 and 2007
and especially in view of my failing health, I hereby request
you to kindly dispense with my personal appearance and
proceed on basis of the extensive documentary evidence
provided by the Company.
Despite my/the Company’s continued cooperation, the
SCN fails to note any of my replies to your Summons(es),
my inability to appear due to my failing health, detailed
response by the Company satisfying all your queries and
having afforded all possible cooperation. The SCN is
posited only on basis of my purported failure to appear
before you without recording any reference to the facts
above vitiates the SCN and is required to be withdrawn
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Ashok Chaturvedi v/s Directorate of Enforcement
21forthwith. No case for such issuance of SCN has been made
out against me since the SCN fails to even refer to the
detailed reasons provided by me for not being able to
appear.
In View of the above, my failing health and related
vulnerabilities, rising covid cases, I request you to provide
me an opportunity to appear before you through video
conferencing and shall remain ever grateful for such
kindness. In view of my continued co-operation, you are
most humbly to take any further steps pursuant to the SCN
and afford me an opportunity to appear before you
virtually.
Sincerely
Ashok Chaturvedi [Emphasiz mine]
13. There is also a reference that the accused wishes to appear
through VC which facet altogether was ignored by the Adjudicating Officer/
C.P.Meena at the time of adjudication of the show cause notice/imposition
of penalty at all. The crux of Section 174 IPC is an intentional omission/
willful disobedience without any reasonable cause.
Worthwhile to note that the documents were already supplied as
notices were directed upon the company and not the revisionist personally.
The company’s official had already replied qua the notices which were being
sent/delivered. There is no personal service upon Ashok Chaturvedi and
most importantly the request for appearing through VC has not at all been
adjudicated upon – neither denied or acceded to.
14. A such in the given set of facts and circumstances the presence of
Authorized Representative of the ED who had filed the complaint on behalf
of the ED ought to have been there on first date of hearing as his examination
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22
was must and would have assisted the Ld. CJM in appreciating the correct
facts – the same have been completely given a go-by or has been completely
effaced by the Ld. CJM in the order dated 07.08.2023.
The order dated 07.08.2023 is not only cryptic but in no manner
takes into account the facts of the case/consider the record of the case in
proper perspective. As such the impugned order is perverse and is liable to
be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
15. In view of the aforesaid discussion in terms of directions passed
by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J m Laboratories v/s State of Andhra
Pradesh (supra) impugned order dated 07.08.2023 and the proceedings
arising therefrom in the case titled as ED v/s Ashok Chaturvedi does not
survive. The same are quashed. Revision petition is allowed in the aforesaid
terms.
16. Ordered accordingly. File be consigned to Record Room. TCR
alongwith copy of the order be sent to the Ld. Trial Court.
Dictated and Pronounced in open Court
on 24.05.2025 (Sumit Dass)
Additional Sessions Judge -05
New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts
New Delhi.
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